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Thomas Reid and the Glasgow Chair of Moral Philosophy

PAUL WOOD

The University of Glasgow figures prominently in any map we might wish to draw of David Hume’s intellectual landscape, for Hume crossed paths with the incumbents of the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy in various ways during his career as a man of letters. If Hume attended William Law’s optional course on moral philosophy during his student days at Edinburgh, he might well have been introduced to the natural law tradition through Gerschom Carmichael’s highly influential edition of Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis.¹ Later, Hume’s exchanges with the renowned Glasgow moralist Francis Hutcheson in the years 1739 to 1743 sharpened his sense of the contrast between the style of philosophizing he championed in the Treatise and that practised by Hutcheson in the classroom, as well as their deep disagreements in the realm of moral theory.² Hutcheson’s subsequent opposition to Hume’s abortive bid to become the Edinburgh Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1745 underlined their differences, and Hume’s defeat may well have prompted him to cast prudence aside and to launch his sustained public campaign against religion (rational or otherwise) in 1748, with Hutcheson undoubtedly figuring as one of his targets. Moreover, Hume’s delineation of the relations between the “easy and obvious” and the “accurate and abstruse” philosophies which opens the Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding of 1748 can also be read as a belated riposte to Hutcheson’s earlier criticisms of his philosophical style.³

With Hutcheson’s death in 1746, Hume no longer faced such powerful opposition from the Glasgow chair, and it is uncertain whether the new...

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occupant, Thomas Craigie, fully grasped the challenge to Hutcheson's philosophical legacy posed by Hume's system. Craigie's assessment of Hume was probably ambivalent at best, but the election of Adam Smith to the chair of Logic in 1751 and his transfer to the Professorship of Moral Philosophy in 1752 served to raise Hume's stock at the university. As well as being a sympathetic critic of his friend's theory of morals in the classroom, Smith also aired some of Hume's ideas in the meetings of the Glasgow Literary Society and was probably instrumental in Hume's election as a member of that body, which may have been at least some small consolation for the fact that Hume had been passed over as a candidate for the vacant logic chair in succession to Smith. When Smith was replaced by Thomas Reid in 1764, Hume was again faced with a sophisticated critic in the morals chair at Glasgow, although we shall see that contemporaries such as that "bigotted silly Fellow" James Beattie were not entirely mistaken in regarding Hume and Reid as fellow travellers. Hence the Glasgow professorship is central to our understanding of key aspects of Hume's life, insofar as his engagement with successive Glasgow moralists defined some of the most significant intellectual and personal moments of his career.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that the history of the Glasgow moral philosophy chair during the Enlightenment remains largely unwritten. In the nineteenth century, one of the major preoccupations of those who wrote about the Glasgow professors was the question of whether Gerschom Carmichael or Francis Hutcheson founded the Scottish "school" of philosophy, which meant that little attention was paid to the subsequent development of the teaching of moral philosophy within the university. A fragmentary and circumscribed picture also emerges from the major biographies of Hutcheson and Adam Smith which have appeared since John Rae's classic portrait of Smith was published in 1895. While Rae, W. R. Scott, and, more recently, Ian Simpson Ross, provide a wealth of detail about the tenures of Hutcheson and Smith, the genre of biography obviously demands that their primary interest be the life of their respective subjects rather than the history of the Glasgow professorship as such over the longue durée. Our view of the chair has been further skewed by the fact that scholars have hitherto lavished their attention on Hutcheson and Smith, and have largely neglected the pre-history of the chair or its fortunes under Thomas Reid, Archibald Arthur, and James Mylne. Consequently, while we now know a great deal regarding the period 1730 to 1764, we are still ill-informed about the rest of the century.

This essay takes a first step towards a comprehensive history of the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy from its inception in 1727 to the death in 1796 of its longest-serving incumbent during the eighteenth century, Thomas Reid. Rather than concentrate exclusively on the considerable achievements of Hutcheson and Smith, I want to focus on Reid's years as the Glasgow
professor, and to address the following issues. First, how did Reid come to be appointed? Secondly, how did the content and structure of Reid's course of moral philosophy relate to those given by his predecessors? Thirdly, how can we characterize Reid's classroom style, and how successful a teacher was he? Fourthly, what did Reid have to say about Hume in his lectures? Lastly, I hope to show that the answers to these questions tell us much not only about the institutional dynamics of the Glasgow chair and the trajectory of Reid's career, but also about the rise of common sense philosophy in the age of enlightenment.

I

In order to provide a context for my analysis of Reid's Glasgow moral philosophy lectures, let me begin by examining the activities of his predecessors. With the adoption of the professorial system by the University of Glasgow in 1727, the then senior regent, Gerschom Carmichael, chose to become the new Professor of Moral Philosophy. First appointed in 1694, Carmichael gradually established himself as one of the most distinguished members of the faculty through both his teaching and his publications, which included his edition of Pufendorf's *De Officio Hominum et Civis* as well as two other texts on logic and natural theology. Although Carmichael was not the only Scot to incorporate elements of the natural law tradition into his moral philosophy course during the early years of the eighteenth century, his response to Grotius and Pufendorf was perhaps the most sustained of any moralist north of the Tweed, and his interest in their work may have been encouraged by the founding of the Regius Chair of Civil Law at Glasgow in 1713. By the 1720s he had become something of a conservative intellectually, for academic philosophers elsewhere in Scotland at this time were increasingly attracted to Shaftesbury's theory of the moral sense, whereas Carmichael opposed this trend and sought to ground human morality on "the existence, the perfection and the providence of the deity." For him, natural jurisprudence and natural theology constituted the essence of moral philosophy, and his Glasgow lectures on pneumatology and ethics reflected this conviction.

When he died on 25 November 1729, Gerschom Carmichael was a popular, if somewhat controversial, teacher, whose class sizes had swelled during the previous decade thanks to an influx of English Dissenters, and the drawing power of his reputation was graphically illustrated by a dramatic drop in student numbers following his demise. It was thus in the University's best interests to find a Professor who could attract students, but the politicking which ensued did not necessarily address such practical issues. Rather, the contest for the chair was a test of strength between the Squadrone party, which had lost its stranglehold on university appointments in Glasgow, and
the rival Argathelians, who were now in the ascendency having scored some key political victories in the college. After a closely fought election, the Argathelian interest ultimately prevailed and their candidate, Francis Hutcheson, was chosen to succeed Carmichael on 19 December 1729. As an alumnus of Glasgow, as well as an experienced teacher and an author of some repute, Hutcheson was well qualified for his new post, and he officially marked the beginning of his illustrious professorial career at his alma mater by delivering his inaugural lecture, *De Naturali Hominum Socialitate* on 3 November 1730.

During the course of the 1729-30 session, Carmichael’s temporary replacement, the Professor of Ecclesiastical History, William Anderson, had allowed the moral philosophy class to fall into disarray. Francis Hutcheson was quick to re-establish order in the classroom, for Robert Wodrow records that Hutcheson was “very full and positive for the restoring the discipline of the College, keeping the students to rules, catalogues, exact hours, &c. wherein ther[e] is certainly a very great decay.” This meant that Hutcheson was committed to a teaching routine of monotonous regularity. Like the Professors of Logic and of Natural Philosophy, he was responsible for taking both a “public” and a “private” class. In his public lectures, which he delivered daily, Hutcheson covered “Natural Religion, Morals, Jurisprudence, and Government,” and he supplemented these prelections with a further hour each day devoted to examining his students on the lecture materials. Then, in his private class given three days per week, Hutcheson schooled his pupils in the art of exegesis by leading them through the writings of Cicero and other moralists of classical antiquity. In addition, Hutcheson lectured each Sunday for one hour “on the truth and excellency of Christianity.” Of these lectures, Alexander Carlyle recalled that:

> every Sunday at Six a clock, [Hutcheson] open’d his class Room to whoever chose to attend, when he Deliver’d a Set of Lectures on Grotius’ *De Veritate Religionis Christianæ*, which tho’ Learned and Ingenious were adapted to every Capacity. For on that evening he expected to be attended not only by Students but by many of the People of the City, and he was not Dissappointed. For this Free Lecture always drew Crowds of Attendants.

Hutcheson was equally popular in his public and private classes. He attracted increasing numbers of pupils from his native Ireland, and often managed their affairs on behalf of their parents. English Dissenters enthused about his teaching. Moreover, Hutcheson was probably able to draw students away from Edinburgh, where the course of moral philosophy was no match for his own, and his ability to do so prompted the Town Council to respond by offering him the Edinburgh chair. Even Hutcheson’s critics attested to his success in
the classroom, if only to bewail the fact that he was making a "Vast Number of Proselytes" subscribing to the same suspect religious principles that he espoused. By the time of his death in 1746, therefore, Hutcheson had fashioned himself into "one of the most masterly and engaging teachers that has appeared in our age."20

Hutcheson prospered as a pedagogue largely because he forged a new inspirational teaching style which embodied his desire to display "Warmth in the Cause of Virtue...amidst abstract Enquiries."21 As his biographer William Leechman noted, Hutcheson "regarded the culture of the heart as a main end of all moral instruction," and he conducted himself in the classroom accordingly. Breaking with tradition, Hutcheson was probably the first Glasgow arts professor (as opposed to those in divinity, law, or medicine) to lecture to his public class in English, and he abandoned the practice of dictating his lectures, preferring a more spontaneous, informal style calculated to "touch the heart, and excite a relish for virtue."22 Yet Hutcheson did not entirely break free of entrenched pedagogical practices, for he continued to use Latin in his other classes, and his students still had to engage in the scholastic exercise of disputing set theses. The best known description of his classroom manner occurs in the published memoirs of Alexander Carlyle, but an even more revealing account was later given by another of Hutcheson's pupils in the 1740s, James Wodrow:

At his early morning Class, attended by many elder Students besides his own, his principal professional Lectures were wholly in English, given without papers, he himself walking up & down, not with a slow step, but a degree of Animation, which gave his delivery too much rapidity; whereas in impugning Theses and at some other times, when the Latin Language only was employed, he was obliged to speak more calmly & deliberately, yet with abundant ease & fluency; and as his stile was formed on the very best models, particularly Cicero, so it was a pleasure to hear him speak in that language.

Wodrow was also captivated by the "easy pleasant Conversation[al] Scene" of Hutcheson's private class wherein "each Student alternately Turn[ed] a sentence or two into English, and answer[ed] some easy Questions, either about the language or sentiments," and recalled that the "forenoon Diet, from the variety of Anecdote, & of Critical Historical & Biographical information, which it furnished was one of the most entertaining Accademical exercises we had."23

Other auditors responded equally enthusiastically to Hutcheson's charisma. Even though he had quarrelled with his master in the 1740s, William Thom subsequently wrote that "if ever [a professor] had the magical power to inspire the noblest sentiments, and to warm the hearts of youth with the
admiration and love of virtue...[Hutcheson] was the man," while Leechman observed that such was the effect of Hutcheson's rhetoric that when he "described the several virtues exercised in real life, as beautiful in themselves," the students "were charmed with the lovely forms, and panted to be what they beheld."24 Whereas earlier professors like Carmichael commanded the respect of their charges, it is clear that Hutcheson's lecturing was instrumental in creating a new spirit of emulation, aspiration, and free enquiry amongst the student body.25

However, it was not just Hutcheson's teaching style that drew so many students to him, for the actual contents of his lectures also had great appeal. The form of rational piety and moderate Presbyterianism which he championed may well have aroused the indignation of the theologically conservative both in the university and the broader community, but his students were receptive to his "new light" on Christianity. Although Hutcheson and his allies were later lampooned by John Witherspoon for the supposed laxity of their beliefs, we should not forget that Hutcheson's lectures were intended to inculcate a belief in God and to remind his pupils of their religious duties.26 As Leechman indicated, Hutcheson deployed the argument from design because he thought it provided the best rational defence for theism, and the overall religious thrust of Hutcheson's lectures is well captured by Leechman's remark that

in his public prelections he frequently took occasion from any hints which his subject afforded him, as well as when it was the direct subject itself, to run out at great length, and with great ardor, on the reasonableness and advantages of habitual regards to God, and of referring all our talents, virtues, and enjoyments to his bounty.27

Unlike some, Hutcheson's engagement with religion was thus not confined to Sundays.

Another feature of his courses which his students found appealing was that they dealt with issues of practical morality. William Thom regretted that Hutcheson wasted "three or four months a-year...on metaphysical and fruitless disputations" concerning the foundations of morals, because once Hutcheson moved on to applied subjects like ethics and politics he was, according to Thom, "delightful and edifying...to hear."28 While he did not share Thom's single-minded obsession with the practical utility of knowledge, Leechman likewise praised Hutcheson for "frequently descend[ing] to common life" in order to discuss

the fashionable vices and follies in the upper part of the world, departures from real justice and equity in the busy and commercial part of it, and the dangerous rocks on which youth is apt to split and make shipwreck both of virtue and happiness.29

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Hutcheson himself was convinced that all knowledge ought to be used for the benefit of humankind, and he thus enjoined his students, "Let not philosophy rest in speculation." Moreover, it is within the context of this aspect of Hutcheson's lectures that we can perhaps better grasp the import of his appeal to the Old Whig canon. Whereas Carmichael expounded a political theory shaped largely by Locke and the natural jurisprudence tradition, Hutcheson drew on the ideas of James Harrington and Walter Moyle, and he became known as a passionate defender of civil and religious liberty. Having been raised as a Dissenter in northern Ireland and having been threatened with prosecution by rabid Anglicans while teaching in a Dissenting academy in Dublin, Hutcheson had every reason to inculcate "a warm love of liberty" because he knew at first hand just how vulnerable groups like the Dissenters could be. Hutcheson's invocation of the Old Whigs was therefore not just a speculative exercise or rhetorical gesture, but rather a matter of practical urgency for both himself and his many students from Dissenting backgrounds.

Hutcheson was an innovator in other branches of the moral philosophy curriculum as well. Whereas Carmichael seems not to have been especially interested in history, Hutcheson put his extensive historical knowledge to good use in his private class dedicated to the moralists of antiquity, as well as in his public lectures. His student James Wodrow later recalled that Hutcheson included "two or three Lectures" on the history of the necessitarian debates, and it may well be that he used historical materials in this way in order to make abstruse metaphysical issues more intelligible to his pupils.

Of greater importance was Hutcheson's promotion of his theory of the moral sense and his positive estimate of the writings of Lord Shaftesbury. Although Hutcheson probably tailored his exposition for his student audience, the very fact that he incorporated Shaftesbury's theory into his lectures marked a significant departure from Carmichael, who dismissed the notion of a moral sense. Furthermore, the ideas of Shaftesbury were anathema to Hutcheson's theological opponents, and his defence of Shaftesbury's reputation in his classes was a highly provocative act within the context of the religious disputes which were then dividing Glasgow (as well as Scotland more generally).

A third novel feature of Hutcheson's course was his advocacy of the use of the empirical method in the science of morals. While Hutcheson said little on this point in his teaching texts, his associate William Leechman recorded that Hutcheson was convinced that moralists had to follow the methodological example set by natural philosophers by grounding their theories on observation and introspection, and he suggested that Hutcheson was guided by this conviction in his lectures. Thus it would seem that Hutcheson was conveying much the same scientistic message as his contemporaries in Edinburgh and Marischal College Aberdeen, although he apparently did not
indulge in the Newtonian rhetoric characteristic of the methodological pronouncements made by the Marischal regent, George Turnbull. Yet in one crucial respect, Hutcheson’s lectures differed little from those given by Carmichael, insofar as the framework for his course was derived from the natural jurisprudence tradition. Hutcheson’s critical engagement with that tradition was already evident in his inaugural oration, and his moral philosophy prelections reflected his critical response to Grotius, Pufendorf, Cumberland, Barbeyrac, and other writers on natural law, which was itself mediated by his predecessor’s influential edition of Pufendorf. Acknowledging his debt to Pufendorf’s *De Officio Hominis et Civis* in his compend of morals, Hutcheson wrote that the “worthy and ingenious” Carmichael was “by far the best commentator on that book” and that his “notes are of much more value than the text.” There was thus a strong element of structural continuity between the courses of the two men, even though they differed on a number of theoretical issues. In effect, Hutcheson was pouring new wine into old bottles, which perhaps explains why he referred to the manuscript of his posthumously published *System of Moral Philosophy* as “a Farrago.” But it would be misleading to infer that Hutcheson himself was an intrinsically unsystematic thinker on the basis of the eclectic nature of his course. While Hutcheson certainly blended together a disparate range of authors and intellectual traditions in his lectures, the evidence regarding the teaching of moral philosophy elsewhere in Scotland during this period shows that he was not singular in doing so. Like other academic moralists, Hutcheson had to work within the limits set by existing institutional structures, which in his case meant that he had to learn to express himself within the idiom of natural jurisprudence established at Glasgow by Gerschom Carmichael (and also to address the needs of the college’s law students). Furthermore, given his overriding aim of instilling in his pupils basic moral principles, Hutcheson would have been willing to overlook differences in theory in order to establish a consensus of authors supporting what he took to be the central truths of practical morality. Arguably, then, Hutcheson’s eclecticism should be seen as a function of both his institutional context and his pedagogical aspirations.

II

With “Mr Hutcheson’s much regreted death” in August 1746, the University was confronted with the task of finding a new Professor of Moral Philosophy. Hutcheson’s closest associate, William Leechman, was delegated to act as a temporary replacement and, on 1 October 1746, the Glasgow faculty unanimously elected the St. Andrews Professor of Oriental Languages, Thomas Craigie, to the vacant post. Craigie had earlier been one of Hutcheson’s recommendations for the moral philosophy chair at Edinburgh and, from what little we know of him, he seems to have been one of Hutcheson’s many
philosophical disciples. According to James Wodrow (whose reminiscences are our primary source of information regarding Hutcheson’s ill-fated successor), Craigie agreed with his master “in almost all his Philosophical sentiments.” In his public class Craigie followed the established sequence of natural theology, ethics, natural jurisprudence, and politics. Wodrow’s comment that Craigie possessed a “deep knowledge of the Philosophy of the Ancients, especially that of the Alexandrian school” suggests that he lectured on the moralists of antiquity in his private class as Hutcheson had done. Craigie also attempted to copy Hutcheson’s lecturing style, but with little success. For although he had an “amiable Disposition & manners,” Wodrow recalled that Craigie was “[inferior] in point of feeling & animation, which made his valuable lectures listened to with less attention & pleasure.” Declining health cut short his tenure, however, and Craigie died 27 November 1751 while on leave from his teaching duties.

III

When Craigie left Glasgow in the early autumn of 1751, the recently appointed Professor of Logic, Adam Smith, agreed to take over Craigie’s classes on natural jurisprudence and politics, and Smith’s colleagues must have been pleased with his performance because on 22 April 1752 he was chosen as Craigie’s replacement. Smith’s brief tenure in the logic chair provided a foretaste of things to come, insofar as he revamped the curriculum while meeting with mixed success in the classroom. Once installed as the Professor of Moral Philosophy he gradually imposed his own stamp on his classes, eventually transforming both the style and the substance of the teaching of morals at Glasgow. According to James Wodrow, Smith initially followed Craigie’s example in emulating “Hutcheson’s extempore ease & animation, in lecturing on Ethics,” but he “soon relinquished” this and settled on reading “his lectures...with propriety from his desk.” John Millar, on the other hand, enthused about his mentor’s classroom manner, claiming that there “was no situation in which the abilities of Mr Smith appeared to greater advantage than as a Professor.” Contrary to Wodrow, Millar claimed that Smith lectured extempore, and that “[h]is manner, though not graceful, was plain and unaffected; and, as he seemed to be always interested in the subject, he never failed to interest his hearers.” But even though the details differ, both Wodrow’s and Millar’s recollections indicate that Smith’s pedagogical style was at odds with that cultivated by Hutcheson, and this impression is reinforced by William Thom’s complaint that the “dry and confused speeches” of Smith failed to arouse any “sort of emotion, nor any desire of virtue, nor even of knowledge” or to inculcate the lessons of practical morality.

There was little Smith could do, however, to change the teaching schedule or the basic structure of the moral philosophy course he inherited from...
Hutcheson and Craigie. On weekdays, Smith lectured to his public class each morning from 7:30-8:30 AM, and then examined his students for a further hour beginning at 11:00 AM. Of these examination periods, William Richardson later wrote:

Those who received instruction from Dr. Smith, will recollect, with much satisfaction, many of those incidental and digressive illustrations, and even discussions, not only in morality, but in criticism, which were delivered by him with animated and extemporaneous eloquence, as they were suggested in the course of question and answer. They occurred likewise, with much display of learning and knowledge, in his occasional explanations of those philosophical works of Cicero, which are also a very useful and important subject of examination in the class of Moral Philosophy.

In addition, Smith met with his private class three days per week for one hour beginning at noon and, breaking with the precedent set by Hutcheson, lectured on “taste, composition, and the history of philosophy.” As for the sabbath discourses on religion instituted by his predecessors, Ramsay of Ochtertyre reported that Smith “discontinued Hutcheson’s practice of convening his class on Sundays, and giving his students a discourse suited to that day,” which caused some observers to suspect his religious orthodoxy.

Like Carmichael, Hutcheson, and Craigie before him, Smith covered natural theology, ethics, natural jurisprudence, and politics in his public lectures. Of his prelections on natural theology we know little beyond John Millar’s statement that Smith “considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and those principles of the human mind upon which religion is founded.” Given that Hume began The Natural History of Religion by insisting that we must consider both the rational foundations for, and the psychological origins of, religious belief, Millar’s remarks are suggestive and they indicate that Smith may well have discussed religion in a manner reminiscent of Hume (as well as Montesquieu and Hobbes). If so, then we can better understand why Smith’s religious views aroused such suspicion, and why Ramsay of Ochtertyre’s assessment of Smith’s natural theology lectures was so equivocal.

The precise details of Smith’s ethics classes are equally sketchy. Millar stated that Smith’s lectures “consisted chiefly of the doctrines which he afterwards published in his Theory of Moral Sentiments” and, after that text appeared in 1759, Dugald Stewart tells us that Smith’s “ethical doctrines...occupied a much smaller portion of the course than formerly.” Quite apart from this change in length, Smith apparently gradually altered both the structure and the contents of this segment of his prelections. For as D. D. Raphael has argued, when Smith first took over the morals chair he
seemingly began with the historical overview of the various theories of ethics that eventually found its way into the seventh part of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, but as the years passed Smith probably gave greater prominence to his theory of sympathy by reworking the sequence of his lectures and moving his historical survey to the conclusion of the course.49

Some of these alterations may well have been inspired by the hostility Smith faced from those of his auditors who remained loyal to Hutcheson's system. As early as January 1752, while Smith was still in the logic chair and about to substitute for Craigie, James Wodrow reported that "I hear [Smith] has thrown out some contemptuous Expressions of Mr Hutcheson," and warned

Let the young man [Smith] take care to guard his Censures by the Lines Palisades & counterscarps of his science Rhetorick For there are some of Mr H[utcheson's] scholars still about the Coll[ege] who perhaps will try to turn the mouths of the Cannon against himself.50

Later in life, Wodrow noted that even though "Hutcheson's scholars" had subsequently been favourably impressed with "all the rest of [Smith's] lectures" on moral philosophy, they nevertheless retained "Prejudices...against his System of Ethics," and an instance of this negative response can be found in William Thom's dismissive remarks regarding Smith's theory of morals.51 The limited evidence we have regarding reactions to Smith's ethics lectures suggests, therefore, that he may have been driven to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards Hutcheson after his initial brush with figures like Wodrow, and that for those schooled in Hutcheson's ideas, Smith's moral theory represented an unwelcome break with the past.52

Hutcheson also loomed large in Smith's lectures on natural jurisprudence and politics, for we know that Smith began teaching these subjects using the relevant sections of Hutcheson's moral philosophy compend as texts and that his treatment of prices, money, interest, and related economic matters was deeply indebted to Hutcheson's.53 But here again, Smith transmuted the legacy left to him by Hutcheson. First, as Dugald Stewart noted, following the publication of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith expanded the segments of his course devoted to natural jurisprudence and politics, and restructured his lectures so that he could give more detailed attention to the topics he covered under the rubric of "police," that is, the promotion of "the opulence of the state" through "regulations...made with respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, [and] manufactures of the country." In these lectures, Smith surveyed many of the same issues in political economy which he later discussed in *The Wealth of Nations*.54 Secondly, Ronald Meek has pointed out that Smith displayed a greater interest in legal questions in his prelections than
Hutcheson seems to have done. This increased emphasis on the law probably owed something to the perceived need to promote the study of the law within the university, but it also reflected Smith's unrealized ambition to
give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law.55

Thirdly, and most importantly, Smith's lectures were much more historical in both content and approach than Hutcheson's. Although Hutcheson deployed historical materials in his courses, Smith's lecturing marked a radical departure from that of his teacher because it embodied the new "philosophical" vision of the past to be found in the writings of Montesquieu, Kames, and Hume. His indebtedness to Hume, for example, can be seen in his exploration of the psychological mechanisms involved in the progress of the human mind as illustrated in the history of astronomy, while his use of the four stages theory in his lectures "to trace the gradual progress of jurisprudence, both public and private, from the rudest to the most refined ages" manifests the influence of Kames and Montesquieu.56 Moreover, Smith's historical mode of analysis was not lost on his auditors. James Wodrow later observed that unlike Hutcheson and Craigie, who had "contemplat[ed] the original powers instincts &c stamped on the human mind by the hand of the creator," Smith "had read [humankind's] history & seemed to view them chiefly as a group of beings, whose minds & powers &c were chiefly formed by their external circumstances, in the different states & stages of Society &c &c."57 What differentiated Smith's course more than anything else from those of his predecessors, therefore, was the way in which he historicized the study of jurisprudence, politics, and, to a lesser extent, morals.58

Quite apart from these changes in the classroom, it should be noted that Smith was also involved in efforts to make the University into a more "polite" institution. During the eighteenth century, Scottish professors often supplemented their incomes by boarding students, and Smith was no exception, for he took in two young Englishmen from distinguished families, the Hon. Thomas Petty Fitzmaurice and Henry Herbert.59 Writing to Smith about Fitzmaurice, Gilbert Elliot of Minto remarked that

I have very little doubt, but you might even draw a good many of the youth of this part of the world [i.e. England] to pass a winter or two at Glasgow, notwithstanding the distance and disadvantage of the dialect, provided that to your real advantages you were to add the best Masters for the exercises, and also for acquiring the french language.60
Smith and his colleagues had, in fact, already made moves to attract students from backgrounds like those of Fitzmaurice and Herbert. The college had long employed individuals from the town to teach French and, while serving as the Professor of Oriental Languages (1755-1757), John Anderson took over the teaching of French, added classes on English, and intended to give lessons in Italian. Then, in 1761, Smith and others planned to establish “an Academy of dancing, fencing, and riding” which was to be run by the University. To some extent the professors succeeded in recruiting more genteel students, because James Wodrow reported to his friend Samuel Kenrick in January 1761 that

the Colledge is throng. Two or three english noblemen or Gentlemen rather but no English Divines except one. about 38 Irish. I hope it will become fashionable for the English Nobility & Gentry to give their sons a scotch education.62

But these initiatives did not meet with universal approval. In his Donaldsoniad of 1763, the irascible William Thom derided the social pretensions of the faculty, and he clearly had Smith in his sights when he complained that “of late, some newfangled fancies of sympathy with the rich and the great [have] got into the c[ollege], and nothing [is] now regarded but money, and pomp, and parade.”63 Unfazed by such criticisms, in November 1763 Smith notified the faculty that “some interesting Business would probably require his leaving the College some time this Winter,” and he travelled to London in January 1764 to take up his new post as tutor to the Duke of Buccleugh. Writing from Paris on 14 February 1764, Smith officially resigned from the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy, and a hotly contested election ensued.64

IV

Smith's colleagues had already been speculating about possible successors as early as February 1763, and one of the men who was then seen as a potential candidate was the Glasgow Professor of Ecclesiastical History, William Wight. Wight, who was closely connected with the Edinburgh Moderates, owed his initial appointment at Glasgow in May 1762 to the Earl of Bute, and he evidently hoped for further preferment because he now chose to compete for the morals chair.65 Another internal candidate with some claim to the post was Thomas Young, a Divinity student whom Smith had recommended to the faculty as his substitute. Young was a success in the classroom and his candidacy was supported by Joseph Black and John Millar; but, for some reason, Smith appears not to have backed him as his successor, leaving it to Black and Millar to lobby on Young's behalf.66

Amidst this jockeying between the different factions in the college, the name of an external candidate was put forward, much to the alarm of Young's
allies. In January 1764, one of the more powerful figures in Scottish politics, James Ogilvy, Lord Deskford, wrote to Smith's physician, Dr. William Cullen,

I have just heard of the loss sustained by the University of Glasgow by Mr Smith's leaving it. It is of consequence to the University, and to the education of Scotland, that he should be succeeded by the fittest person. I do imagine that your acquaintance Dr Thomas Reid, of the King's College at Aberdeen, is the fittest man in the kingdom for that profession. If you are of the same opinion, it will be doing a service to the public to let your friends who have interest in the University of Glasgow know your opinion.67

This letter would have put Cullen in an awkward position because Deskford (along with his colleague on the Board of Trustees for Manufactures, Henry Home, Lord Kames) had used his considerable political influence to advance Cullen's career. But given Cullen's connections with Smith, Black, and Millar, it is unlikely that he promoted Reid's candidacy; if anything, he probably alerted his associates to the fact that Deskford was now canvassing support for an outsider. Reid, however, did have one firm friend on the Glasgow faculty, the Professor of Divinity, Robert Trail. Like Reid, Trail was a protégé of Deskford's and the two of them had been colleagues in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.68 Trail was an important ally because he was related to Baron William Mure of Caldwell; Mure had served as one of the ill-fated Lord Bute's principal advisors, and he continued to wield considerable power in Scotland after Bute's fall in 1763.69

Of even greater importance was the patronage of Deskford's associate, Lord Kames. Deskford was probably responsible for first introducing Reid to Kames, and Kames was so taken with Reid's talents that he campaigned strenuously on Reid's behalf.70 Between them, Deskford and Kames set about cultivating interest with the various Glasgow professors and with the power brokers who managed university appointments in Scotland. Writing to Adam Smith, John Millar reported that Deskford and Kames had been lobbying members of the college and that there was "great reason to believe" that they had recommended Reid to the Lord Privy Seal for Scotland, James Stuart Mackenzie, as well as to the Lord Justice General, the Duke of Queensbury, and the Earl of Hopetoun, who was related by marriage to Deskford.71 Mackenzie's support was crucial because he had taken over from Bute as the man responsible for Scottish affairs in London and, although he initially favoured Wight, by early February 1764 he declared to Baron Mure that

as to who the College will prefer to Mr. Smith's Chair, all I have to say in it is, Detur digniori. It is of great consequence, and I have but a single
wish that the properest person may be placed in it: that done, I care not one farthing what his name and surname is.\textsuperscript{72}

It is also likely that Deskford and Kames had discussed Reid’s candidacy with Lord Milton and Baron Mure, who were their colleagues on the Board of Annexed Estates. In the end, their efforts were rewarded when Reid was elected “by a great majority” to the Glasgow Chair of Moral Philosophy on 22 May 1764. Reid accepted the appointment shortly thereafter, and he was formally admitted to his new post on 11 June 1764.\textsuperscript{73}

Reid’s success was significant in a number of ways. First, the Glasgow professors were deeply divided over Reid’s candidacy. Whereas Smith had been elected unanimously, Reid was not, and the faculty even had to postpone the final vote, presumably in order to resolve their differences. Thus the contested nature of Reid’s appointment harks back to the tensions surrounding Hutcheson’s election in 1729, and it also points to the fact that the political vacuum created by the death of the Earl of Islay in 1761 allowed the Glasgow professors to become a more independent and hence fractious group.\textsuperscript{74} Secondly, John Millar was absent from the meeting which selected Reid, which suggests that even though Reid’s credentials for the post were impeccable, his known opposition to Hume made him unacceptable to Black. Millar, however, would have found it difficult to vote against Reid because he owed his own chair to Kames’s influence, which leads one to speculate that Millar decided not to cast his ballot rather than compromise himself with his patron.\textsuperscript{75} Yet Reid’s reputation as a critic of Humean scepticism and his somewhat ambiguous party loyalties within the Kirk would have recommended him not only to those inclined to vote for Wight, but also to those not necessarily sympathetic to men, like Wight, who were intimately associated with the Edinburgh Moderates.\textsuperscript{76} Thirdly, unlike Hutcheson and Smith, Reid had had no connection with the University of Glasgow prior to his appointment, and he had not come under the direct spell of Hutcheson’s teaching as Smith had done.\textsuperscript{77} Instead, he had spent his formative years and early maturity in the intellectual and cultural matrix of the northeast of Scotland, where his outlook had been shaped by individuals such as George Turnbull and by the traditions of the two Aberdeen colleges. Reid’s consequent status as an outsider at Glasgow was to a large extent mirrored in his teaching which, as we shall see, remained rooted in his native milieu. Finally, Reid was hardly a moralist in the mould of Hutcheson, Craigie, or Smith. Insofar as his first love was arguably mathematics and the natural sciences, Reid’s specialist knowledge in these areas was much greater than that of his predecessors, and his mathematical and scientific pursuits left their mark on the courses he offered.\textsuperscript{78} Thanks therefore to the political connexions and intellectual vision of Reid’s patrons, Lords Deskford and Kames, a new chapter in the teaching of moral philosophy at Glasgow was about to be written.

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Once installed in the Glasgow chair, Reid was confronted with the unenviable task of devising sets of lectures for both his public and private classes. Because surprisingly little evidence survives regarding his teaching at King's, it is difficult to assess the extent to which his new duties either forced him to turn his mind to topics which he had not considered hitherto or led him to reconsider some subjects afresh, but there is little doubt that he now had to elaborate on the ideas which he had put forward in a much more abbreviated form in his moral philosophy course at King's College Aberdeen.79 The many drafts and revisions which survive among Reid's papers illustrate that he laboured hard and long to give his material shape, and the end result was a series of lectures which owed little to the examples set by his predecessors.

In his inaugural lecture, Reid paid tribute to Hutcheson and Smith as "men of...great worth and ability from whose writings I have learned and am always willing to learn," but he served notice that he was not overawed by those who had come before him when he announced that "I must for this Session at least, proceed in my Prelections in that Method & with those Materials which my own thoughts & studies and my former experience in this Profession have suggested."80 Over the next sixteen sessions he proved as good as his word. Abandoning the quadripartite structure employed by previous professors, he recast his public course into three main parts, encompassing pneumatology, ethics, and politics. Whereas Hutcheson and Smith had focused primarily on the latter two branches of moral philosophy, Reid gave pride of place to pneumatology, to which he devoted the largest block of prelections. This segment of his course opened with the subject of "psychology," wherein he anatomized the intellectual and active powers of the human mind and considered the arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the soul, before moving on to natural theology, which he confined to an extended discussion of the being and attributes of God.81 Reid likewise subdivided his ethics lectures into two sections. Beginning with what he called "speculative ethics" (which for him was properly a part of pneumatology), he analyzed our moral and active powers in order to demonstrate that we have free will and are thus capable of making moral choices, and provided an historical overview of the main strands of ethical thought from antiquity to his own day. Then he proceeded to "practical ethics," where he lectured on the various rights and duties of individuals and states as catalogued by the natural jurisprudence tradition.82 Lastly, Reid turned to politics.83 Here he classified the basic forms of government, praised the merits of the British constitution, and surveyed the different branches of "police," which he handled in a manner that differed somewhat from that of Adam Smith. For whereas Smith largely restricted himself to economic matters, Reid cast his net more widely because he defined "police" as consisting of "those Regulations which are common to Different forms of Government for Promoting Religion Virtue..."
Education Arts & Sciences Agriculture Trade Manufactures & for Regulating the Arms and Finances of the State."^{84}

William Richardson recalled that Reid's private class was given over to "a further illustration of those doctrines which he afterwards published in his philosophical essays" and, while there is a grain of truth in this description, Richardson's comments have misled subsequent historians.^{85} In fact, while Reid's private lectures covered material that was closely related to his prelections on pneumatology, they also dealt with subjects such as rhetoric which did not figure in his publications. The confused (and confusing) state of the surviving manuscripts derived from Reid's noon-hour class indicates that while the overall structure of his lectures remained essentially the same, there was far more variability in its specific contents than was the case with his public course. Although most of our evidence comes from his early years in Glasgow, it appears that Reid typically focused on three major topics: what he called the "Culture of the Human Mind" or the improvement of our intellectual and active powers; the interconnections between mind and body; and the grounds of the fine arts in "certain connections which the Author of Nature hath established between body and Mind."^{86} Ranging widely over a variety of issues, Reid tended to give his most sustained attention to logic, and especially to eloquence or rhetoric, which he thought was the "noblest" of the fine arts.^{87} There was thus some overlap between his private classes and those given by Smith in the field of rhetoric, but Reid's obsession with exploring the practical implications of his anatomy of the mind in his noon-hour lectures was of a piece with his philosophical priorities in his public prelection, and the pneumatological bias of his teaching was, as we have seen, without precedent at Glasgow.^{88}

As an experienced pedagogue, Reid was his own man when dealing with his students, and there is no evidence to suggest that he tried to emulate the lecturing styles of either Hutcheson or Smith. Indeed, the descriptions we have of Reid's classroom manner suggest a tone of sobriety which contrasts sharply with the animation displayed by Hutcheson and initially affected by Smith. Dugald Stewart, who was himself a consummate performer in the classroom, was unable to summon up much enthusiasm for Reid's teaching abilities. Having heard Reid lecture "during a considerable part of the winter of 1772," Stewart judged that the merits of Dr Reid, as a public teacher, were derived chiefly from that rich fund of original and instructive philosophy which is to be found in his writings; and from his unwearied assiduity in inculcating principles which he conceived to be of essential importance to human happiness. In his elocution and mode of instruction, there was nothing peculiarly attractive. He seldom, if ever, indulged himself in the warmth of extempore discourse; nor was his manner
of reading calculated to increase the effect of what he had committed to writing. Such, however, was the simplicity and perspicuity of his style; such the gravity and authority of his character; and such the general interest of his young hearers in the doctrines which he taught, that by the numerous audiences to which his instructions were addressed, he was heard uniformly with the most silent and respectful attention.89

Stewart's assessment is echoed by a former student of James Beattie's who visited Reid's class and reported that "his Lectures are extremely sensible and perspicuous; but his language is unmusical, and his manner ungainly." Predictably, the scourgé of the Glasgow faculty, William Thom, complained in general of the professors' "languid, drowsy, and confused manner in their classes," and regretted that "if I hear the lectures or read the books of [Smith and Reid] with all the care I can, my heart is never affected by them; I feel no sort of emotion, nor any desire of virtue, nor even of knowledge."90 However, if the reminiscences of his colleague and friend, George Jardine, are anything to go by, Reid adopted a less formal style when examining his students, and the format of some of Reid's notes indicates that he may well have lectured extempore in his private as opposed to his public class.91 But even though he could not rival other moralists like Adam Ferguson in terms of their classroom oratory, Reid usually attracted a comparatively large number of pupils, and he clearly took considerable satisfaction in informing Andrew Skene in 1766 that "my public class is above three score, besides the private class. Dr Smith never had so many in one year."92 Perhaps Reid's only regret about his students was the continuing presence of impoverished young Irishmen who made up a significant proportion of his auditors; bemoaning "the stupid Irish teagues who attend classes for two or three years to qualify them for teaching schools, or being dissenting preachers," he suggested to Skene that "in a right constituted college, there ought to be two Professors for each class—one for the dunces, and another for those who have parts."93

To understand the rationale for Reid's remodelling of the Glasgow moral philosophy curriculum, we must turn to the reforms he helped to engineer at King's College Aberdeen in 1753. Prompted by the pedagogical initiatives launched by their rivals at Marischal College, Reid and his colleagues at King's adopted a new plan of study, which featured a vastly revamped course of philosophy that began with mathematics and natural history, moved through the various branches of natural philosophy, and concluded with "the Philosophy of the Human mind and the Sciences that Depend upon it." When asked to clarify what the latter actually encompassed, Reid and his associates responded as follows:

By the Philosophy of the Mind is Understood, An Account of the constitution of the Human mind, and of All its powers and Faculties,
whether Sensitive, Intellectual or Moral; The Improvements they are capable off, and the Means of their Improvement; of the Mutual Influences of Body and Mind on each Other; and of the knowledge we may acquire of Other Minds and Particularly the Supreme Mind. And the Sciences depending on the Philosophy of the mind, Are Understood to be Logic, Rhetorick, The Laws of Nature and Nations, Politicks, Oeconomicks, the fine Arts and Natural Religion.  

To justify the changes, the King’s faculty argued that they wanted to teach “those Parts of Philosophy which may Qualifie men for the More usefull and Important Offices of Society,” rather than subjects which merely “contrived to make Men Subtle Disputants,” and, like their counterparts at Marischal, they indicated that the revised sequence of subjects in the philosophy course followed the order in which the human mind develops. Reids own teaching at King’s in the years that followed reflected the pedagogical principles enunciated by the reformers in both Aberdeen colleges, and these ideals continued to shape his classroom practice at Glasgow.

Although Dugald Stewart later remarked that Reid did not lay “much stress on systematical arrangement” in his Glasgow prelections, and that he “availed himself of whatever materials his private inquiries afforded, for his academical compositions; without aiming at the merit of combining them into a whole, by a comprehensive and regular design,” there is no doubt that Reid’s lectures were arranged according to an overall plan which embodied his belief that pneumatology was the foundation for all of the human sciences, and that the study of pneumatology itself had to follow the order exhibited in the developmental stages of the human mind. He opened his public moral philosophy course by emphasizing that even though pneumatology, ethics, and politics were “distinct Branches of Philosophy...their Connection and Dependance is greater than has commonly been thought,” and he defended his “method” of beginning with an extended consideration of the anatomy of mind on the grounds that

its powers & faculties, are the Engines we must use in every disquisition, and because the principles of those branches of Philosophy which relate to Mind such as Natural Theology, Morals, Jurisprudence, & Politicks must be drawn from the constitution of the human Mind.  

Furthermore, Reid affirmed that the sequence he adopted when delineating our intellectual powers in his pneumatology prelections followed “the order in which they seem to unfold themselves,” and he therefore started with the external senses, before proceeding to analyze memory, conception and imagination, abstraction, judgement and reasoning, taste, moral perception,
and, lastly, consciousness and reflection. Similar considerations were at work in his lectures to his private class, for here too he stressed that we must understand the way the mind works in order to grasp the principles governing logic and the fine arts, as well as to improve ourselves both intellectually and morally. Hence we can see that Reid's public and private classes were far from being loosely structured, as Stewart would have us believe. Rather, their general organization embodied the same vision of the temporal and logical relations between the various branches of human knowledge that had already guided Reid in his reform of the King's College curriculum in 1753.

Reid's conception of the cognitive structure of the human sciences was deeply indebted to his regent at Marischal College, George Turnbull, and to his philosophical nemesis, David Hume. For as he noted in his Glasgow lectures,

> Mr Hume hath very justly observed that all the Sciences have a Reference to the human Mind & however far they may seem to go off from it, they still return by one channel or another....The first Principles of all the Sciences are to be found in the Science of human Nature. This a just & important Observation.

Ironically, Reid's courses at both King's College and Glasgow arguably represented the most rigorous examples of the academic institutionalization of Hume's map of knowledge to be found in eighteenth-century Scotland. From a methodological point of view, they also exemplified Reid's preference for the anatomy of the mind as practised by Hume, as opposed to the kind of moral exhortation associated with Hutcheson. Consequently, unlike Hutcheson and Smith, Reid discussed questions of philosophical or scientific method in considerable detail with his students and thereby introduced them to a variety of theoretical issues in the natural sciences. No wonder that James Beattie, who was a moral preacher in the manner of Hutcheson, decried the speculative turn of Reid's writings and that he was moved to exclaim,

> If I were not personally acquainted with [Reid] I should conclude, from his books, that he was rather too warm an admirer of Mr. Hume. He confutes, it is true, some of his opinions; but pays them much more respect than they are entitled to.

Although he was something of an anatomist of the mind, Beattie much preferred warmth in the cause of virtue to sustained metaphysical analysis, and typically resorted to verbal abuse rather than careful argumentation when attacking Humean scepticism. Hence he was unsympathetic to Reid's philosophical strategy, which was to do battle with Hume using his own chosen weapons. In his lectures Reid grappled with specific doctrines advanced by Hume at almost every turn, including Hume's formulation of the theory of
ideas, his account of the association of ideas, and his notion of contract. But Reid's engagement with Humean scepticism also manifested itself in the overall shape of his moral philosophy course due to the prominence Hume gave to the science of the mind. For as Reid told his students, "Mr Humes sceptical System is all built upon a wrong & mistaken Account of the intellectual Powers of Man, so it can onely be refuted by giving a true Account of them." Pneumatology thus became central to Reid because he saw it as both the basis for the human sciences and the major battleground in the fight against Hume, and he refashioned the teaching of moral philosophy in Glasgow accordingly.

V

When Reid retired from the classroom in May 1780, his teaching duties passed to Archibald Arthur, who had studied under Smith and who had become Reid's protégé while serving as college chaplain and librarian. With Arthur's appointment as Reid's assistant and Professor-designate, the University reverted to its previous practice of choosing one of its own graduates to fill the morals chair, demonstrating that Reid's election was the exception which proved the rule. Reid's professorship can, therefore, be seen as representing a notable watershed in the history of the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy. With Reid's election in 1764, the line of moralists directly descended from Hutcheson ended. It was left to William Leechman and James Moor to perpetuate aspects of the Hutchesonian tradition within the college and, for those who continue to maintain that Hutcheson was the "father" of the Scottish school of moral philosophy, this point should give some pause for thought. While it is true that Adam Smith found much to admire in his teacher, we have also seen that his theory of morals was thought to have diverged from that of Hutcheson and that the historical bent of his lectures marked a radical reorientation in the teaching of moral philosophy. Furthermore, even though he did influence Archibald Arthur's philosophical outlook, Smith's real intellectual heir in the University was not one of the moralists but rather the Professor of Civil Law, John Millar, who also defended Hume's ideas in the course of "frequent, and even acrimonious disputation" with Reid in the meetings of the Glasgow Literary Society. Consequently, Reid's move to Glasgow brought with it a realignment of the philosophical priorities of the morals chair, and marked a new stage in the institutionalization of common sense philosophy in Scottish academe.

During the 1750s the "common sense revolution" which transformed the teaching of moral philosophy in the Scottish universities began in Aberdeen with the lectures of Thomas Reid at King's College and those of Alexander Gerard at Marischal, as well as the curriculum reforms of 1753 discussed above. Rooted in the prelections of George Turnbull and dedicated to
combatting the scepticism implicit in the theory of ideas, Reid's philosophizing in the classroom and in his published writings represents a distinctively Aberdonian blend of the anatomy of the mind with practical moralizing, owing more to the stimulus of Hume's "science of man" than to the "farrago" of Hutcheson. Taking over from Adam Smith, Reid further advanced this revolution by turning Glasgow into a philosophical outpost of the Aberdeen colleges, and the importation of his pedagogical approach left a permanent mark on the moral philosophy curriculum, insofar as both Archibald Arthur and James Mylne (who succeeded Arthur in 1797) continued to foreground pneumatology in their courses. For his part, Arthur retained Reid's tripartite course structure and surveyed the intellectual and active powers of the mind much in the manner of his mentor, while keeping up the attack on the philosophical "mistakes" made by Hume. Like Reid, he was also deeply interested in the natural sciences, and he incorporated a significant amount of scientific material in his prelections. Moreover, according to his biographer William Richardson, Arthur always read his lectures and thus followed in the footsteps of Reid (and Smith). Mylne, on the other hand, was far less indebted to Reid intellectually than was Arthur and took the teaching of moral philosophy at Glasgow in new directions, while yet devoting a good deal of his course to the science of the mind.

Nor was Reid's philosophical impact localized in Aberdeen or Glasgow. Adam Ferguson "was the first to applaud Dr REID'S success" and incorporated elements of Reid's analysis of the external senses into his lectures as the Edinburgh Professor of Moral Philosophy soon after the publication of the Inquiry in 1764, while the Professor of Logic, John Stevenson, likewise engaged with Reid's ideas at this time. Furthermore, Reid's influence in Edinburgh also extended to teachers of medicine and the natural sciences, including James Russell, John Gregory and his son James, as well as John Robison. Dugald Stewart's transfer to the Edinburgh morals chair in 1785 can thus be seen as marking the culmination of a lengthy process of assimilation and adaptation of Reid's work in the Athens of the North, as well as the consolidation of common sense philosophy's hold on philosophical instruction in Scotland.

In order to chart the genealogy of academic moral philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment, I have argued above that we must look beyond the horizons of the historiographical tradition inherited from the nineteenth century which casts Hutcheson as the "father" of the Scottish "school." The evidence considered in this paper indicates that we must attend to the interactions between the different local styles of philosophizing at the five Scottish universities, as well as the interplay between the construction of a science of human nature and the imperatives of moral inculcation. When we do so, we cannot but be struck by the irony of the fact that even though David
Hume failed to gain a university appointment, he nevertheless had a profound impact on the structure and style of Scottish academic moral philosophy, thanks largely to his self-styled “Disciple in Metaphysicks,” Thomas Reid.113

NOTES

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1 Although little information survives regarding Law’s teaching, we do know that he discussed Pufendorf in his classes; see Christine Mary King [Shepherd], “Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish Universities in the Seventeenth Century,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1974), 177. Carmichael’s edition of Pufendorf first appeared in Glasgow in 1718, and a second edition was published in Edinburgh in 1724 while Hume was still a student there.

2 The surviving correspondence between the two men from this period is to be found in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), I 32-35; 36-40; 45-48 (hereafter abbreviated as HL).


4 In January 1752, “Mr. Smith read an Account of some of Mr. David Hume’s Essays on Commerce” to the Society, and Hume was elected a member in 1753; see Notices and Documents Illustrative of the Literary History of Glasgow.

5 David Hume to William Strahan, 26 October 1775, HL II 301.


7 John Rae, Life of Adam Smith (London and New York: Macmillan, 1895); William Robert Scott, Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching and Position in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900); idem., Adam Smith as Student and Professor (Glasgow: Jackson, Son, and Company, 1937; reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1965); Ross, Adam Smith.


11 For a contemporary estimate of Carmichael's career and reputation, as well as remarks on the state of the moral philosophy class after his death, see Robert Wodrow, Analecta: Or, Materials for a History of Remarkable Providences; mostly relating to Scotch Ministers and Christians, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: The
Maitland Club, 1842-1843), IV 95-96; 98. See also James Wodrow to Lord Buchan, undated, The Mitchell Library Glasgow (hereafter abbreviated as MLG), Baillies Library MS 32225, f. 47r-v.


13 Hutcheson's lecture has recently been translated in Francis Hutcheson, *On Human Nature*, edited by Thomas Mautner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Robert Wodrow recorded that Hutcheson "delivered [his lecture] very fast and lou, being a modest man, and it was not well understood"; Wodrow, IV 187.

14 Wodrow, IV 191.


16 Leechman, "Account," I xxxvi. Hutcheson discussed the problem of miracles in his lectures and apparently had some difficulty in responding to objections to their existence; see Samuel Kenrick to James Wodrow, 10 June 1791, Dr. Williams' Library (hereafter abbreviated as DWL), MS 24.157(163). Carmichael met with his class on Sundays, but it is unclear whether he gave them formal lectures; see McCosh, *Scottish Philosophy*, 38. At Edinburgh, the Senatus passed a requirement in February 1734 that the professor of moral philosophy was to "praelect upon the truth of the Christian religion" each Monday during the session; see Richard B. Sher, "Professors of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century," in *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, edited by M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 99.

17 Alexander Carlyle, *Anecdotes and Characters of the Times*, edited by James Kinsley (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 36-37; compare Wodrow, IV 185, who here states that townsmen also attended Hutcheson's private classes. Hutcheson's Sunday lectures were later praised by William Thom; see his *The Trial of a Student in the College of Clutha in the Kingdom of Oceania*, in *The Works of the Rev. William Thom, Late Minister of Govan* (Glasgow: J. Dymock, 1799), 403.
Leechman, "Account," I xi; see also Carlyle, 42. Hutcheson's dealings with Irish students are discussed in Scott, *Hutcheson*, 69-74. For an indication of his impact on his English students see the correspondence between Samuel Kenrick and James Wodrow in DWL, MS 24.157. On the teaching of moral philosophy at Edinburgh in this period see Sher, "Professors of Virtue," 93-94; 99-102.


The phrase occurs in David Hume to Francis Hutcheson, 17 September 1739, in HL I 32.

Leechman, "Account," I xxxi; for Hutcheson's use of English in the classroom see James Wodrow's biographical account of Leechman in William Leechman, *Sermons*, 2 vols. (London: A. Strahan, 1789), I 28; Samuel Kenrick to James Wodrow, 27 April 1808, MLG, Baillies Library MS 32225, f. 55r. According to Wodrow, Hutcheson's classes provided a "pleasing entertainment" because they included "stories or anecdotes"; James Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 5 July 1808, DWL, MS 24.157(263)i.


The element of free inquiry is emphasized in Carlyle, 52.


Leechman, "Account," I iv-vi; xxx; xxxii-xxxiii; xxxiv. Hutcheson's use of the argument from design was similar to that of Carmichael's, although it would seem that he placed greater weight on the evidences of design in the physical world than did his predecessor; see Moore and Silverthorne, "Gerschom Carmichael," 78-79.

Thom, *Defects*, 269.


Francis Hutcheson, *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, in Three Books; Containing the Elements of Ethicks and the Law of Nature* (Glasgow: R. Foulis,
1747), iv.

31 Leechman, "Account," I viii-ix; xxxv-xxxvi; Samuel Kenrick to James Wodrow, 19 March 1808, DWL, MS 24.157(260); James Wodrow to Lord Buchan, 4 May 1808, MLG, Baillies Library MS 32225, f.60r. The political context for Hutcheson's appeal to liberty is discussed in: Caroline Robbins, "'When It is that Colonies may turn Independent': An Analysis of the Environment and Politics of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746)," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series 11 (1954): 214-251; M. A. Stewart, "John Smith and the Molesworth circle," Eighteenth-century Ireland, 2 (1987): 89-102; idem., "Rational Dissent in early Eighteenth-century Ireland," in Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-century Britain, edited by Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 42-63. As Stewart shows, Hutcheson's love of liberty also manifested itself when he became embroiled in a dispute over the election of the University Rector while he was studying divinity at Glasgow in 1717-18. A few years later rectorial elections again became a flashpoint, and Irish students like John Smith deployed the idiom of the Old Whigs in their struggles with the university authorities in Glasgow.

Hutcheson's Whiggery can also be seen in Kenrick's remark that Hutcheson had "inspired" both Wodrow and himself to "admire & love [Cicero] & revere the memory of honest old Cato"; Kenrick to Wodrow, 1 December 1785, DWL, MS 24.157(107). At the height of the conservative backlash against the French Revolution, Kenrick and Wodrow corresponded about Hutcheson's defence of religious and civil liberty and his praise of the British constitution at the time of the '45; see their letters dating from 22 March, 28 June and 12-18 July 1794, DWL, MS 24.157(188), (192), and (193)i. Wodrow later alluded to Hutcheson's view that free nations had to be prepared to use force to defend their liberty in the context of the war against France; Wodrow to Kenrick, 3 November 1803, DWL, MS 24.157(240).

32 Hutcheson probably also used historical examples to inculcate moral lessons; Leechman, "Account," I xix-xxii; James Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 22-28 October 1784, DWL, MS 24.157(84), f. 5v; James Wodrow to Lord Buchan, 28 May 1808, MLG, Baillies Library MS 32225, f.53v. Samuel Kenrick indicated that Hutcheson had discussed Montesquieu's account of the Emperor Julian in the Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1734) in his lectures, which suggests that Leechman's remarks on Hutcheson's extensive historical knowledge were not entirely eulogistic; Kenrick to Wodrow, 11 February 1786, DWL, MS 24.157(112), f.1v.

The religious politics of Glasgow during the period are discussed in Sher, "Eighteenth-Century Glasgow," 322-333; for a useful introduction to the broader Scottish context see James K. Cameron, "Theological Controversy: A Factor in the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment," in The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by R. H. Campbell and Andrew Skinner (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), 116-130, although more detailed studies are needed of the kind found in Anne Skoczylas, "Professor John Simson and the Growth of Enlightenment in the Church of Scotland" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1996). Hutcheson's remarks on Shaftesbury in his lectures are noted in Carlyle. 44. Samuel Kenrick later recalled that Hutcheson taught a version of Leibnitzian optimism in his lectures; Samuel Kenrick to James Wodrow, 10 May 1804, DWL, MS 24.157 (242).

35 Leechman, "Account," I xiii-xv. On Turnbull see Wood, Aberdeen Enlightenment, 41; 47. I use the term "scientistic" here advisedly. Although some scholars prefer to use Elie Halévy's phrase "moral Newtonianism" to refer to the attempt made by many eighteenth-century moralists to reconstruct their science in the methodological image of natural philosophy, Halévy's terminology is highly problematic. It is arguable, for example, that the writings of Pufendorf and Cumberland first encouraged moralists to adopt the methods of the natural philosophers before Newton's works transformed the intellectual landscape of the early Enlightenment. Thus Halévy's phrase obscures the complex genealogy of this methodological move. Secondly, Halévy equates "moral Newtonianism" with the attempt to discover a principle in the moral sphere analogous to the law of gravitation in the physical realm. This is a plausible characterization of Adam Smith's approach to the study of morals, but it is less straightforwardly applicable to a figure like George Turnbull and, as we shall see, it does not apply to Thomas Reid, who repeatedly attacked the search for simplicity in his lectures and published works. Moreover, there is no concrete evidence that Hutcheson saw himself as a "moral Newtonian" in Halévy's sense. For the coining of the term "moral Newtonianism" see Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans. Mary Morris (London: Faber and Faber, 1934), chapter 1.

36 Hutcheson, Introduction, i; Hutcheson's remarks indicate that he was not overly enthusiastic about Pufendorf's text.

37 The relationships between the ideas of the two men are explored in Moore and Silverthorne, "Gerschom Carmichael," and in Moore, "Two Systems."

38 Quoted in Sher, "Professors of Virtue," 96n; for a lengthier passage transcribed from this letter to Thomas Drennan see Scott, Hutcheson, 114.

39 For a hint that Hutcheson pursued a syncretic strategy see Leechman, "Account," I xlvi. From a somewhat different perspective, Alasdair MacIntyre has emphasized that Hutcheson's philosophy "was in fact a remarkable, even if unsuccessful, project of synthesis." (Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988], 259). A recent defense of the view that Hutcheson did advance a coherent system of morals (which was deeply indebted to Pufendorf) is found in Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 65-85.
40 Scott, Hutcheson, 142.
41 Scott, Hutcheson, 142; Coutts, 220; Emerson, "Hume's Attempts," 20n.
42 James Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 5 July 1808, DWL, MS 24.157(263)ii; James Wodrow to Lord Buchan, MLG, Baillies Library MS 32225, f. 49r; The Glasgow Journal, no. 544 (23 December to 30 December 1751).
44 Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 5 July 1808, DWL, MS 24.157(263)iii, which is worded slightly differently than Wodrow to Lord Buchan, undated, MLG, Baillies Library MS 32225, f. 49r-v; Stewart, "Account," 1.21; Thom, Works, 404. We do know that Smith lectured extempore in his private class; see Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, edited by J. C. Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), ii.73 and ii.125 (hereafter abbreviated as LRBL).
45 Richardson, 507-508; 515. The teaching of Cicero was thus common to both Hutcheson and Smith.
46 As a man of evangelical leanings, Ramsay of Ochtertyre undoubtedly harboured his own suspicions regarding Smith's religious views; see Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century: From the Mss. of John Ramsay, Esq. of Ochtertyre, edited by A. Allardyce, 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1888), 1 462-463. Ramsay notes here that Smith's orthodoxy was also suspect because of the company he kept, which presumably is a veiled reference to his friendship with Hume. However, to do Smith justice, he was very circumspect in his public behaviour. He was not an enthusiastic promoter of Hume's candidacy for the logic chair, and his correspondence shows that he performed his public religious duties even if he did not enjoy them; see Smith to William Cullen, 3 September 1751, and Smith to William Johnstone, [March/April 1752-63], in Corr., 5-6 and 326.
48 Stewart, "Account," 1.18; III 1.
49 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D. D. Raphael and
Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 21 January 1752, DWL, MS 24.157(16)b. Even though Wodrow was one of those who were initially opposed to Smith, he had a high regard for Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*; see Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 10 July 1759, DWL, MS 24.157(33). In this letter Wodrow likens Smith’s illustrative examples to “so many facts & experiments in Natural Philosophy [which] seem to confirm & support the Authors principles in the most satisfying manner” (f 1r). This echoes Hume’s characterization of Smith’s method in his anonymous review of *TMS* published in the *Critical Review*; see David R. Raynor, “Hume’s Abstract of Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 22 (1984): 51-79, esp. 66.

Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 5 July 1808, DWL, MS (263)ii; Wodrow to Lord Buchan, undated, MLG, Baillies Library MS 32225, f. 49v; Thom, *Works*, 366; 402. The strong personal loyalty to Hutcheson exhibited in the letters of Wodrow and Kenrick provides further evidence regarding the charismatic hold he had over his students.

Smith’s later tribute to “the never to be forgotten Dr Hutcheson” was no doubt sincerely meant, but needs to be evaluated in the light of Wodrow’s comments; see Adam Smith to Dr. Archibald Davidson, 16 November 1787, in *Corr.*, 309.


*LJ(A)*, i.2; compare *LJ(B)*, 5. Evidence for Smith’s expanded treatment of jurisprudence is provided by James Wodrow’s statement in late January 1752 that “[Smith] begins next week to give lectures on Jurisprudentia which I design to attend”; Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 21 January 1752, DWL, MS 24.157(16)b. Compare this with the date of the first lecture contained in *LI(A)*, which is 24 December 1762.

*TMS*, VII.iv.37; Meek, 79; John W. Cairns, “‘Famous as a School for Law, as Edinburgh...for Medicine’: Legal Education in Glasgow, 1761-1801,” in Hook and Sher, 135.


James Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick, 5 July 1808, DWL, MS 24.157(263)ii. Wodrow thus implies that Smith did not recognize the workings of God’s providential design in human nature, and he also remarks here that Smith failed to draw attention to the fact that the argument of *The Wealth of Nations* “exhibited a full proof of the actual existence, & visible exercise of a Divine providence i.e. a wisdom & goodness superior to human, regulating & controuling the ordinary concerns of mankind”; this point is repeated in Wodrow to Lord Buchan, undated, MLG, Baillies Library MS 32225, f. 49v.
58 Smith's discussion of the role played by custom and fashion in forming our moral sentiments has historical ramifications; see TMS, V.2.1-16.
59 Smith also had Lord Buchan as a private student; Scott, Adam Smith, 67-68; Ross, Adam Smith, 134-138.
60 Elliot to Adam Smith, 14 November 1758, in Corr., 27.
61 The Professor of Oriental Languages from 1761 until 1820, Patrick Cumin, taught both French and Italian until ill-health forced him to hand over his classes in 1797; Coutts, 231, 240, 324; Scott, Adam Smith, 149.
62 Wodrow to Kenrick, 4 January 1761, DWL, MS 24.157(42).
63 Thom, Works, 366.
64 Scott, Adam Smith, 220; Smith to Thomas Miller, 14 February 1764, in Corr., 100-101.
66 Rae, Adam Smith, 169; Ross, Adam Smith, 123; Joseph Black to Adam Smith and John Millar to Smith, 23 January 1764 and 2 February 1764, in Corr., 98-100; James Stuart Mackenzie to Baron William Mure, 2 February 1764, in Mure, I 232. Normally, the candidate nominated by the outgoing Professor would have been appointed; see J. D. Mackie, The University of Glasgow 1451-1951 (Glasgow: Jackson, Son, and Company, 1954), 194-195.
67 Deskford to Cullen, 22 January 1764, in John Thomson, An Account of the Life, Lectures and Writings, of William Cullen, M.D. Professor of the Practice of Physic in the University of Edinburgh, 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and T. Cadell, 1832), I 605; later the same year Deskford became the 6th Earl of Findlater and 3rd Earl of Seafield.
68 For a glimpse of the connections between Deskford, Kames, and Cullen, see A. L. Donovan, Philosophical Chemistry in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), 81-83. Deskford was the dedicatee of Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense (1764); on the Wise Club, see The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758-1773, edited by H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 24; 33-34.
70 Deskford supported Home's appointment as a law lord in 1752, and they

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71 Millar to Smith, 2 February 1764, in Corr., 99-100.
72 Mackenzie to Mure, 2 February 1764, in Mure, I 232; the wording of this passage is reminiscent of Deskford’s letter to Cullen quoted above, which suggests that Millar was right in thinking that Mackenzie had been approached by Reid’s patrons. When the question of Smith’s successor was first broached, Mackenzie indicated that he was inclined to back James Baillie (who later served as the Glasgow Professor of Divinity from 1775 to 1778) for the post as a favour to Baillie’s brother-in-law, Dr. William Hunter; see Mackenzie to Mure, 15 February 1763, in Mure, I 171.

73 Glasgow University Archives (hereafter abbreviated as GUA), MS 22643, 28; Reid to Thomas Miller, 26 May 1764, GUA MS 151/34687.
74 Writing to Mure of Caldwell, James Stuart Mackenzie remarked on the intense factionalism in evidence in the election; Mackenzie to Mure, 8 March 1764, in Mure, I 241. On the impact of Islay’s death on the mechanisms of patronage in Glasgow see Emerson, “Glasgow Professors,” 22; 31.
75 On Kames’s patronage of Millar, see W. C. Lehmann, John Millar of Glasgow 1735-1801: His Life and Thought and His Contribution to Sociological Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 17-18. For his part, Hume apparently regarded Reid’s associate Robert Trail as a religious hypocrite and bigot; see Hume to William Strahan and Hume to Baron Mure of Caldwell, 26 and 27 October 1775, in HL II 299-300 and 303.
76 Reid’s involvement in the ecclesiastical affairs of his day awaits further detailed study. Although he was on good terms with leading Moderates like Hugh Blair and George Campbell, Reid was also in touch with men like the Rev. James Oswald of Methven, who was an opponent of the Moderate Party; see Oswald to Reid, 16 October 1766, Aberdeen University Library (hereafter abbreviated as AUL) MS 2131/3/III/17, f. 1r. However, William Thom’s criticisms of Reid indicate that he was not acceptable to the Glasgow evangelicals and, for his part, Reid complained that the religion of Glasgow’s “common people...has a gloomy, enthusiastical cast” (Reid to Dr. Andrew Skene, 14 November 1764, in Reid, Works, 40).
77 In his inaugural lecture Reid emphasized that he knew Smith by reputation only, and that he had no knowledge of the contents of Smith’s lectures (AUL, MS 2131/4/II/9, f. 2r). Reid had, however, read Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments when it was first published in 1759; for a discussion of Reid’s response to Smith’s moral theory see David Fate Norton and J. C. Stewart-Robertson, “Thomas Reid on Adam Smith’s Theory of Morals,” Journal Hume Studies

78 William Ogilvie wrote of Reid thus: "It is not in Metaphysics nor in Moral Philosophy alone or even chiefly that Dr. Reid is Eminent. No Man in Scotland is more attached to, or has cultivated more the profounder parts of the Mathematicks & the Newtonian Philosophy" (Ogilvie to Lord Buchan [1764], Glasgow University Library [hereafter abbreviated as GUL], MS Murray 502 201/65). This is not to say that neither Hutcheson, Craigie, nor Smith had any interest in mathematics or the natural sciences. Leechman noted that Hutcheson used his knowledge of natural philosophy in order to strengthen the argument from design, while Craigie apparently had some competence as a mathematician, because his name was floated as a candidate for the vacant Edinburgh chair of mathematics in 1746 (Leechman, "Account," 1xxi; see also D. B. Horn Papers, Edinburgh University Library MS Gen. 1824, "Histories of the Chairs, 2: Mathematics," 17). Smith was also knowledgeable in these fields, as his various writings demonstrate. However, none of them had the expertise Reid possessed in both mathematics and the natural sciences, nor did they move in the kinds of scientific circles of which Reid was a member.

79 On Reid's teaching at King's see Wood, Aberdeen Enlightenment, 34-35; 129-130. Reid evidently felt the pressure of having to expand his lectures, for he wrote to his friend Andrew Skene, "I have many preachers and students of divinity and law of considerable standing, before whom I stand to speak without more preparation than I have leisure for" (Reid to Skene, 14 November 1764, in Reid, Works, 40).

80 AUL MS 2131/4/II/9, f. 2r-v. As Ross and others have noted, Reid here also indicated that he would like to read copies of Smith's lectures on "Morals, Jurisprudence, Police, or in Rhetorick" (Ross, Adam Smith, 124-125).

81 Reid modelled his natural theology lectures on the relevant sections of Hutcheson's compend of metaphysics (see George Baird, "Notes from the Lectures of Dr Thomas Reid, 1779-80," 8 volumes, MLG, MS A104929, V 19).


83 A thorough discussion of Reid's politics lectures is to be found in Kurtis G. Kitagawa, "Not Without the Highest Justice: The Origins and Development of Thomas Reid's Political Thought," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1994).

84 AUL MS 2131/7/V/4, 17. See also "Heads of Lectures on Politicks," AUL MS 2131/4/III/1, f.2r, and (for the relevant lecture notes) AUL MS 2131/4/III/9, 10, 11, 15, and 16. For his part, Smith had considered arms and revenue as separate topics, and he did not deal with a number of topics Reid lectured on under the heading of police, including population, "National Virtue," and education. But although Smith's focus was more narrowly economic, he was certainly aware that the scope of "police" could be construed in the broad manner adopted by Reid, and he likewise acknowledged the importance of public education (see LJ(A), vi. 20 and LJ(B), 329-330). Some of the complexities of the concept of "police" in the eighteenth century are

85 Richardson, 315; a more nuanced view is presented by Haakonssen in Reid, _Practical Ethics_, 29-30. Passages from Reid's lecture notes for his private class are transcribed in Charles Stewart-Robertson, ""Georgica animi": A Compendium of Thomas Reid's Lectures on the Culture of the Mind," _Rivista di Storia della Filosofia_ 45 (1990): 113-156.

86 AUL MS 2131/4/1/29, 1; 3-4.

87 The rationale for the manner in which Reid treated logic in his private lectures appears in his "A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic. With Remarks," in Kames, _Sketches_, I 229-241. Most of the surviving manuscript material related to his lectures on eloquence is now catalogued in AUL MS 2131/8/1/2-19.

88 Before he switched to the moral philosophy chair, Smith's approach to the teaching of logic and rhetoric was similar to that of Reid, insofar as he grounded both subjects in the study of the powers of the human mind (Stewart, "Account," I.16). But if the student notes from his course on rhetoric and belles lettres given in 1762-1763 are anything to go by, Smith was apparently less concerned about illustrating the connexions between these fields once he became the professor of morals (see Stewart, "Account," I.16, and Smith, _LRBL_).

89 Dugald Stewart, _Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, D. D. F.R.S. Edin. Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow_ (Edinburgh: W. Creech, 1803), 50-51.

90 Alexander Peters to James Beattie, 8 December 1778, AUL MS 30/2/322; Thom, _Works_, 404.

91 George Jardine, _Outlines of Philosophical Education, Illustrated by the Method of Teaching the Logic Class in the University of Glasgow_, 2nd edition (Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1825), 263-264. Jardine here mentions that in the examination hour Reid read with his students Cicero's _De Finibus_. On Reid's lecturing style see also Haakonssen in Reid, _Practical Ethics_, 28-29, and Kitagawa, 292-293. M. A. Stewart has also made the interesting suggestion that Reid's lectures may not have been as dull as contemporary reports suggest because his auditors failed to grasp the wit that Reid's published works demonstrate he possessed.

92 Reid to Skene, 17 December 1766, in Reid, _Works_, 47. Reid was aware of Ferguson's imposing classroom persona, for he wrote to David Skene: "The Professor, Ferguson, is, indeed, as far as I can judge, a man of noble spirit, of very elegant manners, and has a very uncommon flow of eloquence" (Reid to Skene, 20 December 1765, in Reid, _Works_, 42). On Ferguson's career in the Edinburgh chair, see Sher, "Professors of Virtue," 113-123.

93 Reid to Skene, 30 December 1765, in Reid, _Works_, 43. Reid comments on the Irish students throughout his correspondence with Andrew Skene (see also Reid to Skene, 14 November 1764, and 8 May 1766, in Reid, _Works_, 40 and 46).

94 Quoted in Wood, _Aberdeen Enlightenment_, 67. Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion of the reforms at King's and Marischal. Although
Haakonssen states that "there is nothing to suggest interest in natural law, or indeed in law at all, while Reid was in Aberdeen," the quoted passage indicates that Reid probably did teach natural jurisprudence at King's College (see Reid, Practical Ethics, 32).

95 Wood, Aberdeen Enlightenment, 68.
96 Stewart, Account, 52.
97 Reid, Practical Ethics, 103; AUL MS 2131/4/1/13, f. 1r.
98 AUL MS 2131/4/1/13 f. 1v; Archibald Graham, "Notes of Reid's Lectures on Pneumatology, 1769," GUL MS Gen. 760, 1.
99 The subjects Reid covered in his private class were also clearly taken over from his teaching in Aberdeen.
100 Reid, Practical Ethics, 107. I have discussed Turnbull's view of the tree of knowledge and his impact on Reid and his Aberdeen contemporaries in Wood. Aberdeen Enlightenment, 66-68, and in "Science and the Pursuit of Virtue in the Aberdeen Enlightenment," in Stewart, Studies, 130-132; 138-139.
101 On Reid's methodological discussions in his lectures, see P. B. Wood, "Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher: A Study of Science and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leeds, 1984), 149-159. It remains unclear how much classroom time Smith devoted to the discussion of methodological issues. It may well be that he touched on questions of method in his survey of the history of philosophy in his private class, and we know that he outlined his interpretation of the Newtonian method in lectures on rhetoric (see LRBL, 145-146). However, Reid probably spent far more class time on methodological questions than did Smith, because his critique of the theory of ideas involved the careful analysis of the limits of analogical reasoning and the use of hypotheses. Moreover, Reid's understanding of the Newtonian method was radically different from Smith's. Whereas in his rhetoric lectures Smith associated Newtonianism with the search for simplicity, Reid rejected this interpretation, and portrayed Newton as a champion of strict inductivism and anti-hypotheticalism. Reid also attacked the search for simplicity, and claimed that Descartes and Newton had been seduced by "analogy, and the love of simplicity" into the misguided attempt to reduce the phenomena of the mental and material worlds to the operations of just a few principles (see especially Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, On the Principles of Common Sense [London: T. Cadell, 1785; reprinted Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990], 470-474). In the Inquiry, Reid also cautioned against system building in philosophy (487-488). Reid's methodological message was thus at odds with Smith's.
103 Reid, Practical Ethics, 107.
104 On Arthur's appointment as Reid's successor see GUA, MS 26691, entry for 6 May 1780; see also Richardson, 506-507.
105 So too should the deep philosophical differences between Hutcheson and Hume, Smith, or Reid. If Hutcheson was the "father" of these men, then their relations with him were verging on the Oedipal. Apart from the fact that they
impose a questionable uniformity of outlook on Scottish thinkers of the period, those who cast Hutcheson in the part of patriarch typically define the intellectual essence of the Scottish Enlightenment in terms of the study of moral philosophy. Such a definition is, however, far too narrow because, *inter alia*, it overlooks the leading (and multifaceted) role of medicine and the natural sciences in the Enlightenment. The difficulties in sustaining this view of Hutcheson are evident in the work of Richard Sher. Having initially described Hutcheson as "the father of Scottish academic moral philosophy during the age of Enlightenment," Sher has subsequently qualified this description and has broadened the scope of his argument to include classical learning and religion. Compare Sher, *Church and University*, 167, with "Professors of Virtue," 96, and "Eighteenth-Century Glasgow," 321. Sher has yet to offer a persuasive account of the place of natural knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment.

106 On Arthur's debt to Smith, see Richardson, 509-510 and 515, as well as Arthur's prize-winning essay "On the Importance of Natural Philosophy," in *Discourses*, 407-440. The debates between Millar and Reid are noted in John Craig's "Account of the Life and Writings of John Millar, Esq.," which is included in Millar's *The Origin and Distinction of Ranks*, 4th edition (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1806; reprinted Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990), lxi-lxii.

107 The term "common sense revolution" comes from Richard Sher, who dates it to 1785 (Sher, *Church and University*, 311-314).

108 I have discussed the teaching of moral philosophy in the Aberdeen colleges in Wood, *Aberdeen Enlightenment*, chapters 2 and 5. When thinking of the relations between Hutcheson and Reid, we would do well to remember that Reid's initial publication, the "Essay on Quantity," contains a criticism of Hutcheson's use of algebraic reasoning in the first three editions of his *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. Moreover, although Richard Sher states that Thomas Reid was one of those who endorsed Hutcheson's style of philosophy because his name appears in the list of subscribers to the *System*, it is doubtful that the Reid there listed is the Aberdonian philosopher (Sher, "Professors of Virtue," 98-99). The entry in the list is "Thomas Reid, Esq."; Reid the philosopher should have been given the title of either "Reverend" or "Regent at King's College Aberdeen." It is striking that none of the Aberdonian professors or regents are listed as subscribers.

109 Richardson, 498; 503; 509. Arthur's published *Discourses* include two on natural theology explicitly devoted to refuting Hume. The surviving (incomplete) sets of notes from Arthur's moral philosophy lectures show that his extensive account of the active powers of the mind was closely modelled on Reid's lectures and *Essays on the Active Powers*, and that he was especially anxious to refute Hume. Interestingly, Arthur was also intermittently critical of Hutcheson in his classes, but he referred his students to Hutcheson's *Philosophiae Moralis Instituo Compendaria*, along with the posthumous *System*, and he also recommended the English translation of the compend. While he challenged Smith's theory of morals, he relied on the survey of the different systems of moral philosophy to be found in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. See Archibald Arthur's own notes in MLG, MS 891086, as well as the following student notes: John Wilson, "Lectures on Moral Philosophy Delivered at the

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College of Glasgow in...1790," 2 volumes, MLG, MS 76281; William Gossip, "Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 1787-1788," GUL MS Gen. 284-287; James Neilson, "Lectures on Natural Jurisprudence, March 1788," GUL MS Gen. 832. It is curious that no notes survive from the lectures Arthur delivered during the first two months of the session.


111 Stewart, *Account*, 43-44.

112 Stewart, *Account*, 44. Reid was a colleague of Robison's in Glasgow when the latter succeeded Joseph Black as Lecturer in Chemistry in 1766. After Robison took up the natural philosophy chair in Edinburgh in 1774, the two of them corresponded on scientific matters and performed experiments together. Robison was deeply interested in scientific metaphysics, as can be seen in his annotations to his presentation copies of Reid's two *Essays*.

113 Reid to Hume, 18 March 1763, National Library of Scotland, MS 23157, letter 3, f. 1r.

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