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Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?

CHRISTINE SWANTON

Abstract: It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as part of a virtue ethical tradition. However there are a number of obstacles in the way of such a reading: subjectivist, irrationalist, hedonistic, and consequentialist interpretations of Hume. In this paper I support a virtue ethical reading by arguing against all these interpretations. In the course of these arguments I show how Hume should be understood as part of a virtue ethical tradition which is sentimentalist in a response-dependent sense, as opposed to Aristotelian.

I. Introduction

It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as part of a virtue ethical tradition. In her “Virtue and the Evaluation of Character,” Jacqueline Taylor claims that “Hume’s moral philosophy may plausibly be construed as a version of virtue ethics,” for “among the central concepts of his theory are character, virtue and vice, rather than rules, duty, and obligation.”1 This reason for classing Hume as a virtue ethicist conforms to my basic definition of virtue ethics in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View,2 according to which virtue ethical theories are those in which virtue concepts are central. Thus, I argued, virtue ethics should be seen as a genus of moral theory rather than a species, such as Aristotle’s eudaimonism. The proper comparative class for the genus virtue ethics is, for example deontology, rather than say Kantianism, neo-Kantianism, let alone Kant himself. Given this, there is on the face of it no problem in classifying Hume as part of both the sentimentalist tradition and the virtue ethical tradition.

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However, the failure to place Hume in both traditions has tended, at least in the past, to render invisible non-subjectivist, cognitivist, and non-irrationalist readings. Because Hume says that sentiment is the essence of ethics, as well as the essence of beauty, he has been read as a subjectivist or skeptic in both ethics and aesthetics. This paper aims to do justice to Hume’s convictions both that sentiment lies at the foundations of ethics, and that ethics is a form of reliable, objective interaction with the world, permitting critical purchase on both people’s behaviour and emotions through objectively and socially accessible notions of virtue and vice. Hume, in short, can be read as being part of both the sentimentalist and virtue ethical traditions.

Subjectivist interpretations are not the only obstacles to virtue ethical readings of Hume. They also have to contend with hedonistic and consequentialist interpretations. These will be discussed in the final sections.

To be clear about the task ahead, let me summarize how you cannot read Hume if he is to be part of the virtue ethical tradition.

(A) A non-sensible subjectivist.

Wiggins’ “sensible subjectivism” I do not regard as incompatible with virtue ethics. More on this later.

(B) A non-rationalist.

In standard virtue ethics, ethics is at least in part a reason-giving and reason-responsive enterprise.

(C) A hedonist.

Virtue ethics rejects list theories of the good according to which you can provide a list of non-aretaic values such as pleasure, and then understand virtue in terms of dispositions to promote, love, or respect such values. What is good without qualification as Aristotle would put it, is not for example pleasure, but pleasure handled well or excellently.

(D) A consequentialist.

Virtue ethics is a type of non-consequentialist normative ethical theory, because not all virtues have as their point or rationale the promotion of good, or value. Some are virtues because they are expressive of flourishing states, for example, joyfulness, some are closely connected to respect and status, for example, justice and honesty, some are centrally concerned with the manifestation of love, affection, or other bonds between individuals or between individuals and institutions or projects, for instance, friendship, loyalty, perseverance. Responsiveness to bonds in, for example, grief is not and need not be proportional to degree or strength of value. Consequences then are not the only things that matter morally for the virtue ethicist.
It is unquestionable that virtue and vice are the central objects of moral evaluation for Hume, but if any of the above types of interpretation are correct he can be read as a theorist of virtue but not as a virtue ethicist. In this paper I begin the task of interpreting Hume as a virtue ethicist, by arguing against all the above interpretations.

To begin it is necessary to appreciate the complexity of the relation between Hume’s meta-ethics and normative ethics. In order to avoid confusion, we need to distinguish between several layers in his thought. Muddle between these layers results in the kinds of interpretations to be rejected. Here are the layers.

1. The definition of virtue.
2. The moral sense.
3. Causes of the activation of the moral sense.
4. The conditions for having a moral sense.
5. The conditions for possession of an authoritative moral sense.
6. The features which make a trait of character a virtue: the criteria of virtue.
7. Moral judgments of someone with an authoritative moral sense.
8. True moral judgements.

II. Hume as Response-Dependent Theorist

We consider now the first obstacle to reading Hume as a virtue ethicist: the claim that Hume is some kind of non-sensible subjectivist. By a non-sensible subjectivist I shall mean a subjectivist who does not think that virtues and vices are properties of objects. I shall argue that Hume is a “sensible subjectivist” in David Wiggins’ terms, namely a response dependence theorist of a certain kind. To argue this I need to show both that virtues and vices are properties of objects (albeit of a response-dependent kind), and that there are features which merit those properties being called virtues and vices. In this section I show how virtues and vices can be seen as response-dependent properties for Hume, leaving the issue of “merit” for section III.

To begin we first have to connect response dependence with virtue ethics, since traditional virtue ethics has not been response-dependent. In particular it has not understood a virtue (or a vice) in the way Hume does, namely as a response-dependent property—though one that is dependent on certain emotional responses. So, before we discuss Hume, a brief detour on the role of the emotions in virtue ethics is necessary.
Virtue ethics is well known for assigning an important place to the emotions. First, in emphasising the centrality of character to ethics, it emphasises the importance of the emotions to being a good person. For virtuous character incorporates not just tendencies to right acts, but excellence in emotional and affective dispositions. Second, in its skepticism about the codifiability of ethics, virtue ethics assigns to practical wisdom the role of determining right or desirable action. Since one cannot have practical wisdom without emotional excellence (what is now called emotional intelligence), emotional excellence is required for the requisite sensitivity to, and appreciation of, morally significant features. Hence emotion has a central epistemological role.

In my view, virtue ethics has been insufficiently radical in its recognition of the importance of emotion. Contemporary virtue ethicists have not sufficiently explored thinkers such as Hume for whom emotion is central in the metaphysics of ethics. In this respect, Hume differs sharply from the traditional neo-Aristotelian naturalism of modern virtue ethics. For Hume, ethics is response-dependent, and the relevant responses are certain emotions. To say that ethics is response-dependent in this way is to say, broadly speaking, that morality can “only take root in” (to use Wiggins’ apt phrase) creatures having something like our emotional capacities. These capacities are fundamentally self love, benevolence, and extensive sympathy. Self love ensures that we have a sense of our own good. Benevolence without self love, for instance, would be defective and non-virtuous, even if malevolence, and related vices (such as mistreatment of inferiors stemming from self contempt) are worse:

An abjectness of character . . . is disgusting and contemptible in another view. Where a man has no sense of value in himself, we are not likely to have any higher esteem of him. And if the same person, who crouches to his superiors, is insolent to his inferiors (as often happens), this contrariety of behaviour, instead of correcting the former vice, aggravates it extremely by the addition of a vice still more odious. (EPM 7.11; SBN 254n)³

While self love is necessary for virtue, benevolence ensures that morality goes beyond prudence. However, benevolence with self love is not sufficient for moral virtue in general. The requirement of extensive sympathy ensures that morality extends beyond the partialistic affections.⁴ Again, while extensive sympathy is also necessary, it too is not sufficient: without self love or the partialistic affections of close bonds and intimacy, extensive sympathy would also be defective. A virtuous person would not be a philanthropist and a bad parent. Finally extensive sympathy (in the sense of empathic capacity) without a general benevolence would also be insufficient for a moral sense: such “sympathy” may tempt us to extend a partialistic affection inappropriately, or even worse, a fundamental hostility or malevolence.
Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is not response-dependent. For the Neo-Aristotelian, and indeed for Aristotle, a virtue is a trait which makes one good as a human being. But the goodness of a human being, as human, is a response-independent notion for the Aristotelian. For the Aristotelian tradition unpacks the idea of goodness as human in terms of being a non-defective member of a species, or an excellent specimen. According to this view, certain facts about a human being’s nature make for such excellence. They are thus facts of a special evaluative kind, facts about a species’ characteristic modes of operating.

The Aristotelian forges a tight connection between goodness as a human being and being good for a human being. Being good as a human being is characteristically good for you. Furthermore, not only is it a necessary condition of being a virtue that it makes one good, but it is a necessary condition of a trait being a virtue that it is characteristically good for you. Goodness and the good are both response-independent notions determinable by facts of human nature accessible to science.

In opposition to the Aristotelian picture, I shall understand Hume as espousing a response-dependent view of virtue having the following form:

(a) V is a virtue only if V is such as to elicit appropriate responses from qualified actors. Such responses include approving of V, cultivating V, modelling V, training children into V, being ready to recognize and acknowledge the presence of V in oneself and others.

(b) An actor is qualified only if she has certain emotional dispositions.

(c) A virtue or a vice is a power in an object to elicit relevant responses in qualified actors.

By contrast, according to David Wiggins, Hume’s “official theory” denies that virtue and viciousness “are in the objects themselves,” for judgments about virtue and so forth are not judgments about “real existents” or “matters of fact.” Hume’s writings may encourage this interpretation. Consider the following well-known passage from David Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature*:

Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. (T 3.1.1.26; SBN 468–9)
This passage has often been interpreted in the following way. Supposedly, objective moral properties can be perceived in objects, as can properties like size. But no such properties are detectable. Were we to postulate such objective properties, they would be queer, detectable only by a mysterious faculty. Since all that is really noticeable are various mental items in the observer, moral properties really are such items.

For example, Jonathan Harrison claims: “It is extremely puzzling that Hume says he is going to show that morality is not a matter of fact, but ends up concluding that it is a matter of fact about our sentiments.” The vice for Hume, says Harrison, is in our sentiments. There are two mistakes here. First, Hume does not say that morality is not a matter of fact: he says that it “consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover’d by the understanding” (T 3.1.1.26; SBN 468). Second, morality is not a matter of fact about our sentiments, it is a matter of fact about virtue and vice, which are in objects. For Hume explicitly claims that virtues are powers (in objects) to excite the moral sentiments. Specifically, a virtue is a “stable” and “enduring” quality of mind that has a power to produce love or pride:

[T]hese two particulars are to be consider’d as equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power to produce love or pride, vice and the power of producing humility or hatred. (T 3.3.1.4; SBN 575)

Note that as a definition of virtue this passage tells us nothing about what properties in objects merit being called virtue and vice. That is the job of the criteria of virtue, to be discussed below. In short, in a discussion of Hume’s virtue ethics, (1) (the definition of virtue) must not be confused with (6) (the criteria of virtue).

As a result of a virtue’s power to produce love or pride, a virtue “gives rise” to sentiments of approbation “which [are] nothing but . . . fainter and more imperceptible love” (T 3.3.5.1; SBN 614). These sentiments are forms of pleasure, while the sentiments of disapprobation arising from the power of a vice to produce humility or hatred are forms of displeasure or pain:

[W]e . . . must pronounce the impression arising from virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy. (T 3.1.2.1; SBN 470)

[T]he distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures. (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471)

The sentiments of approbation (a form of pleasure) constitute our sense of virtue, but virtues themselves are powers in objects. Again, we must not confuse the various layers of Hume’s thought: we must not confuse (1) (the definition
Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?

of virtue) with (2) (what constitutes the sense of virtue). As powers in objects giving rise to moral sentiments, which help define those powers as virtues, virtues are response-dependent properties, and are therefore not projections as some commentators claim.10

We turn now to the question: what kind of thing is a moral sense? It is central to Hume’s notion of the moral sense that pure emotionless reason is blind to ethics, and thus cannot provide a moral sense or moral cognition. What such reason aims to do is discover “eternal,” “immutable,” “natural” fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, and if there were such fitnesses in the moral domain, they would impose obligations on all rational minds including that of the deity. Those obligations would be “the same to every rational being that considers them” (T 3.1.1.3; SBN 456), regardless of the kinds of sentiments (if any) that form their constitution. However, there are no such eternal fitnesses in the moral, prudential, or aesthetic domains. This is the point of Hume’s claims that

\[ \text{[‘t]is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. (T 2.3.3.6; SBN 416)} \]

and

\[ \text{[‘t]is not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person totally unknown to me. (T 2.3.3.6; SBN 416)} \]

Here Hume means by “reason” pure emotionless reason of the kind possessed by all rational beings regardless of their emotional constitutions. Human beings do possess such reason, provided we understand it as the operations of the understanding, a faculty “considered apart from any passions and any feelings of pleasure and pain.”11

It may be thought that Hume’s infamous representation argument supports subjectivist interpretations of Hume. As described by Rachel Cohon and David Owen, the argument has the following structure:

(1) Passions have no representative quality;

(2) Only what represents real relations and matters of fact, and so can agree or disagree with them (T 3.1.1.8–10; SBN 458), can be contrary or conformable to reason;

(3) Therefore passions cannot be contrary or conformable to reason.12

As Cohon and Owen point out, the first premise is simply a “consequence of passions being impressions rather than ideas.”13 Impressions do not represent,
only ideas can do this. Reason is an operation of the understanding for Hume, and as such, involves only relations between ideas, that is, between items which represent. In that sense, the conclusion of the Representation Argument merely claims that since passions cannot represent, they cannot conform to reason, understood as an operation of the understanding. Reason in that sense could discover eternal and immutable fitnesses in the domain of morality were there to be such things, but there are no such fitnesses. Nonetheless, the passions such as hate can take objects, and for Hume there can be natural fitnesses between passions and their objects, discoverable only by what we now call emotional intelligence, but not by the faculty of understanding, for that faculty exists “apart from any passions.” In this regard Hume anticipates psychologists such as Damasio and Daniel Goleman.  

To understand the nature of the moral sense for Hume then, it is necessary to understand its conditions of possibility, namely the existence of certain emotions and a certain kind of empathic capacity presupposing those emotions. The condition for the possibility of a moral sense in humans for Hume, is the existence of certain sentiments in them: self love, benevolence, and extensive sympathy. In *The Sceptic*, Hume describes the condition of the possibility of a moral sense in terms of disqualifying conditions:

where one is born of so perverse a frame of mind, of so callous and insensible a disposition, as to have no relish for virtue and humanity, no sympathy with his fellow-creatures, no desire of esteem or applause; such a one must be allowed entirely incurable, nor is there any remedy in philosophy.

Such a person is not qualified to make judgements of virtue or vice, for he does not have the emotions and capacities requisite for a moral sense—self love, benevolence, and extensive sympathy.

Likewise, the condition of the possibility of truths concerning prudence is a conception of personal good, and such a conception can be entertained only if we have a conception of a prudential sense. The condition for the possibility of a prudential sense is the passion of self love.

We now consider a problem for Hume’s notion of a moral sense. As we have seen, the condition for the possibility of moral truth for Hume is the conception of a moral sense, which itself presupposes that the conditions of possibility for a moral sense are satisfied. Recall that the moral sense itself consists in certain kinds of “faint,” “more imperceptible” love and hate, which are pleasures and pains, arising from love and pride, and hate and humility. But now we must ask: what if we love vice and hate virtue? The problem is resolved, I shall argue, if we distinguish the moral sense itself from its conditions of possibility, namely the
existence of certain passions, notably benevolence. We must not in short confuse (2) (the moral sense) with (4) (conditions of its possibility).

Let us consider the problem in more detail. The problem of loving vice and hating virtue has been expressed as “The Twin Earth Problem.” According to this problem, response dependence views of ethics are vulnerable to an unfortunate kind of moral relativism. Consider a world in which beings have “the sort of deliberative and motivating response we [have] when we approve of things in our actual world.” These beings have “the same attitude toward cruelty or animal mistreatment that we do towards kindness or integrity.” So, it is thought, cruelty would be a virtue on Twin Earth while a vice in ours. Surely it will be claimed, a response dependence view having this implication is not a possible option for any virtue ethics, for such a consequence would be unacceptable.

If we pay attention to the distinction between the moral sense and the conditions of its possibility we will see that Hume’s version of response dependence is not vulnerable to this problem. For what makes a judge have a moral sense, for Hume, whether in our world or on Twin Earth, is neither mere deliberative capacity, nor mere ability to be motivated by what he or she takes to be a virtue or a vice. What enables a judge to have that sense is the possession of certain emotional and empathic capacities, notably benevolence and extensive sympathy. Such judges could not endorse cruelty as a virtue. The mistake is to think that mere deliberative and motivational capacities of the kind necessary to approve of something are sufficient for moral response on any response-dependent view.

This reply may not be thought to have solved the Twin Earth problem. On Hume’s view, Twin Earthers would have no moral practice, since they lack some of the requisite emotions and empathic capacities, namely benevolence and extensive sympathy. If they have no moral practices, it may be thought, there would be no virtue or vice in that society. Not so. There is rampant but unrecognized vice on Twin Earth. For I shall argue, in section III, there are for Hume properties that merit the attribution “vice” (e.g., cruelty) even if no qualified judges are around in that society to recognize that fact.

It turns out then that the idea that “morality can take root only in creatures having certain emotional capacities” is ambiguous. It may mean that moral practices can take root only in societies containing creatures having certain emotional capacities. Or it may mean that moral truth is something recognizable only by creatures having those capacities. Admittedly, for Hume, moral practices could not take root on Twin Earth because Twin Earthers are malevolent: the conditions for having a moral sense are not satisfied there. But it does not follow from this that on a Humean response-dependent view there is no moral truth on Twin Earth of the sort we (by and large benevolent creatures) would recognize.

We might summarize the key features of Hume’s response-dependent notion of morality and thereby virtue thus. For Hume, virtues are properties of objects,
but their normative status as excellences of character is not queer: they are powers to elicit certain responses in those having a moral sense.

Emotionless or “pure” reason (the faculty of the understanding) is not a faculty qualified to reveal those properties. You need a “moral sense.” To have a moral sense at all one must be capable of certain kinds of emotions or attitudes (“passions”) namely self love and benevolence, and furthermore, extensive sympathy. These features enable us to experience the pleasures constituting the moral sentiments of approbation by contrast with those pleasures constituting, say, musical appreciation; and enable us to distinguish the former pleasures from the latter.

One further crucial feature of Hume's response-dependent view remains to be discussed. A moral sense is not necessarily authoritative. The authoritative moral sense consists in further features, which include reasonableness based on knowledge of facts including consequences, experience, and the capacity for fine discrimination. The operation of these features results in authoritative moral judgements about what properties merit being called virtues or vices.

I want to claim next that for Hume, cruelty for example would merit being called a vice in both our world and on Twin Earth because it has certain connexions to a (response-dependent) notion of human good. We need to say more about what, on a response-dependent view, makes a response of a qualified judge warranted. This discussion brings us to an investigation of the second obstacle to calling Hume a virtue ethicist: the interpretation of Hume as a non-rationalist, and therefore not possibly a virtue ethicist.

III. Hume as not a Non-Rationalist

We might think both that a qualified judge’s calling a trait a virtue is warranted if the trait is fitted to be called a virtue, and that Hume explicitly allows for such warranted claims. However, according to David Wiggins, the following suggestion of Hume’s “has no clear place in his official theory”: “It must be allowed that there are certain qualities in objects that are fitted by nature to produce particular . . . feelings.”

In my view, this claim does have a clear place in Hume’s theory in general, for it is asserted not merely of vice and virtue, but of a range of qualities. Hume’s denial that there are “eternal” and “immutable” natural fitnesses proper to ethics, aesthetics, and prudence is perfectly consistent with his affirmations (in, e.g., “The Standard of Taste”) that properties may be naturally fitted to produce approbation in suitable observers:

A clear and distinct sentiment attends him through the whole survey of the objects; and he discerns that very degree and kind of approbation or displeasure, which each part is naturally fitted to produce.
For the quoted claims are simply examples of the following thesis, which is compatible with Hume’s attack on the doctrine of “eternal fitnesses,” namely that such properties as virtues and beauty are qualities in objects which are powers naturally fitted to produce certain sentiments in creatures constituted as we are constituted. That is, virtues, qua virtues, are not “in the objects themselves” independent of our moral sense, but do exist as properties of objects conceptualizable as virtues by beings with constitutions like ours.

However, it may be thought that the claims about natural fitnesses are merely causal claims. If we think that virtues are powers in objects which cause certain responses, and that this is a brute though natural fact, the only way we can secure any normativity in our judgements of virtue is to claim of certain responders that they have some kind of privileged undistorted causal access to relevant properties. In such a way we can discount the responses of the colour blind in judgements of colour. In the case of virtue however, we want to approve of persons of virtue, and back our approvals with reasons. That requires, in Hume’s own terms, accounts of what makes an object fitting for predications of virtue in the case of beings endowed with emotional and rational constitutions like ours. We need to show, in short, that a Humean response-dependent virtue ethics can account for the reason-giving force of ethics, and in particular for our justifications about the status of traits as virtues and vices. If we can show this, we will have refuted Philippa Foot’s view that Hume’s theory about moral sentiment “commits him to a subjectivist theory of ethics,” and that for him there is no “method of deciding, in the case of disagreement, whether one man’s opinion or another’s was correct.”

We must address then the following question: what features warrant a claim that a trait is a virtue for Hume? An answer to this question has two aspects.

(a) The criteria of virtue for Hume

The definition of virtue as a power to elicit sentiments of approbation does not yield the criteria of virtue: that is, a general account of those properties which make traits of character virtues, and which enable us to justify our claims about virtue-status. If we just think of a virtue as a power, we may think of it simply as a causal power, in which case the rational aspect of ethics has not been secured.

(b) The account of the authoritative moral judge

The claim that the authoritative judge determines virtue and vice is epistemological. Just as Aristotle claims that the virtuous is the rule and the measure of the right because only she has practical wisdom, a claim that I take to be epistemological, so the authoritative are the best judges of virtue. But even the best judges can get it wrong, for even they may make mistakes about the tendencies of traits in very complex worlds. In fact given Hume’s view that “in moral decisions all the
circumstances and relations must be previously known” (EPM App. 1.1; SBN 290), this eventuality is not unlikely. So, though moral truth depends on the possibility of a moral sense, neither the operations of a moral sense, nor even those of an authoritative moral sense, guarantee the discernment of moral truth. Status as a virtue or a vice depends on facts which may not be picked up. In short, (7) (judgments of someone with an authoritative moral sense) must not be confused with (8) (true moral judgments).

We consider (a) and (b) in order. First, the criteria of virtue.

The following passage makes it clear that the moral sense may be activated by two kinds of cause: reflections on the tendencies of traits and passions, either in general or on particular agents (including the subject), and second, the immediate pleasurable impact of traits or passions.

Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish’d by our sentiments, not by reason: But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearances of characters and passions, or from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons. My opinion is, that both these causes are intermix’d in our judgments of morals; after the same manner as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty: Tho’ I am also of opinion, that reflexions on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great lines of our duty. There are, however, instances, in cases of less moment, wherein this immediate taste or sentiment produces our approbation. (T 3.3.1.27; SBN 589–90)

However, we must distinguish the causes of the activation of the moral sense both from the moral sense itself and the criteria of virtue. For it is the criteria of virtue which enable us to justify our claims about virtue and vice. The causes of the activation of the moral sense suggest two general criteria of virtue:

(C1) A trait is a virtue if it tends to the happiness of mankind.

(C2) A trait is a virtue if it has properties which make it naturally fitting that its species or appearance causes “this immediate taste or sentiment.”

(C2) itself may be subdivisible into several criteria on the assumption that several types of feature, not reducible to consequences for the happiness of mankind, make it fitting that “immediate taste or sentiment” be produced.

Consider first (C1). What for Hume constitutes a human being’s happiness or good? For Hume, happiness is not constituted by pleasure alone. In “Of Refinement in the Arts” he makes this clear:
Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients; action, pleasure and indolence: And though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular disposition of the person; yet no ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying in some measure, the relish of the whole composition.24

A life of activity with no regard for pleasure is an incomplete life, for as Aristotle claims, pleasure is a good for us. Nonetheless, for Aristotle, it is not good “without qualification” unless embedded in a life of virtuous activity. Hume recognizes this point in his distinction between pleasure and activity as parts of human good. Accordingly, given that for Hume activity is part of human good, a life of hedonism where we are seen as mere receptacles for pleasure is not good for us either. Notwithstanding this point, Hume also recognizes that indolence is a necessary indulgence to the “weakness of human nature” (our need for rest, from both activity and pleasure).

The virtues speak to all three of the ingredients of happiness: for example, justice, benevolence, and courage relate to excellence in activity; temperance, charm, appreciation of beauty and the arts are concerned with pleasure; industriousness and lack of self indulgence correct our tendencies to excessive indolence (by, for example, avoiding excessive devotion to luxury). At the same time, however, correct attitude to luxury permits for Hume “innocent” luxury, on the grounds that the virtue, understood in that way, is useful to society. According to Hume then, we cannot claim that any luxury exhibits the vices of self indulgence or greed.

Pleasure, activity, and indolence need therefore to be integrated, by the operation of virtue, in the well lived, happy life. In this regard, Hume is completely Aristotelian, and does not have a hedonistic view of human good.

Consider now (C2). What features of traits make them immediately agreeable to authoritative judges as opposed to those traits which tend to promote human happiness, whether in relation to pleasure, indolence, or activity? Two points should be noted. First, it is not necessarily the case that sentiments of agreeability are directed at what is of benefit to human kind—the concern of (C1). An authoritative judge may find immediately agreeable artistic appreciation in another simply because of its nature as sophisticated discernment of aesthetic quality. We do not need to say that virtues of connoisseurship are virtues because they promote human good, or indeed, any kind of being’s good. Again, the ability of a person to “overflow” from an “elevate” or “humane” disposition (T 2.2.2.8; SBN 335) when taking pleasure in wonderful or pleasing objects is sourced in our capacity for joy, a direct passion. Joyfulness is a virtue not because it promotes human good, but because it is expressive of our capacities to, for example, appreciate wonderful
objects. Second, even where traits found immediately agreeable speak to elements of human good, they do not need to be appreciated as virtues because they promote human good, let alone that aspect of human good comprised of pleasure. More on this below.

We turn now to (b)—the notion of an authoritative judge. To have a moral sense is not necessarily to have an authoritative moral sense. To defend rationalism in Hume, we must not confuse (2) (the moral sense) with (5) (an authoritative moral sense). Similarly, to have some taste, a conception of beauty for example, does not make one a connoisseur. The moral sense is authoritative only if it can provide authoritative judgments, which are informed by correct reasoning about, for example, consequences.

A response-dependent view needs to give an account of what makes a moral judge authoritative. Such a judge has a number of features. First, besides possessing the emotional conditions for having a moral sense, the approver must possess the moral point of view: that is, be possessed of the capacity for (benevolent) “extensive sympathy” (T 3.3.1.23; SBN 586) to a sufficient extent. She is not however an idealized impartial observer, and accordingly she is not wedded to impartial maximization of utility. Rather, she is part of the “usual and natural” class of human beings, and will hence approve reasonable favouring of near and dear:

[W]e always consider the natural and usual force of the passions, when we determine concerning vice and virtue; and if the passions depart very much from the common measures on either side, they are always disapproved of as vicious. A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where everything else is equal. Hence arise the common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other. Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions. (T 3.2.1.18; SBN 483–4)

Second, the moral point of view, to be appropriate, must satisfy a condition of sufficient stability and impartiality—described in the Treatise as the steady and general point of view (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581). Third, for the moral point of view to be appropriate, the approver must have an understanding of certain facts, and importantly, the general tendencies of traits.

But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. (EPM 1.9; SBN 137)
Since as Hume points out in “A Dialogue,” the tendencies of traits can vary quite markedly in different social and cultural contexts, knowledge of facts cannot just be based on a general knowledge of human nature: we need also knowledge of where we live, and varying social customs.

Fourth, the approver must be someone who is sufficiently discriminating. An authoritative moral judge can attain knowledge of virtues only by a “finer internal sense”; unlike our knowledge of those sorts of facts which are discoverable by methods common to “every rational intelligible being” (EPM 1.3; SBN 134). For only finely tuned and properly honed emotion allows one to distinguish for example genuine tenderness from phony or affected tenderness, and what is genuinely dazzling from what is dazzling to a person whose mind is “disordered by excessive enthusiasms.”

Finally from the perspective of a virtue ethical interpretation of Hume, it is interesting that an authoritative judge must have virtue, and in a correct balance; otherwise her discriminations will be distorted. It is not enough that she have some sympathy: it must not, for example, be “narrow and ungenerous”:

A griping miser, for instance, praises extremely industry and frugality even in others, and sets them, in his estimation, above all other virtues. He knows the good that results from them. (EPM 6.3; SBN 234n1)

Even though he knows the good that results from those virtues, and therefore praises them, he has a distorted view of their importance, relative to other virtues, and a distorted view of the requirements of those virtues.

Nonetheless there is room for variation in authoritative judgements. Authoritative discrimination may yield differing but legitimate judgments, since different authoritative judges can have different “humours” depending on whether for example they are young or old. Different customs too can be a source of different but legitimate weightings of the sources of virtue:

[D]ifferent customs have also some influences as well as different utilities; and by giving an early bias to the mind, may produce a superior propensity, either to the useful or the agreeable qualities; to those which regard self, or to those which extend to society. (EPM A Dialogue 38; SBN 336)

As a result of all these complexities and legitimate variation, we should not expect that authoritative judges rely on decisive moral principles for their determinations:
It is allowed on all hands, that beauty as well as virtue, always lies in a medium; but where this medium is placed is the great question, and can never be replaced by general reasonings.  

Depending on the virtue in question, the “medium” may admit of more or less latitude; it does not necessarily consist in a “point.” For example in his discussion of luxury, Hume claims that “the bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be exactly fixed, more than in other moral subjects.”

IV. Hume as Non-Hedonist

We consider now the third obstacle to a virtue ethical reading of Hume—the claim that Hume is a hedonist. Hume says in the Treatise that “the very essence of virtue . . . is to produce pleasure and that of vice to give pain” (T 2.1.7.4; SBN 296). Roger Crisp takes this claim to be the “clearest evidence” that Sayre McCord’s Bauhaus theory reading of Hume is wrong. The Bauhaus reading “avoids any commitment to their being a single overarching standard for evaluating all solutions to problems.” The quoted passage about the essence of virtue provides no evidence of the wrongness of Sayre McCord’s interpretation. For Hume’s remark concerns meta-ethics and not the criteria of virtue. The claim about essence refers to Hume’s response-dependent view of virtue: one might say that just as it is the essence of redness to produce red sensations, so it is the essence of virtue to produce pleasure (more specifically that kind of pleasure which constitutes the moral sense). In fact, directly after the quoted passage, Hume claims that “the virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride and humility.” He is referring to the definition of virtue as a power to elicit certain sentiments. In short, to read the claim about essence as endorsing a hedonistic understanding of the criteria of virtue is to confuse (1) (the definition of virtue) and (2) (the moral sense), with (6) (the criteria of virtue).

Reading Hume as a hedonist is not just a meta-ethical mistake, it is also a substantive one. As I have already pointed out, for Hume, pleasure is but one general aspect of human good. However, to show that Hume can be read as a virtue ethicist one also needs to show that he has an aretaic conception of many important values such as pleasure. On this conception, many so-called values are not truly values or goods unless they are, as we may say, infused with virtue. Pleasure, on this view, is not, as Aristotle would put it, good without qualification unless it exhibits virtue. As I have argued elsewhere, virtue ethics rejects “list theories” of the good or “values” which subscribe to what I have called The Thesis of Non-Aretaic Value:

Virtues and vices are understood derivatively as forms of responsiveness to, or as instrumental in the promotion of (or minimization of
respectively) ‘base-level’ goods or evils, or intrinsic values or disvalues, understood non-aretaically.\textsuperscript{32}

Can Hume be seen as rejecting such a thesis? I cannot argue for this definitively, but his writings, by comparison with modern theories, are shot through with aretaic notions, such as decency, admirability, good breeding, and politeness, which inform the value notions. Here is an example from the \textit{Enquiries} where he considers cheerfulness as a virtue. One may think that cheerfulness is a virtue simply because it spreads pleasure. But not so for Hume. His view is more sophisticated than that. What merits approbation is cheerfulness which diffuses pleasure having a certain aretaic quality, dependent on the status of those spreading cheer, and on the nature of the pleasure as temperate and decent:

\begin{quote}
In all polite nations and ages, a relish for pleasure, if accompanied with temperance and decency, is esteemed a considerable merit, even in the greatest men; and becomes still more requisite in those of inferior rank and character. (EPM 7.3; SBN 251)
\end{quote}

The passage suggests that the status of cheerfulness as a virtue is dependent on the aretaic sources of the pleasure diffused, as well as on the aretaic nature of that pleasure. Pleasure can be indecent, crude, impolite, and intemperate, and if it possesses these qualities it is no longer valuable or good.

\section*{V. Hume as Non-Consequentialist}

We turn finally to the fourth obstacle to reading Hume as a virtue ethicist—a consequentialist interpretation. The great importance of utility for Hume is not at issue in this paper, consequently I will not discuss the numerous ways in which virtue is connected with utility. My concern is with a claim that he is a consequentialist. The version of consequentialism to be discussed here is virtue consequentialism, and not consequentialism about right action. According to Crisp for example, Hume is not a consequentialist about the right, for “Hume’s focus in ethics is not primarily upon actions at all,” and at “the level of rightness of actions . . . Hume is best understood as . . . a virtue-centered, common sense moralist, who will praise and blame actions in accordance with his best understanding of a common-sense morality upon which there is general agreement.”\textsuperscript{33}

However, both Crisp and Sayre McCord interpret Hume as a virtue consequentialist, though the latter interprets him as a pluralist virtue consequentialist. According to virtue consequentialism, what makes a trait a virtue is its tendency to promote good consequences overall. Both Crisp and Sayre McCord, in interpreting Hume as a virtue consequentialist, fail to take seriously (C2) as a thesis allowing
for non-consequentialist criteria of virtue. This failure is the result of readings which in my view confuse the criteria of virtue with the pleasures of the moral sentiment. Two different interpretations show how this can occur. Consider first a virtue consequentialist reading.

T 3.3.1.27 (SBN 590) and environs suggest that in the case of all traits approved as virtues, the following is the case:

(i) We reflect on the general consequences of the trait;
(ii) We judge that the trait does have overall pleasurable consequences;
(iii) These reflections produce sentiments of approbation;
(iv) Hence we have Hume’s general principle “upon which all our notions of morals are founded,” a principle that is substantive and consequentialist. That principle can be understood as “sympathy . . . with the good consequences of virtues, both immediate and remote.”

Compare now a virtue ethical reading. T 3.3.1.27 (SBN 590) and environs suggest that in the case of all traits approved as virtues, the following is the case:

(i) We need to co-ordinate moral judgements about traits if our own is not to be dismissed as idiosyncratic or partial;
(ii) We do this by considering the pleasurable sentiments of approbation that contemplation of the trait produces in those who have commerce with the possessor of the trait;
(iii) We ourselves approve of traits in line with that consideration;
(iv) In virtue of what properties we approve of a given trait is an open question. In particular (C2) is not necessarily reducible to (C1).

The question arises: How do these rival readings apply to traits giving rise to the sentiment of approbation on account of their immediate impact on “taste or sentiment”?

Consider first the virtue consequentialist reading.

(i) We reflect on the immediate consequences of traits;
(ii) If these immediate consequences are pleasurable, then ceteris paribus we approve of the trait;
(iii) (C2) is reducible to (C1).

Now consider the rival reading.

(i) The moral sentiments of approval result from a judgement produced by reflection on the consequences of traits (whether remote or near at hand)
or they are constituted by immediate pleasure arising from “species” or “appearance.”

(ii) If the latter, then approval of traits may arise from contemplation of features not reducible to their consequences.

(iii) The moral sentiments of approval, whether arising from reflection on consequences or from “species” or “appearance,” are similar in that both are pleasures—faint or more imperceptible love.

Roger Crisp subscribes to the consequentialist interpretation arguing that the apparently dual criteria for virtue status—(C1) and (C2)—are in fact just one consequentialist criterion. He claims that the pleasures derived from the impact of appearance are consequences of traits, just as are (longer term) utilities. Hence, he believes, Hume should be read as a trait or motive utilitarian. But as I argued above, this claim confuses the pleasures of the moral sense (the love and pride felt on contemplation of a suitable object) and the moral sentiment of approbation itself (which is a form of pleasure—“faint” and “more imperceptible” love) with what makes a trait a virtue. The pleasures produced by contemplation of traits are indeed pleasurable consequences, but the properties in virtue of which a trait is a virtue are different. These properties are those which merit a trait being called a virtue, namely its usefulness to mankind (where usefulness is not reducible to pleasure producing) and/or those many kinds of properties which warrant the production of pleasurable “immediate taste or sentiment”: properties which are not reducible to tendencies “to be of service to any mortal” (T 3.3.1.30; SBN 590). What counts as warranted is what would give pleasure to an authoritative judge on contemplating “species or appearance.”

I shall now illustrate how (C2) can be read in a non-consequentialist way. Though we may admire and take delight in some, indeed most, virtues because they are effective in promoting some end—the good of mankind—as (C1) suggests, some may be delighted in and admired for other reasons. Hume’s system allows for the possibility that an authoritative judge may ground her judgments in features other than consequences, features that also make a trait “naturally fitting” for possession by human beings. Charm, tenderness, dazzling qualities may be fitting or not, for all kinds of reasons. For example, charm that is fitting is engaging, as opposed to sleazy or insincere; the right sort of honesty is honorable as opposed to weak divulgence of what should not be divulged; proper deference, opposed to, for example, servile deference, is well bred; attentiveness can be delicate, as opposed to invasive; tenderness can be cloying or fittingly expressive of affection. As we saw above, one of the marks of an authoritative judge is that she is discriminating, and is able to distinguish between the excessive joyfulness of a mind “disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm,” and healthy joyfulness. Charm that is employed in a manipulative way to get a job, is unnaturally exces-

Volume 33, Number 1, April 2007
sive, or is expressive of a narcissistic personality, will not give immediate pleasure to an authoritative judge. It will not be registered as engaging. Recall, however, the considerable latitude allowed by difference in social custom: what might count as excessive politeness or charm in Australia may not be regarded as such elsewhere. This is not, however, a recipe for relativism: much scope for social critique exists.

It may be admitted that aretaic notions such as decent, honourable, engaging, may qualify individual actions whose merit does not lie in their consequences. But a virtue consequentialist may reply that it does not follow from this that Hume is not a virtue consequentialist. To make a non-consequentialist account of (some) virtues credible, we need to explain why immediate pleasure gained from contemplation of tenderness for example, is grounded in features other than the general consequences of the virtue of tenderness. We need to know what it is about the trait that is “naturally fitted” to produce such responses, so that we can make sense of an authoritative judge’s determinations. Why, for example, does Hume claim that the partialistic forms of love such as parental love can be seen as virtues even though we are not considering consequences, but only the “usual and natural force of the passions”? I suggest that tenderness is seen as engaging because it is the loving expression of a bond, and bonds are morally significant features grounded in the fact that we are creatures who naturally form bonds and need them from infancy. Virtuous expression of bonds does not, and need not, track degree or strength of value or good, as I have argued elsewhere.37 So when Hume states that our hearts are seized by “engaging tenderness” he is focusing on the bonds of love rather than the mere promotion of good (or value) by acts of tenderness. What affords pleasure is not in this instance the thought that the consequences of such tenderness are likely to be generally beneficial, or that such tenderness is liable to play a role in the solving of problems. Rather, the pleasure is immediate, and is excited by the emotionally charged perception of a bond being expressed in a decent, healthy, or admirable way.

Attentiveness has the same kind of rationale for Hume:

'Tis remarkable, that nothing touches a man of humanity more than any instance of extraordinary delicacy in love or friendship, where a person is attentive to the smallest concerns of his friend, and is willing to sacrifice to them the most considerable interest of his own. (T 3.3.3.5; SBN 604–5)

In short, I am claiming, Hume recognizes a set of virtues based on the passion of love, whose morally significant feature is the expression of bonds: “Love may shew itself in the shape of tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, goodwill” (T 2.3.9.32; SBN 448). Although I cannot argue this here, the passions of pride,
Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?

respect and esteem, joy, hope, also give rise to virtue “clusters” whose goodness may be grounded in features other than consequences.

My claim is that features of our constitution recognized by Hume, such as the fact that we are creatures who bond, creatures who express emotions such as joy, and creatures who appreciate beauty and other aesthetic properties, can explain the “natural fittingness” of the relations detected in “immediate taste or sentiment” by an authoritative judge. These features do not reduce to consequences. Nonetheless we should bear in mind that according to Hume “reflections on the tendencies of actions . . . determine all the great lines of our duty.”

NOTES

Grateful acknowledgement is due to Jacqueline Taylor and to anonymous referees of this journal.


4 Although benevolence is particular for Hume, in the sense that it is directed at particular individuals and not at humanity in general, it is not necessarily partial. In Appendix II of the Enquiries Hume notes that there are two “kinds” of benevolence: “particular” and “general.” The first includes the partial, being founded on “an opinion of virtue, on services done us, or on some particular connexions” such as friendship. The second “general” form of benevolence, also owed to particular individuals, is not based on such features as esteem or affection but rather on “general sympathy”: a “compassion for his pains” or a “congratulation with his pleasures.” General benevolence Hume also calls “humanity,” or “sympathy” (EPM App. 2.6; SBN 298n1). Extensive sympathy allows for the possibility of general benevolence.


8 Ibid., 62.

9 I do not intend to discuss what Hume could mean by “power.” I think that serious discussion of what is meant here involves discussion of representational metaphysics, an issue well beyond the scope of this paper. For elaboration of Hume’s use of the term “power” see Jacqueline Taylor “Hume on Beauty and Virtue,” forthcoming in *A Companion to Hume*, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe (Oxford: Blackwell).

10 See for example, Barry Stroud, *Hume* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), who says: “Although there is no such characteristic [as virtue or vice] in actions or characters, the feelings we get on contemplating them inevitably lead us to ascribe it to them. . . . Our moral judgments, like our causal judgments, are ‘projections’” (185). He does not take seriously Hume’s claims that impressions may “arise from virtue” or that a virtue is “whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation” (EPM App.1.10; SBN 289).


12 Ibid., 60.

13 Ibid.


18 Ibid., 188.

19 This mistake is made by Lebar when he claims that “any plausible form of response dependence about value will take the judgements that establish value properties to proceed from deliberation and reflection (perhaps as the result of reflective equilibrium)” (194). What is missing is any reference to the emotions which are necessary for the *kinds* of deliberation required for moral judgments.

20 Ibid., 194.

Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?


It is natural to think that these two criteria (C1) and (C2) correspond to the criteria of utility and agreeableness in the Enquiries, where Hume also suggests that the merely agreeable is not of as great moment as the genuinely utile. Detailed comparisons of the employment of the criteria of virtue in the Treatise and the Enquiries are beyond the scope of this paper.

Essays, 1:300. See also EHU 1.6 (SBN 8–9).


See, e.g., EPM App. 1.1 (SBN 234). In her “Hume on the Standard of Virtue,” The Journal of Ethics 6.1 (2002): 43–62, Jacqueline Taylor argues that the account of what is needed to correct moral sentiment for moral appraisal in the Treatise is deficient, and needs the superior account of the Enquiries. Discussion of the details of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.


Ibid., 241.

Of Refinement in the Arts,” 1:299. The notion of the “medium” should not be understood in terms of moderation. Avoidance of excess and deficiency is one feature, but by no means the only one. Similar issues attend Aristotle’s notion of the mean.


Ibid., 171n55.

Swanton, Virtue Ethics, 34.


Crisp, “Hume on Virtue, Utility, and Morality,” 169. See also Rachel Cohon who claims that according to Hume “approval of fasting, penance, and mortification is not warranted because these produce no good at all.” This is correct, but it does not follow that for Hume our approval of traits is “warranted . . . provided the disposition has some systematic causal connection to the social good, though that connection need not be a direct or simple one.” Rachel Cohon, “Hume’s Difficulty with the Virtue of Honesty,” Hume Studies 23.1 (1997): 91–112, 103. By contrast, Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), takes seriously immediate agreeability as an independent standard of virtue.

Of Refinement in the Arts,” 1:299.

In Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, chap. 2.