The Myth of Original Existence

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The myth of original existence is a story told by many readers of Hume. According to it, the author of the Treatise argues that no passion is unreasonable or contrary to reason on the grounds that passions have no ingredient ideas, and, having no ingredient ideas, are in no position to disagree with or be contrary to the product of reason, belief. While Hume doesn’t actually say that passions contain no ideas to provide them with their objects, he does say that “a passion is an original existence . . . and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence” (T 2.3.3.5; SBN 415). I shall refer to the uninterpreted argument in this passage as The Argument.

My question is whether the originality of a passion at T 2.3.3.5 is its lack of intentional or representational content, as many authors, even those most sympathetic to Hume, suppose. Annette Baier concedes the standard reading of The Argument but dismisses it so read as silly because it is inconsistent with the explanatory role played by the intentional content of the passions in the rest of the Treatise. Moreover, since she regards the argument as dialectically inept, because question begging, and in any case not central to Hume’s real concerns, she sees no great philosophical loss in removing it from play. Rachel Cohon, however, also representing the standard interpretative tradition, argues that the loss of the argument deprives Hume of his best argument against his rationalist opponents. She sums up the interpretative dilemma this way.

(i) Read Hume as committed to The Argument on the standard interpretation and acquiesce in the traditional ascription to Hume of an atomist theory of the passions according to which, at best, the representational content of a passion is completely external to it and, at worst, is not representational content.
at all, passions being assimilated to tickles and itches. Or (ii) interpret passions or impressions of reflection, including pride, desire, and moral approval, as having full-blooded intentional content, and deprive Hume of his master argument against his rationalist opponents.

I reject this dilemma and propose a way out. If the view I propose appears hopelessly quixotic, at the very least I hope to show that the standard interpretation of The Argument isn’t obvious and inevitable. To these ends, I approach the notorious passage at T 2.3.3.5 by setting out the minimum required for the success of Hume’s argument for the claim that passion doesn’t oppose reason. I show how Hume’s text can be read in line with the minimum requirement and that it is thus consistent with other Humean doctrines presupposing intentionality on the part of the passions. I then consider the similar argument at T 3.1.1.9 (SBN 458). Finally, I turn to a more general discussion of Hume’s account of the relation of a passion and its object.

Before beginning, I should say a word about intentionality. I understand it quite broadly. I assume that intentionality involves presentation of an object in some guise or other. I assume that an impression of red, understood as an act, is intentional because, for Hume, it is an act of visual awareness of something red in the character of a determinate shade of red. Accordingly, in speaking of the passions or impressions of reflection as intentional states, I understand them to be directed to objects in some guise or other. The intentionality of an episode of passion—anger, for example—would involve the presentation, in some guise or other, of the person at whom, under that guise, one is angry. The intentionality of an episode of moral approval would involve the presentation in some guise or other of the character of whom one approves under that guise. Below, I discuss the manner of integration of a passion and presentation of its object.

I

Here is The Argument on the standard reading.

(1) A passion is an original existence or an original modification of an existent and has no representational content, i.e., contains no ideas.
(2) A passion can be opposed by reason, or contradictory to truth and reason, only if it contains an idea that disagrees with the idea contained in a judgment of reason.
(3) But since no passion contains an idea, no passion can be opposed by reason or contradictory to truth and reason.
Here is the minimum requirement for the success of The Argument. Since
the product of reason is a judgment, the only way a passion could be opposed
by a product of reason is by being an opposing judgment. Therefore, if a pas-
sion, an episode of anger or desire, say, were not a judgment or belief, then a
passion couldn’t be contradictory to truth and reason. All Hume would then
need to argue would be that passions or impressions of reflection are not judg-
ments. A passion might well have an ingredient idea, propositional or
otherwise, just so long as the passion itself weren’t the propositional atti-
tude of belief. In particular, Hume would not need to argue that passions have
no ingredient ideas or intentional content: he would only have to argue that
passions are not assertions of putative fact. Passions needn’t be dumb so long
as their speech is restricted to the imperative and optative moods.9

To establish the context of The Argument, let me quickly rehearse the
opening arguments of section 3 of part 3 of Book 2. Hume announces that he
will show the fallacy of supposing that reason is to be given preference over
passion in the regulation of our conduct. He sets out to prove “first, that rea-
son alone can never be a motive to an action of the will; and secondly, that it
can never oppose passion in the direction of will” (T 2.3.3.1; SBN 413). Rea-
soning, whether causal or demonstrative, influences action only as it directs
our judgments concerning cause and effect. Judgments concerning cause and
effect only influence action by giving direction to impulses having their
source in something other than reason. From seeing that there is an apple
over there and being hungry, one might come to want to eat that apple over
there. However, in the case of wanting to eat some apple or other, with none
in view, the “emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every
side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by
the relation of cause and effect”(T 2.3.3.3; SBN 414). That is, the desire to eat
some apple or other is enlarged so that one desires to do what is believed to
realize the goal of the original desire. In the latter case, the direction of the
desire is influenced by causal reasoning, and so, in a sense, the determinate
intention to do what is believed to realize the goal is a product of reason. The
source of the motive force of this now determinate intention, however, is not
reason, but that in virtue of which we are affected by objects. In the former
case where the perceptual recognition of an apple gives rise to the intention
of eating it, one might also say that the volition is a product of the cognitive
faculties. But again, the source of the volition is not a cognitive faculty, but
that in virtue of which the agent is not indifferent to eating that apple. In
short, reason or cognition in general by itself never produces a volition or
motivating impulse. Moreover, since a motivating passion can only be op-
posed by an opposing motivating impulse, it follows that reason can not
oppose a motivating passion. “Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of a passion but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition. But if reason has no original influence, ’tis impossible it can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspense a moment” (T 2.3.3.4; SBN 415).

Let me make a number of observations about this argument leading up to the slave passage and to The Argument. First, Hume seems to be assuming that passions have intentional objects. At T 2.3.3.3 (SBN 414) he says “[e]motion . . . comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one.” The original object of an emotion is an end, and various means believed to realize it are subsidiary ends/objects. The presumption seems to be that an end is somehow given in an emotion, even if the emotion is instigated by a prior act of the understanding. Second, what motivating passions have and reason lacks is an original influence on the soul. This may have a bearing on how we’re to understand “original existence” in the next paragraph, not only because of proximity, but because, third, Hume introduces The Argument as considerations confirming the extraordinary opinion that reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions. The first set of arguments show that reason, the finder of fact, is motivationally inert, and thus unable to oppose the passions. The considerations Hume next introduces to confirm the extraordinary opinion regarding the role of reason in the regulation of conduct are intended to establish that some feature of passions precludes them from opposing or being contrary to reason or its product, judgment. Fourth, it’s hard to see how Hume will be able to sustain the rhetorical effect of claiming that reason is the slave of the passions, if it becomes wholly mysterious how passions have ends, as it surely would be if he tells us in the next paragraph that they are possessed of no representational character. Even if it is left to the slave to indirectly propose ends by pointing out the actual and possible, the master must still have some idea of what his heart desires.

Finally, the initial impression that passions have intentional objects, and that they survive The Argument with their content-bearing character intact, is further sustained by Hume’s famous cases of passions not contrary to reason.

Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. ’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the
I don’t see how to conceive the case Hume is imagining, if the preference in question is a passion without representational character. What’s the point of saying that a vector of motivational energy somehow externally related to the idea of one’s scratch-free finger and to the idea of the destruction of the whole world is not contrary to reason? What’s not contrary to reason and rhetorically shocking is the motivational attitude toward precisely the continued existence of the world and one’s finger remaining scratch-free. Even if one supposes that the preference isn’t a higher order evaluative desire, but rather a desire of merely relatively greater strength, at the very least the passion in question involves the desire that one’s finger be scratch-free. Of course, one can understand the narrow dialectical point that preferences not founded on false factual belief are not contrary to reason, even if one assumes that preference is devoid of representational content. But then Hume’s rhetorical bravado is all sound and fury.

II

How to understand the notions of original existence and reference is crucial in deciding on a reading of The Argument. For ease of reference, I’ll quote it at length along with the first sentence of the next paragraph.

(1) A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.

(2) When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high.

(3) It is impossible, therefore, that this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects which they represent.

(4) What may at first occur on this head is, that as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow that passions can be contrary to reason only, so far as they are accompanied with some judgment or opinion. (T 2.3.3.5–6; SBN 415–6)
The key premises are that a passion is not a copy and does not refer and that contradicting reason and truth requires disagreement between an idea (or complex of ideas) that copies and the object(s) it represents. My plan is to work from back to front. My reason for proceeding preposterously is to counteract the overwhelming presumption in favor of the standard reading by looking at the implications Hume sees in The Argument and by considering his use of the term “reference” in sentence (4).

Consider, then, sentence (4). What does Hume have in mind in speaking of the reference to truth and reason that only judgments of the understanding have? I suggest it is the fact that only in a judgment of the understanding does one assert an idea as true. Only a judgment of the understanding refers to its idea as true and as what fact-finding reason indicates. A passion is contrary to reason only if it is accompanied by a false judgment of the understanding and, a fortiori, by a judgment of the understanding that refers to truth and reason by asserting an idea as true. Here, of course, the contrariety between reason and passion isn’t one between passion and an opposing faculty, but rather between passion via a judgment of the understanding accompanying it and the truth correctly represented by right reason. This is how passions, in a an extended sense, can be said to be unreasonable. What is important for our purposes is that the reference to truth and reason required for contrariety to them is something only judgments of the understanding have.

Now suppose, contrary to the current suggestion, that Hume understands the reference in question to be intentionality in general. Since only judgments of the understanding have it, it follows that other acts of the understanding and other mental acts in general don’t have it, acts of doubting, for example. To take another example, consider perfect ideas of the imagination, which Hume introduces at T 1.1.3.1 (SBN 8) to contrast with impressions of sense and memory with respect to force and vivacity. Because perfect ideas as acts have none of the force and vivacity of their originating perceptions, they are not judgments. Imagining a golden mountain is neither a judgment nor an explicitly propositionally structured act. But on the current interpretative hypothesis, having reference to truth and reason is having intentionality, and thus the putative imagining of a golden mountain would not be an imagining of anything at all. Moreover, unless Hume thinks it’s impossible to understand a sentence without believing the idea it stands for, on the current hypothesis he would have us understand sentences through acts of the understanding with no intentional content. Finally, the context of the passage itself favors taking the reference in question as the assertoric character of judgment. Hume is developing the point that passions...
are unreasonable to the extent that they are based on false judgments of fact. So the point about reference to truth and reason is, presumably, that the act associated with a passion that makes it unreasonable, even in an improper sense, must deny what truth speaking reason affirms. Otherwise, Hume has left a gap between merely content-bearing states and those that are contrary to truth and reason. In sum, an act can be contrary to truth and reason, i.e., unreasonable, only if it has reference to truth and reason. If, however, this is taken as requiring only that such acts be content-bearing states, it doesn’t follow, as Hume claims it does, that only an accompanying judgment or opinion could be responsible for an act being contrary to reason, in particular only those accompanying judgments that are mistaken either about the existence or character of the object of a passion or about the means of achieving the goal of the passion.

In light of the foregoing considerations, I take it that there is good reason to pursue the suggestion that what makes it impossible for passions (i) to be contrary to truth and reason, i.e. unreasonable and (ii) to oppose reason as a faculty of judgment is their lack of assertoric character. And they needn’t be further cognitively impoverished to shore up the point. Desiring to drink that glass of water presupposes particular judgments, for example, that that’s a glass of water and that I’m not drinking it, but it also in some sense contains the idea of drinking that glass of water without being the claim that I am drinking it, which would be contrary to reason. With this suggestion in mind, let’s turn to sentence (3) where Hume is drawing the conclusion of The Argument:

‘Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent.

Here again, the truth and reason seem to stand together on the side of what gets represented rather than what does the representing. Contradicting truth and reason is a matter of using ideas and getting the facts wrong. In contradicting truth and reason, ideas, considered as copies, misrepresent their objects. As copies they disagree with the objects they otherwise manage to represent. But then Hume would appear to be losing sight of his target, which was to confirm the claim that reason is the slave of the passions by showing that passions lack some feature, rendering them unable to combat reason as a faculty of understanding and judgment. The earlier line of argument was: (a judgment of) reason, by itself, doesn’t motivate at all; therefore, there is
no combat between reason and passion. What we expect here to confirm the earlier argument is: a passion doesn’t contradict anything; therefore, there is no combat between passion and reason. Instead, we get an argument for the claim that a passion can’t contradict the facts. This is a conclusion that looks forward to the next two paragraphs, where the idea of contrariety to reason has to do with unreasonableness rather than the opposition of the faculties of reason and passion. Hume does not return to the latter theme until the last three paragraphs of the section, where he explains how motivating passions are mistaken for the determinations of reason, the faculty that judges of truth and falsity, and that the putative combat between reason and passion is the opposition of calm and violent passions.

Perhaps Hume is just being economical, if in fact the conclusion about faculty opposition is a consequence of the conclusion about contradicting the facts. Without yet pressing an interpretation of ideas considered as copies, we see that a passion doesn’t contradict the facts because that requires disagreement between an object and an idea considered as a copy of the object it represents. But if a passion is incapable of this disagreement as well as the comparable agreement, then it does seem to follow that it is also incapable of contradicting what can contradict the facts. Reason as a faculty of judgment produces ideas considered as copies that on occasion agree and disagree with the objects such ideas represent. But on no occasion does a passion involve such ideas. That’s why it can neither contradict nor affirm the facts. But to contradict or conform to reason as a faculty of judgment requires being able to do what reason does, namely contradict or affirm the facts.

Let us return to the main business of understanding why a passion can’t be contradictory to truth and reason and what role an idea considered as a copy plays in this. My suggestion is that passions lack assertoric character and that Hume indicates this when he speaks of contradiction to truth as disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with the objects they represent. It’s not simple disagreement between an idea and the object it represents. The idea has to function as a copy of the object it represents. One might, however, suppose that for Hume every idea is a copy. This supposition is, of course, correct, but not to the point. Every determinate idea is a copy or an image of its engendering impression(s). Hume’s general practice is to use “copy” and related terms to designate a relation between ideas and impressions to mark the fact that ideas inherit their content from impressions. But in our passage, the mention of copies is not a reminder of that fact. Instead the phrase, “considered as copies,” occurs as a qualification. What, then, does copying add to the mere representative character of an idea? Here, I suggest Hume’s usage is related to an earlier usage we find in Locke and Berkeley,
where copying is primarily a mind-world relation, not a mind-mind relation. Accordingly, I claim that in our passage for an idea to be considered as a copy of what it represents is for it to function as an assertion, to portray what it represents as true, to have a reference to truth and reason, if you like.

There is, of course, another sense in which a false propositional idea or an individual idea of a nonexistent disagrees with truth and reason. In this sense, the idea of a golden mountain disagrees with truth and reason, as does the idea that Hume wrote “God Bless America.” But in our passage, an idea contradicts truth and reason only if it disagrees with its object by misportraying what it’s intended to copy. For the disagreement to contradict, there must be both a false idea and a referential use of that idea, i.e., asserting as true. Part of the difficulty of seeing this point lies, I think, in a certain ambiguity in “idea” and Hume’s failure to deal with it adequately. An idea can be that in virtue of which certain perceptions, i.e., mental acts, have the intentional objects they have. An idea can also be a mental act of understanding or belief. In the sentence I have been considering, Hume seems to be treating ideas more as beliefs than as their content. Contradiction consists in disagreement of an idea, considered as a copy, i.e., a belief, with an object portrayed this way rather than another. The conclusion I am drawing is that a passion is not contrary to reason because it is not an idea in the sense of belief. Moreover, we already have good reason, based on the preceding discussion of the paragraph following this sentence, for questioning the presumption that Hume is fixing on the mere having of content as a necessary condition for being contrary to reason.

Let’s move toward the beginning of the passage and see how well the suggestion fares.

When I am angry, I am actually possesst with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high.

On the current hypothesis the paraphrase would be

When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion no more claim something about another object, than when I am thirsty (a state of pain), or sick (a physiological condition), or more than five foot high (a state of a material body).

Now I concede that “reference to an object” doesn’t sound like the assertoric character of judgment, and that the denial that anger possesses such reference,
being coordinate with the denial that the states of being thirsty, sick, or more
than five foot high possess such reference, may seem to imply more than anger’s
simple lack of assertoric character. Nonetheless, I think that “reference to an
object” in this sentence is continuous with our theorized sense of “reference
to truth and reason.” The first point to make is that the language Hume uses in
stressing that one who is angry is actually possesst of that emotion is quite simi-
lar to the language he uses in the first Enquiry when calling attention to the
difference between being angry and an idea of anger.

A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from
one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person
is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just concep-
tion of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the
real disorders and agitations of the passion. (EHU 2.2; SBN 17)

The suggestion I am making is that Hume is drawing attention to the fact
that a passion is no mere manner of conceiving, but rather is contrasted to
those perceptions in which one refers to other objects. The question is
whether an agent who qua angry refers to no other objects has qua angry
nothing in mind. On the current hypothesis, an agent who qua angry refers
to no other objects is one who qua angry does not assert the existence of any-
thing or make a claim about anything, despite the fact that an outburst of
anger presupposes believing in the existence of the cause/object of anger and
making claims about it. An episode of anger, so construed, is thus compat-
ible with anger as characterized in earlier passages (T 2.2.9.3 [SBN 382], T
2.2.9.15 [SBN 387]), according to which it is a perception with an object,
namely, a person or thinking being, a ground, and an end, namely, the mis-
ery of the object. More important, Hume continues to show allegiance to this
view when at T 3.3.1.31 (SBN 591) he summarizes the discussion from the
erlier passages.

As to the good or ill desert of virtue or vice, it is an evident conse-
quence of the sentiments of pleasure or uneasiness. These sentiments
produce love or hatred; and love or hatred, by the original constitu-
tion of human passion, is attended with benevolence or anger; that
is, with a desire of making happy the person we love, and miserable
the person we hate. We have treated of this more fully on another
occasion. (T 3.3.1.31; SBN 591)
It is also appropriate to note that elsewhere Hume does not shrink from attributing to passions referential abilities of some sort. “We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society” (T 2.2.5.15; 363).²⁵ Pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, and lust have as their animating principle sympathy and, therefore, a reference to the thoughts and sentiments of others. Here, Hume is obviously not claiming that a wish is a belief. So either Hume is denying of anger at T 2.3.3.5 (SBN 415) what he earlier attributes to revenge, or in claiming that *qua* angry he has reference to no other object he means to be denying that the function of anger is to refer its object to the world in the way that belief does.

In any case, it is puzzling that Hume links passions’ lack of reference to that of states that are in some sense more obviously nonintentional than nondoxastic, if, as I am supposing, Hume’s point is that passions are not themselves assertoric. After all, he could have just said that the force and vivacity that make both impressions of (outer) sense and ideas beliefs is not the same as the force and vivacity characteristic of impressions of reflection, a point to which I’ll return. Or better, he could have compared passions with perfect ideas of the imagination in respect of not being judgments (cf. T 1.1.3.1 [SBN 8]; T 1.3.5.5 [SBN 86]). To shift the burden, however, had Hume wanted to deny that passions have content he could have just said that strictly speaking there are no ideas in or intrinsically associated with passions to provide them with objects.²⁶ In short, he could have explicitly denied what Cohon calls the cognitive inclusion theory. Instead, Hume continues to speak in ways suggesting that passions are content bearing.

Some two pages later he offers one explanation of the rationalist mistake of supposing that reason can oppose passion. He observes that calm passions, including benevolence and the passion involved in weakness and strength of mind, are easily confused with the determinations of reason.²⁷ These passions “[p]roduce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation” (T 2.3.3.8; SBN 417). Here are passions that are motivationally effective in determining conduct, yet, as mental acts are often indiscernible by introspection from determinations of reason, the faculty that judges of truth and falsity. Here, there is no presumption that these passions have been shown to be content-barren and that they are merely confused with beliefs lurking in the neighborhood.²⁸ X doesn’t recognize as the cause of her behavior the passion-constituted desire to avoid eating sweets. She thinks it’s a rational desire to avoid eating sweets or an imperative or normative determination of reason expressible as either, “Avoid eating sweets” or “One ought to avoid eating sweets.”
Moral sentiments and the general desire for happiness as it gets specified into determinate intentions are not violent like anger but they are passions nonetheless. So if the calm passions mentioned in T 2.3.3.8 (SBN 417) have content, so does the anger of T 2.3.3.5 (SBN 415), despite the fact that it no more possesses reference to another object than does being more than five foot high. The final determination of this question must await the discussion of the first sentence of The Argument. For Hume clearly seems to be relying on the chain of implication from “is an original existence” to “is not a copy” to “does not refer.”

Let us then press on to the beginning of the paragraph and see what to make of the fact that passions are original existences or original modifications of existences containing not any representative quality, which renders them copies of any other existence. Taken in isolation, one might suppose, as proponents of the standard interpretation do, that Hume is using the contrast between an original and copy to make the point that a passion has no content. But Hume certainly does not generally take the contrast between an original and a copy to license an inference to the contentlessness of originals. Impressions are original perceptions. “All our ideas are copy’d from our impressions” (T 1.1.3.4; SBN 10). And original perceptions are “copied from no precedent perception” (EHU 2.9, note 1; SBN 22). Yet, the visual impression of the copy of the Treatise in the reader’s hand to which Hume calls attention on the first page of the Treatise is not without content. It’s an act of awareness of an object in some guise or other.

Indeed, on its face it’s quite strange that Hume would describe passions as original existences. In the opening sentence of Book 2 he bothers to redescribe the distinction previously drawn in terms of “impressions of sensation” and “impressions of reflexion” with the terms “original” and “secondary.” So it turns out that passions, which show up in our passage as original existences, begin life in Book 2 as secondary impressions. It might be a good idea to recall what the secondariness or reflective character of a passion is, namely, responsiveness to perceptions in contrast to impressions of sense, which are not responses to antecedent perceptions. The perceptions to which passions are responses can be either ideas or impressions, though, Hume tells us (T 1.1.2.1; SBN 8), they are for the most part ideas. If they are ideas as in the case of the idea of the pleasure of eating an apple, which returns and gives rise to the desire to eat an apple, then the perception being seconded is broadly speaking cognitive. If the occasioning perception is an impression of outer sense, an impression of a man beating a horse giving rise to anger and pity, again the perception to which the passion is a response is cognitive. In each of these cases, the object of the passion,
insofar as it has one, is determined by the content-bearing state to which it is a response. By parity, one might expect that in the case of a passion caused by impressions that are bodily sensations (pleasures and pains) or impressions of reflection the object of the passion, insofar as it has one, is also determined by a preceding content-bearing state. After all, if the idea of the pain of someone’s stepping on one’s gouty toes excites the fear of it happening, surely the pain of having one’s gouty toes stepped on wouldn’t excite a host of passions, in particular the desire that the pain cease, desire to retaliate, unless some notice were taken of the pain, i.e., unless there were cognitive perception of pain, in contrast to reflex responses to pain. It doesn’t matter whether the taking notice is a feature of the pain itself or not. Similarly, disgust arising from an unseemly desire would seem to presuppose one’s awareness of the desire at which one was disgusted. This is even more apparent in cases where one is mistaken about the desire at which one feels disgust.

On a thinner reading, the secondariness of impressions of reflection is simply the fact that like ideas and unlike impressions of sense they have mental causes. It is to be understood in contrast to the originality of impressions of sense that have as proximate causes only physiological causes the inquiry into which Hume leaves for the anatomists. But notice that, even on this reading, the originality that the passions lack sheds no light on the issue of content. Impressions of outer sense, construed as acts of sensory awareness, however minimally, must have mental aboutness of some sort. Otherwise, their correspondent ideas would have nothing from which to inherit their cognitive content. Moreover, as first acts of the judgment, impressions of outer sense constitute premises in reasoning to the unobserved. On the other hand, bodily sensations are clearly not cognitive, even if they are self-intimating. So nothing at all follows one way or another about whether a perception is content-bearing from the fact that it is or is not original, in this original sense of the distinction.

A passion is an original existence. As a perception and as original, it follows that a passion is an impression not copied from any precedent perception. It also follows that a passion is not a product of reasoning, since no inferentially produced perception is an impression. What more, then, are we to make of the unexpected claim that passions are original existences? The gloss Hume gives is that they are (original) modifications of existence. This is not so much a gloss as a reminder that passions are more or less occurrent features in contrast to the bodies with distinct and continued existence, whose features they are. I think it would be a mistake, however, to identify the originality in question with mere occurrentness, as though being thirsty, sick, or more than five foot high were original modifications of existence.
These three properties might share something with passions, but I don’t think it’s originality, even if some of what they share is a consequence of the originality of passions.

As I have observed, the argument in question is continuous with the preceding argument. In that argument, Hume introduced the idea of an original influence on the will as something reason lacks to reinforce the point that reason can’t oppose (motivating) passion. Although reason has an indirect or secondary influence on the will, it has no original influence by which it could oppose passions that do have such an influence. In The Argument Hume is arguing from the other side, namely, that passion, because of its originality, is unable to contradict reason. Let us, then, for the moment entertain the suggestion that Hume is trying to connect original existence and original influence on the will. One way to connect them is to identify them. Among the considerations ruling this out is the fact that, while every passion is, I presume, an original existence, not every passion has an original influence on the will. Pride, for example, doesn’t. If, however, Hume establishes (i) that every passion as an original existence is incapable of opposing reason in the only way reason can be opposed, namely, by contradicting it, by asserting what it denies, he will also have shown (ii) that what has an original influence on the will is also incapable of opposing reason, assuming that among perceptions only passions have original influence. Furthermore, given Hume’s earlier claim that reason as a capacity for factual judgment can’t oppose what has an original influence on the will, it will also follow that no perception can be both a judgment of fact and a motivating impulse. That is, being doxastic and being conative are contrary properties.

Well and good. But this excursus brings us no closer to answering the crucial question: what, beyond the fact that passions are impressions and not inferentially produced by reason, may we conclude from the fact that they are original existences or modifications thereof? The further interpretation of “original existence” rests entirely on the interpretation of the phrase with which it is conjoined, “contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.” At this point, there are two interpretative options on my side of the issue: (i) defend a minimal reading of representative quality as assertoric character in line with our earlier treatment of reference and take the subsequent relative clause as appositional; or (ii) grant the intuitively more obvious, namely, that the representative quality is intentionality in general and argue that the relative clause, “which renders it a copy,” is restrictive and not appositional, and then defend a minimal reading of copying in this context as having assertoric character. On (ii) Hume would be claiming that a passion doesn’t have the sort of representative quality that
would make it a copy, i.e., a claim. Either way, I'll have to defend a reading of copying that restricts it to claim-making. But I have already done that in the case of the last sentence in the paragraph (3). Recall that the contradiction passion is unable to effect with reason “consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent.” Not only does an idea have to be a content that disagrees with an object or state of affairs it represents, it has to function as a copy. Here, Hume seems to be opening a gap between the mere representational character of an idea and its use as a copy in acts that contradict truth and reason. This gap favors option (ii). Well, does Hume use relative clauses set off in commas and beginning with “which” as restrictive as well as appositional?

Consider the sentence fourteen lines above the clause in question, and one at T 2.3.4.8:

’tis impossible it can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy. (T 2.3.3.4; SBN 415) . . .

Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquility, is confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from first the view and appearance. (T 2.3.4.8; SBN 417)

And my favorite, which we’ve already seen:

We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. (T 2.2.5.15; SBN 363).

III

Before I turn directly to the version of the argument that appears later at T 3.1.1.9 (SBN 458), some discussion of its dialectical context is in order, although I will not undertake anything resembling a detailed analysis of this rich but rather recalcitrant stretch of text. That said, Hume has just opened Book 3 and introduced the topic of morality. He reminds the reader that his arguments are cumulative “[a]nd that our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the understanding and the passions” (T 3.1.1.1; SBN 455). The question he raises and pursues throughout the section is “Whether ‘tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy” (T 3.1.1.3; SBN 456). The choice is between judgments of fact or relations of
ideas issuing from reason and impressions as the calm passions of moral sense. (When, in the next paragraph, he characterizes the rationalist systems as “concurring in the opinion, that morality like truth, is discerned merely by ideas, and by their juxtaposition and comparison” he is using “ideas” in the object sense as in the “idea of killing.”) The entire section is primarily an exposition and buttressing of an argument for the claim that the perception by which one determines an action to be blameable or praiseworthy is not an act of reason but a passion. Toward the end of the section, he moves from a claim about the sort of psychological capacity involved in making moral judgments to a metaphysically deflationary claim about what makes a character or action virtuous or vicious, namely, that it evinces a sentiment of approval or disapproval from a certain point of view.

Of concern for our assessment of the argument at T 3.1.1.9 (SBN 458) are considerations of two kinds: (i) Hume’s use of the argument, and (ii) the apparent presumption that passions are contentful. Regarding the first, Hume’s aim is to recast the faculty for distinguishing moral good and evil, namely, conscience, in terms of moral sentiments or passions. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that in framing the question whether it is by means of ideas or impressions that we distinguish between vice and virtue Hume blithely refers to the perceptions by which we distinguish virtue and vice as judgments, despite the potentially misleading use of that term (T 3.1.1.2; SBN 456). Moral sentiments are obviously not judgments of factual truth or falsity according to Hume’s theory. And yet, the fact that he holds on to this term strongly suggests that what is approved or disapproved in a token act of moral sense is present in that act in a manner analogous to the presence of ideas in factual judgments of truth or falsity. At the very least there is still a general presumption in favor of the view that passions have intentional content.

Note further that Hume speaks of the merit and demerit of actions controlling natural propensities. The thought here is that the passion by which we discern the demerit of doing something can sometimes control the desire to do it. This suggests a higher order capacity involving a representation of the lower order propensity, i.e., a desire to refrain from acting on the desire to do something or disapproval of doing what one realizes one has an occurrent desire to do. At the very least, it suggests the possibility of motivational conflict, the understanding of which requires attributing content to the conflicting motivating states just as does Hume’s earlier redescription of weakness of mind at T 2.3.3.10 (SBN 418). The violent appetitive desire to eat that piece of fruit and the calm desire to refrain from eating that piece of fruit due to some conception of the good can only be seen to conflict if they are opposing attitudes to the same object, eating that piece of fruit.
Hume's use of the argument at T 3.1.1.9 (SBN 458) calls for some comment. Reason is motivationally inert. “The rules of morality, being practical, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason” (T 3.1.1.6; SBN 457). This is the direction of Hume’s thought leading up to the argument at T 3.1.1.9 (SBN 458). He takes it as established that reason is motivationally inert but thinks it worth reminding the reader of the arguments supporting this principle. When he now presents a version of the earlier argument offered at T 2.3.3.5 (SBN 415), he introduces it as a reprise of one which, he claims, has already proved that reason is perfectly inert. This is somewhat puzzling, since the conclusion of that argument, recall, is that it is impossible for a passion to be opposed by or contradictory to truth and reason and the argument here hearses here similarly proves that it is impossible for a passion, action, or volition to be either true or false and thus impossible that any be contrary or conformable to reason.

After Hume presents this argument, he claims in the next paragraph that it is doubly advantageous. It proves directly that the merit or demerit of an action has nothing to do with conformity to reason. This is obvious. An action or the volition it expresses, because neither true nor false, is neither contrary nor conformable to reason. A fortiori, the demerit of an action or the volition it expresses is not its being contrary to reason. Of course, this only shows that demerit with respect to action is not false judgment. Hume further claims, however, that the argument proves the same truth in a more indirect manner. Despite the explicit conclusion of the argument, that actions and passions, because neither true nor false, are neither contrary nor conformable to reason, Hume now, as earlier in the introduction to the argument, takes the conclusion to be the motivational inertness of reason, from which he purports to prove that it’s not by the exercise of reason that we determine actions to be laudable or blameable. So we are again faced with the puzzle of accounting for Hume’s easy transition from the truth-valuelessness of passion and its overt expression in action (or at least from some piece of the argument) to the motivational inertness of reason.

One solution is that Hume is simply relying on a principle of contrariety.

No mental act is both (i) a truth-evaluable claim pertaining to matters of fact or relations of ideas and (ii) something that has original influence on the will.

Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood, i.e., reason produces truth-evaluable claims pertaining to matters of fact or relations of ideas.
Therefore, reason is without original influence on the will.

This reconstruction fits with our earlier discussion in which I claimed that Hume was in a position to establish the reciprocal exclusion of the causal property of directly (originally) influencing the will and the semantic property of being a true or false judgment pertaining to matters of fact or relations of ideas. Here, in Book 3 he seems to be exploiting that result to fill an apparent gap in the argument. None of this, however, presumes that passions are lacking in intentional content.

With these reminders in place let us proceed to the argument.

(1) Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood.

(2) Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.

(3) Whatever therefore is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason.

(4) Now, it is evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions.

(5) It is impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. (T 3.1.1.9; SBN 458)

The first two sentences are a variation of a doctrine familiar from sentence (4) of The Argument, but from a more explicitly rationalist point of view, perhaps to draw in his opponents. Reason is cast as an organ for determining truths and falsehoods, the extension of which is exhausted by candidates for agreement or disagreement with the facts, conceptual or causal/existential. In concluding in sentence (3) that only such candidates are objects of our reason, Hume is restricting the evaluative scope of reason to items that are true or false regarding matters of fact or relations of ideas. In light of the conclusion drawn in sentence (5), we see that he moves from what fails to fall under the evaluative scope of reason to what can be neither contrary nor conformable to
reason, apparently assuming that reason asserts only what it discovers to be true and, thus, that what is contrary to reason is what reason pronounces false, and what is conformable is what it pronounces true. The central question is how Hume gets to his conclusion that no passion, action, or volition can be pronounced either true or false on the ground that they are original facts and realities. Are original facts and realities to be understood in terms of the nonintentional character of such states as being more than five foot high, or in some other terms?

Despite the fact that the context of this argument, as I have just argued, generally favors a reading compatible with our reading of the original argument at T 2.3.3.5 (SBN 415), there are two novel elements in the later argument that one might take as grounds for reassessment. Hume links originality to being complete in itself and he includes actions along with passions and volitions as original facts and realities. With the inclusion of actions, we see that Hume has extended the earlier idea of original existence beyond that of noninferentially produced perceptions. While actions are original in that they are neither products of inference nor copies, they are not impressions. Yet, since Hume’s theme is the nature of the moral assessment of actions, it is natural that he fit actions into the list of original facts and realities whose character renders them incapable of being contrary or conformable to reason. Indeed, precisely because an action is the natural causal expression of a volition, it’s perfectly sensible of Hume to group actions with passions and volitions. This becomes even clearer when one takes into account Hume’s view at T 3.2.1.2 (SBN 477) where he states that an action is an external sign of a motive and that its merit or demerit lies in the motive it signifies. In this context, at any rate, motives and volitions are intentions with the content appropriate for individuating actions. Otherwise, they couldn’t be the focus of moral assessment, i.e., objects of moral sentiment Moreover, actions are intentional entities insofar as what an agent does depends, in part, on what she has in mind to do as constituted by her motive. So any attempt to link actions with nonintentional processes or properties in an effort to argue for the nonintentional character of the other original facts and realities is effectively countered, unless the fact of volitions, passions, and actions being complete in themselves provides superior evidence.

One way to try to exploit this fact in defense of the nonintentionality of original facts and realities would be simply to propose that being complete in itself is the property of nonintentionality. But such a proposal derives all its support from a certain construal of originality and of the reference that completeness and originality imply that passions, et. al., lack. Without such support the proposal limps. There’s nothing in the phrase “complete in themselves” that
determines its interpretation. At T 2.2.6.3–6 (SBN 367–8), Hume argues that love and hate, unlike pride and humility, are “not compleated within themselves,” because by a kind of physical necessity the former passions are conjoined with benevolence and anger, respectively.

Let us briefly return to the question of reference. We are told that their originality and compleatness imply that no passion, volition, or action refers to any other passion, volition, or action. We have already seen, however, that in another sense actions refer to the volitions they are the signs of. Hume’s point seems to be that none of these realities original and compleat in themselves refer to passions, volitions or actions in ways that would make them capable of being pronounced true or false. In short, passions, volitions, and actions are either not judgments or at least not propositionally structured. At this point, the only reason I can see for insisting that Hume is relying on the nonintentional character of original facts and realities is that Hume’s argument, as I have construed it, is notably lacking in inferential forward motion. If, however, in accordance with the standard reading, he were boldly announcing that original realities were no more possessed of ingredient ideas than being sick or more than five foot high, he would at least have given us something more than the inference from not being a judgment to not having a truth value. This, however, is hardly a decisive reason for attributing to Hume a view that would appear at least unexpected, or worse, inconsistent, with what he says in the environing context of the argument and elsewhere.

Moreover, the price of inferential forward motion is a contentious and question-begging assumption, namely, that intentions are not intentional entities. Is there reason to think that at last Hume is claiming that neither passions, volitions, nor actions have internal objects or content and that this is why they can’t be pronounced true or false? Well, no, not if original facts and realities are perceptions and actions that lack representational character of the sort distinctive of judgment, and not if the subsequent remark about the lack of reference is meant to explain being complete in itself and reference, in accordance with our reading of T 2.3.3.5 (SBN 415), pertains to judgment and not merely to bearing content.

IV

I have thus far argued that the central premise in The Argument makes explicit the fact that passions are not truth-evaluable assertions pertaining to matters of fact or relations of ideas and that Hume does not deny that passions have representational content. I have, however, not yet offered a view about the relation between a passion and the idea that provides it with its
object. The issue of representational content in Hume's theory of mental states is rather complicated, if for no other reason than Hume’s theory of abstract ideas, according to which the only intrinsic representational content any perception has is completely determinate. No token perception has an ingredient abstract idea, i.e., an idea of a determinable, intrinsically (T 1.1.7 [SBN 17–25]; T 2.3.6.2 [SBN 424–5]). Before offering positive suggestions regarding a passion and the idea of its object, it will be helpful to consider Cohon’s attempt to provide Hume with a causal account of a passion’s intentional object in light of the negative results of The Argument on the standard interpretation.

The point of The Argument, as she sees it, is to show that unlike a belief which represents its objects with a resembling idea, a passion has no intrinsically ingredient idea with which to resemble or fail to resemble an object. While a belief represents a state of affairs because it includes a propositional idea as a metaphysical part, a passion does not. Hume rejects what she calls the cognitive inclusion theory of the passions. The crucial premise of The Argument, that a passion is an original existence etc., is Hume’s denial of that theory, Cohon argues, but not the idea that passions have intentional objects or representational content in some sense or other. Cohon argues that Hume can give a causal account of the intentional objects of the passions while rejecting the cognitive inclusion theory. After all, Cohon concedes, he must somehow accommodate the presumption of his own views, namely that passions have intentional objects. “The intentional object of the passion does need to be before the mind, either as an impression . . . or as an idea (my idea of myself arises and comes to my attention whenever I feel pride or humility). The feeling of pride could be such as reliably to turn my attention to my idea of myself” (190).

Let me begin by making a number of points about pride. First, while Hume does speak in a number places of the passion producing the idea and turning our view to ourselves, it is mistake to conclude that on Hume’s view a token of the idea of oneself only occurs subsequent to a tokening of the feeling peculiar to the passion in the double relation of ideas and impressions from which the passion is derived (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286). The idea of my fine house as fine is converted into its correlative idea of my fine house as mine as part of the process that produces the feeling of pride. The feeling may sustain the view of oneself by replenishing the idea of self, as it were, but it makes no sense to suppose that a token of the idea of oneself is temporally the last of the four elements in the double relation of impressions and ideas to appear on the scene. How would the feeling of pride be triggered without a cognitive perception of my fine house as my fine house? (Cf. T 2.2.2.8; SBN 335.)
When Hume speaks of the relation to self as one of the properties of the cause of pride, he means the relation to self in idea. Whether, in fact, I own the fine house has nothing to do with my view of the house making me flush with pride. The view must include a representation of me as owner correctly or incorrectly. Such locutions as “the passion makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances” should be understood in line with “the moisture in the air makes it humid” rather than with “the drive shaft makes the wheels turn.” In any case, for the rest of the passions their content is a function of the cognitive states that trigger them.

Second, it is somewhat misleading to characterize Hume’s causal account in terms of reliability when he says that “[t]his absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions should ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious” (T 2.1.5.3; SBN 286).

This brings to me to my main concern regarding Cohon’s causal alternative to the cognitive inclusion theory. On this view, a passion has an object in virtue of its contingent causal relations to doxastic states whose ideas provide the passion with its object. This causal alternative, however, makes trouble for the standard reading of The Argument precisely because it aims to accommodate the presumption that passions do have objects, even as it denies that their having them is true a priori and that they contain representations of their objects as metaphysical parts. For if passions have objects, despite the fact that the ideas providing them with their objects are neither metaphysical parts of them nor connected to them a priori, then the reason that they are neither true nor false cannot consist in the fact that they do not have objects, unless one assumes that the reason consists in the fact that they do not have them necessarily. Consider the following version of the contingent causal theory. Conditionals of the following form are true. If Lou has become angry, then he just tokened the belief that someone, x, is something, F, in (causal) virtue of which he came to be angry and angry at x for being F, e.g., at Freddie for walking the bases loaded. If we assume that Hume holds this view, it becomes difficult to reconstruct The Argument on the standard reading in a way that exploits the contentlessness of passions considered in themselves.

(1) If, for example, Lou has become angry then he just tokened the belief that someone, x, is something, F, in (causal) virtue of which he came to be angry and angry at x for being F.
(2) But passions such as anger are original existences so, despite their having objects in virtue of their causal relations to doxastic states, they aren’t intrinsically about anything at all.

(3) But if they are not intrinsically about anything at all they aren’t intrinsically either true or false.

(4) What isn’t intrinsically either true or false can’t be opposed by or contradicted by what is intrinsically either true or false.

(5) Judgments of the understanding or reason are intrinsically either true or false.

(6) Therefore reason can’t oppose passion and no episode of anger is contrary to reason.

I take it that the argument is valid, but I see no reason for accepting (4), let alone attributing it to Hume. The only ground for accepting it is the assumption that only acts that are intrinsically intentional are intentional at all. But acceptance of this assumption directly undermines the causal account of intentionality at issue. Defenders of the standard reading of The Argument thus face a dilemma. Read the crucial premise in The Argument as the simple denial that passions have objects, thereby assimilating them to bodily sensations, or give Hume a causal account of the intentionality of the passions and abandon the standard reading of The Argument.

Hume’s argument is much more effective if the point it makes is as follows. Despite the fact that passions inherit their content from the truth-valued beliefs that cause them, the passions as directed upon their objects in virtue of being annexed to particular conceptions are neither true nor false because passions don’t assert what they represent, even if some of them are expressible as evaluative truth-evaluable beliefs.

The question is whether annexation is cognitive inclusion. The answer is yes and no. I am prepared to ascribe to Hume the following claims: (i) It is necessary with respect to humans that episodes of passion are caused by token beliefs or content-bearing states and that such episodes of passion are directed at objects by virtue of the ingredient ideas of the beliefs that cause them. Of course, in many instances a passion is produced by the concurrence of a token belief and a standing passion. My standing antipathy toward the Yankees and my mildly favorable attitude toward Anaheim, combined with the belief that they were to play each other in the division series to produce
the hope that Anaheim would beat the Yankees in the division series. (ii) It is necessary, with respect to humans, that some passions are directed at persons, for example, pride and humility, moral approbation and disapprobation. It wouldn’t be a case of human pride unless the feeling of approval involved the idea of self in virtue of which it was directed at oneself. In the typical case, the human sentiment of moral approval arises in response to witnessing what one takes to be an action expressing a character-revealing intention. Absent the idea representing the action with its character-revealing intention, the sentiment, taken by itself, whatever that would be, would not be the human sentiment of moral approval.

It is tempting to go further and ascribe to Hume the view that beliefs and passions are coordinate. Whereas beliefs are assertoric or doxastic attitudes, passions constitute various kinds of nondoxastic attitudes, such as certain to desire and evaluation. In the case of beliefs, including impressions of (outer) sense and memory, force and vivacity are primarily assertoric character. The force and vivacity that an idea inherits through inference from an impression of sense or memory is what makes it a belief inferred from observation as opposed to an idle reverie. This assertoric character is an integrated feature of cognitive perceptions and not a separate intellectual act of assent, and that’s because assertoric character constituted by force and vivacity is a manner of conceiving. 48 The force and vivacity appropriate to assertoric character can become so attenuated, however, that ideas can be embedded in acts of the imagination that aren’t beliefs at all as in free association, understanding without believing what others say, or wondering whether something is true. 49 One might, then, suppose that in the case of a passion, a desire, for example, we find a similar phenomenon. That is, one might suppose that a desire to have one’s finger be scratch free, at all costs, is a unitary act in which conative character, in this case the force and vivacity appropriate to desire, is integrated with the intentional object toward which it is directed. As mentioned above, calm passions as in the case of strength of mind are, Hume claims, mistaken for acts of the rational faculty and thus must be content bearing states. And thus, one might further suppose that they involve comparable integration of content with force and vivacity peculiar to the defining attitude and behavioral propensity of the passion.

Hume, however, does not seem to concur. 50 This, despite the fact that force and vivacity are what distinguish both impressions of sense and impressions of reflection from perfect or unasserted ideas. At Appendix 4 (SBN 625) he is arguing that belief is not an impression distinct from the idea constituting its content. It is a manner of conceiving. The manner is sufficient force and vivacity of the appropriate sort as an integral feature of a representational
perception. Hume contrasts this sort of integration with the relation passions bear to their objects. Will and desire are annexed to particular conceptions of good and pleasure. They are not modifications of such conceptions.²¹

There are a number of reasons for Hume to reject the suggestion that passions are simply distinctive modes of force and vivacity otherwise perfectly coordinate with the doxastic force and vivacity of beliefs, impressions of outer sense, and memory. Many of the reasons are implicit in Hume’s rejection of the claim that will and desire are modifications of conceptions of pleasure and good. A passion isn’t merely a manner of conceiving. (i) It has a hedonic core, to use Baier’s expression.²² That doesn’t mean, however, that passions are to be assimilated to bodily pleasures and pains any more than to propositional attitudes. (ii) In some cases, a passion can be so loosened from its inciting object/cause that it turns into a lingering mood annexed to no particular conception at all. Thus, while an objectless desire and volition are as absurd as an objectless belief, sadness as a mood that colors one’s entire world needn’t have a persistent manifest object. (iii) The fact that a passion has a content, i.e., that it is annexed to a particular conception, is dependent on a doxastic cause whose content is merely reproduced in the passion. That’s what makes it an impression of reflection and not an inferentially produced perception. What, then, is the relation Hume has in mind when he says that will and desire are annexed to conceptions of pleasure and good? At the very least, we can say that any episodic passion, \( x \), has a doxastic cause whose content is conception \( c \) such that \( x \) is annexed to \( c \). And thus, while this original existence does not contain any representative character, which renders it a factual judgment about anything, it is annexed to a particular conception inherited from its doxastic cause to provide it an object without which it wouldn’t be an episode of passion at all.

NOTES

In addition to the editors and reviewers for this journal, to whom I am indebted for generous and valuable criticism, I also wish to thank Marcia Lind, Jean Roberts, Angela Smith, and Kaspar Stoffelmayr.

1 John Brice is a notable exception (Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume’s Moral Psychology [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 21–7]). He concedes the atomism of Hume’s official theory while insisting that passions in Hume’s theory of action are propositional attitudes. The points on which we differ will emerge, but at a minimum I provide detailed textual arguments for the thesis we share, that
Hume does not rely on the claim that passions have no representational content to reach his conclusion that no passion is contrary to reason.


4 Cohon claims that Baier is committed to ascribing what she, Cohon, calls the cognitive inclusion theory to Hume. According to the inclusion theory, the idea providing a passion with its intentional object is a metaphysical part of the passion making it belief-like, even if not exactly a propositional attitude. On Cohon’s reading of The Argument the premise that passion is an original existence etc., entails the denial of the inclusion theory. That’s why she supposes that Baier dismisses it as an unfortunate lapse on Hume’s part. However, Cohon herself departs from the standard view in that she grants that passions do have intentional objects by offering Hume a causal theory of intentional objects for the passions. I believe, as I’ll show below, that this proposal spoils the standard reading of The Argument.

5 I am aware of the custom of using the expression “content” for referring to the qualitative character of what is sensed in an impression of outer sense and to the phenomenological features of bodily sensations and impressions of reflection. To avoid confusion I refrain from this usage. I understand the claim that passions have no content to deny that they are intentional states; and not to deny that they have introspectible qualitative features.

6 I am using the term “passions” as coextensive with “impressions of reflection” and imply nothing further about moral sentiments, whether, for example, they are direct or indirect passions or neither.

7 To this extent, Hume is committed to innate quasi-conceptual abilities. This isn’t so hard to swallow once one realizes that Hume does not seem to recognize the later problem of moving from preconceptual cognition to judgment and that his account of simple causal inference takes impressions of (outer) sense to constitute premise-beliefs and thus fairly robust perceptual judgments.
8 Even if one fastens on Hume’s initial characterization of moral sentiments as pleasures and pains, I would argue that such pleasures or pains are better understood as cases of being pleased or pained at. Moral sentiments are impressions of reflection not impressions of sense.

For, first, ’tis evident, that under the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance, as is requisite to make them expressed by the same abstract term. (T 3.1.2.4; SBN 472)

To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases; but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments of concerning all kinds of beauty, tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey to us. (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471)

You can never find it [the vice of murder], till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, toward it. (T 3.1.1.26; SBN 468–9)

9 I need to issue the following qualification. Although the passions Hume considers in The Argument are obviously not truth-evatable beliefs, he does recognize a class of passions that are in a sense truth-evaetable or at least evaluable against a standard of correctness. The moral sentiment of disapproving of x is expressible as the judgment that x is vicious, which is correct if such disapproval would be evinced in an judicious spectator. Similarly, preferring the destruction of the world to a scratch on the finger, insofar as it is a cool settled preference and involves a sentiment of approval, is expressible by the judgment that the destruction of the world is better than getting a scratch on the finger which is contradicted by “custom and practice that settles the just value of everything” (T 2.1.6.9; SBN 294). Another way of putting the point is that Hume recognizes a class of truth evaluable-beliefs, evaluative judgments, to which passions are contrary. I cannot here take up the task of examining Hume’s theory of evaluative judgments. I am going to assume that either their evaluative content adequately distinguishes them from judgments of the understanding or, what in the end comes to the same thing, that they are logically tied to the evaluative passions they express. This move is not as question begging as it seems. If it later emerges that there are judgments of value that are not products of understanding or mere intellect, it doesn’t effect his arguments against rationalist opponents who hold that all judgments are judgments of intellectual reason. Moreover, Hume will not, in any case, be able to narrowly refute his rationalist opponents from a stock of shared premises. For a different attempt to reconcile truth-evatable explicit judgments of evaluation with evaluative sentiments see Don Garrett’s discussion in

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In Bricke’s reconstruction of The Argument, Hume is shoring up a weakness in his first argument for conativism. The first argument establishes that the element playing the major role in the psychological complex constituting a reason for action “has a practical goal setting function” (Bricke, 19), and that no judgment of fact can play this role. Hume has not shown conclusively that only desires can play this role, since the candidacy of explicitly evaluative belief has not been considered. Thus, Bricke supposes that the reference to truth in The Argument is meant to go beyond truth-evaluability as it applies just to factual judgments and include evaluative judgments as well. Otherwise, Bricke supposes, Hume will simply be assuming that only passions can motivate, thus begging the question in favor of conativism. I have several responses. There’s no sign that in The Argument Hume is advancing to consider evaluative judgments. Indeed, the reference to truth is tied to reason, and reason is restricted in this context to what produces judgments of fact, whether demonstrative or probable. Moreover, the distinction between descriptive and evaluative judgments isn’t one that the thinkers Hume is arguing with are going to recognize anyway. Eternal fitness might be a different kind of property than being more than five foot tall, but they are ontologically on a par. It’s Hume who draws attention to evaluative attitudes to recast them in terms of passions.

I would argue that the preference is a calm interested passion, a settled principle of action.

It is evident, passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but, on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated custom and its own force have made every thing yield to it, it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion. (T 2.3.4.1; SBN 419)

Moreover, I believe that the preference involves the evaluative judgment that keeping one’s finger scratch-free is better than preventing the destruction of the world.

Rachel Cohon and David Owen (“Hume on Representation, Reason and Motivation,” Manuscrito 20 [1997]: 47–76) claim that the originality of the passions is the absence of representational character by way of idea. They argue that, while unlike impressions of sense in having mental causes, passions are, nonetheless,
as impressions, like impressions of sense in that they do not represent. Several points need to be made here. First, it is, of course, true that impressions of sense do not represent by way of idea. Second, assuming, as does Hume throughout T 1.3, that impressions of (outer) sense are acts and not sensory data as they appear to be in T 1.4.2, it is clear that they do present or represent perceptual objects, even if the distinct and continued existence of such objects turns out to be problematic. Indeed, an impression of sense as an element in causal inference is an act of perceptual judgment. Moreover, if the ingredient idea in a thinking of a red apple represents a red apple by copying or resembling an impression then it must do so by being representationally of what that antecedent impression is (re)presentationally of. If one insists that impressions of (outer) sense are sensory objects and not acts of sensory consciousness, then there’s very little rationale for grouping impressions of sense with passions as a coordinate species of impressions, since passions are obviously mental acts.

14 He certainly doesn’t mean to restrict judgments of the understanding to explicit judgments about truth and reason. On might suppose, however, that he is committing himself to the entailment from “x judges p” to “x judges that p is true and in accordance with right reason.” On the other hand, in the sentence, “Nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it,” instead of referring jointly back to truth and reason as a sealed unit, “it” might only pick out truth. In that case, the argument would be that only judgments of the understanding are acts in which an idea is asserted-as-true. No act is contrary to reason unless it is one in which an idea is asserted-as-true. Therefore, no passion is contrary to reason except by way of an accompanying judgment. Similar considerations apply to sentence (3) where contradiction to truth and reason admits of multiple readings. I discuss this below when I get to sentence (3).

15 The phrase, “the judgments of our understanding only have this reference” has to be understood as limiting those mental acts (perceptions) having reference to truth to judgments of the understanding. Otherwise, the conclusion Hume draws doesn’t follow.

16 It should be noted that at T 2.2.5.15 (SBN 363) Humes says, “We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society.” Here I take the idea to be that a cheese sandwich as the object of my wish for the same implies the existence of cheese-makers, bakers, farmers, merchants and the rest, so that my wish for a cheese sandwich refers to all of the above. That is, under questioning I would acknowledge that my wish is for an object whose production involves all those just mentioned.

17 I am assuming that the force and vivacity that a perfect idea of the imagination lacks is the force and vivacity missing from an act of thinking whose content is a perfect idea of the imagination. In “Why Hume is a Direct Realist,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (2001): 258–85, I argue that the force and vivacity of an impression of sense or an idea of sense is the assertoric character of an act rather than merely an introspectible feature of an act or a discernible feature of content. If decrease in force and vivacity is increase in faintness of what is depicted, then since a perfect idea of the imagination has lost all the
original force and vivacity of its engendering impressions its content would be too faint to be discernible.

18 Despite our lamentable credulity and too easy faith in the testimony of others (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 112–13), we are capable of understanding and dissenting.

Suppose a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, _that Caesar dy'd in his bed, that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold_; it is evident, that, notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas which he forms. (T 1.3.7.3; SBN 95)

19 Hume would not be happy about speaking of doxastic and conative attitudes toward propositions, insofar as this way of speaking suggests, among other things, that belief is the product of a distinct act of understanding and a volitional act of assent. Propositional content for Hume is an abstraction. It is what remains of an impression of sense when its force and vivacity have been removed.

20 There are three options. (i) Truth and reason go together on the side of the represented. (ii) Truth and reason go together on the side of the representer. (iii) Truth goes on the side of the represented and reason goes on the side of the representer. The fact that contradiction is characterized as disagreement of representer with represented favors (i) over (ii). (iii) requires two senses of “contradiction,” contradiction to truth as the stated disagreement between an object and an idea functioning as copy, and contradiction to reason understood as disagreement between two ideas, one considered by reason as a copy of an object and another idea considered (by reason’s rival) as a copy of that same object.

21 See, for example, T 1.1.1.12 (SBN 7), T 1.1.2.1 (SBN 8), T 1.1.3.4 (SBN 10), T 1.1.7.5 (SBN 19), and T 1.3.1.7 (SBN 72), and in _An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), EHU 2.5 (SBN 19), 7.4 (SBN 62), 7.30 (SBN 78).

22 Here are some examples from Locke (An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975]).

First, simple ideas, which are _ektupia_, or copies; but yet certainly adequate. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. (II xxxi 12)

Secondly, the complex ideas of substances are ectypes, copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate. (II xxxi 13)

Thirdly, complex ideas of modes and relations are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. (II xxxi 14)
Berkeley takes over Locke’s use both in criticizing Locke’s view as well as presenting his own view, so that even when copying looks like a mind-mind relation it is, nonetheless, a mind-world relation, given Berkeley’s ontological revisions. Of course, they both hold that human ideas of common sense objects are ultimately copies of archetypes external to human minds.

Philonous: If I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind; but that they are copies, images, or representations of certain originals that do. (Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, ed. Jonathan Dancy [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], 91)

Philonous: It is your opinion, the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images, or copies of them. (128)

The ideas imprinted on the senses by the author of nature are called real things: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. (A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Jonathan Dancy [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], §33, 114)

When Hume, in our passage, speaks of ideas functioning as copies of the objects they represent, he makes contact with Locke’s usage, although in Hume’s case copying has an active character. The point I am emphasizing is that, in both cases, copying pertains to semantic success in representing objects.

23 This can lead to the suggestion that ideas are quasi-objects as well as impressions of sense of which ideas are faint images. This suggestion receives some support from T 1.4.2. The counter evidence is the discussion of causal inference throughout T 1.3 in which impressions are token premise-beliefs and ideas are token conclusion-beliefs.

24 It’s curious in any case that Hume should say that in being angry he has no reference to any other object as though there is some object to which qua angry he does have reference. This suggests another line of interpretation to rival the standard reading.

25 The obvious way to blunt the intended point of this citation is to insist that this reference properly belongs to the beliefs accompanying the wish.

26 On the contrary, in his discussion of pride he says “[t]hat the peculiar object of pride and humility is determined by an original and natural instinct, and that ’tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou’d ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious” (T 2.1.5.3; SBN 286).

Because pride is a double relation of impressions and ideas, it is clear that as the object the passion never looks beyond self is present by way of idea. Cohon (191) downplays the significance of this passage as evidence of Hume’s commitment to a logical connection between pride and oneself. She says “[t]o say that the
connection between the feeling of pride and turning our ‘view’ to ourselves wrought by the primary constitution of the mind is not yet to say that the idea of ourselves is part of the primary constitution of the *passion.*” Perhaps, but it does show Hume’s commitment to something more than a contingent relation between the idea of self and pride as it occurs in a mind or at least a human mind. Hume seems to be making the same kind of point regarding the connection of love and benevolence at T 368, although he makes the point in a manner ostensibly more favorable to Cohon’s view, until one recalls that Hume is arguing that love is not the same as benevolence. I take Hume’s implied point to be that while love and benevolence are distinct because, abstractly considered, it is logically possible for the former to occur without the latter, it’s not possible in some sense of “possible” for love to occur in a human without benevolence toward the person loved, although I recognize this to be a controversial point. For other passages where Hume makes essentialist sounding claims apparently at odds with the dictates of empiricism and his own putative atomism, see T 1.4.4.1 (SBN 225); 3.1.2.8 (SBN 474); and EPM 6.4–5 (SBN 235). Cohon also cites T 2.1.2.1 (SBN 277) as evidence against the view that an episode of pride and a passion in general can have an idea as a constitutive and defining part. Here Hume says that pride and humility are simple uniform impressions. But I think it would be rash to conclude from this that pride and the all the other passions are to be understood as constituting a species coordinate with bodily pleasures and pains, despite the fact that Hume more often than not refers to passions as sensations. He also says that “belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 183). It is likely that in speaking of pride as a simple and uniform impression he is simply pointing to its indefinability with respect to its phenomenological feel. He makes a similar point as he introduces the topic of the relation of love and benevolence. Some, misled by appearances, think they are not only inseparable but the same. The misleading appearance is due to the fact that “[i]mpressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colors, may be blended perfectly together, that each may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole” (T 2.2.6.1; SBN 366). True enough, the opening sentence of the discussion of pride and humility seems by implication to characterize all passions as simple impressions. It doesn’t follow, however, from the mere statement that a perception is a simple impression that it has no mental aboutness. Simple impressions of (outer sense) are simple but, assuming them to be acts, they possess mental aboutness. In any case, if it were obvious that the simplicity and uniformity of a passion entailed that it had no representative character, Hume would be well advised by defenders of the standard reading of The Argument to have begun with the premise that a passion is a simple and uniform impression rather than an original existence.

27 Similarly, at T 3.1.2.1 (SBN 470) he says that because a moral sentiment is commonly soft and gentle it is apt to be confounded with an idea. Here Hume is not assuming that moral sentiments are content-barren and yet as mere content-barren feelings can be confused with representational content. Rather, he is pointing out that, although a moral sentiment is not an idea in the sense of an act, namely, an act of judgment or belief, it can be mistaken for one.
28 A defender of the standard reading might, nonetheless, insist that the calm passion is mistaken for a determination of reason because it is confused with the factual belief related to the calm passion. But that misses Hume’s point. Suppose that someone refrains from taking another helping of pudding. Such a person obviously believes that another helping of pudding is available for the taking. We might suppose further that he believes that taking another helping is unhealthy and that he wants to be healthy. It would be natural to explain what did not happen by ascribing to such a person the will-determining thought, “I ought to refrain from taking another helping of pudding, tempting though it be” or “It would be bad for me to take another helping of pudding.” Hume’s point, I take it, is that the perception so characterized is in fact a calm passion properly described as the desire to refrain from taking a second helping. Because this desire is calm and not violent as is the appetitive desire to take a second helping, one confuses this opposing “judgment” with a determination of reason. The motivating attitude toward taking another helping is a calm passion not a determination of reason despite the phenomenological similarities. This point is lost if what one mistakenly takes the passion for is the factual belief that a second helping is available for the taking or the belief that taking another helping is unhealthy.

29 This reading might seem to be reinforced by the talk of containment. However, the containing in question is not that of a mental act containing an idea. It is the containing by a subject of a property, i.e., property exemplification.

30 Apparently Hume denies that one can just be struck by a fear or desire in the absence of an antecedent thought of the object feared or desired. This might be taken as evidence that impressions of reflection are not themselves content bearing states. All that it shows, I would argue, is that as impressions of reflection they inherit their content from their mental causes. On the other hand, Hume recognizes (T 1.3.10.4; SBN 120) timorousness and melancholy as prevailing passions that can affect one’s perceptual beliefs. The coward’s perceptual apprehension distorts the scene and manufactures occasions of fear. Now consider a standing fear of being poisoned. If it is a passion then it is a passion which affects the content of belief and sensory states. Such a person finds that the taste of the drink is off in a way that makes her believe that it is poisoned and afraid to take another sip. Even if the standing fear inherits its content from beliefs about toxins in the environment and food supply, it is because her fear is a fear of being poisoned, a fear with that very content, that her perceptual beliefs are distorted the way they are. Again what this shows is that impressions of reflection, for the most part depend for their content on truth targeted states.

31 In the Abstract (22; SBN 654) Hume claims that “[belief] has a more forcible effect on the mind than fiction and mere conception” due to “[i]ts influence on the passions and on the imagination; which are only moved by truth or what is taken for such.”

32 See note 13 as a response to Cohon and Owen 1997.

33 See the author’s “Why Hume is a Direct Realist.”
At T 2.2.9.2 (SBN 381–2), Hume observes that, while logically distinct, there is, owing to our constitution, a peculiar connection between love and benevolence. If $x$ loves $y$ then $x$ desires to make $y$ happy. “This cannot take place with regard to pride and humility, because these are only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action.” Notice by the way, that in characterizing pride as a pure sensation he appears only to be denying that it has an original influence on the will.

In Bricke’s words (85), “[a] given psychological state cannot have both the world-to-mind and the mind-to-world directions of fit, cannot (as construed within the confines of the theory) be both conative and cognitive.”

I am pleased to discover that others find such relative clauses to be restrictive. See Nicholas L. Sturgeon, “Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume,” *Hume Studies* 27 (2001): 60.

Hume obviously doesn’t consider impressions of sense as viable candidates.

The practicality of morality that Hume insists on would lead one to expect that the moral sentiments introduced to replace the discredited rationalist conception of moral judgment would be practical. Thus, Bricke’s claim that moral judgments, properly construed, are moral desires (82). However, the moral sentiments Hume posits as constituting judgments of virtue and vice are not moral desires but moral assessments. One way to satisfy the requirement that morality be practical consistent with the explicitly evaluative rather than conative character of the moral sentiments Hume actually discusses is as follows. Morality is practical not because moral sentiments play a primary role in the motivation of morally positive action, but because we are moved by motives which, because positively assessed by moral sentiments, have the title “moral.”

See note 8.

It’s more than somewhat puzzling. Not only does The Argument not have the practical inertness of reason as its conclusion, there is no earlier proof anywhere, despite Hume’s announcement that he will “endeavor to prove first that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will” (T 2.3.3.1; SBN 413). At best, he presents an articulation of his conception of reason familiar from Book 1, part 3. What he proves is that reason can’t oppose passion. The proof is an inference from the inertness of reason.

A variation of this solution that works from the conclusion of the argument relies on the symmetry of both conformability and contrariety.

Mental act of type $A$ is not of a type to conform or be contrary to mental act of type $B$ only if mental act of type $B$ is not of a type to conform or be contrary to mental act of type $A$. Passions cannot be pronounced either true or false and are thus of the type neither to be contrary nor conformable to reason. Therefore, acts of reason are not of the type to be contrary or conformable to passion. What is not of the type to be contrary or conformable to passion is without original influence on the will. Therefore, reason has no original influence on the will.
42 Of course that argument presupposes the inertness of reason as a premise. Reason has no original influence. Only judgments of reason are truth-evaluable. Therefore, nothing is both a truth-evaluable judgment and something with original influence.

43 For other attempts to fill the various lacunae, see Cohon and Owen and Bricke, chapter 3.

44 Garrett (193) maintains that reason is the faculty for making inferences one consequence of which is that Hume’s claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason does not entail that moral distinctions are without warrant. The unwanted entailment is also blocked if reason is the general capacity for forming beliefs pertaining to matters of fact and relations of ideas. Thus, more broadly construed, the products of reason would include inferentially produced beliefs, as well as noninferential beliefs of memory, sense perception, and relations of ideas.

45 In another context Hume explicitly attributes referential powers to actions. In discussing promises he says of agents with mutually acknowledged interests that “the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other” (T 3.2.2.10; SBN 490).

46 One might go further and wonder whether for Hume, as he gives the nod to anatomists, any token mental act is intrinsically content bearing. Donald Davidson (“Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride,” Journal of Philosophy 73 [1976]: 744–57), speaking for Hume and himself, holds that pride as a type is defined in terms of the beliefs that cause it, even though, one imagines, he holds that no token of pride is such that it is logically necessary that it be content bearing. David Pears (Hume’s System, [New York: Oxford University Press, 1990], chapter 2] holds that the representational character of a token idea is a functional/causal feature rather than an intrinsic feature. Of course, if Hume is as radical a naturalist as some would have him, then he would acknowledge that no token mental act—a belief—for example, is such that, necessarily, it is content bearing while maintaining that, necessarily, every belief has representational content.

47 Here are the claims, I take it, that Cohon’s Hume subscribes to in virtue of his rejection of the cognitive inclusion theory.

1. It is not necessary that a passion be paired to an idea of an object.

2. In particular it is not necessary (it is not a conceptual truth) that any episode of pride be linked to an idea of self. That is, the fact that x is feeling proud does not entail that she is also entertaining an idea of her-self, an idea of which she is proud of, or an idea of anything at all.

3. Any passion that happens to be paired to an idea need not be so paired.

4. In particular, even if S is angry today at the Mariners for losing today, that very episode of anger need not have been paired with the idea of the Mariners’ losing today or with any idea at all.
(1) and (2) are *de dicto* claims. (3) and (4) are to be read *de re* along the lines of token identity theory. Every token mental event is a physical event, but need not be mental. 

$$(x)((Mx \rightarrow Px) \& \neg\neg Mx)$$

Similarly, although (i) in fact, every episode of passion is paired with an idea providing it with an object, and (ii) necessarily, every episode of being angry at $y$ for being $F$ is an episode of anger paired with an idea of $y$’s being $F$, a particular case at $t$ of $x$’s being angry at $y$ for being $F$ is such that it could have occurred at $t$ without being paired with an idea of $y$’s being $F$ and thus without having been directed at $y$ for being $F$ or at anyone at all for being anything.

48 For the detailed arguments, see the author’s “Why Hume is a Direct Realist.”

49 It should be pointed out, however, that as an occurrent mental act, every perception has some force and vivacity as Hume indicates at T 1.3.8.15 (SBN 106).

50 At T 2.1.5.11 (SBN 289–90) he does speak of an analogy between inference and the double relation of impressions and ideas in indirect passions. It does not serve the point, however.

51 And, thus, there is a certain point to Cohon’s claim that passions aren’t cognitively inclusive.

52 Baier, 213.