Hume, Multiperspectival Pluralism, and Authorial Voice
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Of all the great philosophers, Hume is probably the one about whom there is, among specialists, the deepest diversity of incompatible interpretations. Hume scholars, their results the outcome of years of labour and close intelligent command both of the Hume texts, and of each others' views, still arrive at remarkably different understandings, at the most basic levels, of what is going on in Hume's philosophical work. At the same time, these incompatible interpretations are typically forwarded with astonishing confidence by their proponents, as pretty much obviously, and certainly not seriously disputably, what Hume meant, and what informed exploration of his writings shows.¹ There are of course some results of consensus, and some matters about which hardly anyone is in doubt. But to a degree probably without equal in the cases of other major philosophers, Hume elicits certitude, but to outcomes impossible to combine.²

By Hume's philosophical work I mean essentially A Treatise of Human Nature, the two Enquiries, and attendant or accompanying material such as the Abstract of the Treatise, and its Appendix.³ There are of course differences to be met with in Hume's work with the passage of time; significant differences of tone, and probably of doctrine, between the Treatise and the first Enquiry, for example. Yet, even for those who claim an inconsistent or erratic Hume, there is commonly agreed to be a fundamental commonality in his work, a unitary philosophy identifiable in all these core writings. What is not agreed is what that philosophy is.

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Hume's views on religion illustrate this theme. Some are sure that Hume is an atheist, others that he is a deist, or at least some kind of theist; some even think he is a nonstandard fideist Christian. Likewise with regard to the possibility of knowledge of reality: some think Hume is a metaphysical realist, others that he is a positivist, hostile to any possibility of metaphysical pretension. Others see the latter animus, but still hold, sometimes on new grounds, to the classical conception of Hume as a genuine skeptic of one degree or other. Still others combine something of the first reading with something of the third, calling Hume a skeptical realist. Páll S. Ardal, if I interpret his view of Hume correctly, sees him as a sort of pragmatist, or proto-pragmatist, as do others. Most—though not all—contemporary interpreters identify Hume as a naturalist. Some think Hume unquestionably believes in causality—indeed, causality of full rationalist stripe; others are sure that he denies that there is causality in the world, or else impute to him an altogether novel sort of causality, that, as they see it, no one before him—and possibly few since—have entertained. Some think Hume denied that there are people, or selves; others are confident that he shares standard common sense assumptions about human persons, and other items of the world.

The relations between Hume's epistemological and psychological views and his work in moral philosophy, also are conceived in radically different ways. For some Hume means primarily to be the Newton of the mind—the first social scientist. Others contest the Newtonian ascription. Still others argue that Hume's whole goal is the formulation of an account of moral thinking, and the moral life, and all else is just propaedeutic to that end. Some see a profound unity and an architectonic interconnectedness in the Humean philosophical edifice, where others think Hume turns his philosophical attention upon one topic or range of topics then on to others, not noticing that he reaches views in one sector that are inconsistent with his views in other areas. For some Hume is a supremely masterful philosophical mind, with a synoptic command not only of the terrain of his special topics in human experience but of the inquiring eye and stance of naturalist investigator that he brings to these topics; cool, self-conscious, ironist, this Hume comes to views about all projects that explore experience, including his own project. Others think there is quite a lot that Hume didn't notice or see, including the fact that he comes to results he proclaims with confidence where, if the results are sound, this must preclude the very possibility of his or anyone's having reached them.

I

The foregoing is meant to set the stage for an attempt to explain, at least in part, the complex challenge producing "the real Hume" has posed for his interpreters. Then in virtue of that explanation—if I am right—a better
grounded identification and inspection of Hume's philosophy may be offered.

One (though only one) of the reasons for the wide proliferation of incompatible interpretation of what is going on in Hume's philosophical writings is, I argue, that Hume's texts sometimes juxtapose perspectives, which his style and probably his temperament make it easy to see as his own settled view as the author occupies and presents them. Among these are the perspective of the vulgar, or common sense, that of pre-modern rationalist philosophy, that of the new science (especially typified by Locke), that of ancient (Pyrrhonian) skepticism, and that of a corrected or chastened naturalist empiricism. This last is essentially Locke much modified, in naturalist directions, by the modesty skepticism induces and by closer attention to the—misguided—ideas of the vulgar. Given my strictures against others' overconfident global interpretations, and given the central role assigned here of multiple perspectives in Hume's writing, many of which should not be taken as Hume's own views, I had better not myself adopt too sure a note. Nonetheless, my own view is in fact that the modified more fully naturalized Lockean empiricism just identified is Hume's own philosophical position, at any rate that it is the one closest to Hume's views as to the truth of things. Even if this is correct, what may be called Hume's authorial stance—sometimes confusingly—is that of the philosophical man of letters, his model probably Cicero, whom Hume frequently affirms having been one of his earliest, and continuing and most admired, influences. Ciceronian background considerations and stylistic or literary facts duly noted, I argue that though they may, they need not have primary philosophical significance. Authorial stance is not necessarily philosophical stance. I argue for a comprehensive unity in Humean philosophy, and see it—as many others of course also do—as claiming a limited or boundaried naturalism, within which the beginnings of genuine social science are being forged. I also argue that the unity notwithstanding, Hume gives no evidence of posing fundamental self-referential queries for his project.

Fully making the case for this large and comprehensive set of views, in the nature of the sort of views they are, would require quite extensive inspection and comparison of Humean textual passages. My aim here will be chiefly to provide a substantial beachhead for that case. And parts of that case are intended to be more suggestive than probative. As on other Humean themes Årdal offers wise counsel. In his instructive review of Annette Baier's *A Progress of Sentiments* he says the following about her work: "The fact that a view is interesting does not of course justify attributing it to Hume. The view has to be there as a reasonable interpretation of the text."23 Årdal's cautionary note duly registered, the present paper means to sketch a way of interpreting much in the philosophy of Hume that seems enigmatic, and not satisfactorily explained. The interpretive idea I forward is essentially literary.
It holds that Hume needs more closely than he has usually been to be understood as a literary artist, using literary—more specifically, dramatic—devices to set out views he is discussing, and not necessarily, appearances to the contrary, advocating.24

II

The whole of Part iv—"Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy"—of Book I of the Treatise, is the site of greatest challenge for interpreting Humean philosophy overall; the present proposal is especially prompted by and intended to have application to the Hume encountered there. Part iv not only poses the problem of consistency with the rest of the Treatise; it is also not obvious why those ninety-four pages are there at all. It is not self-evident that a naturalist view of human nature should discuss skepticism. Hume's particular naturalist views about people in fact may make skepticism something to contend with, indeed worry about; so this is presumably at least part of why the section is there. Still, within it, where to find the real Hume is not easy. It is above all for Part iv that the "multiperspectival" idea is meant to be useful. But I think it also has application elsewhere in Hume, perhaps especially in relation to his remarks on—indeed, his philosophy of—religion.

Contemporary discussions of Hume often discern two foci of Humean philosophical enterprise, usually seen as its chief targets. Specifically, a rationalist metaphysical perspective, regarded as yielding what we might call synthetic a priori truths, is sometimes seen as contrasting, in Hume and in fact, with a so-called common sense perspective, with Hume juxtaposing and arbitrating between the two—either (usually), according to the interpreter, coming to a skeptical position, holding that philosophy is unable to decide or to know, which of the alternatives is more convincing (or deciding with confidence that neither is), or else coming to the common sense view. The analyses and the resolutions that both of these interpretive positions involve meet with the difficulty, chiefly, and baldly, that on each one Hume seems to emerge as inconsistent, or with troublesome texts that challenge and complicate the favoured view.

I argue that Hume juxtaposes, and moves dialectically among three primary positions or perspectival anchors, not two; with further perspectives that also play a role in his work. One of the three is indeed a common-sense stance. This is the location of "the vulgar," of what we are inclined to think about ourselves, the world, and our epistemic and other relations with the world. (Hume is not very interested in what we are inclined to say about these, or any, matters. In fact, Hume has hardly any interest at all in language, or semantics; contrary to what many twentieth-century analytic interpreters have supposed.) The second anchored stance is that of
rationalist metaphysics, though sometimes Hume groups what he thinks of as modern supposedly scientifically grounded natural philosophy—e.g., much, at least, of the philosophy of Locke—with the second pole. But Hume mostly rejects both of the latter stances, and for the most part not in favour of a genuinely, or a radically, skeptical position, but rather in favour of what he thinks is a truly scientific or empirically grounded view that will correct both "pure reason" and "common sense." The result of Humean analysis is supposed to be a guarded, tentative, observationally or experimentally supported naturalist view of the world as a whole, and of its several constituent phenomena, external and internal. Hume identifies what "common sense" aspires to and repudiates its pretensions, and does the same with what the learned doctors, ancient and modern, have proposed. Some of common sense survives the analysis, and is retained, just as some (not perhaps quite as much) of what pre-eighteenth-century philosophy proposes does; but both are chastened and corrected, i.e., revised, and added to by Hume's own concrete positive theories and analyses. In the common sense voice, for example, Hume affirms that "philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected" (EHU 162). As for skepticism: Hume feels its power and thinks that if standards of justification are made high enough, no argument can refute it. Hume also argues that detailed analysis—mostly empirical introspectional analysis—of how thought develops reveals us to be less rational and less cognitively successful animals than we (and almost all other philosophical views) suppose. So for Hume there are in fact two major varieties of skepticism to worry about: radical or justificatory skepticism, and what I call phenomenological skepticism.25 Though Hume does worry somewhat about both (I will have further remarks about the first below), and possibly ought to worry more than he does, on the whole and in the end he nails his standard to the ship of naturalist or 'scientific' philosophy (in the sense manifested in the twentieth century, in the work of Russell, Reichenbach, Quine, and many contemporary naturalist and materialist positions). Indeed Hume may be said to be the first 'mature' scientific philosopher. (Democritus is the original formulator, and remains the iconic prototype, of scientific philosophy; Hobbes is an 'immature' or 'premature' instance of the genre.) The Treatise and the first Enquiry are rightly viewed, as they sometimes are viewed, as the authentically canonical launch documents for this tradition.26

If this general view is correct then seeing oppositional polarities between 'reason' and 'common sense' in Hume (with 'skepticism' the siren whose shoals Hume and his interpreters must seek to avoid, or—for some interpreters—the option Hume is finally embracing) is confused and wrong-headed. Hume is the champion neither of common sense nor of
skepticism, but of a scientific philosophy that, partly impelled by the force of the latter, modifies, diminishes and augments the former.

Complicating things though, I suggest, are features of Hume's philosophical style. In his texts some of Hume's pronouncements should be seen as representing views of the vulgar, others those of pre-modern rationalism, others those of Pyrrhonian skepticism, and others, finally, of 'corrected' scientific empiricism. Moreover, while it is generally made clear, or clear enough, in context, that Hume is not endorsing a view that projects one or other of these perspectives, it is not always so. Sometimes, especially perhaps in Part iv of Book I of the Treatise, and in passages on theism, a persona is left to speak without the Humean authorial voice identifying its stance on that persona. Thus—quite understandably—the inattentive reader is left, sometimes, in some confusion.

Thus, Hume says (T 252) that he can observe no such thing as a self, and implies that a self, were there one, would be a stable enduring substance. In this mode Hume affirms the non-reality of selves. But in another, in the same context, Hume says (T 252) that selves are bundles of perceptions. Such selves as these plainly are real. So: are there selves or not? The answer is that there are no such things as the selves of rationalist metaphysics. Corrected scientific empiricism, on the other hand, affirms that what rationalist theory incorrectly identifies as stable enduring mental substances are in fact aggregations over time of perceptions, or groups of perceptions. The latter is Hume's real view. Rationalism is reproved and corrected. At the same time Hume is offering a reductionist theory—one of several in his work—that either reduces (analyses) a macro-phenomenon of everyday life to elements held to make it up, or displaces the phenomenon with a best-obtainable-simulacrum, the closest item whose reality experience justifies.

Interestingly, this famous case, of the elusive or unreal self of metaphysics, appears to clash with Hume seeming also to identify and defend a self known both in vulgar theory and in corrected empiricism. Årdal27 and others point to the appearance of an inconsistency between Hume on the self in Book I of the Treatise, and Hume in Book II. For in the latter (T 317) Hume refers to "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves" which he says is "always intimately present with us." This view reappears at T 354: "The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other subject to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression...." The contradiction is only apparent, however. Hume himself takes pains to indicate that the personal identity about which he is skeptical is one claimed by philosophers and metaphysicians; in Section 6 ("Of personal identity") of Book I, where this skepticism is affirmed, Hume also tells us that "we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in
ourselves. The first is our present subject"—i.e., in Book I; it is the second, of course, that is involved in the claims of Book II Section 11 of Part I and Section 4 of Part II. The idea/impression of the self involved in passional life is, evidently, merely phenomenal and without metaphysical import; its exact status seems incompletely explained.

Årdal's view of Hume on the self is formally at odds with the account just given, though I think closer inspection shows fundamental similarity. For Årdal there is not even apparent inconsistency in Hume. Årdal's Hume denies only the simplicity of the self. Selves, or persons, are invariably held real; what is denied are philosophical theories (advocated by Plato, Descartes, and numerous philosophers between and after them) according to which a self is a logical point, as it were, an indivisible logically atomic unit. Still, for Årdal's Hume, you and I are real, we are selves; and little, if anything, of a common-sense conception and conviction of a perduring and metaphysical unity, is withheld or modified. What evidently persuades Årdal of this—as it seems to me, somewhat anodyne—interpretation is the need to bring Book I of the Treatise into harmony with Books II and III, where selves are not only taken for granted but play a key role in the theories Hume develops. Årdal is surely right that fundamental Humean unity is to be preferred to Selby-Bigge's chaotically inconsistent Hume. There must be at least a presumptive expectation that a single Hume is to be found throughout his individual philosophical books.

III

Besides the multiplicity of perspectives, another key to understanding Hume's apparent inconsistencies is his reductionism. Hume's reductionist analyses of psychological facts and entities are central and pervasive in the Treatise and both Enquiries. Hume means them seriously and they are offered as creative contributions to a science of human nature. They are also radical analyses, that, if successful, would exhibit psychological complexities as built out of a relatively simple stock of states of imagination. In fact Hume's reductionist analyses are almost entirely unsuccessful, at any rate as reductions of complex realities. Reid was quite right. A plethora of psychological states—belief a central example—are, if not primitive, of highly nuanced structure. Hume's reductionist analyses are variants of only a little greater sophistication of the prototypes launched by Hobbes in the Leviathan. To take just one example of the latter, Hobbes thought that reasoning is a case of, and is reducible to, counting. Many of Hume's reductive proposals are in fact only relatively more plausible, as Reid was acutely to argue.

But Reid, and later Humean critics win battles without thereby winning a war. They only refute Hume on the large topics he is primarily concerned
with if the manifest image—'folk psychology'—is accorded the privileged status of unrevisability. Not only is there no evidence that Hume so viewed it, it is false to the spirit of Humean philosophy that he would have. He writes before the twentieth-century contrast between reductive and eliminative analytic alternatives had been framed. But there seems no doubt at all that Hume would have been happy with both alternatives; indeed, that Humean reductive theories are properly taken as disjunctive—x's are y's or so-called 'x's' are (i.e., are to be replaced, in a scientific account of the world by) y's.

Viewed in this light, Hume's particular proposals for analyses of psychological states, or of fundamental concepts like person or cause, are less interesting or important than the underlying empiricist naturalism which they are prompted by. In its terms Hume really is the world's first bundle theorist of the self, and an advocate of an objective non-necessary causality. Will the first of these make Book I inconsistent with Books II and III, the latter forgetting the former's claimed insights? No. Books II and III are not concerned with the ontological substructure of the mental as was Book I, and the plane of appearance can be satisfactorily resumed, contrastive reality having been clearly identified.

IV

Another case for the thesis is afforded by the rationalist and in this case also the vulgar notion of causality, which involves an objective necessity, a "glue" in the world, binding causes objectively to their effects. Like selves, such necessity is not supportable from experience. On the other hand, again, there is a causality that is supported by experience, and this is constant conjunction (once, in the first Enquiry [EHU 78], augmented by a clause affirming counterfactuality—i.e., that if E₁ causes E₂, then had E₁ not obtained, neither would E₂). The verdict then is that vulgar causality is unreal, but the causality of corrected scientific empiricism is real. It is causality. Again: Hume's reductionist analyses are meant to be substantive theories, contributions to scientific advance. There are selves and causes, according to Hume, only neither are as vulgarly supposed.

Still a further case is afforded by perceptual representationalism. Here Hume notes the direct realism of the vulgar, and the commitment to what he calls "double existence" views of the new science and modern philosophy broadly. Hume finds fault with both. He thinks we have experiential evidence only of a single existent, not also a double—the external object itself—allegedly paired with it. But the single existent is, as far as our experiential evidence goes, wholly mind-dependent—contrary to another view of the vulgar, viz., that the perceptual object exists independently of being perceived. In this case—I think—corrective empiricism sides, for
Hume, with double existence. For, though not phenomenologically justifiable, our belief in enduring mind-independent objects happens to be true. Higher-order issues are posed by viewing Hume as I propose. For some philosophers, the first of them possibly Thomas Reid, some anchored core of a common sense view of the world, or a fundamental set of concepts we are (somehow) equipped with, are not revisable in principle. They are part of what any intellectual enterprise concerned with anything must operate from. Hume is, if I am right, not just a naturalist but a meta-naturalist; a philosopher who disputes this last view. His twentieth-century intellectual progeny include Russell and Ernest Gellner, but do not include P. F. Strawson, Michael Dummett, the whole of the “ordinary language” school, or the Neo-Fregean verificationists of more recent vintage.

V

Part of what I propose for reading and interpreting Hume's *Treatise* and *Enquiries* is that his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* be taken as more nearly a model for the larger works than may have been supposed, in precisely the sense that in all of them Hume animates and juxtaposes incompatible positions dramatically and dialectically. He can seem both closer and more sympathetic to, and more distant from and denigrating of, each stance that appears, as it is at the centre of the stage of presentation or philosophical attention or being assessed by a competitor position. Some—much—of this is literary artifice, or skill, or at any rate style and manner. It invites comparison with the style of other eighteenth-century writers, above all the satirists and ironists like Swift, Pope, and, later, Gibbon.

Striking support for the multiperspectivist idea is provided by a remarkable series of four essays Hume published in 1742, in the second volume of his essays. “The Epicurean,” “The Stoic,” “The Platonist,” and “The Sceptic” constitute a dialectically-ordered quartet in which Hume writes, sequentially, in the persona of the philosophical position (or a version of the philosophical position) of the respective titles. In each, one after the other, Hume dons the mantle of the position dramatically, and offers argument for its stance above all on human nature, art, and morality. He is, to be sure, less convincing as proponent in some stances than others. Certainly it is easy, and somewhat natural, to take the final essay—the longest, and most philosophically interesting of the set—as an expression of Hume’s own settled view. This would plausibly be the inference to draw were “The Sceptic” the only one of the four to have been written or published. Yet, read sequentially, this is not quite so clearly the correct conclusion to reach. Each of the four stands by itself. They are written artfully and juxtapositionally. As encountered in Hume’s text they are exercises in
philosophical display, as well as pieces of conceptual artifice. This is as true of "The Sceptic" as of the others. One leaves the set conscious of the possibility of still further philosophical impersonations, the sceptic by no means having achieved a crowning and definitive triumph on the issues addressed in the four essays. At any rate, what Hume undertakes in these essays (and achieves still more effectively and explicitly in the Dialogues) he can, obviously enough, be seen as doing only a little less explicitly three years earlier in the Treatise.

Another instance of the same idea appears in Section XI ("Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State") of the first Enquiry, where Hume artfully presents, or imagines, a supposed "conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes" (EHU 102). The "friend"—Hume himself, or a Humean persona at least mostly adopted—sets out an Epicurean position on the relevance of theological cosmology to serious public concerns, and the fundamental epistemic principles of not imputing more to unobserved causes than is sufficient to explain the observed character of their effects. Here what is going on is more or less transparent; but the philosophical use of literary impersonation, with contrastive stances not conclusively identifying the author's full views, is striking.

VI

In writing in this mode Hume—as I read him—is not playing with his audience. He does not write to create mystery, either about the truth or his own views on the truth. He is an ironist. One passage I take absolutely to clinch this (if it were ever thought to be in doubt) is Hume's ever-delightful remark (EHU 131) that not only was the Christian religion attended at its birth with the miraculous, it takes even now a miracle to believe it. This cannot possibly be meant seriously, or literally; it also discloses, only a little obliquely, some of Hume's real views.

But what to make then of Hume's remark on religious belief near the end of "Of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy" in the first Enquiry? This justly celebrated section reads throughout as "straight"—Hume honestly, searchingly, summarizing the investigations that precede and disclosing his conclusions openly and frankly: viz., rationalist philosophy is empty, and impossible, all results concerning existence and matters of fact are contingent and necessarily grounded in experience, the great majority of our knowledge is and should be confined to the human sphere, large issues of the extra-human being beyond our reach. This is plausibly taken to be proto-positivism and, to a degree, empirical proto-Kantianism. It is also classical empiricism; and it stakes the claim that there is a sense in which all science is fundamentally what we call social science. It bears not merely accidental relation to Pope's Essay on Man (even if some who most admire Hume affect to sneer, philosophically, at Pope's great poem).

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But now: "Divinity or Theology...has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation." The first sentence is carefully qualified: if there is any evidence for theism, it will be rationally grounded. But what of the second sentence? What on earth can Hume mean? Can he be serious—and literal—here? Is tongue in cheek? That is, was the "conversational implicature" meant to be: "faith and divine revelation...and we know how paltry and impossible to justify those are"? To go directly to the point, is Hume saying here, or is he not, that divinity and theology have a good foundation?

I think he is not; the comment is ironical. (Another possibility is that he is being insincere—either through moral cowardice, or hypocrisy; or else with strategic intent: religious belief is more effectively sabotaged where the faithful have abandoned evidentiary defense in favour of fideism; consider Demea in the Dialogues.) But how can one be sure? If there had been such a thing as divine revelation, then religious conviction would presumably be "supported by experience," at least for those experiencing the revelation. But can Hume suppose that faith is a good and solid foundation for religious belief? I think not—even if I think, as I do, that Hume supposed that a species of faith is required to ground our fundamental conceptions of reality. I think Hume means—Jesuitically, as it were—that the central tenets of theism have no better or more solid foundations than foundations which are not foundations at all.

There is still another possibility for the passage, viz., that Hume is being sincere, and non-ironic, and he is prompted here as much by pity for the mass of humanity as anything else. His meaning then would be: the actual evidence for theism is so pathetic, so frail, that it is better, by far, to ground religious commitment—if one is going to have religious commitment—in sheer faith, or in claims of someone's direct revelations, than in trying to hoodwink self or others into thinking that nature, or pure reason, actually offer serious support for theism. This potentially attractive reading still makes it dodgy—as the ironic reading does not, at least, not for those conceived as having the relevant eyes and ears—whether Hume is saying, or not, that there is a good foundation for theism. But my point is not to set forth an interpretation of this one brief passage in the first Enquiry. It is to draw attention to the fact that there is little or nothing in the passage to reveal that Hume is being ironic or otherwise insincere, and indeed that the passage occurs in a broader setting that there is very strong reason to regard as candid and self-revealing; and yet that the passage seems flatly to contradict what most of the rest of Hume's writings in the philosophy of religion say (or seem to say).
Passages on theism might be held not helpfully representative of Hume's overall philosophical position or method, or even style. Still, what is clear in one part of his work is at least suggestive of what is going on elsewhere.

Michel Malherbe's interesting essay "Hume and the art of dialogue" focuses on Hume's dialogic writing and offers thereby a perspective on central aspects of Humean philosophy that is partly convergent with views advanced here, and partly in conflict with them. For Malherbe, too, literary device is the key to understanding Humean practice; indeed for him a model of the philosophical dialogue largely articulated by Shaftesbury serves as a frame and blueprint by which Hume binds himself in his dialogic writing. According to this conception the philosophical dialogue is to be the juxtaposition of human and metaphysical archetypes, none of which represent or project an authorial view, Hume's special appropriation of the model above all for the investigation of religion reflecting his convictions of the unanswerability of the metaphysical topic concurrent with its important and revealing human nature-disclosing dimensions. For Malherbe too then there are multiple philosophical impersonations in Humean texts (he includes also Section XI of the first Enquiry in the dialogic corpus), which are only misleadingly or inappropriately explored to arrive at the real Hume's view. Divergence comes with the—to my mind too positivist or postmodernist—idea that there is for Hume no fact of the matter (even if unprovable or unknowable) there. I think Hume believed that it was more improbable than otherwise that he and other humans would have an afterlife or that a morally perfect being created and ruled the world, or that Jesus was a divine being. I think too that there is little question that Hume's dialogic writings are meant to encourage their reader to share these or like views. For Malherbe—it seems—Humean text should generally be taken on its surface, or, at any rate, as without irony. This seems wrong. But I may misjudge part of this author's intent in this important and suggestive essay.

VII

Outside Hume's entire enterprise, the model he adopts for himself, providing the framework from which he addresses his audience (and himself) in setting out to explore human nature, is, I suggest, that of the Roman philosophical essayist: paradigmatically typified by Cicero, in his essays, dialogues, and letters to his friends, on philosophical themes and topics. From this perspective, Hume takes for granted, and never accepts any philosopher's arguments (including his own) as dislodging, a shared public, social, cultural, historical, and natural world. Cicero too had favoured—seen both value and persuasive power—in Academical Skepticism; without its ever being allowed to displace a fundamental realism, in metaphysical, practical, and epistemic senses.
There are speculations of a biographical kind which seem to me to have explanatory bearing on how Hume may at least sometimes present the positions one encounters in his work. These speculations were prompted for me by conversations and correspondence with Roger Emerson, who thinks that a more troublesome dilemma than most have recognized is posed by Hume's nearly getting the chair in moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Had Hume obtained this coveted post, he would have had to make public avowal of adherence to the Westminster Confession, a detailed Christian credo. Since he seriously sought the job, and his many friends supported him in it, Hume and they apparently would have seen no difficulty in Hume's signing this Confession. (At Glasgow, where he was also to be an unsuccessful candidate, he would also have had to lead the students in prayer.) Emerson asks whether—particularly considering what genuine importance was attached to public oaths in the eighteenth century—this should lead us to view Hume as having actually been what we might call a closet Christian (since Hume was well known as a freethinker), or else as a hypocrite of deeper and more opprobrious dye than the many admirers of "le bon David" and his character, in his lifetime and ever since, have supposed.

Emerson raises a serious query, which deserves a carefully considered response. I think one finds a significant base for that response in a passage in Hume's *Natural History of Religion*, and by occasional references elsewhere in his work. In a paragraph in the *Natural History* he briefly sketches the attitudes to received religion, and the practices, of Cicero:

> If ever there was a nation or a time, in which the public religion lost all authority over mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in ROME, during the CICERONIAN age, would openly have erected its throne, and that CICERO himself, in every speech and action, would have been its most declared abettor. But it appears, that, whatever sceptical liberties that great man might take, in his writings or in philosophical conversation; he yet avoided in the common conduct of life, the imputation of deism and profaneness. Even in his own family, and to his wife TERENTIA, whom he highly trusted, he was willing to appear a devout religionist; and there remains a letter, addressed to her, in which he seriously desires her to offer sacrifice to APOLLO and AESCULAPIUS, in gratitude for the recovery of his health.34

This passage, I claim, suggests itself as autobiographical for Hume, or at least as intimating a model of private skepticism and public conformity in matters of established religion that he may have seen himself as partly following. Hume held Cicero in extremely high regard, as a philosopher and, certainly, as a man of letters, treading a public as well as private stage.35
Hume here evinces surprise at the degree of observance of religious practices that Cicero cannot have believed in, that the Roman philosopher nonetheless followed. There is no hint of reproach though. It seems reasonable to suppose that Hume would have seen similarity in the public requirements, and public irrationality, that he and Cicero both confronted; and a comparable possibility, permitted by the state of civilization their two societies had reached, of being reasonably candid and self-disclosing in their philosophical writings, even as their respective public pursuits and activities involved a felt need to conform, smoothly and without complaint.  

More broadly, I think that Hume models himself, in relation to his age and its prevailing practices and norms, and in relation to his "literary pursuits" (in the very wide sense that the expression has in both cases) on Cicero. Further, Hume sees so modelling himself as admirable; and he more or less openly discloses in his writings, from time to time, at any rate, his own instantiation of the Ciceronian mode. He is a gentleman, addressing himself to other gentlemen who have interests in the moral and natural sciences, and other topics literary and historical. A gentleman, among other gentlemen, is to be allowed wide departure from received views, including those of the multitude, those that have public or official or legal sanction, and those to which most other gentlemen would adhere. He can mean seriously such departure, and they are to respect these intellectual liberties in him as he would in them. But all of this is compatible with full public adherence to received public practice and avowals; which—the practices and their support by people like himself—as a matter of fact as well, Hume regarded as generally necessary or appropriate for maintaining public order and the structure of the civilization of which he was a cheerful and acceptant part.  

The idea of taking Cicero seriously as an important component of Hume the philosopher begins, it seems, with the work of Charles W. Hendel, and different facets of Cicero's philosophical significance for Hume have been explored intermittently in the years since. If anything is novel in the treatment offered here, it is the idea that Cicero is a primary model and mentor, for Hume's views on religion and its interface with the public world, as well as for the idea that Cicero is the primary model for the cultural and intellectual location from which Hume wrote; together with the idea that that location—Hume's "authorial voice"—notwithstanding, Hume actually means and intends sometimes radical naturalistic—and non-Ciceronian—philosophical results, toward which his reader is by one route or other pointed.  

It should be remarked further that, even if Hume held Cicero in extremely high philosophical regard, twentieth-century commentators and historians of philosophy generally have not. Annette Baier's occasional
references to Cicero, for example, in her recent book on the *Treatise* are almost uniformly acerbic and dismissive.  

VIII

As well as identifying perspectives or personae which appear in, or lie behind, Hume's philosophical writings, I want to comment on two which, according to me, do not appear there (or in one case barely does). I proceed here to enlarge upon claims made sketchily earlier. One of the Humean perspectives is that of the vulgar, or of common sense. It is important to recognize that this is not, nor is there anywhere in Hume, the common sense of Reid, Moore, or the twentieth-century view foisted (inaccurately, I believe) upon Frege and championed by Strawson, Geach, Dummett, and other philosophical citizens mostly of the United Kingdom. This latter is allegedly an ahistorical or transhistorical *philosophia perennis*, which "embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making in the life-times of many generations"—all of them likely to be sounder than "any that you and I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon" as Austin put it, implying that you and I and our armchairs extend to most philosophical activity since Thales. There may or may not be justification for such a perspective as this; unless extreme relativism or historicism is true, there must be some rational and conceptual location from which views and arguments, whenever and wherever they arise, can be interpreted and assessed. But the Strawson-Dummett version of common sense is much more contentful than any such thing as the latter, and Hume would not recognize it, either as friend or foe. Hume's 'vulgar' stance is closer to the 'folk psychology' sneered at by eliminative materialists, though Hume is at least a little more respectful of the views of the vulgar than the Churchlands and their associates are of those of the folk. Some of the views of the vulgar are, Hume thinks, correct—even if he can see no way genuinely to justify or ground them. Among these are the beliefs in enduring autonomous physical objects and in causality. Others of the beliefs of the vulgar are, however, erroneous, according to Hume: e.g., the belief that causal relations involve objective necessities, or that there are stable and enduring substantial selves, or that experienced regularities confer rational grounding for expectations of their continuing. (This last needs putting with some care, since Hume does believe in the possibility of science. His view, as I see it, is that we are lucky, our inductive habits happening to coincide with ways the world is, but not in respects that confer rationality on those habits.) Also a mistake of the vulgar, according to Hume—at least I think this is his view—is direct realism in the philosophy of perception. Although the textual evidence is ambivalent, on balance it appears to affirm what Hume calls the "double
existence" view of sense data theory or perceptual representationalism. I should add both that this seems to me less certain than other attributions, and that in any case it is of far less philosophical consequence one way or the other—neither direct nor indirect realism being, so I would argue, as important for fending off or letting in skepticism as so many have supposed. Hume's textual ambivalence or irresolution on the double existence view may suggest—I am pleased to think—that he too may have realized how little it matters whether one affirms or denies direct realism.

IX

The second perspective that I think is absent, in this case almost wholly absent, from Hume's pages is genuinely radical skepticism. This may seem surprising. Hume briefly considers extreme skepticism in his short discussion of the Cartesian epistemological project, and indicates that he thinks both that radical skepticism is unanswerable, or rationally invincible, and unable seriously to be adopted; and in any case that its adoption is without productive consequence. Descartes's project, Hume holds, is a hopeless failure, a complete non-starter. There are, it is clear, several skepticisms in Hume's texts, as many interpreters have observed. The relatively extreme skepticism Hume sometimes considers is, I think, what he takes to be the position of the ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics—which accepts "appearances" and mostly argues against people's (especially philosophers') "theories." It is seldom noted, but Hume in virtually all formulations of 'unmitigated' skepticism as a philosophical position takes it to limit knowledge to the immediate evidence of the senses and of memory. Radical skepticism would not privilege memory in the way that Hume repeatedly does. It is true that Hume analyses memory as something that need not confer veracity, hence as what a twentieth-century vocabulary would call apparent memory, or memory traces. But, the analysis duly registered, he proceeds straightforwardly and repeatedly to talk of memory as a validating source of ideas, alongside the senses. Hume never in fact formulates the idea of what we would call a solipsism of the present moment, but always assumes (or appears to assume) an ongoing succession of states of consciousness. In short, although the potential for it is certainly there, Hume does not offer evidence of a very impressive radical skepticism, such as many a twentieth-century philosopher has entertained. Hume's "mitigated" skepticism is of course a position that Hume explicitly advocates. But it is just (as David Fate Norton and others show at length) the moral position of scientific caution and humility in the face of a contingent and always only incompletely known (or knowable) world, with a special clause or corollary, for Hume, that our best cognitive and epistemic bet is to stick primarily to human (psychological and anthropological) topics of investigation.
I have been arguing for a view of Hume's views that sees them as rejecting, but continually interacting with, particular varieties of common sense and skepticism—to both of which Hume displays attraction, greater attraction than for rationalism ancient or modern, even as they are ultimately fended off. One of the Humean data that must be repeatedly explicitly registered in relation to trying to get what is going on in his texts right is something to which Páll Árdal's book made so signal an affirmation and contribution. This is the quite obvious fact (however often commentators ignore it) that well over half of the Treatise (Books II and III) is concerned with the passions and morals, i.e., with subjects which in themselves and in Hume's treatment of them require the assumption of an ongoing organized social, indeed cultural world. The only possibility of an even somewhat impressively radical skeptical Hume is—as some critics, especially of the later nineteenth century, have supposed—seeing a quite disjointed Hume, who went from one philosophical territory to another ignoring what he had earlier said or implied. The resulting deeply inconsistent Hume cannot be seriously believed in. The cleavages and inconsistencies that would then need to be supposed are just too glaring. There is in addition the fact—seldom noticed as a contribution to understanding Hume's work, especially in the Treatise—that in the latter Hume conforms to the illustrious predecessor models of Hobbes's Leviathan and Spinoza's Ethics. All three great works begin with fundamental topics of metaphysics, then proceed by stages to finer-grained issues of human life, producing in due course a theory of ethics. Hume, to be sure, has taken, not "the linguistic turn," but the turn to the introspective phenomenological perspective, befitting a radical disciple of Locke. But the major classics of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Hume have a broadly similar thematic structure, and—surely significantly also—come to broadly similar naturalist and determinist views of the world.

All of Hume's depth and creative originality acknowledged, and his broad consistency affirmed, there is nonetheless serious reason to believe that he misses something. It is something that other naturalist philosophers have also missed. This is an accounting, within the terms of the system, of what the system itself is and how it is possible. Hume does seem not directly or genuinely to have confronted his own early version of the conundrum laid at the door of the logical positivists; viz., how do you verify the verification principle? In Hume's case there seem to be deep epistemological questions which his system appears to foreclose the possibility of answering. These take the general form: if we and our condition are as Hume says, how is it possible for Hume to know (or even to have any justified grounds for
supposing) that we and it are so? Even if an answer could be devised on Hume’s behalf—I am agnostic whether one can—there is no avoiding the fact that Hume nowhere gives evidence of having posed the question, even to himself: If human nature is as I say it is, how in its terms have I managed to write these truths about it?

Summarizing the argument of the paper in outline, or silhouette: Humean texts like the passage on the evidence for theism appear without warning, as it were, offered without self-disclosed irony, though they cannot be Hume’s real views or views his text is endorsing. These passages suggest the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, with that work’s juxtaposed positions, as a closer key to Humean method or stylistic practice than hitherto supposed. Whether ironically or for dramatic flair or for dialectical purposes, a passage in a Humean text can embody a stance or perspective that is not to be taken automatically as Hume’s own. This realization may not only eliminate or minimize apparent Humean inconsistency; it may illuminate insightfully Hume’s philosophical methodology. Sensitized to different stances or perspectives in his work, one may plausibly identify at least three such points of view, one of which, dialectically related to the others, is Hume’s real view. The foregoing is compatible with Hume’s having genuine skeptical concerns on occasion; with his leaving a topic behind that he thinks he has settled; and with real lapses, concerns he should have had—given his real views—but does not seem to have. Finally, all is compatible as well with Hume’s authorial stance or voice, which is consistently Ciceronian. As well as aspiring to be the Newton of the mind, Hume means to be the new Cicero.

NOTES

This paper is a considerably modified version of a paper delivered at a symposium in honour of Páll S. Árdal, which took place at Memorial University, St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1 June 1997. Thanks to the co-symposiasts, and to Páll Árdal and Fred Wilson for being its raison d’être and organizer, respectively.

1 Something of this wide diversity of incompatible interpretation, and the certitude with which “the real Hume” is claimed, may be discerned in Nicholas Capaldi, James T. King, and Donald W. Livingston, “The Hume Literature of the 1980’s,” American Philosophical Quarterly 28.4 (1991): 255-272—both in the works surveyed and in the three authors’ confident and magisterial assessments of them.

2 The same evaluation of interpretive pluralism about Hume, though without comparison to the cases of other major philosophers, is given, and widely illustrated in Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s


8 Many interpreters share this view: most, in fact, who take Books II and III of the Treatise seriously.


15 Fred Wilson, "Is Hume a Sceptic with Regard to the Senses?" Journal of the


17 Livingston, chapter 1.


19 Livingston, passim. For Livingston history is the ground level investigative model for all of Hume’s writings.

20 Andrew Cunningham (in unpublished work) defends this view. It is also suggested in the work of a number of interpreters whose focus is chiefly on Hume’s ethical writings.

21 This was the common nineteenth-century and early-twentieth century view, represented especially explicitly, and forcefully, by Selby-Bigge. A “disunity” view is also adopted by Norton.

22 John Passmore, for example, takes this view, in Hume’s Intentions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 133 and 151.

23 Páll S. Árdal, “Depression and Reason,” Ethics 103 (1993), 549. Árdal here discusses a view of his own, not one of Baier’s.

24 Another significant treatment of Hume from a literary point of view, with close attention to literary facets of his philosophical craftsmanship, is M. A. Box’s The Suasive Art of David Hume (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).


26 In affirming this interpretive stance I align myself more with prevailing earlier interpretations of Hume than many commentators of recent years would do. The more recent commentators seem to me on the whole to produce a more anodyne Hume, whose brash radical empiricist/naturalist innovativeness can be lost or lost sight of in the close-textured probing and sifting of the writings that is characteristic, and laudable, in much recent secondary work.


28 If this interpretive view has substance, it will cohere significantly with what is also argued in the present paper, viz., that Hume’s authorial stance throughout his work is deeply grounded in Cicero; for the Dialogues themselves are directly modelled on Cicero’s philosophical dialogues, especially his De Natura Deorum. On this theme see J.C.A. Gaskin, “Hume on religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), passim. See especially 325–327 and 341n8; and Christine Battersby, “The Dialogues as Original Imitation: Cicero and the Nature of Hume’s Skepticism,” in McGill Hume Studies, edited by David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi, and Wade L. Robison,
Hume, Multiperspectival Pluralism, and Authorial Voice

(San Diego: Austin Hill, 1979), 139-252. Both Gaskin and Battersby argue for important departures in the Dialogues from Cicero's De Natura Deorum, even while affirming the latter's centrality as prototype for Hume.

29 This was the second edition of the Essays, Moral and Political. Thanks to Robert Fogelin for drawing my attention to the significance of the four essays of philosophical impersonation for the multiperspectival idea. Fogelin has given special argumentative weight to “The Sceptic” in his Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), passim. See especially 117-121.


36 See the reference made by Hume's Epicurean “friend,” imaginatively conceived as addressing the Athenian assembly, to “the traditions of your forefathers and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce)” (EHU 104).

37 His Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume developed from a Princeton Ph.D. dissertation, and was originally published in 1925. A substantially revised second edition was published in 1963 (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs Merrill).

38 Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), 218 and 314. At the same time, Baier sees a significantly Ciceronian dimension to Hume's results that she is, I think, the first to identify: “One could see the final Humean version of reason as Ciceronian. Cicero takes reason to be basically the ability to discern a causally connected series of events. Derivatively it is the willingness to cooperate with others in a speech community, to try to create good conditions of life for one's descendants, to track down the truth on specific matters, and to value sincerity and veracity. (De Officiis I, pp. 11-13); (Baier, 322n9).

40 Thus, the first *Enquiry*'s formulation of the queries that launch "Skeptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding" affirms: "It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory" (EHU 26, my emphases).

43 Perhaps most notably L. A. Selby-Bigge. See his Introduction to his edition of the *Enquiries* (1893).