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Collingwood’s Understanding of Hume

S. K. WERTZ

What was David Hume’s reception in the British idealistic tradition? In this paper, I shall contribute a short chapter on this question by examining Hume’s place in R. G. Collingwood’s thought.¹ Such an examination has been lacking in the literature, so what follows is a comprehensive study of Collingwood’s use of Hume throughout all of R.G.’s writings. I shall mainly focus on two main, unrelated discussions of Hume: first is the theory of the imagination which primarily occurs in *The Principles of Art*, and second is the set of relations between human nature and human history which is principally found in *The Idea of History*. These sections will be followed by a section on minor discussions and omissions and a conclusion. It is a common misconception that Collingwood (1889–1943) has little to offer Hume scholarship, and I wish to amend that here. Actually, Collingwood has good insights into the nature of the imagination and its role in human understanding, besides instructive thoughts on Hume on human nature and history, even though his discussion of the latter is flawed.

This essay serves both historical and philosophical purposes. It is to sample Hume’s place in early twentieth century British idealism at a time when he began to emerge as an important philosophical figure worthy of careful study. (By “idealism,” I mean the philosophical movement which takes ideas to be an irreducible part of the world and whose program is opposed to both materialism and realism.) So Collingwood’s portrait is historically interesting. But over and above this, it carries significant philosophical amendments,

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criticisms, and suggestions about Hume's thought and the eighteenth century intellectual climate. Collingwood has mostly been studied as a philosopher of history or as an aesthetician, but not in toto from the perspective of one of the historical figures to whom he is deeply indebted. Such a view affords a portrait of Hume that is instructive and rewarding. The comparison of Hume and Collingwood lead us to finer appreciation of both philosophers. Let us first look at Collingwood's positive contribution.

Imagination

Collingwood begins his analysis by declaring his intentions:

I shall...try to show that there are such things, to be with what Hume (whose account of them I shall take as my starting-point) called 'ideas' as distinct from 'impressions'. I shall try to show that there is a special activity of mind correlative to them, and that this is what we generally call imagination, as distinct from sensation on the one hand and intellect on the other. (PA 170–71, emphasis added)

Why would Collingwood start with Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas? Undoubtedly, this means that Collingwood is willing to accept the validity of the distinction and to build on it. Isn't this a strange place for an idealist to begin? Not really. When we look at British philosophy at the turn of this century, we find idealists preoccupied with the distinction,2 so it is not extraordinary to find Collingwood utilizing it to some extent. Like most Oxford students of the time, Collingwood read Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in his undergraduate program. Consequently we find them in the problems he addresses.

"It was Hume who first perceived the [Lockean] problem [of confusing sensation with imagination]," Collingwood attributes, "and tried to solve it by distinguishing ideas from impressions" (PA 200). In detail:

He [Hume] was right when he laid it down that the immediate concern of thought is not with impressions but with ideas; that it is ideas, not impressions, that are associated with one another and thus built up into the fabric of knowledge; and that ideas, though 'derived' from impressions, are not mere relics of them like an after-taste of onions or an after-image of the sun (as Lockeans like Condillac supposed), but something different in kind: different, if not in what he calls their 'nature', in the way in which they are related to the active powers of the mind. But because he was not able, as we have seen [PA; 182ff.], to give a satisfactory account of this difference, we find today that philosophers who attempt to follow him lose sight of his partial but very real achievement; either identifying the idea with a special kind
of impression, like Condillac, or denying the idea altogether, and reducing what Hume called the relations between ideas to relations between the words which we use when we talk about ideas. (PA 201)

So the latter kind of move was made by A. J. Ayer, Collingwood notes, who was “to merge the idea in the word by which we designate it, and thus reduce what Hume calls relations between ideas to relations between words’ (PA 201n). This positivistic move robbed ideas of their ontological status. The relations of ideas, contrary to Ayer, reflect psychological “laws” or propensities; they refer to mental events, like a memory of an impression. Hence, these relations are not semantic or syntactic. “Hume’s ideas,” David Pears reminds us, “are always images.” The ideas are a by-product of the mind, and they have a force and reality of their own.

Modern philosophers, Collingwood argues, fail to distinguish two kinds of mental acts when they talk of sensation: the act of seeing “real” colors, and something altogether different, the act of imagining “imaginary” colors. Collingwood insists:

There must be a form of experience other than sensation, but closely related to it; so closely as to be easily mistaken for it, but different in that the colours, sounds, and so on which in this experience we ‘perceive’ are retained in some way or other before the mind, anticipated, recalled, although these same colours and sounds, in their capacity as sensa, have ceased to be seen and heard. (PA 202)

“This other form of experience,” Collingwood recollects, “is what we ordinarily call imagination” (PA 202), and “its existence was a cardinal point in the philosophy of Hume” (PA 203). Collingwood finishes his discussion of modern philosophers with the following estimation:

It was in order to distinguish it [imagination] from sensation that Hume distinguished ideas from impressions; and it was his great merit to have realized that what modern philosophers miscall relations between sensa (that is, between what he calls impressions) are relations not between impressions but between ideas. The place which Hume’s ideas inhabit is the empty room of Locke, progressively furnished with what ‘the busy and boundless Fancy of man’ provides. And it is imagination, not sensation, to which appeal is made when empiricists appeal to ‘experience’. (PA 203)

Now let us see how Collingwood builds on and modifies the Humean distinction.

Impressions and ideas do not exhaust the perceptions of the mind. How
Are impressions converted into ideas? How do our impressions of sense become ideas of imagination? Collingwood's answer is attention or awareness. Not all impressions become ideas. Why some and not others? "It is necessary that each one of the feelings thus reflected upon" [for example, when we envisage them as arranged in a time-series], he points out, "should be attended to and held before the mind as something with a character of its own; and this converts it into imagination" (PA 223). Collingwood supplies these important qualifications:

Consciousness itself does not do any of these things. It only prepares the ground for them. In itself, it does nothing but attend to some feeling which I have here and now. In attending to a present feeling, it perpetuates that feeling, though at the cost of turning it into something new, no longer sheer or crude feeling (impression) but domesticated feeling or imagination (idea). (PA 223)

But Hume tacitly uses the concept of attention in the Treatise:

The attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind is uneasy; and the spirits being diverted from their natural course, are not govern'd in their movements by the same laws, at least not to the same degree, as when they flow in their usual channel. (T 185)

Collingwood has made explicit that an act of attending is necessary to account for ideas, whereas Hume left it unanalyzed. Hume says that custom and experience make him form certain ideas. How do they compel him? And why does he form certain ideas rather than others? Collingwood's answers to these questions is that which tames or domesticates mere sensation or feeling is the activity of consciousness, and this is a kind of thought. This activity imparts a character of its own as it acts upon things like sensations or feelings. Attention or awareness presents things to consciousness so that they may be acted upon or converted into something different yet numerically the same. (Collingwood's interesting metaphor of taming or domesticating wild or crude sensa appeals to those of us on the range.) This is very much a Kantian critique, but with the unity of experience emphasized, we find portions of Bergson making his way into Collingwood's phenomenology. For instance,

If, while I am thus enjoying one idea, I proceed to summon up another, the new idea is not held alongside the old, as two distinct experiences, between which I can detect relations. The two ideas fuse into one, the new one presenting itself as a peculiar colouring or modification of the old. Thus imagination resembles feeling in this, that its object is never a plurality of terms with relations between them, but a single indivisible unity: a sheer here-and-now. (PA 223)
Before I can say, "This is blue," I must first of all attend to it—the blue object—which means that I must appreciate something, "just as it stands, before I can begin to classify it" (PA 203), with a color word or whatever. The point Collingwood is making here is that attention focuses the object so that things become arranged in a foreground and background, a "conscious" part and an "unconscious" part. "Attention divides, but it does not abstract" (PA 204). Intellect does the abstracting. Collingwood puts scare quotes around conscious and unconscious because the latter is only relatively, and not absolutely, so. That which is unconscious, Collingwood contends, "is not absent from attention; it is removed from its focus, ignored. And obviously we cannot ignore a thing unless we give it a certain degree and a peculiar kind of attention" (PA 205). In other words, "Attention is focused upon one thing to the exclusion of the rest" (PA 207). Almost in response to Hume, Collingwood declares:

The mere fact that something is present to sense does not give it a claim on attention. Even what is most vividly present to sense can do no more than solicit attention; it cannot secure it. Thus, the focus of attention is by no means necessarily identical with the focus of vision. I can fix my eyes in one direction, and my attention upon what lies at a considerable angle away from it. (PA 207)

With the Humean distinction supplemented with the concept of attention, we can turn to Collingwood's criticism of Hume on this score. "The truth is," Collingwood argues, "that Hume does not distinguish the two meanings' [of "impression"]. The core of the argument is worth quoting in full:

An impression, for him [Hume], is distinguished from an idea only by its force or liveliness; but this force may be of two kinds. It may be the brute violence of crude sensation, as yet undominated by thought. Or it may be the solid strength of a sensum firmly placed in its context by the interpretative work of thought. Hume did not recognize the difference; and his failure has been a damnosa hereditas for all subsequent philosophy, at least for those philosophies which stand on the empiricist wing of our tradition. For such philosophies [e.g., A.J. Ayer's] it has become a commonplace that the world we know is somehow constructed out of sense-data, and that our statements about it are in the first instance based upon experience, and subsequently verified by reference to the same; where experience is taken to mean a store or supply of something called sense-data. We saw that in the current use of this and kindred words Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas had been ignored with disastrous results....The word sense-datum or sensum is applied not only to
something given by sensation, in which case it would at once be taken away again; not only to something perpetuated by consciousness or imagination, in which case the only region from which it could be called up would be that of past sensation; but to something constructed inferentially by the work of intellect. If all these three things are habitually confused, part of the blame, unless my reading of him is at fault, must lie with Hume. (PA 214)

The fault lies, however, not with Hume but with Collingwood’s reading of him. In at least two places in the Treatise (T 7-8 and T 275-76), Hume divides impressions into two groups: original and secondary. The former he also calls impressions of sensation which “without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs” (T 275, emphasis added). The latter impressions, Hume describes, “are such as proceed from some of these original ones [i.e., impressions], either immediately, or by the interposition of its idea.” Examples, Hume offers, “[o]f the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.” So secondary or reflective impressions usually have some antecedent perception. (And remember that by “perceptions,” Hume means an activity or process much broader than we ascribe to the term; he declares that “all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination” (T 456), and they—the secondary impressions—also usually develop “by the interposition of...[their] idea(s).”) He then gives this illustration: “A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not derived immediately from any [particular, present] affection or ideas” [but from antecedent perceptions or a combination of them] (T 276). Hence, a fit of the gout “may be,” as Collingwood phrases it, the result of “the solid strength of a sensum firmly placed in its context by the interpretative work of thought” (PA 214). Indeed, this is how we know it is a fit of the gout rather than just stiffness or soreness. One knows or recognizes “the antecedent train [or combination] of perceptions” as gout rather than something else. Obviously, this means for Hume that the perception “proceed(s) by the interposition of its idea.” (In other words, I recognize these perceptions as symptoms, which means that I place them within an interpretive context.) Be that as it may, Collingwood’s point about interpretation and inference is a good one, and one that anticipates David Pears’s recent criticism of Hume’s distinction.

Again, Pears appreciates that Hume’s ideas are sometimes, “but not always, concepts.” And given that Hume’s ideas are images, the latter cannot fix the range of their own application as concepts. “For you might get such an image before you acquired the ability to recognize it, or anything else, as blue,” Pears speculates. “That shows up,” he argues, “the difference between getting
an image of a sensory quality and possessing the concept of it."7 "The so-called sense-datum [our immediate awareness of a thing], whenever we analyze it,' Collingwood concludes, "proves to contain exactly what by calling it a sense-datum we deny that it contains: namely 'interpretation,' or in other words, thought" (ST 72). This is to say that "this is blue" is an idea or image which rests upon interpretation or mediation, according to Collingwood (ST 74). So both Pears and Collingwood make the same Kantian point about images that become bearers of meaning through their own application as concepts.

Feeling, for Collingwood (PA 213), has three stages in its life. First there is bare or mere feeling which is below the level of consciousness; next is feeling of which we have become aware or conscious; and last, and this is also Pears' point, is feeling in relation to others and this is the work of the intellect. This last stage involves "interpretation" for Collingwood and "application" for Pears and leads the latter to propose that: "Perhaps what he [Hume] needs to do now is to add a third way in which an idea may be derived from impressions. He can allow an idea to be derived, as it were, laterally from other ideas in the group to which it belongs."8 The "lateral" move Collingwood describes as inference (see the lengthy quote above).

Related to the above exposition is a point Collingwood makes regarding the role of emotion in sensing and thinking. He makes no mention of Hume in his discussion (PA 162–64), but it clearly reflects Hume's general maxim of Books II and III of the Treatise. Hume boldly asserts "no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" (T 373). Collingwood, too, perceives an intimate connection: "every sensum has its own emotion, charge" (PA 162); and, in finding reason impotent or ineffectual with emotions or feeling, he suggests "[f]eeling appears to arise in us independently of all thinking, in a part of our nature which exists and functions below the level of thought and is unaffected by it" (PA 163).9 Collingwood clarifies what he means by calling it (i.e., feeling) "below":

I do not mean that it is relatively unimportant in the economy of human life, or that it constitutes a part of our being which we are entitled to despise or belittle. I mean that it has (if I am right in my opinion about it) the character of a foundation upon which the rational part of our nature is built; laid and consolidated, both in the history of living organisms at large and in the history of each human individual, before the superstructure of thought was built upon it, and enabling that superstructure to function well by being itself in a healthy condition. (PA 163–64)
So one of Hume's major premises in regard to the relation (or the lack thereof) among the passions, morals, and reason is prominent in Collingwood's theory of the imagination. Sensations or impressions and ideas or thoughts are "riddled through and through with traces of" (ST 65) emotion; however, impressions are "not purely sensuous but irrevocably tainted with intelligibility," but emotions are not so tainted. This is a non-cognitive theory of emotion. The cognitive theory advocates, like the Stoics and more recently Robert Solomon, argue that emotions are judgments, and consequently they, too, are tainted. Keeping this issue in mind, let us now turn to our second topic, the relations between human history and human nature.

Human Nature and History

How did Collingwood conceive of Hume's understanding of the relationship between human nature and history? Previous discussions of this question or topic have been limited just to The Idea of History. In this section I add other important works of Collingwood that supplement other ideas and interpretations to those of The Idea of History. In the only reference to Hume in An Autobiography, Collingwood puts it this way:

...history was still in the chrysalis stage in the eighteenth century, that eighteenth-century thinkers, when they saw the need for a science of human affairs, could not identify it with history but tried to realize it in the shape of a 'science of human nature'; which, as men like Hume conceived it, with its strictly empirical methods, was in effect an historical study of the contemporary European mind, falsified by the assumption that human minds had everywhere and at all times worked like those of eighteenth-century Europeans. (AA 115–16)

Collingwood views Hume primarily as non-historical and even as anti-historical in methodological outlook. Hume scholarship of the past twenty years has shown this view to be fundamentally mistaken. Collingwood interprets Hume's method as "strictly empirical," which demonstrates that he had not looked beyond Book I of the Treatise, but more of this criticism in the conclusion.

Collingwood's interpretations of Hume stem from the Treatise, but he clearly was acquainted with Hume's History of England in order to make remarks like this: "Hume, in his historical work, and his slightly older contemporary Voltaire stand at the head of a new school of historical thought" (CH 76). What is this school of historical thought? Collingwood supplies us with an answer in An Essay on Metaphysics:
The ‘illuminism’ [a new and important school of historical thought that took little interest in the remoter past] of which Voltaire was the apostle was not the only determining influence in the formation of Kant’s mind, but it was one of them, and as regards history the most important. (EM 246–47)

Nevertheless, Collingwood adds elsewhere the judgment that: “Critical history is the child of the eighteenth century. It began in the hands of men like Vico and Hume, Gibbon and Lessing, and Herder and Niebuhr, and ripened into the nineteenth century when history stood forth the unmistakable queer of the sciences...” (SM 53).

Again, this is the only reference to Hume in that work (Speculum Mentis) but nonetheless another interesting one since Collingwood pairs Hume with Vico—something recently done by Leon Pampa in Human Nature and Historical Knowledge. In The Idea of History, Collingwood presents the two together under the heading of Anti-Cartesianism. Collingwood portrays Hume as a thinker who (in the Treatise) “...had reflected on the problems of historical thought had decided that the Cartesian objections to it were invalid, and had arrived at a philosophical system which in his own opinion rebutted those objections and placed history on a footing at least as sound as that of any other science” (IH 75). He then adds the following estimation of Hume:

I would not go so far as to call his entire philosophy a reasoned defence of historical thought, but that was undoubtedly one of the things which it implicitly undertook; and it seems to me that when he had finished his philosophical work and asked himself what he had accomplished in it, he could have said with justice that one thing at any rate was the demonstration that history was a legitimate and valid type of knowledge, more legitimate in fact than most others because not promising more than it could perform and not depending on any questionable metaphysical hypotheses. (IH 75)

But at this promising juncture, Collingwood claims that Hume was “...barred like them [the men of the Enlightenment] from scientific history by a substantialistic view of human nature which was really quite inconsistent with his philosophical principles” (IH 76). Where did Collingwood get the idea that Hume held a substantialistic view of human nature?

Collingwood’s argument runs like this. Hume’s dismissal of spiritual substance amounts to adhering to the principle that “we must never separate what a mind is from what it does” (IH 83). “A mind’s nature,” Collingwood rightfully attributes to Hume, “is nothing but the ways in which it thinks and acts” (IH 83). As Alfred North Whitehead estimates: “...credit must be given to Hume that he emphasized the ‘process’ inherent in the fact of being a mind.”12 However, Collingwood makes an erroneous move when he claims
that this concept of mental process becomes Hume's concept of mental substance, because human nature is "ready-made and unchanging from [its] beginning" (IH 83), or human nature remains "eternally unaltered" (IH 82). In other words, substance becomes substituted for process, and this is a dubious substitution. Earlier Collingwood says that the history of mankind "assumed that human nature had existed ever since the creation of the world exactly as it existed among themselves" [the eighteenth century historians] (IH 82). Two problems cast doubt on this premise in Collingwood's argument: one historical and the other philosophical.

The historical problem is telling. As Livingston points out, Hume did not narrate pre-sixteenth-century British history because he thought it was barbarous and unsuitable for a civilized age. Human nature was unchecked; Hume foresaw no moral causes to barbarian behavior. The process of the barbarian mind is not the same as that of the cultivated mind for Hume. Caprice, cruelty, and violence dominate the former (see the opening of The History of England), so Collingwood should not equate the two processes in such a way as to get a substantialistic interpretation out of human nature.

The barbarians, for Hume, are peoples who lack any virtues for the most part. But in his narration of the Saxons, Hume makes it clear that the reason their history is worth narrating is because of their virtues:

Of all the barbarous nations, known either in ancient or modern times, the Germans seem to have been the most distinguished both by their manners and political institutions, and to have carried to the highest pitch the virtues of valour and love of liberty; the only virtues which can have place among an uncivilized people, where justice and humanity are commonly neglected.

One of the functions of history is to strengthen virtue, according to Hume. So his argument runs like this: if history is to strengthen virtue and the barbarians are peoples without virtues, then they have no history worthy of recording, assuming that the annals and literary remains are accurate and truthful (which Hume did not; see, for example, the History, I, 4).

Hume did not think of human nature as "eternally unaltered" (IH 82), because, according to him, it was considerably altered by the transition from the barbarous age to the civilized age. Human nature was not the same prior to the sixteenth century as it was after that pivotal period. Hume did not assume "that human nature had existed ever since the creation of the world" (IH 82); if he had, he would have thought that historians (like himself) have the ability to sympathize with the moral causes (if there were any!) behind barbarous actions. The beginning of the story of an enlightened community (like England) began, for Hume, with the sixteenth century. Consequently, human nature, as Hume conceived of it, especially in the History and Book II of the
Treatise, is historically constituted, just like its expressions in traditions and institutions. Another place where Hume makes this abundantly clear is in the essay “Of the Study of History,” where he conjectures:

In reality, what more agreeable entertainment to the mind, than to be transported into the remotest ages of the world and to observe human society, in its infancy, making the first faint essays towards the arts and sciences: To see the policy of government, and the civility of conversation refining by degrees, and every thing which is ornamental to human life advancing towards its perfection. (“Of the Study of History,” 565–66; emphasis added)

Hence, Hume did conceive of human society (and human nature, since society is a public expression of that nature) historically, and there is a linear progression from its beginnings to Hume's own time. The continuity in human nature among the English people of the past and present, Hume thought, was not there prior to the sixteenth century. The early English peoples and their ruthless situations “...exerted to the utmost their native ferocity” (History I 13). Hume's compatriots lacked ferocity. No doubt Hume is wrong about some of this, but what matters here is that my interpretation of this account casts doubt on Collingwood's premise.

Nonetheless, Collingwood is generally correct in his assessment of Hume's historiography. In An Essay on Metaphysics, Collingwood writes:

One of Voltaire's own declared principles in historiography was that only the recent past was knowable. Hume, the second great 'illuminist' historian, thought it worth while to begin his History of England with an account of distant times; but this was so perfunctory and superficial that in effect it proclaimed his agreement with Voltaire. (EM 247)

And Collingwood conditionally adds that “Hume taught his readers more by example than precept that in England serious history began with the Tudors” (EM 247). Evidently, Hume's moral history did not set well with Collingwood's notion of scientific history, especially since Collingwood was an accomplished archaeologist and historian of Roman Britain.16 Ironically, Collingwood changes one of Hume's famous quotes to a principle of scientific history which he would then use to dismiss most of Hume's writings on history:

“If we take in our hand any such volume”—I adapt another saying of Hume’s—“let us ask, does it contain, I will not say evidence that its author is well read in metaphysical literature, but evidence that he has thought historically about what he has read?—No.—Commit it
then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.” (EM 236)

Livingston accuses Collingwood of failing to think historically or re-enact properly Hume’s own thoughts which were close to his own. We must concede that Collingwood is right on Hume’s historiographical illuminism, but its weakness does not stem from the argument concerning human nature; rather it is the moral and literary point of view that compromises his illuminism. Later (1773), Hume reviewed Robert Henry’s History of Great Britain and changed some of his ideas about the remote past.

The philosophical problem which casts further doubt on the argument is that Collingwood portrays human nature in Hume as merely an expression of impressions, ideas, and dispositions. But as John Burke observes, “[t]he distinction between the past as it was and the past as it appears to have been led Hume to introduce a new criterion into his account of English history—the situation, a notion not unlike that of the Zeitgeist favored by later historians.”

Charles I’s actions which “led to disastrous results both for himself and for England,...[were] due, not to any wickedness on [King] Charles’ part, but to the situation.” Burke’s point is that Hume’s uniformity of human nature is balanced by the situation in which individuals find themselves. Their circumstances led to different expressions of emotions and dispositions; consequently, human nature does change from person to person, period to period. The difference was so great, Hume thought, between the barbarous age and the civilized age that the cultivated historian cannot understand the actions which flow from barbarous human nature. The barbarous age did not produce adequate evidence to tell its story; nor is the story worth telling, Livingston notes.

In an overworked passage from the first Enquiry, Hume speaks of the “great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations” (EHU 83). After all he says about the constant and universal principles of human nature, he forcefully writes:

We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions...This affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures [and periods]. (EHU 85–86)
This passage exhibits, among other things, an idea of genuine change in human nature. Laws, government, social customs and conventions, and manners have a causal impact on the laws of human nature. The former subtly affects the latter. That part of our nature which facilitates such changes is the imagination. Book III of the *Treatise*, “Of Morals,” provides clues as to how artificial institutions have an impact on human nature. The laws of human nature are shaped by civil practices. The causal agency of such shaping is the imagination. The “higher” moral virtues, like the greatness of mind, are much of the civil mind for Hume, and they take an educated imagination and sympathy for them to be realized.

Hume declared that “[a]ll causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity” (T 86). And, “[t]he most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation” (T 88, emphasis added). Again, Hume uses the situation as a means to balance his emphasis upon the uniformity of human nature. “Historical thought,” Collingwood contends in a similar fashion, “studies mind as acting in certain determinate ways in certain determinate situations” (IH 221). He believes “the work which was done by the science of human nature is actually done, and can only be done by history” (NH 102); this is also seen by Hume, especially in the first *Enquiry* as the important function of history: “Its [history’s] chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature” (EHU 83). And in the *Treatise*, he concludes: “We must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgment, as a check or control on our first judgment or belief; and [w]e must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances, wherein our understanding has deceived us, compared with those, wherein its testimony was just and true” (T 180, emphasis added). So human reasoning, for Hume, is essentially historical in character. But Hume’s understanding of these principles and “the ‘science of human nature,’” Collingwood explains, “broke down because its method was distorted by the analogy of the natural sciences” (NH 101). Elsewhere he claims that “[e]ven Hume, for all his scepticism, was thoroughly convinced as any of his contemporaries that the Newtonian physics was valid” (EM 234). I am not sure about this; in the essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” Hume apparently thought that the jury was still out on Newton’s theory: “...if it can overcome the obstacles which it meets at present [1741] in all parts of Europe, [then] it will probably go down triumphant to the latest posterity” (“Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” 121–122, emphases added).

In his unpublished manuscripts Collingwood has one important criticism that seems to be aimed at Hume’s theory of history although he does not mention him by name. It is that past feelings or emotions as such cannot be re-enacted by the historian. Hume evidently thought so and used emotional enactment as a premise in his argument for his claim that history strengthens
...in this connection to Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas, the first ones being livelier and more vivid than the second, Collingwood asserts: ‘We may, and must, recognise that the historian is unable to share the emotional heat with which the characters in his narrative did the things narrated of them, and that his emotional heat attaches only to feats of historical research, historical discoveries made and historical perplexities removed.’ It is with reference to this assertion that Collingwood then makes the distinction between the different contexts of the thoughts in the past and the ones re-thought in the present.  

Collingwood’s only reason for this claim is that “[s]surely everybody knows that the peculiar thrill with which the victorious commander [for example] watches the collapse of an enemy’s defence is a thrill which the historian cannot recapture.” But Hume thought not only that historians can recapture “the emotional heat,” but that it is one of the historian’s central tasks once the research is done and the writing of the narrative begins. Collingwood’s reason is question-begging. Hume’s theory of history is in need of more careful examination and should not be dismissed in such a cavalier fashion. In the second Enquiry (EPM 221–222), Hume anticipated Leo Tolstoy’s “infectiousness” of art, and in fact Hume may have influenced Tolstoy in this regard.

Minor Discussions and Omissions

Sometimes Hume is absent from sections or chapters of Collingwood where one would expect to find him: for example, Chapter VII (on philosophy) in Speculum Mentis, and Chapters III and IV (Parts III and II, respectively on miracle and evil) in Religion and Philosophy. Collingwood considered Religion and Philosophy “juvenile”: “It had been written some years earlier [1916], in order to tidy up and put behind me a number of thoughts arising out of my juvenile studies in theology...” (AA 43). His interest in Hume grew with age, so it is mainly in his later works that we find him wrestling with Hume’s problems and solutions. This was not uncommon for philosophers in England during this time—Norman Kemp Smith was an exception.

Hume appears only in passing at the end of An Essay on Philosophical Method where Collingwood concludes that:

This double procedure [asking ‘what follows from our premises?’ and ‘What do we find in actual experience?’], whose reasons could not be set forth until the eighth chapter, is the only one that can be either adopted or defended by any philosopher who has realized the
deadliness of Hume's attack on what Kant was to call the dialectic of pure reason....[F]or myself, though I could never plead guilty to a charge of scepticism, I am too diffident of my own reasoning powers to believe that I can neglect Hume's warning; and I know of no way in which I can travel in the wilds of philosophical thought except by this double method: compass and dead-reckoning, and the finding of my daily position by the stars. (PM 223)

In *The Idea of Nature*, we find only two references to Hume, and in a book on that subject one would expect to find a discussion of the design argument especially in discussions concerning the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Chapter One, Part II) and the eighteenth century (Chapter Two, Part II). But Collingwood does pose the Berkeleyan problem of nature:

How can mind have any connexion with something utterly alien to itself, something essentially mechanical and non-mental, namely nature? This was the question, at bottom the only question, concerning nature which exercised the great philosophers of mind. Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel. (IN 7)

All these thinkers—with the exception of Hume—are singled out for individual discussion. Almost as an addendum in the section on Kant Collingwood remarks:

It might be that Kant was so much under the influence of the metaphysical scepticism of writers like Voltaire and Hume that he really doubted whether there could be a philosophical theory of the thing in itself, although the logic of his own position implied the possibility of such a theory. (IN 119)

So Hume doesn't really fit into this topic at all for Collingwood. Does Hume make a contribution to the concept of nature? I think he does by his critique of the design argument, especially in the *Dialogues*, which is conspicuously absent from Collingwood's corpus.

In the curious Hobbesian book, *The New Leviathan*, Collingwood has only one reference to Hume and it is anecdotal in character:

We, who know this [the non-social community], are inclined to pat him [Rousseau] consolingly on the back like his friend David Hume on a famous occasion [Philosophical Works of David Hume, 4 vols., Edinburgh, 1826; vol.i, p. lxxxiii] and murmur: 'My dear sir! my dear sir!' (NL 269)
There are no references at all in Collingwood's shorter political work, *The Three Laws of Politics* (1941), so Hume's political thought has no place in Collingwood's socio-political philosophy. (Of course, this was not Collingwood's major concern or contribution to philosophy, even though *The New Leviathan* was his most popular book during his lifetime.)

Collingwood takes Hume head-on in answering his famous question:

From what impression, as Hume pertinently asks, is this idea [the idea of power or compulsion or constraint] derived? I answer, from impressions received in our social life, in the practical relations of man to man; specifically, from the impression of 'compelling' or 'causing' some other man to do something when, by argument or command or threat or the like, we place him in a situation in which he can only carry out his intentions by doing that thing; and conversely, from the impression of being compelled or caused to do something. (IC 95; EM 309)

Notice the reference to situation here.) Collingwood insists that the idea of causation is shot through with what Hume referred to as internal impressions and that if we eliminate the metaphorical language about causation, "you are left with a vocabulary in which all that is said [literally] is that we find certain means useful to certain ends" (IC 96). Collingwood laments, "This, I take it, is what modern physics has done...it has eliminated the notion of cause altogether" (IC 106). Collingwood defends the notion of agent or mental causation and the Kantian law that every event is necessitated by what has gone before (IC 110).

Collingwood takes the idea of cause of an event in nature to be relative to human action; what he means by this is "that which causes is something under human control, and this control serves as means whereby human beings can control that which is caused" (EM 296). So we don't observe causes, we manipulate them. Causes are relative to what people are able to do (by producing or preventing) to their [the causes'] conditions. Because of this stance on causation, Collingwood concludes:

When Hume tried to explain how the mere act of spectation could in time generate the idea of a cause, where 'cause' meant the cause of empirical science, that is, the cause in sense II, he was trying to explain how something happens which in fact does not happen. (EM 307)

In other words, "[i]n sense II of the word 'cause' only a person who is concerned with producing or preventing a certain kind of event can form an opinion about its cause" (EM 307).
Collingwood offers a critique of the empiricist answer to the causal question: “necessitation means observed uniformity of conjunction” (EM 318) as opposed to the rationalist answer which takes necessitation to be implication (EM 316). Both Hume and Mill, according to Collingwood, leave necessitation undefined. In place of it is the observed uniformity of conjunction: “In fact the question (so urgent, e.g., for Hume and Mill) how we proceed from the mere experience of conjunction to the assertion of causal connexion resolves itself into the question how we pass from the first of these to the second” (EM 318). Later Collingwood says, “Hume’s discussion is wholly based on the presupposition that a cause and its effect are two ‘objects’, constantly conjoined by way of temporal succession” (EM 331). This is true only of sense II or the practical scientific (Humean) conception of cause. But in theoretical scientific conception of cause, it turns out to be that the connections are nonrelative (one to one) and “tight” (EM 314): “There can be no relativity of causes, and no diversity of effects due to fulfilment or nonfulfilment of conditions” (EM 313). Causes are simultaneous with their effects (EM 315). Since Einstein, no events have causes and the notion of cause has disappeared from modern physics, replaced by the concept of laws (EM 50–51). Causation pertains to internal impressions rather than external ones. Hume and Collingwood agree on this point as we have witnessed above. In his discussion of causation in theoretical natural science, Collingwood is again guided by the Humean question:

We found the idea of compulsion present in sense II of the word ‘cause’. From what impression, we then asked, is this idea derived? We now find it present in sense III, and we must ask the same question, and answer it in the same way. The idea of compulsion, as applied to events in nature, is derived from our experience of occasions on which we have compelled others to act in certain ways by placing them in situations (or calling their attention to the fact that they are in situations) of such a kind that only by so acting can they realize the intentions we know or rightly assume them to entertain: and conversely, occasions in which we have ourselves been thus compelled. Compulsion is an idea derived from our social experience, and applied in what is called a ‘metaphorical’ way not only to our relations with things in nature (sense II of the word ‘cause’) but also to the relations which these things have among themselves (sense III). Causal propositions in sense III are descriptions of relations between natural events in anthropomorphic terms. (EM 322)

In the end, Beauchamp and Rosenberg say, “This unexpected defense of Hume seems to us essentially correct.”31

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One other statement on causation in Collingwood's *An Essay on Metaphysics* is worth noting because of its connection with Newton:

It [the supposition that every event has a cause] is not in Hume, who is clearly following Newton when he says: 'tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, — must have a cause of existence', and asks 'for what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning should also have a cause' (*Treatise*, part iii, sec. iii *ad init.*, sec. ii *ad fin.*; *Works*, Edinburgh, 1826, vol. i, pp. 110, 109; I have italicized the words that emphasize Hume's agreement with Newton at the point in which Kant differs from him). (EM 329–30)

Another figure Collingwood links to Hume is George Berkeley:

It [Berkeley's famous onslaught upon "abstract general ideas"] is all implied in what Hume said when he endorsed Berkeley's attack as "one of the most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters." (EM 15)

Collingwood refers again to "the republic of letters" in *An Essay on Metaphysics*: "The most 'valuable discovery' that has been made since Kant's time in what Hume called 'the republic of letters' has been the discovery of a scientific technique in history" (EM 235).

Lastly, some thinkers in the nineteenth century, Collingwood reports, describe the eighteenth century, as "a Humian age of reason as the slave of the passions" (EM 112). Collingwood seems to agree:

Psychology cannot be a science of thought, because the methods it has developed in its history as a science of feeling preclude it from dealing with the problems of criteriology. (EM 119)

In other words, psychology cannot adequately deal with meaning, truth, and error.

Conclusion

In *An Autobiography*, Collingwood mentions Plato, Bacon, Descartes, and Kant, all of whom had an impact on his early (and late) philosophical career. Why isn't Hume a more central figure in Collingwood's philosophy? Part of my answer lies in how he conceived of Hume's understanding of the relationship between human nature and history. If he had read Hume differently, and more sympathetically, Hume would have figured more dominantly in his philosophy. But this is a truism. Collingwood's major interest is history and if he had looked beyond Books I and II of the *Treatise* and the *Enquiries* to
Book III of the *Treatise*, the *History*, and the *Essays*, he would have formed a different conception of human nature. His substantialistic interpretation of Hume on human nature led to a lack of interest in Hume's conception of history especially as it is portrayed in the *History*. Before the Hume scholarship on this topic in the early seventies (see note 11) which exhibited a dynamic historically constituted human nature, Lionel Rubinoff wrote the following—then standard—interpretation that agreed with Collingwood's basic assessment:

> Even Hume, who declared war on the concept of human nature as something solid and permanent, was nevertheless implicitly presupposing it. For in attacking the idea of spiritual substance he *simply* substituted the idea of constant tendencies to associate ideas in particular ways, and, writes Collingwood, “the laws of association are just as uniform and unchanging as any substance.” (IH 83)

Nothing is ever *that simple* in Hume's thought! This analogy between laws and substance should have led both Collingwood and Rubinoff to question their interpretation. It even led Collingwood to think that the “conception was self-contradictory” (IH 83) because “the historical development of the science of human nature entails an historical development in human nature itself” (IH 84). Hume would have surely detected a self-contradiction that evident and major. As we have seen, a sense of genuine historical development is in Hume's thought, especially in the *History* and the *Essays* where he talks of the move of the barbarous to the non-barbarous or civil mind. How is that possible if not by historical development? He didn't have the concept of evolution available, so history seemed the only option, if he had a genuine sense of development, which I think he had. Thus human nature, for Hume, is variable. He certainly did not look forward to some Utopia (IH 84–85)—his concept of progress is not one without its set-backs and declines.33 British character came into existence historically in the sixteenth century for Hume and it certainly was not the same prior to that time. If it had been, Hume would have narrated it, and the opening of the *History* would have been appreciatively different.

Another point which reinforces this interpretation of human nature as historically dynamic comes from Hume's statement of the problem of induction in the first *Enquiry*:

> that the course of nature may change....Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. (EHU 37–38)
If Hume held this of nature in general, he would have seen its application to human nature too.

Besides the History (see also IH 78), Collingwood used Hume's question of Caesar's death (T I 3 iv) for his discussion of the nature of historical data (IH 74). Collingwood reads this famous passage as if the historian's data are given to him or her by direct perception. But this is only half the story. In commenting on the testimony of historians, Hume sets up two alternative ways in which we “arrive” at the event or know what happened:

Here are certain characters and letters present either to our memory or senses; which characters we likewise remember to have been used as signs of certain ideas; and these ideas were either in the minds of such as were immediately present at that action, and received the ideas directly from its existence, or they were derived from the testimony of others, and that again from another testimony, by a visible gradation, till we arrive at those who were eye-witnesses and spectators of the event. (T 83, emphases added)

Collingwood elected to portray Hume along the lines of the second disjunct or the testimony alternative which Hume gives. But what about the first disjunct in italics? “Characters...used as signs of certain ideas” sounds very similar to Collingwood's reenactment of past actions. The critical historian, for him, relives the thoughts and purposes of those whom he or she studies (see IH Part V, 205ff). As Collingwood accounts:

The peculiarity which makes it historical is not the fact of its happening in time, but the fact of its becoming known to us by our re-thinking the same thought which created the situation we are investigating, and thus coming to understand that situation. (IH 218)

Hume holds that this “re-thinking” is done by sympathy. He explains:

When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections [over time], which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho' they may the person himself, who makes them. (T 317)
And again from Book II of the *Treatise*:

Our affections depend more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of them. This is the nature and cause of sympathy; and 'tis after this; and 'tis after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them. (T 319)

So when we look beyond Book I of the *Treatise*, we find other principles, like sympathy as a process of communication, of historical knowing. Livingston and James Farr align sympathy with *Verstehen* theories of the nineteenth century. Hume's "*Verstehen*" is a kind of sympathy which historians use, "but [they] are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation; which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves" (T 332). Together with presentation and sympathy, Hume has a basis for how the past is experientially known. This account is admittedly flawed and has the same kind of limitations as *Verstehen* theories—perhaps including those problems of Collingwood's theory of re-enactment. My point here, though, is that had Collingwood consulted Books II and III of the *Treatise* he would have perhaps seen that Hume does not fit the mold of eighteenth century historians and philosophers which he cast for them. In other words, had Collingwood detected a connection between the topics of the imagination and human nature and history, he would have likely conceived of the latter more positively and sympathetically.

Looking beyond the theory of history, another major preoccupation of Collingwood is Immanuel Kant. Kant dominates the pages of most of Collingwood's corpus. Since Kant's philosophical education is derived from Leibniz and Hume (EM 329), a thorough understanding of both is required. Collingwood frequently spoke of Kant by way of Hume:

Kant's third set of principles [the analogies of experience] are based on the idea of necessary connexion: not necessary connexions between 'ideas', to quote Hume's distinction, such as are found in the realms of logic and mathematics, but necessary connexions between 'matters of fact', necessary connexions between perceptible things such as go to make up the world of nature. (EM 262)

Hume is basically there because of Kant; Collingwood's projects are Kantian with the two exceptions of the discussions of the imagination and human nature and history.

In their analysis of the problem of causation, Beauchamp and Rosenberg call Collingwood "a probing critic of Hume," and generally think that his criticism stands. In speaking of the masters of British historiography,
Nicholas Phillipson muses about the trio: "Nor has any other historian been guided by a philosophy which is as nuanced and profound as Hume's; here Marx and Collingwood are surely his only rivals." But no discussion follows of Collingwood on Hume.

By now it should be abundantly clear that Collingwood is a challenging critic of Hume. Hume has an important role to play in the development of Collingwood's arguments and analyses. Consequently, Hume plays a significant role in British idealism, and this is testimony to Hume's enduring value and contribution to philosophy—even where one least expects to find it. But Collingwood's work on Hume also performed another service. Stuart Hampshire remarks, "T. H. Green's Introduction to the Treatise had for several generations counted as a final demolition of this [Hume's] scepticism. Suddenly, in the late 1930s, all this, at least in England, changed." Who were the principals? Collingwood was one of them for sure.

NOTES
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the 19th International Hume Conference, University of Nantes, Nantes, France, July 1992. I thank my commentator, Henry C. Clark; Richard Dees, Kenneth Merrill, and David Raynor; and the Program Committee for their constructive suggestions. An even shorter version was presented in a seminar at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany, July 1992, and Hans Lenk's comments were particularly helpful. Also, the editors and referees of Hume Studies gave very useful advice in revising the paper. What errors remain are my own.

1 The writings of R.G. Collingwood are cited parenthetically in the text, abbreviated as follows:


By impressions and ideas I intend simply to discuss the view of experience which has been made familiar by the philosophy of Hume. It is sometimes described as psychological idealism. It is not Hume's philosophy, but the ground of his philosophy. Impressions and ideas as a description of experience was not a theory of experience that he invented, but was simply accepted by him as undeniable fact, the analysandum of philosophy.

(115)

Carr thinks that Hume's description of experience “drives us into idealism, or at least leaves us only two alternatives, idealism and scepticism” (124). Carr finds idealism unacceptable, and consequently embraces scepticism.


4 David Pears, Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of His Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16. I have used this work as a contemporary backdrop for interpreting Hume alongside Collingwood's Principles.

5 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). In his discussion of "Whether in Sensation The Mind is Active or Passive?" (Chapter II, Section X) of An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1739/1764), Thomas Reid foresees the necessity for the activity of attention in an adequate account of the mind:

...in proportion as the attention is more or less turned to a sensation or diverted from it, that sensation is more or less perceived and remembered. Every one knows that very intense pain may be diverted by a surprise, or by anything, that entirely occupies the mind. (Ronald E. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer, eds., Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983], 30)

Collingwood (IH 206) read Reid's Inquiry so it is probable that Collingwood was influenced by Reid on this point.

6 Pears, 16.
7 Pears, 17.
8 Pears, 25.
9 For Hume's discussion of the relations between reason and the passions (and morals), consult the Treatise, Books II and III, especially 413f, 415f, 457ff.


His [Hume's] analysis of that process is faulty in its details. It was bound to be so; because, with Locke, he misconceived his problem to be the analysis of mental operations. He should have conceived it as the analysis of operations constituent of actual entities. He would then have found mental operations in their proper place. Kant followed Hume in this misconception; and was thus led to balance the world upon thought—oblivious to the scanty supply of thinking. But Hume, Kant, and the philosophy of organism agree that the task of the critical reason is the analysis of constructs; and ‘construction’ is ‘process.’ Hume’s analysis of the construct which constitutes a mental occasion is impressions of sensation, ideas of impressions of sensation, impressions of reflection, ideas of impression of reflection. This analysis may be found obscurely in Locke. But Hume exhibits it as an orderly process; and then endeavors—and fails—to express in terms of it our ordinary beliefs, in which he shares.


David Hume, “Of the Study of History,” in *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary*, edited by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty/Classics, 1987), 565. In Hume’s words, “The advantages found in history seem to be of three kinds, as it amuses the fancy, as it improves the understanding, and as it strengthens virtue.”

From 1921 to 1935, Collingwood held two lecture posts at Oxford, one in philosophy and another in Roman History. He published a series of pamphlets and books on the history and archaeology of Roman Britain from 1923 to 1936. Obviously, Hume’s brief account of England’s remote past was far from adequate for Collingwood or other specialists on that subject. The nineteenth century brought about that change in historiography, the narratability and historicality of the remote past.


David Hume, “Review of Robert Henry’s *History of Great Britain*” (1773), in *David Hume: Philosophical Historian*, edited by D.F. Norton and R.H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 377–388. Hume says, “When we see those barbarous ages delineated by so able a pen, we admire the oddness of their..."
manners, customs, and opinions, and transported, as it were, into a new world" (378). It was for Hume, and this comment further casts doubt on Collingwood's substantialistic interpretation of human nature in Hume's thought. Hume says, "By this delicate and well fancied method [cf. periodization], the thread of the narration is preserved unbroken, and some degree of unity and order introduced into a portion of the history of Great Britain, which has perplexed the acuteness of our most philosophical and accomplished historians" (379). Hume would have included himself in this group.

20 Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, 236.
22 Pompa agrees:

It appears that the most fundamental difficulties which arise for Hume's account of historical knowledge stem almost entirely from his desire to base it upon principles derived from his science of man, in which the concept of a science is understood in terms of the sort of science appropriate to the natural world. The concept of man as a fixed causal sub-system, operating within a wider causal system and, hence, subject to a system of universal causal laws, would leave no room for knowledge of the existence and development of bodies of belief and systems of practice specific or unique to particular historical societies, if there have been any such systems. (65)

25 Van der Dussen, 8-9.
26 For an attempt to examine Hume's theory of history pertaining to this issue, see S.K. Wertz, "Moral Judgements in History: Hume's Position," presented at the 18th International Hume Conference, University of Oregon, Eugene, August 1991.
28 Even later, Collingwood omitted Hume's discussion of the problem of evil in the midst of discussing the Kantian and the utilitarian conceptions in "What Is the Problem of Evil?" Theology: A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity, 1 (August 1920): 66-74. Why is there the absence of Hume here?
Collingwood is referring to the incident (March 18, 1766) concerning a letter Rousseau wrote to Chenonceaux. Hume became anxious about its contents and there appeared to be a give and take between the two about the letter being posted. E.C. Mossner (whom Collingwood did not read) gives this account in *The Forgotten Hume: Le bon David* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 153–54:

That same evening during and after supper, Hume kept looking at Rousseau, frightening him with stares of unnatural intensity. Rousseau, on his side, tried to return the look but became dizzy and had to lower his eyes. He was swept by a violent emotion, ending in complete remorse. Bursting into tears, he threw himself into the arms of le bon David and cried out: “No, David Hume is not a traitor; that is impossible. If he is not the best of men, he must be the blackest.” Hume neither joined in the weeping nor got angry. Calmly he patted Rousseau on the back, saying over and over, “My dear Sir! What is the trouble, my dear Sir?” This aroused Rousseau all the more because Hume did not demand to know why he was accused of being a traitor.

I: speaks well of the breadth of Collingwood’s reading that he would read biographical accounts of Hume’s life such as this letter, when Hume was not one of the primary textual figures in his arguments—except, of course, for those concerning imagination and history.


32 Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg, *Hume and the Problem of Causation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 184. I have included the topic of causation under the section on minor discussions and omissions because it has been adequately treated by Beauchamp and Rosenberg, not because I think causation is a minor discussion in either Hume or Collingwood.


34 For some analysis of Hume’s idea of progress, see Wertz, “Moral Judgments in History.”

Collingwood's Understanding of Hume


36 Another important reference to Hume on this point that should be noted is in Collingwood's correspondence with Gilbert Ryle (1935) pertaining to the nature of metaphysical propositions. Collingwood writes:

...what, I suppose, I am objecting to...is a question-begging assumption that Hume was right when he divided all possible subjects of discourse into (a) ideas and the relations between them and (b) matters of fact.... (T 4) (Donagan, 261)

37 Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 285, 184, 200.


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