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Hume: Radical Sceptic or Naturalized Epistemologist?

KEVIN MEEKER

According to Barry Stroud, we should view David Hume neither as a prototypical analytic empiricist nor as "the arch sceptic whose primary aim and achievement was to reduce the theories of his empiricist predecessors to the absurdity that was implicitly contained in them all along." Rather, he urges us to follow the watershed work of Norman Kemp Smith and view Hume primarily as a naturalist—i.e., as a philosopher who approached the study of human nature in roughly the same way that Newton studied the physical world. Insofar as Stroud and Smith are correct, it seems reasonable to consider Hume a forerunner of what today is called "naturalized epistemology." In this paper, I will argue that even if we can label Hume as a naturalized epistemologist, the "traditional" construal of him as a sceptic is in some sense much more apt because the philosophical system that he constructs has far-reaching sceptical implications.

Before arguing for my interpretation, however, let me briefly outline how I will proceed. In section I, I will define scepticism more precisely and provide a prima facie case for a sceptical interpretation of Hume's system. The burden of section II will be to argue that the standard "naturalist" attempts to counter this sceptical reading are misguided. Before concluding, I will examine (in section III) other naturalistic readings of Hume in the context of naturalized epistemology to show why my sceptical interpretation is preferable.

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I. The Prima Facie Case for a Sceptical Interpretation of Hume

A. Hume's Attack on Reason. In this paper, I will understand scepticism as a thesis denying that humans have knowledge. Philosophers often associate Hume's alleged scepticism with some particular topic. That is, they view Hume as sceptical about inductive inferences, miracles, and so on. But I will argue that Hume's system leads to a more thoroughgoing scepticism because his system is sceptical with regards to knowledge claims in all areas (what some call global scepticism).

The main passage upon which I want to focus to support my interpretation is found in I iv 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature, which is entitled "Of scepticism with regard to reason." Although I will not critically analyze Hume's argument for scepticism, we should familiarize ourselves with its reasoning for two reasons. First, it will reveal why Hume believed that this argument had momentous consequences for philosophy. Second, it will help us consider how others try to reconcile a naturalist reading of Hume with this section. So let us turn to an exposition of the text. Hume's first major point in this section is that it is always possible for us to be wrong about a specific judgment. While this is obvious in perceptual cases, Hume insists that even in areas such as simple arithmetic we can still make mistakes. Now his point is not that the fundamental theorems of arithmetic are not necessarily true; rather, his point is that our epistemic grasp of such principles is always fallible. That is, all beliefs have some degree of uncertainty attached to them. Or, in Hume's own illustrious terms: "all knowledge resolves itself into probability..." (T 181).

Hume's second point is that our beliefs do not arise ex nihilo; they have their source in one of our cognitive faculties. Consequently, according to Hume, when we try to estimate the probability that a particular belief is true we should not only evaluate that belief per se, but also compute the reliability of the faculty that produced that belief. Because all of our beliefs are fallible, the probability calculus dictates that we assign both the probability that a particular belief is true and the probability that that particular belief is true given the reliability of the faculty that produced it a value of less than one. But elementary mathematics also tells us that when you multiply two real numbers that are less than one, you will always get a number lower than either value. Adding in considerations of the faculty that produces belief thus inevitably lowers the probability that the belief is true.

But we cannot stop here. Hume urges that we must also consider the reliability of the faculty that estimates that conjunctive probability. Unfortunately, this process lands us in an infinite regress in which each time we make an estimation we must immediately re-evaluate that calculation considering the relevant cognitive faculty. Obviously, though, the cumulative effect of each successive estimation will require us to lower the probability that that belief is true to (virtually) zero. Hume then goes on to
conclude that

[when I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my opinions, than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed still farther, to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence. (T 183)]

Now this conclusion certainly sounds sceptical. And a few sentences later, Hume concedes that this thesis amounts to “total scepticism” (T 183, Hume’s emphasis). Clearly, we have sufficient textual grounds to construct a prima facie case for a sceptical reading of Hume’s system. Before continuing, though, I need to say more about the nature of the scepticism that I attribute to Hume’s system.

B. Scepticism and Knowledge. We must be careful to distinguish at least two levels at which we could interpret Hume as a sceptic: the intentional and the actual. To elaborate a bit, on one level we might interpret Hume as an intentional sceptic—that is, one who intended to show that empiricism leads to sceptical absurdity. Unfortunately, we sometimes fail to fulfill our intentions. Thus, even if Hume intended his system to yield sceptical results, it is still a further question as to whether or not he actually achieved his desired end. On the other hand, it is a possibility that even if he did not set out to be a sceptic, his theses may ultimately lead him down this primrose path, whether he fully recognized it or not. Of course, one could consistently maintain that Hume both intended to be a sceptic and actually succeeded. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to conflate these two levels automatically. Casting this distinction in terms that we saw Stroud use in the quotation at the beginning of this paper, one could possibly argue either that although Hume did not aim to be a sceptic (i.e., he did not set out with the intention of producing a sceptical system), his philosophical achievements were nonetheless sceptical or that although he did aim for a sceptical system, he did not achieve this goal.

Returning to the passage just examined, we should note that some have considered the argumentation of this section as hopelessly inadequate. D. C. Stove, for example, minces no words in telling us that he does not even discuss this argument because: “[t] is, and has been generally recognized as being, not merely defective, but one of the worst arguments to ever impose itself on a man of genius.” Fortunately for us, however, we need not worry here about the validity, soundness, or overall effectiveness of Hume’s argument(s). What will be crucial is the conclusion he draws. After all, from this conclusion he wishes to extract the momentous consequence “that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom;
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and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our natures" (T 183, Hume's emphasis). It is crucial to note that this consequence becomes a controlling factor in Hume's subsequent deliberations. Indeed, Hume's exaltation of the passions over reason is a (if not the) major theme of his project. But our primary question is this: how does this thesis, which Hume accepts, actually affect the rest of his philosophy? In other words: given the wide-ranging scope of Hume's conclusion, can he consistently avoid a radical scepticism?

Let me make my point perfectly perspicuous. Call the set of propositions that Hume affirms the Humean System (HS). We can obviously ask if some members of (HS) actually provide argumentative support for other members of the set, but the very fact that a proposition is a member of (HS) shows that Hume intended to affirm it. Nevertheless, the more important question is this: does any proper subset of (HS) actually entail a kind of radical scepticism? It is here where I want to give an affirmative answer while the naturalist demurs.

Because I am characterizing scepticism as denying that humans have knowledge, a few words are in order about what I take knowledge to be. In the twentieth century, philosophers have often analyzed knowledge in terms of justified true belief (with the recent recognition that some further condition is needed to counter Gettier problems). Although Hume never explicitly endorses this definition of knowledge per se, some philosophers believe that this account of knowledge at the very least has part of its roots in Hume. For example, Joseph Pitt claims that: "[A] way to view the development of the logical positivist's account of scientific knowledge is to see it as evolving away from an older and very long tradition, in which knowledge means certainty, toward the newer view, associated with Humean empiricism, that knowledge is justified true belief."15 For our purposes, then, it will hopefully be illuminating to couch the discussion in these terms. My main thesis is that although Hume may not have intended his system to deny that we have justified beliefs, his system actually does deny this because a consequence of one of his propositions (namely, the conclusion of his sceptical argument) denies that we can be justified in any belief (and this is the case whether or not this proposition follows logically from the other members of [HS]). In other words, we can say that if one is to adopt all of Hume's theses (especially those in "Of scepticism with regard to reason") and this more explicitly contemporary analysis of knowledge, then one is committed to scepticism.

To summarize briefly: I have provided a prima facie case for my claim that Hume's system is sceptical in the sense that it denies that humans have knowledge. In the next section, we will examine how naturalistic interpreters might respond to this case.
II. The Naturalist Position

A. Does Hume Abandon his Attack on Reason? Many interpreters who read Hume as a naturalist stress that this sceptical argument against reason surfaces only in the *Treatise*. It seems most charitable, then, to assume that Hume recognized the deficiency of his argument and abandoned it. This riposte gains considerable strength from Hume's own proclamation that he wanted to be judged by his later reworking of the epistemological sections of the *Treatise* in *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*.

In response, I want to make two points. First, it is not at all clear that Hume elected to expunge this argument from the first *Enquiry* because he no longer believed it to be effective. Given that the *Treatise* failed miserably to bestow upon Hume the literary fame he so desired, it is understandable that he would want to remove its most abstract arguments; and the argument of I iv 1 is very difficult to follow by Hume's own admission. So to provide more felicitous expressions of his points, it would be natural for Hume not to repeat this particular argument. In short, then, its failure to appear in the *Enquiry* does not show that Hume abandoned this line of reasoning. For there are other equally plausible explanations for why Hume never repeats it (e.g., it is difficult to read). What's more, if exclusion from the *Enquiry* is sufficient for dismissing some claims from Hume's system, then the competing naturalist interpretation is likewise in poor shape. After all, that interpretation of Hume also draws its main inspiration from parts of the *Treatise* (especially the Introduction) that do not appear in the *Enquiry*. On the whole, then, the fact that the sceptical argument from I iv 1 does not appear in the *Enquiry* fails to damage my interpretation.

Second, although this particular argument never appears after the *Treatise*, it still receives attention elsewhere in the *Treatise*. At the end of Book I, Hume refers back to these deliberations:

For I have already shewn, [Footnote referring to Sect. I, 182f.] that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. We save ourselves from this total scepticism only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things, and are not able to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more easy and natural. Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be receiv'd? Consider well the consequences of such a principle. By this means you cut off entirely all science and philosophy: You proceed upon one singular quality of the imagination, and by a parity of reason must embrace all of them:
And you expressly contradict yourself; since this maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning, which will be allow'd to be sufficiently refin'd and metaphysical. What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we embrace this principle, and condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which implies a manifest contradiction.

(T 267-268)

Given that the arguments of I iv 1 undeniably play an integral role in Hume's other deliberations in the *Treatise*, it seems odd that he would dismiss their validity for his other writings without mentioning it. After all, he expresses grave misgivings about his apparently inconsistent thoughts on the nature of the self in the Appendix of the *Treatise* (T 633–636). If Hume did reject the conclusion of I iv 1, then it seems that he would have explicitly said so. Since he did not, it appears that we can regard these passages as properly Humean.

B. A Naturalistic Interpretation. Some naturalists argue that the *prima facie* case for a sceptical interpretation ignores the possibility that we should read Hume's argument not as a *reductio* of reason per se but of the rationalistic (or intellectualist) conception of reason. Thus, Hume's argument is hypothetical; he is contending that if we understand reason in such a manner, then these dire consequences follow. The *prima facie* case, then, overlooks the logical propriety of Hume discharging the rationalistic conception of reason after reducing it to absurdity and adopting his own naturalistic approach. One of the most articulate advocates of this view is William E. Morris who contends that Hume's aim in I iv 1

[is to attack the] intellectualist model of the rationally reflective epistemic agent in what should be its heartland—the realm of relations of ideas and demonstrative argument. Section I is an extended *reductio* of this model of the mind in the area where it should be the strongest. Hume is saying that if this model were correct, if we were reflective rational epistemic agents, then we would not only know nothing, we would be unable to form any beliefs.
at all! If the intellectualist model and scepticism were genuinely exclusive alternatives, then scepticism would win the day. The model cannot withstand the sceptical arguments it invites. (Morris 55-56)

But in discharging this "intellectualist model," what is Hume offering in its place? According to Morris "there is another alternative: the description of the actual operations of the mind Hume outlines in his positive account of how our causal expectations operate—his 'sceptical solution' to the sceptical doubts he raised about the understanding" (Morris 56). The solution to which Morris points is Hume's famous claim (quoted above in section Ib) that all our reasonings are based on custom (Morris 57). That is, we believe not because of any intellectual evidence, but because nature forces us to believe.

Unfortunately, this maneuver does not reveal that we have any knowledge. For all Hume would have shown, on Morris' view, is that we still have beliefs despite our lack of evidential grounds for these beliefs. After all, Hume himself concedes (T 184-185) that the sceptical argument is still "unrefuted" on his own hypothesis even though nature does not allow us to cease believing. But recall that the justified true belief theory of knowledge requires that a belief be epistemically justified if it is to count as knowledge. From this perspective, there are two ways to see why Hume's system does not allow for epistemically justified beliefs even if Morris is correct.

First, when Hume concludes that there is no evidence for any belief (no matter what hypothesis one adopts) he in effect denies that we can be justified in believing anything. After all, insofar as epistemic justification only attaches to beliefs that we have good reason to think are true, then no belief can be epistemically justified because we have no reason (i.e., no evidence) to think that any of our beliefs are true. Thus, Hume's observation that nature nevertheless forces us to believe is irrelevant. That is, insofar as Hume's conclusion is actually sceptical in regards to justification, then Hume's subsequent remarks about belief do not re-establish how beliefs can be epistemically justified (and hence how we can have knowledge). For the whole point of the argument is to show that attempting to discern the probability that any particular belief is true will reveal that we have no reason to believe anything. Recall that in the passage from I iv 7 cited above, Hume admits that the argument of I iv 1 forces us to choose between a "false reason or none at all." Surely this conclusion seems functionally equivalent to the claim that our beliefs lack any justification or evidence (i.e., evidential grounds).

Some commentators, though, might object that this first point misinterprets what Hume means when he uses the term 'evidence' in I iv 1. Thus Don Garrett claims that "Hume does not use 'evidence' as a term of
epistemic evaluation at all. On the contrary, he consistently uses it to mean 'evidentness'—that is, as equivalent to 'belief,' 'assurance,' or 'vivacity,' construed as properties of ideas...."\(^{24}\) Even if we grant that Hume does sometimes use 'evidence' to mean 'evidentness,' it is crucial to note that he does at times indisputably employ it as a term of epistemic evaluation. Perhaps most famously, Hume declares that "[a] wise man...proportions his belief to the evidence."\(^{25}\) In the context of the argument of I iv 1, it seems that Hume employs 'evidence' as a term of epistemic evaluation for reasons I have discussed. Of course, each occurrence of 'evidence' will require a careful reading. And some will protest that in I iv 1 we should read 'evidence' as 'evidentness.' For example, at T 181 Hume claims that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence, which we employ in common life...." Can evidence (in the 'evidential ground' sense) for mathematical truth (e.g., 1+1=2) really come to have the same nature as the evidence for empirical truths (e.g., X is the burglar)?\(^{26}\) We can give an affirmative answer here because in the case of mathematical beliefs and empirical beliefs the evidential grounds are not infallible. Mistakes occur in mathematical reasoning as well as in everyday reasoning. Granted, one might have stronger evidence for a mathematical belief than an empirical one, but the evidence in both cases is fallible (or defeasible). So in this sense the evidence in both cases can be of the same nature. Accordingly, a sceptical interpreter can make perfect sense of what Hume says at T 181. Unfortunately, in this paper we cannot settle the complex debate about the meaning of 'evidence' in I iv 1. So if this discussion is unsatisfactorily short, hopefully the second reason to read Hume's conclusion as sceptical (despite Morris' interpretation) will be more acceptable.

Questions about 'evidence' notwithstanding, then, let us focus on the claim that our beliefs are based on nothing but custom. This claim, which Morris trumpets as Hume's solution to scepticism, also seems functionally equivalent to the thesis that our beliefs lack evidential grounds. For what reason do we have to take custom as a reliable guide to the truth? If custom is the sole cause of our beliefs, then it seems that we have no evidence for our beliefs—i.e., no reason to suspect that our beliefs are true. In other words, if a belief is correct, then its origin in custom is not enough to convert that true belief into knowledge. So our beliefs are not epistemically justified and, as a result, we have no knowledge.

At this point, a naturalized epistemologist may protest that what Hume was doing was not any different from what Quine advocated. For in coining the phrase "epistemology naturalized," Quine argued that we should view epistemology as a subdiscipline of the science of psychology where we simply describe how it is that we attain the beliefs that we do have.\(^{27}\) And this certainly seems like what Hume is doing when, as Morris emphasizes, he
simply reports that, fortunately, nature does not allow us to be held in the
grips of sceptical arguments for too long.\(^\text{28}\) Hence, on this account whether
or not we think Hume’s gambit works will probably be partially a function of
how successful we think naturalized epistemology can be (or is). That is,
some might protest that while the promise of Hume’s naturalizing strategy
might have been lost on his contemporaries, the recent advent of
naturalized epistemology provides us with the resources to avoid attributing
such scepticism to his system. To answer this challenge, the next section will
examine some different naturalistic readings of Hume to reveal how issues
surrounding naturalized epistemology not only support the \textit{sceptical} reading
of Hume’s system but also help us to appreciate its full import.

\section*{III. Hume and Naturalized Epistemology}

\textbf{A. Naturalistic Descriptions and Epistemic ‘Oughts’: The Problem of
Normativity.} Needless to say, naturalized epistemology is a daunting subject
because it encompasses a broad range of controversial topics. Although we
can not deal adequately with all of them here, we can at least briefly explore
the issue of the \textit{normativity} of epistemic judgments. After all, it seems that
when Quine urged epistemologists to \textit{describe} how we come to our beliefs
instead of dictating how we \textit{ought} to order our epistemic affairs, he was in
effect saying that we should \textit{eliminate} normative epistemic judgments.\(^\text{29}\)
While Quine’s proposal brings to the fore many topics, Hilary Kornblith is
surely correct when he notes: “Precisely what the Quinean project amounts
to is...a subject of some controversy.... At the centre of the controversy is the
issue of the normative dimension of epistemological inquiry....”\(^\text{30}\) Now it
certainly sounds as though Hume is abandoning epistemic normativity
when he denies that our beliefs have any evidence to support them. After all,
the concept of evidence seems inextricably tied to the normative concept of
epistemic justification. As Jaegwon Kim puts it: “The concept of evidence is
inseparable from that of justification. When we talk of ‘evidence’ in an
epistemological sense we are talking about justification: one thing is
‘evidence’ for another just in case the first tends to enhance the
reasonableness or justification of the second.”\(^\text{31}\) Unsurprisingly, then,
Hume’s system raises the same problem of epistemic normativity that has
surfaced with naturalized epistemology.

Regrettably, Hume never explicitly tells us his \textit{precise} views about
normative epistemic properties. Indeed, it seems that the only passage that
touches on such a subject is in the latter stages of the \textit{Treatise}, where Hume
famously observes that it is difficult to derive an “ought” from an “is”:

\begin{quote}
In every system of morality...the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or
makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I
\end{quote}
am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (T 469, Hume's emphasis)

Here Hume is speaking about moral "oughts," to be sure. Yet, it certainly seems in the spirit of his naturalism to make the general claim that it is difficult to derive norms of any kind from "pure facts." More specifically, Hume's project seems to demand that at the very least we need some explanation about how descriptive facts about what we believe have any bearing on what epistemic norms should guide our reasoning.

With this in mind, let us now examine the following passage from Hume:

...if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us. (T 270, emphasis added)

Interestingly enough, Hume makes this comment immediately after his discussion about how nature saves us from the sceptical argument of the section we have been discussing. Now some naturalists may seize upon such admonitions and argue that although Hume may have struggled with sceptical tendencies, in the end he leaves room for some sort of epistemic normativity. I confess that Hume does appear to appeal to some kind of epistemic normativity in such passages. But given the conclusions he accepts at other places, a significant tension arises in Hume's system.

For consider the passage just quoted. If his answer to scepticism is merely to describe how nature prevents us from being total sceptics (as Morris contends), then this statement is quite mysterious. After all, here Hume himself seems to move imperceptibly from what natureforces us to believe to what we ought to believe. Hence, even by Hume's own standards we are owed a much better account and explanation about the source of this epistemic "ought." Unfortunately, Hume never gives such an explicit explanation; so clearly the burden of proof rests on those who wish to argue
that Hume endorses epistemic norms that are consistent with his naturalism—especially given his demand for such an explanation in these circumstances. In other words, in the context of my sceptical reading of Hume, I do not need to show that there is no possible way to give an adequate naturalistic account of Humean epistemic norms/justification; instead I only have to contend that we have not been presented with an adequate account. Because I cannot probe all available naturalistic readings here, I will examine some other representative naturalistic readings to show that even the most promising proposals fall far short of undermining the sceptical reading.

Annette Baier's *A Progress of Sentiments* is one of the most interesting recent naturalistic attempts to provide an account of norms that is consistent with Hume's alleged naturalism. Baier claims that for Hume "all necessity derives from normative necessity, and all the norms available to us are our human norms, the products of our reflection" (Baier 100). In short, she contends that Hume can accept norms that survive reflective scrutiny (Baier 97). Interestingly enough, when she applies this general interpretive framework to I iv 1, she develops a view similar to Morris': that is, she not only claims that intellectualist/rationalist norms destroy themselves, but that the solution is to affirm that belief arises only from custom (Baier 96-97). In other words, custom/habit/practice forces us to abort reason's ultimately self-destructive attempt to validate its own deliverances. Now even if she is correct that Hume accepts norms that actually do pass the test of critical reflection, it is difficult to see why we should accept such epistemic norms. That is, once norms are reflectively validated, we can make the purely descriptive or factual claim that such norms have not been rejected by those who have critically reflected on them. But how can a good Humean naturalist go from this description to the normative claim that we ought to follow such norms? By the same token, how can a naturalized epistemologist argue that we should follow reflectively endorsed norms?33 We can further exacerbate this puzzle by noting that, according to Baier's reading of Hume, all reasoning is based only on custom. It thus follows that reflective reasoning is derived from custom. But then why should we have any confidence in the verdicts of reflection? More specifically, why should we believe that the norms that it validates are the correct ones? In short, while Baier's proposal seems initially promising, it still does not come close to addressing adequately the fundamental problem of normativity.

In light of the thesis of this paper, perhaps we can reconstruct Baier's position along the following lines. If the sceptical interpretation of Hume's system is correct and there are no evidential grounds for any belief, then in a sense we should not believe anything. So, assuming that ought implies can, the argument of I iv 1 is irrelevant because it tells us not to believe anything
when this course of "action" is unavailable to us. The norms of I iv 1 are thus not reflectively validated because we simply cannot comply with them. Hence the naturalist reading wins.

The difficulty with this reasoning is that it misunderstands how the norms operate according to the sceptical interpretation. To be sure, the sceptical reading will indeed yield the result that, epistemically speaking, we should have no beliefs. But surely there are other reasons to form beliefs. As Hume points out, pragmatically speaking, we still should form beliefs. If we grant that we must form beliefs for pragmatic reasons, then, admittedly, we cannot "follow" the epistemic norms in question by suspending judgment. Nevertheless, we can "follow" Hume's reasoning to the extent that we "see" that no belief has evidential backing. (Otherwise, Hume would not be able to make his point that our beliefs are based only on custom!) In the context of scepticism as a thesis about a lack of knowledge, then, Hume's position certainly seems to entail that we have no evidential backing for our beliefs; thus, no belief is epistemically justified. At the very least, then, we should "follow" these norms by resisting the temptation to claim that we have knowledge.

But herein lies the rub: if no belief has any evidential backing, then the alleged naturalist project loses much of its appeal. For whatever results are produced by applying the "experimental methods of science" to moral subjects have no evidence to support them. They are no more justified than an account that does not use such methods. Take, for example, Hume's significant claim that nature prevents us from suspending our beliefs. Strangely enough, a consequence of his system is that both the proposition (a) nature prevents us from being total sceptics and (b) nature does not prevent us from being total sceptics have the same probability: namely, (virtually) zero. So Hume's thesis effectively cuts off the justification of any appeal to nature. In short, then, the sceptical interpreter of Hume can agree that we still form beliefs for various reasons but insist that we should abstain from maintaining that one belief (or system of inquiry) is more justified (epistemically speaking) than its competitors.

B. Hume: Radical Sceptic and Naturalized Epistemologist? Let me make my point as clear as possible. My thesis is not that Hume's sceptical system precludes him from being a naturalized epistemologist. What I am maintaining is that even if he is a naturalized epistemologist, his overall system is still sceptical. It is thus not inconsistent to maintain that Hume is both a naturalized epistemologist and a sceptic. After all, one can coherently deny that we have knowledge and yet still attempt to describe how we obtain our beliefs. But at times Hume seems to go beyond mere description by dictating how we ought to govern our intellectual affairs. It seems to me that this is precisely what he is doing in the passage from T 270, and this seems inconsistent with many of his other ideas. I suspect that it is here where
many naturalist interpreters go awry. For many people are committed to what Mikael M. Karlsson calls “constructive exegesis,” the guiding principle of which is that

we do not understand a philosophical text until we interpret it in such a way as to render it both coherent and correct.... Constructive exegesis is indeed a strange, and peculiarly optimistic enterprise. Someday, I imagine, in a leisurely moment, I will think more reflectively about the principles of our art. But not now.37

Those who hold to this principle might reason along these lines: if this sceptical thesis is correct, then Hume violates his own edict in other places where he clearly distinguishes rational beliefs from irrational beliefs (i.e., beliefs with no evidential backing). But Hume could not have been so careless as to rely on this distinction in other places in the Treatise and then deny its validity here. The sceptical interpretation of Hume therefore cannot be correct.

David Pears appears to exemplify this interpretive approach to Hume. Although Pears advocates reading Hume as a naturalist, he is disturbed when Hume says “all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. ’Tis not solely in poetry and music we must follow sentiment, but likewise in philosophy” (T 103).38 Pears rightly recognizes (as we have discussed) that if beliefs are simply based only on sentiments, then we have no evidence or justification for those beliefs. But he argues that “if the evidence really is exactly balanced, Hume can only be guessing, and he was supposed to be telling us how inference works.... So we must conclude that he was carried away by his own rhetoric in the passage that has just been quoted [T 103]. He ought not to have implied that causal inference is ever a response to autonomous feeling.”39 In essence, Pears argues that we should ignore the passages that lead to scepticism because this would produce an irreconcilable contradiction in Hume’s system.

But we can not dismiss Hume’s thoughts at T 103 so easily. For Hume’s discussion of causal inferences is almost exactly parallel to the significant consequence he gleans in I iv 1: that belief comes only from custom. It would be implausible in the extreme to dismiss Hume’s appeal to the sensitive part of our nature in I iv 1 as overblown rhetoric—especially because both Morris and Baier claim that Hume somehow saves himself by adopting this thesis!

More generally, this type of reasoning based on constructive exegesis seems suspect at best. It simply rules any interpretation of Hume that might lead to contradiction as out of bounds. But why presume this? After all, such an assumption seems to be extremely ad hoc and is quite unHumean in the way it legislates discussion in an a priori fashion. There is nothing
improper, of course, with a general rule of charity in interpretation. What I am protesting, however, is the de jure assumption that any interpretation that renders Hume as even slightly inconsistent must be mistaken.

In sum, my sceptical interpretation of Hume means that his system denies that we have knowledge because it denies that we possess justified beliefs (or, more precisely, that we have evidence for any of our beliefs). Although this is not inconsistent with a naturalist program of simple description per se, we seem to run into a problem when Hume discusses what principles we ought to follow (as Pears recognizes). For either such admonitions tell us how we can acquire epistemically justified beliefs or they do not. If they do not, then it is difficult to see how they can provide comfort for an interpretation of Hume as a naturalized epistemologist (similar to that of Baier and Morris) because without epistemic justification we cannot have knowledge. On the other hand, if these recommendations will lead to epistemically justified beliefs, then we are owed some account of how a belief can be justified if we have no evidence for it. This last point is absolutely crucial. For it is vital to see that the burden of proof rests on the naturalist, given the Humean demand that we need an explanation of how we can derive epistemic justification or normativity from simply describing how we acquire our beliefs. Without this burden discharged, the sceptical view triumphs. In other words, while we should be as charitable as possible in interpreting philosophers, we seem to have substantial evidence that Hume's system is sceptical, and any argument based on constructive exegesis to the contrary simply begs the question.

C. Back to the Future: Hume and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. At this point, I want to switch gears to attempt to formulate our question in slightly different but related terms. In contemporary parlance, one attracted to a naturalized epistemology reading of Hume's system might approach the problem like this: what if Hume was simply an externalist? Now the term 'externalism' is a fairly recent blip on the epistemological radar screen. The position is essentially a denial of internalism, which states roughly that the justifiedness of a belief is solely a function of states reflectively or introspectively internal to an agent. Externalism denies this thesis and claims that the justifiedness of a belief is also at least partially a function of external states of affairs. Furthermore, it seems that this externalist view of justification is a close cousin to naturalized epistemology. Indeed, from the way many philosophers have characterized these views, it is easy to draw the conclusion that there is an indissoluble link between one's being a naturalist and one's being an externalist. As John Pollock puts it: "One of the attractions of externalist theories is that they hold promise for integrating epistemic norms into a naturalistic picture of man.... Externalist theories have seemed to provide the only possible candidates for naturalistic reductions of epistemic norms...."
Swain notes that when externalism was first proposed, it "was associated primarily with the work of causal and reliability theorists, also known as 'naturalistic' epistemologists." Lest one think that this portrayal is idiosyncratic to Pollock and Swain, here is how David Armstrong, one of the first proponents of externalism, characterizes this view: "According to 'Externalist' accounts of non-inferential knowledge, what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural [my emphasis] relation which holds between the belief-state...and the situation which makes the belief true." Thus, it seems that we can view at least some externalist theories as an attempt to give a naturalistic basis for epistemic normativity without eliminating it entirely.

Along these lines, Francis W. Dauer has attempted to connect what he takes to be Hume's solution to the problem of induction to Goldman's earlier causal theory of knowledge. Roughly, Dauer claims that according to such a theory a belief can lack internally accessible evidential grounds and still count as knowledge so long as it is caused in the appropriate manner. In other words, a true belief that arises via appropriate causal channels is still an instance of knowledge even though the cognizer cannot by reflection alone determine that the belief is appropriately produced. While Dauer does not say that Hume offers such an account, he does say that it "would be consistent with Hume's position for him to offer it as a solution." Clearly this is an externalist attempt to save Hume's system from scepticism.

But even this externalist maneuver fails. For many externalists admit that some internalist constraint is necessary for justification. Specifically, most externalists concede that what one believes about the reliability of one's cognitive faculties can affect the justifiedness of a belief it produces. Even Alvin Goldman, one of the brightest externalist stars in the epistemological heavens, abandoned the causal theory upon which Dauer relies and has stressed the following internalist constraint:

I do not mean to imply that use of a highly reliable method is sufficient for...justifiedness.... A further necessary condition of justifiedness...is that the believer's cognitive state, at the time he uses the method, should not undermine the correctness, or adequacy, of the method. Very roughly, it should not be the case that the believer thinks that the method is unreliable, nor is he justified in regarding the method as unreliable.

Now this seems to be the type of situation in which Hume finds himself. After all, although Hume does not believe that all his cognitive faculties are unreliable per se, he does hold that they offer beliefs that have no evidential backing. To reiterate Hume's own words: "nothing [remains] of the original probability" (T 182) and "all the rules of logic require a
continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 183). As a result, not only is there no way to determine the reliability of our cognitive methods but there also seems to be an undeniable *undermining* of the confidence we should have in the adequacy of a method that provides us with no evidence for any of our beliefs. To be sure, Hume does emphasize that outside the study, such arguments undermining our belief-forming capacities have little effect on us; nevertheless, while we still do form beliefs, the argument (which Hume admits is not defective) simply reveals that even in “common life” we should still abstain from claiming that our beliefs are justified or evidentially supported. Thus, the wide-ranging scope of Hume’s own deliberations on this topic certainly does seem to undermine any conclusion he later draws.

In short, then, Dauer’s externalist attempt fails in our context because it falls prey to the same general undermining problem that Goldman himself later highlights. For as long there is no evidence for any belief, then even if a belief is appropriately caused we have no reason to believe it is so caused. Thus the belief is not justified and cannot count as knowledge.

Now I confess that many of my comments on these matters are programmatic, sketchy and incomplete in many ways. This bears repeating. I confess that many of my comments on these matters are programmatic, sketchy and incomplete in many ways. But, as I have emphasized, the burden of proof rests on those who want to give some plausible naturalistic reading here. The question simply is this: how precisely would such a naturalistic account of epistemic justification proceed without violating *Hume’s own demand* that we need an explanation for such normativity? The naturalistic accounts we have examined seem to run aground on this problem. When the issue is cast in the terms sketched above, then it seems that the venerable tradition of interpreting Hume as a sceptic is not only well-supported textually, but has emerged unscathed even after considering some of the most sophisticated naturalistic treatments of current issues concerning knowledge, justification, and scepticism. Of course, I realize that my remarks have not shut the door on *all possible* externalist or other naturalist attempts to save Hume from scepticism; nor do I claim to have uncovered an *insoluble* problem for naturalist strategies concerning epistemic normativity. At the very least, though, the resiliency of my sceptical reading reveals that we need a serious response from naturalistic interpreters on these issues. Otherwise, the sceptical interpretation triumphs.

**IV. Conclusion**

What is the upshot of this whirlwind tour? I do not claim by any stretch of the imagination to have *proven* that Hume’s system was sceptical. What I have attempted to do, however, is to expose how accepting his system and
all it relevantly entails would commit one to scepticism given our contemporary construal of knowledge. It is thus a strategic paper blazing the path to what I take to be a return to the more traditional interpretation of Hume. Along the way, of course, we have discovered that focusing on these issues places us in the middle of a broad range of topics in contemporary epistemology and philosophy in general. Thus, even if my interpretation does show some tensions or inconsistencies in Hume, this does not mean that he is an insignificant figure in the history of philosophy not worth studying. On the contrary, exploring Hume's system (and Humean interpretations) with the lenses of current epistemology may serve to throw significant light on Hume's philosophy and our own situation.

NOTES

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2 Stroud, Hume, 1.


6 Such a comparative argument cannot, of course, consider all possible alternative interpretations. I will not, for instance, consider the aforementioned analytic empiricist interpretation. As a result, when I ask
whether Hume was a radical sceptic or a naturalized epistemologist, I am not assuming a false dichotomy, but rather comparing the two major camps of Humean interpretation.


10 Here is how Hume describes the situation in his own words:

Having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv’d from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having adjusted these two together, we are oblig’d by our reason to add a new doubt deriv’d from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. This is a doubt, which immediately occurs to us, and of which, if we wou’d closely pursue our reason, we cannot avoid giving a decision. But this decision, tho’ it shou’d be favourable to our preceeding judgment, being founded only on probability, must weaken still further our first evidence, and must itself be weaken’d by a fourth doubt of the same kind, and so on in infinitum; till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty. (T 182)

For a technical reconstruction of this argument, see Fred Wilson, "Hume's Sceptical Argument Against Reason," Hume Studies 9.2 (November 1983): 90–129.

11 By employing terms such as "achievements" and "achieve" here, I do not mean to imply that Hume successfully argues for all of his points. Instead, the achievement to which I refer is simply Hume’s system (i.e., the totality of propositions that Hume affirms in his philosophy).

12 So far as I can tell, Stroud never explicitly separates these two distinctive ways of viewing Hume’s comments on scepticism. Thus, he makes the following comment about I iv 1 in passing: "[Hume's] aim there is to show that so-called 'demonstrative reasoning' is no more immune to sceptical challenge than is non-demonstrative reasoning.... I have tried to indicate that the point of the sceptical arguments is a different one [i.e., is not to advocate scepticism]" (Hume, 268, n 14; my emphasis). Note that Stroud does not broach the issue of the actual effect these conclusions have on Hume's system regardless of what the point of this section was. As will become
apparent, if Stroud’s naturalistic interpretation of Hume simply amounts to the claim that Hume intended to be a naturalist, then my arguments do not gainsay his position.

13 D. C. Stove, *Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 132, hereafter, Stove. For a brief synopsis of how many major commentators on Hume view this section, see Richard DeWitt, “Hume’s Probability Argument of I iv 1,” *Hume Studies* 11.2 (November 1985): 125–140, n 3. Fred Wilson (“Hume’s Sceptical Argument Against Reason”) obviously is more impressed with this argument than Stove was. His evaluation is that this is “an argument worthy of a philosopher, and, if it is unsound, then it is at least worth refuting” (124). For a more recent interpretation of this argument that attempts to show that the reasoning is not obviously incorrect, see Francis W. Dauer, “Hume’s Scepticism with Regard to Reason: A Reconsideration,” *Hume Studies* 22.2 (November 1996): 211–229.

14 For the original article that brought this problem to the attention of the philosophical community, see Edmund L. Gettier, Jr., “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” *Analysis* 23 (1963): 121–123.


16 Stove seems to make such a point. He claims that “Hume was not...deceived by it for long: the argument was never repeated after the *Treatise*” (132).

17 Annette Baier has argued that one horn of this dilemma is generated only if one adopts certain “Kantian” principles (Baier, 14). But the text itself does not seem to suggest this. The dilemma, rather, is generated by considering the “understanding when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles.” For a more thorough criticism of Baier’s reading of this passage, see Wayne Waxman, *Hume’s Theory of Consciousness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 280, n 1.

18 Terence Penelhum makes a more general point about Hume’s *Treatise* in relationship to the rest of his writings that seems to support my reading: “There is no reason to suppose...any...of the psychological theses of the *Treatise* to have been abandoned [by Hume in the rest of his writings]” (*Hume [Macmillan: London, 1975], 36–37).


20 We should note that some philosophers have recently contended that epistemic justification is not necessary for knowledge. William Alston is one epistemologist who has argued for this claim. See particularly “Justification and Knowledge” in his *Epistemic Justification* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 172–182; see also Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chapters 1 and 2. For some critiques of these arguments, see my “Chisholming Away at Plantinga’s Critique of Epistemic Deontology,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76.1 (March 1998): 90–96 and “Knowledge from Gossip?” *Philosophia* (forthcoming). But since
my thesis is conditional (i.e., if we accept the justified true belief theory of knowledge as approximately true) we can ignore such views here. In the next section, though, I will deal explicitly with issues surrounding externalist/naturalist theories of justification.

21 Here I am assuming that there is a strong connection between justification and evidence. Once again, I will grapple with possible externalist/naturalist objections to this assumption in the next section.

22 Foundationalists may deny this inference. For according to them, foundational (or basic) beliefs, upon which all our other beliefs rest, can be epistemically justified without evidence. Nevertheless, even if this is the correct way to characterize foundationalism, such an appeal will not save Hume. For while foundationalists deny that we must have "evidence" to support foundational beliefs, they admit that such beliefs must be "grounded" in some sort of experience. Thus, the foundational belief that 1+1=2 is grounded in our apprehension of the meaning of this proposition, to put the matter somewhat imprecisely. But Hume denies that even these beliefs are likely to be true because our "apprehensions" are fallible; and if they are fallible, then they succumb to the same sceptical argument that doomed all the other beliefs.

23 To be sure, Hume does seem to try to stake a middle ground of urging us to accept reasoning when it mixes with some propensity (T 270); yet it is difficult to see how this middle ground helps—as I shall discuss more fully in the next section.

24 Don Garrett, *Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 228. Michael Lynch ("Hume and the Limits of Reason," *Hume Studies* 22 [April 1996]: 89–104) has advocated a reading along similar lines: "I take it that when Hume mentions 'evidence' here [i.e., in I iv 1], as in many other parts of the *Treatise*, he means 'evidentness'; that is, being evident to the subject" (104, n 12).


26 This objection I owe to an anonymous referee.

27 See Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized."

28 Keith Lehrer (*Theory of Knowledge* [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989]) is one of the few philosophers of whom I am aware who has explicitly discussed Hume under the heading of naturalized epistemology. This is how Lehrer justifies his classification: "What is a naturalistic theory? It is one in which all the terms used in the analysis are ones that describe phenomena of nature, such as causation, for example, or that can be reduced to such terms. Hume's theory of belief was naturalistic in this sense. He restricted his account of human knowledge to relations of causation, contiguity, and resemblance" (154).

29 Thus, Maffie, in "Recent Work on Naturalized Epistemology," classifies Quine as an eliminativist naturalist who denies "the existence of normative epistemic properties, forsaking the standard account of knowledge as justified
true belief in favor of a purely descriptive account” (285).
33 It is, of course, possible that the test of reflective scrutiny is such that it would be legitimate for a Humean/naturalized epistemologist to claim that we should follow norms that pass this test. But, to reiterate, it is difficult to see how such a test would work without a much more detailed account of this test.
34 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this general point.
35 Some may here protest that we may still be justified in our beliefs because nature forces us to believe them. We are justified because we are not culpable for believing as we do. But on this account all our beliefs would be justified because we have no control over any of them. Thus any true belief would count as knowledge (Gettier problems to the side) since all beliefs would be justified. Surely this is an untoward consequence.
36 Others have recognized the point that Hume’s conclusion, if allowed to stand as is, wreaks havoc on the rest of his system. Thus Stove: “the kind of scepticism, whatever it is, which is argued for in that section [I iv 1], would include inductive inferences in its scope. But now mark another consequence of endorsing that argument.... The effect of the argument, as we have seen, is to involve all inference in a common ruin. It will thus inter alia obliterate a distinction, on which rests the whole of Hume’s argument of Book I Part III for inductive scepticism, and even his argument for inductive fallibilism: the distinction between valid and invalid inferences. This is also a distinction which is of considerable importance to other philosophers.... But apparently Hume must be praised even though the heavens fall” (Stove, 132).
37 “Epistemic Leaks and Epistemic Meltdowns: A Response to William Morris on Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” Hume Studies 16.2 (November 1990): 121–130, at 121. Interestingly enough, Karlsson is thus at a loss when he finds all reconstructions of Hume’s arguments of this section (I iv 1) dubious. He claims that “I am about as far away as ever from understanding Hume on these points. Could Hume really have argued so badly? Could he have overlooked such obvious errors and contradicted himself so glaringly? I doubt it” (127).
38 Quoted in Pears, Hume’s System, 96.
39 Pears, Hume’s System, 97.
We should note, though, that while the term 'externalism' is new, some have claimed that the position itself is an ancient one. Alvin Plantinga, in *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), for instance, claims that externalism dates back at least to Aristotle (v, 183-184).


Alvin Goldman, “Strong and Weak Justification,” in *Philosophical Perspectives, 2: Epistemology*, edited by James Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1988), 54. In quoting this passage approvingly, I am assuming (along with most contemporary epistemologists) that any pure externalism that rejects such an internalist constraint is mistaken. This point seems to me to be obviously correct, but I cannot argue for it here.

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