A Response to Our Colleagues
David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton


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We recognize—indeed, we emphasize—that our annotations are neither complete nor definitive, and thus we welcome suggestions for their improvement. (Clarendon *Treatise* 2:687)

Let us begin this Response by thanking those, and especially Manfred Kuehn, who arranged for a symposium on the Clarendon Edition of Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature* at the 34th Annual Hume Conference (Boston University, August 2007). We also thank our three colleagues, John Bricke, Peter Fosl, and Jacqueline Taylor, for comments that provide us with a further opportunity to clarify and expand on what we have done in both the Clarendon *Treatise* and in our earlier Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of this work, and for suggestions that will lead to improvements in any subsequent versions of the editorial materials published with the Clarendon *Treatise* or the two pamphlets, *An Abstract of . . . A Treatise of Human Nature*, and *A Letter from a Gentleman*, associated with it and included in volume 1 of this edition.

As Fosl has summarized the contents of the two volumes of the Clarendon *Treatise*, we can turn directly to the questions or issues raised by the three commentators mentioned. We look first at Fosl’s concern to “situate” *The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume* and the Clarendon *Treatise*, and then respond to the questions he raises in Part III of his paper, questions about the relationship of

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David Fate Norton is Macdonald Professor of Moral Philosophy Emeritus, McGill University, and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, University of Victoria. His address is 8-4305 Maltwood Lane, Victoria V8X 5G9, Canada. Email: davidnorton@telus.net.

Mary J. Norton is an independent scholar. Her address is 8-4305 Maltwood Lane, Victoria V8X 5G9, Canada. Email: mjnorton@telus.net.
the new edition of the Treatise to earlier editions of it. Our final section concerns illumination, interpretation, and omissions. We close our response with a suggestion of our own for improving the annotations related to the Clarendon Treatise (CT).


In his contribution to this Symposium, Fosl traces the beginning of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume to a particular historical context by quoting Tom Beauchamp’s comment that by 1975 many Hume scholars had realized that the then “available editions of Hume’s works were often textually and historically inaccurate” and “lacking in basic information” needed for satisfactory scholarly work on critically important texts.¹

As evidence that Beauchamp was not merely beating a drum for the Clarendon Edition already in progress by the year of his remark (2000), we can look at the views and comments of P. H. Nidditch. By the mid-1970s Peter Nidditch’s edition of John Locke’s An Essay concerning Human Understanding would have established him as a leader among textual editors of English-language philosophy of the early modern period. And it was exactly at this time that Nidditch turned his attention to the widely used and highly regarded editions of Hume’s most important philosophical works, his Treatise and the two works, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, that since 1902 had been bundled together as Hume’s Enquiries.³ In his 1975 edition of this bundle, the third edition of the Enquiries, Nidditch pointed out that the text of the highly praised Selby-Bigge edition of EHU and EPM was significantly “faulty” in “about eighty places” when compared to the 1777 texts on which they were said to be based.⁴ The faults to which Nidditch referred were substantive or textual errors and a few “defects of punctuation” that he “remedied.”⁵

This was not, however, the end of Nidditch’s critique of Selby-Bigge, or of the revised third edition of the Enquiries, the edition to which his name is affixed. Taking issue with the high praise T. E. Jessop had given to the Selby-Bigge editions “of the Treatise and of the two Enquiries,” Nidditch reported that even after his revisions of the SB Enquiries the “only edited publication of the Enquiries that displays a close fidelity to the 1777 edition both in wording and in punctuation, spelling, capitalization, etc., is that in the four-volumed and now expensive edition prepared a century ago by [T. H.] Green and [T. H.] Grose.” He then went on to say of his revised third edition of the Enquiries (the SBN edition) that “most” of the pages have been “left to depart” from “the original at several places in punctuation and other by no means negligible formal respects.” That this is a significant understatement of the inaccuracy of this edition—a still admired and widely used edition, there is reason to believe—is made clear by Peter Millican’s
report that the text of *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* in the SBN edition is marred by “well over a thousand editorial intrusions or errors (mainly of punctuation).” In short, Beauchamp was on solid ground when, ten years ago, he said that scholars had begun to suspect that the “available editions of Hume’s works were often textually” inaccurate, but we do now wonder whether “many” scholars had these doubts in 1975. We even wonder if these doubts are currently widespread for many scholars appear not to realize that even after Nidditch had corrected the approximately eighty faults he mentions, the third edition of the SBN Enquiries still contains important substantive errors and well over two thousand errors of punctuation, spelling, capitalization, and font selection.

From this highly critical assessment Nidditch went on to say that, despite their many flaws, the SBN texts of EHU and EPM were more accurate than four other “editions of one or the other of Hume’s Enquiries . . . published within the last twenty years.” We can only urge that those working on Hume’s EHU and EPM, now made aware of the multitude of flaws in the SBN volume of the Enquiries, use the carefully edited OPT or Clarendon Editions of EHU and EPM prepared by Tom Beauchamp for Oxford University Press.

2. Contents of the Volumes

Turning next to the Clarendon Treatise itself, Fosl notes that we have undertaken to provide readers with “some semblance” of the revised version of this work that Hume pronounced himself anxious to produce even before he had finished revising the manuscript of the third volume. As we point out in “Editing the Texts of the Treatise, the Abstract, and the Letter from a Gentleman,” in mid-March 1740, in a letter to Francis Hutcheson asking for advice about publishing his third volume, Hume gave clear signs of his dissatisfaction with the two volumes he had published only fourteen months earlier: “I wait with some Impatience for a second Edition,” he told Hutcheson, “principally on Account of Alterations I intend to make in my Performance.” He then added that he wished he “cou’d discover more fully the particulars wherein I have fail’d,” as this would give him the opportunity of “frankly confessing [his] Errors.” Some months later in the opening paragraph of the Appendix published at the end of volume 3 of the Treatise, Hume wrote that he had “not yet been so fortunate as to discover any very considerable mistakes in the reasonings deliver’d in the preceding volumes, except on one article,” the article, as he says, on “personal identity” (App. 1.10). Nonetheless, he did leave behind him not only the minimally corrected copies of volumes 1 and 2 of the Treatise—those copies once owned by Henry Home, Lord Kames, and Alexander Pope—but also the corrected and more significantly amended copy of volume 3 now the property of the British Library, as well as those copies of volumes 1 and 2 containing “a Vast of Corrections and Additions in the handwriting of the Author”
that formed a part of the library of his favorite nephew, David Hume the Younger. As we have shown elsewhere, this library was catalogued in 1840 by a then well-known Edinburgh bookseller, Thomas G. Stevenson, who later purchased at least a great part of this library and then went on to sell his purchase, piece by piece, through his Princes Street bookshop and the catalogues he issued c. 1850. Unfortunately, despite concerted effort, we have been unable to locate these potentially important copies of the *Treatise*.9

Fosl is pleased to find that the text of the Clarendon *Treatise* has both line numbers and SB page numbers in the right-hand margins (on the advice of our colleagues and the press, we used SB rather than SBN in order to keep these marginal entries as short as possible).10 His recommendation that Index 2, the index to Hume’s texts and our annotations, might better be included in volume 1 along with the texts of the *Treatise* and pamphlets so that users would have an index to the text without having to lug around volume 2, is, with one important modification, a good one. The modification is an obvious one: Index 2 will need to be divided between entries to the text and those to the annotations, with the former placed in volume 1 and printed in the smaller but still readable font used for volume 1.11

3. Critical Questions

At the end of his commentary Fosl raises several “Critical Questions.” These may appear to be simple questions, but they are not. In general terms, Fosl wants to know more about the second through what he takes to be a distinct fourth edition of the *Treatise* (that found in *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, Boston and Edinburgh, 1854). “Perhaps,” he suggests, “David Norton’s extensive 155-page ‘Historical Account’ of the *Treatise* might have included a section assessing the history of prior editions of the *Treatise*—their accomplishments, their significance—and comparing them with the present edition.” Interestingly, Fosl asks no questions about the unreliable edition of 1969 prepared by E. C. Mossner,12 an edition that some instructors may be choosing for their students because they suppose that the best student edition of any philosophical text is the least expensive one. We turn now to Fosl’s suggestion and his related questions.

*The editions of 1817, 1825, and 1854 taken together.* In our “Editing the Texts” (ETT) we do comment briefly on these editions, but we say only that “The second (published 1817) and third (published 1825, reissued 1826, and reprinted in 1854 and since [reprinted] as the Everyman and Intelex . . .) editions of the *Treatise* silently modernize Hume’s orthography according to the standards of their time, and in this way eliminate many formal inconsistencies” (CT, ETT 2:608n47). And then later in this same section we suggest that these publications are, in any positive sense of the term, bibliographically insignificant: “Because the editors of the 1817 and 1825 editions of the *Treatise* uncritically revised Hume’s orthography,
no account of their texts is provided here” (CT 2:646; see also 2:650). In other words, from the point of view of the Clarendon Treatise, we did, as Fosl requests in the opening paragraph of his Critical Questions, “distinguish the new Clarendon edition” from these earlier editions. We did not, however, distinguish them in the way(s) he suggests. In the remainder of this section we undertake to fulfill, albeit briefly, his requests.13

The edition of 1817. Although a visit to Stationer’s Hall, London, showed me that the copyright for this “NEW EDITION” had been registered by Thomas Allman, the imprint in the two volumes reads:

LONDON

PRINTED FOR THOMAS AND JOSEPH ALLMAN,

PRINCES STREET, HANOVER SQUARE:

AND SOLD BY DEIGHTON AND SONS, CAMBRIDGE; R. BLISS OXFORD; AND

P. HILL AND CO. EDINBURGH.

1817.

This imprint likely means that the ownership of the copyright was shared, in fractions ranging from as much as one-half to as little as one-eighth or even one-sixteenth, with the number of copies allocated to each bookseller reflecting these fractions of copyright ownership.14 Readily available information about these publishers15 is limited, but that their interest in the Treatise was probably not motivated by any significant philosophical or scholarly interest in Hume or the Treatise can be inferred from the character of their publishing activities and from the fact that no editor is associated with their edition. We look in turn at the four publishers making up the imprint.16

Thomas and Joseph Allman. The Allmans began publishing in the late eighteenth century, but before the publication of the Treatise in 1817 they appear to have had no interest in philosophy. In this same year they also joined with eight other booksellers to publish an edition (again an edition printed in Edinburgh) of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Over the next few years they offered for sale works by William Paley (Moral and Political Philosophy, Natural Theology, and his Works, all in 1823), Edmund Burke (A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, 1824), John Locke (The Conduct of the Understanding, 1824), and Adam Smith again (The Works of Adam Smith, 1825), but philosophy never constituted more than a minor part of a wide and varied list.17

Deighton and Sons. In 1778 John Deighton purchased a small bookshop in Cambridge. The following year he moved his business, which included bookbinding
and repair, to Trinity Street, “opposite the [Cambridge University] Senate House, a prominent location long occupied by booksellers.” By 1785 “his imprint had appeared on at least thirty books,” including those of Cambridge University authors, but late in this same year he moved back to London and expanded his publishing activities. In his nine years there “over 200 works appeared with his imprint.” In October 1794 Deighton returned to Cambridge and became “the university’s leading copyholding bookseller, a position which he maintained to his death.” He eventually established a shop located near the Senate House and the two largest colleges, Trinity and St John’s, and as “a bookseller he continued to supply most of the needs of the university library as well as of students and scholars, both in Cambridge and further afield.” Although Deighton’s list is said to be “particularly strong in mathematical and classical works,” he in fact published on a wide range of topics including the philosophy of religion. Examples of the latter include John Ogilvie, *The Theology of Plato, Compared with the Principles of Oriental and Grecian Philosophers* (1793); Thomas Renell, *Ignorance Productive of Atheism, Faction, and Superstition* (1798); and Samuel Vince, *A Confituation of Atheism from the Laws and Constitution of the Heavenly Bodies* (1807). But the most interesting of Deighton’s books in the present context is clearly a thirty-two page pamphlet, also by Vince, entitled *The Credibility of Christianity Vindicated: in Answer to Mr. Hume’s Objections* (1798).

R. Bliss. We have found little about Robert Bliss of Oxford beyond the fact that his name, usually in the form “R. Bliss, Oxford,” appears in imprints from as early as 1778, and as late as 1821, and some times along with R. Bliss, Jun[ior]. In addition, we note that with the exception of two classical titles, Cicero’s *De officiis* (1805) and Aristotle’s *Rhetoric . . . Made English by the Translators of The Art of Thinking* (1806), OCLC searches have located no other works published by Bliss that would be included in the philosophical canon. On the other hand, two works published by Bliss and his son at about the time of their involvement with the *Treatise* could perhaps be justly classified as philosophy of religion. It would come as no surprise if the first of these, John Bidlake, *The Truth and Consistency of Divine Revelation: With some Remarks on the Contrary Extremes of Infidelity and Enthusiasm* (1811), at some points discussed Hume. The second, *Vindicæ geologicæ; or The Connexion of Geology with Religion Explained* (1820), by the popular early geologist, William Buckland, surely deserves a look by those interested in the history of “intelligent design.”

P. Hill. The Scottish Book Trade Index (SBTI) suggests that before he became a bookseller about 1784, Peter Hill was “principal clerk to Mr. Creech,” to, we assume, William Creech, the publisher of virtually all of James Beattie’s works, including his *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism* (1770) and his two-volume *Elements of Moral Science* (1790, 1793). During the period that Hill may have been working for Creech, the latter also
published Adam Ferguson, *Institutes of Moral Philosophy* (1769, 1773, 1785); the second edition of Henry Home, Lord Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man* (1778), Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1774); and at least two posthumous editions of Hume’s *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* (1777, 1784). This is to suggest that well before he became a bookseller, Hill would have known about Hume and some of the responses to his work. As a publisher, however, Hill had little involvement with philosophy until in 1812 he published George Campbell’s *Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles Advanced by David Hume, Esq. in an Essay on Miracles: With a Correspondence on the Subject by Mr Hume, Dr Campbell, and Dr Blair*. This was a likely item for a publisher who two years earlier had added Hume’s *History of England . . . to which is Prefixed, a Short Account of His Life, Written by Himself*, to his list. As we know, Hill then went on to join in the publication of the *Treatise* in 1817. In 1818 he added another edition of Hume’s *History of England* to his list, while in 1819 he published his last philosophical work, William Duncan’s *Elements of Logic*.

There appears to be little of philosophical significance in the circumstances surrounding the publication of the 1817 edition of the *Treatise*, and equally little of bibliographical significance. The fact that Allman, the London publisher, was joined in his venture by others in Cambridge, Oxford, and Edinburgh may indicate that there was at the time some philosophical interest in the *Treatise*, interest aroused perhaps by discussions of it in the writings of such philosophers as Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown. From our present perspective, however, it may appear that first prize should go to Thomas Reid, whose *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (Edinburgh, 1764), a work whose criticism of Hume is focused entirely on the *Treatise* (CT, HA 2:545–54), and that had been published in at least eleven distinct editions by 1815. Second prize would perhaps go to James Beattie, whose *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism* (Edinburgh, 1770) often challenges the views of the *Treatise*. This work had been published in at least fifteen editions by 1816 (CT, HA 2:555–64). The fact that the four booksellers named in the imprint of this second edition of the *Treatise* published a wide range of books—ancient and modern drama, fiction, poetry, editions and translations of classical Greek and Latin authors, reference books, sermons and religious tracts, travel books, language books, mathematics textbooks, discussions of early modern science, and the occasional work of philosophy, to mention only some of the kinds of publication they had in common—suggests that to them the *Treatise* was perhaps just another product for which there was a market. This suggestion gains credibility when it is found, as we have said, that no editor is associated with this edition of the *Treatise*, nor does the edition show that any significant editorial care was taken in its production. Some corrections of the first-edition text are made, including *some* of those called for by the Errata printed in volumes one and three of the first edition, while
those parts of the Appendix marked for inclusion in Book 1 are duly placed in
the text as Hume instructed. But the text abounds with errors, both substantive
and accidental, and is modernized, to the standards of 1817, inconsistently and
without notice.

The edition of 1825. The third edition of the Treatise appeared as volumes 1 and
2 of The Philosophical Works of David Hume, A New Edition. Including all the Essays,
and Exhibiting the more Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions
Published by the Author, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Constable, 1825).

This first collected edition of Hume’s philosophical works came about in a
remarkably casual way. Archibald Constable (1774–1827) was in his early years an
antiquarian bookseller who began publishing in 1795 and who quickly went on to
become Scotland’s foremost publisher, best known perhaps as the sometime pub-
lisher of Sir Walter Scott’s works. Here he is important for the sequence of events
that began when he sent his son David a letter that includes a recommendation
that his printing shop always have in hand the printing of “one or two Works” that
would have no public connection with Constable & Co.25 In April, 1823 Constable
senior wrote to his son:

Dear David

. . . .

I should like your office always to have one or two Works if possible inde-
pendent of C[onstable] & Co I think a neat edit of Humes Essays 4 Vols a
cheap 8vo with the various readings—& original Essays left out26—would
be very acceptable & I have no doubt some youngster might be found to
do this without your hand or name Appearing to it. 1000 Copies would
meet a ready Market & I should secure a purchaser for them as soon as a
Specimen Volume was ready think of this. I am quite certain it would sell
in this Size & also in 8vo I would have a portrait & [?] his Life by himself.
& perhaps an engraved title with the Monument in it The Trade properly
arranged might yield £1000 a year & carry on itself.27

David Constable took his father’s advice, and in due course the Treatise, as
part of the four-volume edition of Hume’s works, edited by one Cosmo Innes,
was ready for sale to a London publisher.28 As it happened, however, Archibald
Constable encountered difficulty in placing the book. A bookseller with whom he
had often dealt, J. O. Robinson of Hurst, Robinson, Hurst, declined to be involved.
Robinson’s letter of June 11, 1825 is, to say the least, complex and indirect, but it
suggests that he may be refusing to put his firm’s name on the edition because he
disapproved of Hume’s views.29 He wrote:
My Dear Sir,

....

Now with Respect to Humes Philosoph[ica]l Writings I have only to say that if you could not offer them to me on Terms that would allow of my declining the offer[ed] Purchase if my own views led me to such a course, I would rather the work should not be offered to me at all because I dont see that my declining to purchase could injure anyone . . . but with regard to Hume just consult your own Feelings only dont offer it to me without leaving me open to decline it without the Fear of hurting either your Feelings or anyone else . . . I never was more in[cline]d to purchase from you than at present and I never in my life felt more or so much inclined to do any & every thing I could to meet your wishes but you must promise me before you make the offer that I must just do as I think best and that if I decline it you will not feel hurt and then all will be well dont let it be a Bargaining matter but say your Terms and if I approve I accept at once if not I decline without any Remarks & offers at different Terms . . .

Y's Faithfully

J O Robinson

[P.S.] I dont exa[ctly] understand your [remark?] about Money & Character but I can tell you my opinion that the latter is more valuable than the former and with prudence it stands in the place of both the one and the other and you and I have experienced this to be the Fact.30

With Hurst, Robinson, Hurst out of the picture, the Constables looked to other possibilities. On Sept. 1, 1825 David Constable wrote to his father saying: “I think Adam Black & Longman & Co would take Hume on the terms you offered the book to Robinson.” A day later his father replied: “I have now fixed to go to London on Monday . . . I shall do what I can for the Hume.” The following October Archibald wrote to David: “With regard to Hume I have not yet made any arrangement—but desire Mr Hutcheson to ship it immediately—the full Impression of 750 Copies . . . the title page can be printed here . . . ” On the 20th of the same month he wrote to an unidentified correspondent:

I have the pleasure of sending you a Copy of Hume’s Philosophical Writings—which I do at my Son’s request—he is Very Desirous that the publication should be entirely yours—it was offered Sometime ago to another quarter and declined the Correspondence respecting which you will receive enclosed.—
You may have observed the Work in the lists of my house—but I never intended it should be in my own hands . . . the book is Very Well printed & I have reason to believe will be found a correct edition of Hume. . . .

P.S. My firm might Appear after your own in the title should you wish it. & I dare say a good many Copies would sell at Edinburgh.31

At the end of the next month Archibald, facing the bankruptcy of his own famous firm, an event that did indeed take place less than two months later (on January 19, 1826), wrote to David:

I enclose a letter from Duncan, in reply to mine respecting Hume which looks an unpromising concern, the most so of anything to which I have ever Lent my hand, odd enough you will say at this stage of things, but so it is—but I shall do all I can to get you well through with it still—but how this is to be I cannot well make up my mind—you see what trade is, I regret you should have sent any copies abroad till the book had been in a fixed train of publication.32

A complete edition of Hume’s philosophical works was obviously not an easy item to sell in 1824–1825. But two things need to be kept in mind. Britain, or at least its booksellers, were facing difficult, even desperate, financial circumstances in 1825, and, whatever discouraging words came from “Duncan,” the Constables’ edition of the Philosophical Works of David Hume was sold, and quickly enough for it to bear an 1826 imprint, not to Adam Black and Longman’s, as David Constable had thought possible, but to Adam Black and William and Charles Tait, so that the imprint of this re-issued edition reads, “Edinburgh: Printed for Adam Black and William Tait; and Charles Tait, 63, Fleet Street, London. MDCCXXVI.”

This edition of the Treatise may be slightly more accurate than the edition of 1817, but spelling and accidentals are again altered without notice to suit contemporary taste. The edition later served as copytext for that printed in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and published in Boston and Edinburgh in 1854. It or its 1825 predecessor also appears to have served as the basis for the Everyman edition of the Treatise, edited by A. D. Lindsay, and first published in 1911, and which about 1990 was reproduced in electronic form by the Intelex Corporation.33

Although Fosl does not explain what he means by the phrase “historico-antiquarian animus,” if he means to suggest a motivation to produce an accurate text “situated” in its historical context, there is little to indicate that such a scholarly concern motivated either the editions of 1817 and 1825, or the re-issues of the 1825 edition that continue to be used.
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The edition of 1874–1875. The fourth edition of the Treatise was that edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. As Taylor has shown in her contribution to this Symposium, Green’s reason for publishing an edition of the Treatise is set out in the opening pages of his 299 page Introduction to Book 1 of the work. The Preface to the work addresses the question, why had the editors not acceded to Hume’s well-known request that the Treatise be ignored as a premature and imperfect expression of his views? In response to this question the editors wrote:

Our answer is that if we had been treating Hume as a great literary character, or exhibiting the history of his individual mind, due account must have been taken of the [Advertisement]. Such, however, has not been the object which . . . we have presented to ourselves (See Introd. to Vol. I, § 4). Our concern has been with him as the exponent of a philosophical system, and therefore specially with that statement of his system which alone purports to be complete, and which was written when philosophy was still his chief interest, without alloy from the disappointment of literary ambition. Anyone who will be at the pains to read the ‘Inquiries’ alongside the original ‘Treatise’ will find that their only essential difference from it is in the way of omission. They consist in the main of excerpts from the ‘Treatise,’ rewritten in a lighter style, and with the more difficult parts of it left out. It is not that the difficulties which logically arise out of Hume’s system are met, but that the passages which most obviously suggest them have disappeared without anything to take their place . . . there is nothing [in them] corresponding to Parts II. and IV. of the first Book of the ‘Treatise.’ The effect of this omission on a hasty reader is, no doubt, a feeling of great relief. Common-sense is no longer actively repelled by a doctrine which seems to undermine the real world, and can more easily put a construction on the account of the law of causation, which remains, compatible with the ‘objective validity’ of the law—such a construction as in fact forms the basis of Mr. Mill’s Logic. How inconsistent this construction is with the principles from which Hume started, and which he never gave up; how impossible it would be to anyone who had assimilated his system as a whole; how close is the organic connection between all the parts of this as he originally conceived it—we must trust to the following introductions to show. (See, in particular, Introd. to Vol. I. §§ 301 and 321.)

When coupled with Taylor’s summary of Green’s view, little more need be said to show that the Norton and Norton edition of the Treatise is greatly different from that of Green and Grose (GG). We are committed to the view “that any defensible interpretation of Hume’s texts requires attention to, and thus appreciation of, the
intellectual and philosophical context that gave rise to the issues dealt with in these texts” (CT 2:686). This commitment motivated us to provide readers with a lengthy set of annotations which, according to Fosl, present an important “resource for scholars immersed in work on Hume’s thought” and who aim to offer the defensible interpretations of which we speak. Had T. H. Green been “at pains” to make this commitment, there would surely be many fewer errors in his Introductions to the Treatise. To cite only one example, he would not have supposed, as Taylor reminds us, that Hume is a hedonist.

Fosl also says, surprisingly, that, “the Green and Grose edition reflected the philosophical movement of its times, not to mention its presumption.” This claim is surely doubtful. At best, the Green and Grose edition reflected a would-be philosophical movement of its times, British Idealism. In 1875 Utilitarianism was clearly a more lively movement—during the 1870s Longmans published far more of J. S. Mill’s works than of those by Green or other British Idealists. In addition, the Clarendon Press, from 1860 to 1910 seems not to have been bitten by the British Idealist bug, while in the United States Peirce, James, and Dewey were busily making pragmatism a going concern. The answer to Fosl’s following question, “Does the Nortons’ edition do the same?”—does the Clarendon Treatise reflect the philosophical movement of the present time?—is surely negative. As evidence supporting this answer we note that over the course of the past decade, perhaps the past two or more, the book review sections of the leading English-language philosophical journals have systematically ignored the critical editions of not only Hume, but also those of Hobbes, Locke, Reid, Peirce, James, and Dewey, to mention some of the important English-speaking philosophers who come to mind.37 We suggest, by the way, that to engage in discussions of the meaning of texts without first considering their accuracy or provenance may do little to advance our understanding of those texts.

The edition of 1888. Fosl suggests that the “Selby-Bigge 1888 Clarendon edition of the Treatise, together with Peter Nidditch’s 1978 revisions to it, manifests a more historically-driven approach to the Treatise, a desire to get the text right,” and then asks, “Is the Norton text another specimen of this tendency?” If Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge was motivated by a desire to get the text of his new edition of the Treatise right, then he fell short of his goal in more than one respect. His editor, Peter Nidditch, offers the proverbial faint praise by saying that, “on the basis of my collation of [the SB and Mossner editions] with one another and with the original edition, ‘Selby-Bigge’s text of the Treatise is largely sound; it has fewer serious errors than Mossner’s.’”38 He then goes on to amplify this remark by saying that while the “inaccuracies of wording” of the SB Treatise “are gratifyingly sparse and, with one exception, brief; and although its accuracy in punctuation, spelling, and other formal respects is less satisfactory, it is both verbally and formally far better than Mossner’s.” A page later he points out that Selby-Bigge’s Treatise comes up to his
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(Nidditch’s) own standard of verbal accuracy except for its omission of Hume’s prefatory Advertisement to Book 3; it is, however, not up to that standard of accuracy in respect of forms even if the many repeated instances of “reflexion” for “reflection” and “sect.” for “Sect.” are discounted. Selby-Bigge apparently did no rechecking of his text, with the result that the numerous reprints retain his initial errors and oversights apart from two or three corrections that have been made by the publisher at readers’ suggestions.39 Nidditch was unable to correct the many formal errors (some of which are verbal) he mentions, nor was he able to prevent the SBN Treatise from joining the SB version in being the only editions of the work that fail to follow Hume’s explicit instructions regarding the Appendix passages he said were to be inserted in the Treatise in this order and, using CT pagination and note numbering, in these locations: 1.3.5.4; 1.3.7.7; n. 21 (70); 1.3.10.10–2; 1.3.14.12; n. 5 (18–9); 1.2.4.22; 1.2.4.31; and n. 12 (46–7).40 And at note n. 23.1 (CT 1:96), SBN sends the reader to two non-existent pages, xxii, xxiii.41

The edition of 1969. The editor of this edition, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. E. C. Mossner (Hammondsworth: Pelican, 1969), was the first to incorporate the authorial corrections and amendments found in the Kames copy of the Treatise (the Pope and Hume copies had not yet been discovered in 1969). As we noted above, Nidditch had pointed out in 1976 that the text of the Mossner edition is exceptionally unreliable. Nidditch found more than 100 substantive errors, some of which give an entirely different sense to the text as published by Hume,42 and also a great number of errors of form.43 Although we have been told that the publisher has been informed of these errors, when we last checked the edition these errors remained uncorrected. This edition also omits the helpful running heads indicating Book, part, and section found in all earlier printed editions, and has no index.44

4. Illumination, Interpretation, and Omissions

These annotations provide materials intended to illuminate, but not interpret, Hume’s texts, a distinction which, however difficult to maintain in practice, provides a useful ideal. (CT, EA, 2:685)

All three of our commentators mention our reliance on the distinction between illumination and interpretation, but it is Bricke who explicitly asks the crucial questions. If “the annotations and accompanying index do not, themselves, constitute instances of exposition or interpretation,” then how, precisely, “do they serve to illuminate the Treatise? How might they [then] forward exposition and interpretation?” By drawing attention to a few examples, he shows that annotations that are, as he puts it, “austerely” limited to offering no more than
illuminations do nonetheless, especially when used with Index 2 of the edition, “provide invaluable assistance to those whose concerns are expository, interpretative, and, yes, critical” (italics added; see, for example, the annotations to 1.4.6.12, SBN 257 or 1.4.6.20, SBN 261). They do this, he says, by pointing out some of the “apt . . . and illuminating . . . citations” of other authors that Hume may have read, or some of the “locations at which Hume introduces, defends or deploys a given concept, distinction, or argument,” and by helping readers of the Treatise build up a “thick textual context” that contributes positively to a form of “constructive reflection, interpretative and critical” that provides a useful barrier to “all-too-easy anachronism.” Nonetheless, it may be useful for us to offer a brief comment about a central feature of our understanding of the distinction between illumination and interpretation.

A decision to annotate a word, phrase, or longer passage presupposes that the item chosen has been understood, and that we think it important enough to merit annotation. We grant without question, then, that the act of choosing passages to be annotated does itself presuppose an element of interpretation. This granted, we suggest that as we use them in the relevant discussion, illumination and interpretation may be thought of as forming a continuum, and that our goal was to provide, as much as possible, annotations that fall near the illumination end of this continuum. That we have on all occasions achieved this goal is unlikely, and especially as far as Index 2 is concerned. In short, we readily grant Bricke’s final methodological point: “the intimated boundary between illumination and interpretation is not a sharp one.” But we have intended, to provide, and, if Bricke is right, have with some regularity provided readers with a useful and relatively neutral historical background against which arguments and discussions of the Treatise may be read, understood, and assessed.

That said, Bricke outlines four (sample?) objections showing that he is not satisfied that we have always accomplished what we set out to do. He argues that on these four occasions we have not provided the illumination we have promised. In response, we think that on two of the four occasions he has outlined (numbers 2 and 3 in his list), what he has asked for falls, as he himself suspects, on the interpretation end of the continuum we have sketched. But as much as philosophers like to make and then defend distinctions, we will not attempt to defend what we have done by arguing that Bricke has misclassified in this way. Perhaps our view of these instances could by careful argument be shown to be correct. If so, it might then turn out that our annotations of the passages in question nonetheless fall short because we fail to provide the illumination the passages merit. In that event we would have to repeat, in order to emphasize, what we have said in the epigraph we have placed at the head of this Response: “We recognize—indeed, we emphasize—that our annotations are neither complete nor definitive, and thus we welcome suggestions for their improvement” (CT 2:687).
Having granted that our distinction between illumination and interpretation is not a sharp one, we find it at least mildly ironic that Taylor begins her comments on our edition with a discussion of T. H. Green’s openly interpretive introductions to the 1874–1875 edition of the Treatise, introductions that undertake to show that the philosophy embodied in the Treatise had begun with the empiricist assumptions and methods of Locke, and then moved on through Berkeley’s immaterialism to discover in Hume, as we still sometimes hear or read, the comprehensive skeptical conclusions (epistemological, metaphysical, and moral) implicit in the empiricist program. If so, the irony has a second dimension, for it was exactly Green’s introductions that provided the negative models used by the three General Editors (Tom L. Beauchamp, David Fate Norton, M. A. Stewart) when they mapped out plans for a critical edition of the Philosophical Works of David Hume. It is particularly satisfying, then, to see that Taylor finds that the new Clarendon edition of the Treatise avoids Green’s “narrow and single-minded interpretive stance,” and that, with some degree of success, we as editors of this edition of the Treatise have managed to provide scholars with the kind of philosophically neutral annotations at which we aimed. Thus, while (1), we have chosen passages that seemed to us important enough to annotate, and (2), we have supposed that we understood the fundamental import of a large and varied set of textual segments, (3), we have not allowed Green’s kind of interpretation to characterize David Norton’s “Historical Account” of the Treatise or the jointly authored text of our “Editors’ Annotations.”

But let us say that while we appreciate Taylor’s assessment of our aims and accomplishments, we also know that other factors—our cultural and intellectual backgrounds and our interests, experiences, reading, and the amount of time available to us—have influenced our choices and our performance. It was for that reason that we placed at the close of our Foreword to the Editors’ Annotations the epigraph to this paper, and for that reason that we have quoted this epigraph again just above. Moreover, it is in the spirit of this sentiment that we welcome the suggestions of Bricke and Taylor regarding appropriate additions that could be made to my “Historical Account” or to our jointly produced “Editors’ Annotations.” But while we agree with Taylor that more could be aptly said about the works of Locke and Mandeville as a way of illuminating Hume’s moral views, it cannot be said that we ignore them in our annotations to Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise. At the same time we are by no means surprised to learn, as Taylor says she is, that there are features of Hume’s moral theory that appear to relate to Locke’s account of powers or to Mandeville’s moral views to which we make no references. Indeed, we expect that many such oversights will be noticed. Our hope is that the annotations we have begun will be continued and recorded. Indeed, the success of the annotations or discussions of Hume’s texts found in volume 2 of the Clarendon Treatise could well in large part be judged by the role these materials play in encouraging others to make the kinds of connection we have made. We hope that Taylor is correct when
she suggests that, with our annotations in hand, “scholars can now reconstruct more fully the debates that Hume assumed or participated in, and thus have a clearer appreciation of what may be distinctive in his thought.” We are equally convinced that the progress in Hume scholarship she envisages will be all the more likely to take place if our annotations are amplified in the ways that she and Bricke amplify them when they draw attention to additional materials that illuminate the texts with which they are concerned. Such amplifications and others that we hope would follow them could be systematically collected, carefully vetted, and recorded on a well-maintained web site dedicated to precisely this purpose. Or they could be recorded on such permanent, existing web sites as those provided by the McGill Hume Collection, the Hume Society, or the Oxford/Leeds site organized by Peter Millican.

NOTES

For comments and suggestions that have led to significant changes and improvements in this paper, we wish to thank Tom L. Beauchamp, Peter Loptson, and Peter Millican. For generously helping us to confirm the accuracy of our references and transcriptions of the National Library of Scotland (NLS) manuscripts used in this paper, we are indebted to Dr. Iain G. Brown, Principal Curator, Manuscripts Division, NLS. For relevant information about the holdings of the John Murray Archive (see note 31), we are indebted to Rachel Beattie, the John Murray Archive Assistant Curator, NLS.

1 In David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, vol. 3 of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2000) [hereafter, The Clarendon EHU], v. Another starting point was furnished by Roland Hall. Near the end of the essay that served as the Introduction to his 50 Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958), Hall, listing the most important gaps in Hume scholarship c. 1976, announced that, “In the long run, of course, we ought to have a Collected Works and a Concordance.” In the context of his essay it is clear that by “a Collected Works” Hall means a reliable critical edition. Hall expanded his desiderata by indicating that “the immediate need” is for a “philosophical commentary on the Treatise. To be of use, this would need to inform the reader of the Treatise continually about its language, its sources, the structure of the argument, parallel passages, and the interpretations that have been offered; as is done for Aristotle or Kant” (7). Between them, the OPT Treatise and the Clarendon Treatise make a significant start toward four of the five items mentioned, and the OPT edition offers one introductory interpretation of the text, but on the whole we think Hall’s fifth and final desideratum unrealistic given the explosion of interpretations, in the past forty or fifty years, of the Treatise and Hume’s related works, and as we go on to explain, we concluded that such interpretation would be unsuitable in a critical edition.

This edition was first published with the title *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* and *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894); see T. E. Jessop, *A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy* (London: A. Brown & Sons, 1938), 20. The second edition of these two works, published by the Clarendon Press in 1902, and re-issued by the same press several times since that date has this handy but misleading title, *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902) [hereafter, SB *Enquiries*]. The title is misleading because Hume did not publish a work entitled *Enquiries*.


P. H. Nidditch, “Preface to the Third Edition,” SBN *Enquiries*, v. Nidditch went on to say that all “errors of miswording have been corrected in this edition” (SBN, Notes, 348). Our own sample check of SBN EHU Section X reveals that Nidditch is overly optimistic about the substantive accuracy of his revised edition. We found one obvious substantive error in section X (*cure* for *cûrè*), while in Section I we found four instances of “reflexion” for “reflection.” For brief discussions of this potentially misleading deviation from Hume’s usual spelling of “reflection,” see our “Editing the Text,” CT 2:617, 623–5.

*An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. Millican (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), lvii. Our visual check of Sections I and X of the SBN EHU confirms Millican’s estimate of the number of “errors or intrusions” in this edition. Attending only to the mistakes found in Section X, our collation reveals that in this section, a text of about 8700 words and just over 1200 accidentals, there is one error for approximately every sixty-six words or punctuation marks. A check of Sections I and IX of the SBN EPM indicates that this text is equally inaccurate. In defense of Prof. Nidditch, we note that he had marked many of these further errors, but that the publisher chose not to correct a great proportion of them, especially those of accidentals. We base this defense of Nidditch on an opportunity we have had to examine a copy of the second edition of Hume’s *Enquiries* in which he had marked discrepancies between the Selby-Bigge text and the 1777 edition on which it was said to have been based.

These were the editions of EHU and EPM edited by C. W. Hendel for The Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955 and 1957, respectively); the edition of EHU included in *David Hume: On Human Nature and the Understanding*, ed. A. Flew (New York: Collier Books, 1962); and the edition of EPM included in *Hume’s Ethical Writings*, ed. A. McIntyre (New York: Collier Books, 1965). As these editions are not now widely used, we omit discussion of their flaws.


For basic information about this library and the two volumes of the *Treatise* found in it, see above, Fosl, “The Clarendon Critical Edition,” notes 4 and 6, and the texts related to these notes. For greater detail, see David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, *The David Hume Library* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Bibliographical Society & The National Library of Scotland, 1996), 25; 45n115; 102–3. It is not unlikely, we suggest, that a significant
part of the many “Corrections and Additions” in Hume’s hand found in these volumes are (assuming the volumes do still exist) drafts of the 5,600 word Appendix published at the end of volume 3 of the Treatise, for as everyone who has read it knows, the Appendix is entirely concerned with volume 1 of the Treatise.

10 So too for the past four years (beginning with the eleventh impression in 2005) do the texts of the OPT edition have the SB page numbers in the right-hand margins of the text.

11 For that matter, we think all the materials in volume 2 could be printed in this smaller type, thus putting the entire edition on a diet. The font for volume 2 is as it is because the design for The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume calls for the texts of this edition to be set in a larger font than the corresponding OPT texts (see, e.g., the differences between the OPT and Clarendon editions of EHU and EPM). Notwithstanding this policy regarding the design of the works in the two editions, we successfully argued that the two versions (student and scholarly) of Hume’s Treatise should be paged alike so that student and instructor would always be, literally, on the same page. We also recommend that, even now, the texts of the OPT and Clarendon editions of EHU and EPM should be set in fonts of the same size and the texts paged alike.

12 P. H. Nidditch’s detailed criticisms of this edition are summarized below at “The edition of 1969.”

13 Given their bibliographical insignificance, our decision to ignore these texts is consistent with our decision not to trace the philosophical reactions to the Treatise beyond the time of Hume’s death.

14 During the early modern period copyright was often divided into fractions based on the progression 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16 . . . , and for exceptionally large works, even 1/128 or 1/256. In practice, the copyright was often shared among all those individuals whose names appeared in the imprint of the work.

15 In the terminology of the times, they were “booksellers” or individuals and private companies that both published books and also sold these in bookshops and through advertisements and catalogues.

16 With the exception of P. Hill, much of what we report about the works published by these firms is derived from Online Computer Library Center FirstSearch [hereafter OCLC] searches. Information about Hill’s list has been derived from the catalogue of the National Library of Scotland.

17 The Allman list for 1817 also included the anonymous Common Consent, the Basis of the Constitution of England; Walter Bates, A Narrative of the Conduct and Adventures of Henry Frederic Moon (a notorious criminal); and in 1818, an anonymous Map of the Countries around the North Pole; Daines Barrington, The Possibility of Approaching the North Pole Asserted; Hans Egede, A Description of Greenland; W. S. Kenny. Practical Chess Grammar; J. Ray. A Complete Collection of English Proverbs; and University of Cambridge, Cambridge Prize Poems.

This work was jointly published by Deighton and J. Nicholson, W. Wingrave, P. Emsley, W. H. Lunn, and F. & C. Irvington. It is recorded in Jessop’s Bibliography, 55.

We mean this statement to be taken literally. Despite at least a half-dozen searches for “Publisher” and “R. Bliss,” with “Publisher Location” as “Oxford,” Hume’s Treatise was not included in the lists obtained.

By 1817 copies of the Treatise must have been extremely scarce, especially as it is not unlikely that many of the 290 copies of volumes 1 and 2 bought by George Keith in 1763 were recycled—pages from unsold books were used, e.g., in the binding of other books. Many of the 200 copies of what I have argued was volume 3 and sold in 1760 could have met a similar fate. See my “Historical Account of A Treatise of Human Nature from its Beginnings to the Time of Hume’s Death” [hereafter, with references in the text, HA], CT 2:583, especially note 452.

Brown, Stewart, at least five other individuals, and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland had engaged in the Leslie Election Controversy in 1805–1806, a controversy that focused attention on Hume’s analysis of cause and effect, and then both Brown and Stewart continued to publish works that addressed this issue. For more on the works of Brown and Stewart, see Jessop, Bibliography, 105, 178–9. For further details regarding the Leslie Election Controversy, see, in the McGill Rare Books Division, http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/hume/search/results.php.

The re-issues of Reid’s works included an item Jessop missed, a four-volume American edition, The Works of Thomas Reid . . . With an Account of His Life and Writings by Dugald Stewart [and] Notes by the American Editors (Charlestown, MA: Samuel Etheridge, Jun’r, 1813–1815).

The remaining part of the Appendix is printed following Book 3, as it is in the Clarendon Treatise.

David Constable, an advocate, managed the printing shop that had previously belonged to his deceased maternal grandfather, D. Willison.

Including, that is, the essays withdrawn from time to time. Nine withdrawn essays were included; see vol. 4:517–77. These nine items correspond to those found in Eugene Miller’s edition of Hume’s Essays, except that “A Character of Sir Robert Walpole” is excluded from the edition prepared at Constable’s request.

NLS Ms 678/ff.34–5.

The NLS Catalogue indicates that the edition of 1825 was edited by David Constable. But in NLS Ms 676/f144, dated 13 July 1825, A. Constable wrote: “I sent you last week a Copy of Hume’s Philosophical Writings new completed—the Impression Consists of 750 Copies—& Paper Printing Engraving & a Sum paid to the Editor of the Notes (Mr Cosmo Innes) with other Charges amt to a total of £867 14/- . . . .” For more on Innes see ODNB, “Cosmo Innes.” This edition, as re-issued in 1826, may be seen online at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_statictxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1728&Itemid=28 (search “Liberty Fund David Hume” and scroll down to The Philosophical Works of David Hume, misdated 1828).

This firm served as Constable’s London Agent.
David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton

NLS Ms 326/f.438.

NLS Mss 679/f.360; 678/f.155; and 678/f.161. There is reason to believe this letter was addressed to John Murray, perhaps Britain’s foremost publisher at the time. We know the edition was offered to Murray for c. 20 October, 1825, Archibald Constable wrote to his son David saying: “I annex a Copy of a letter I have just written to John Murray, about Hume. [I]t would be by far the best channel for its publication” (NLS Ms 678/f187). Two days later David wrote to his father: “I am extremely pleased to find you & Mr Murray are now on friendly terms & have always regretted that it was otherwise. He is out of sight the first & foremost bookseller of them all & combines the gentleman and the man of business. If he purchase Hume, as I am led to hope, by your second letter which I have today, nothing will give me greater satisfaction” (NLS Ms 679/f.366). Murray’s reasons for declining are not known, for as Rachel Beattie, the John Murray Archive Assistant Curator, NLS, has informed us by personal communication, while the Murray Archive has “many folders filled with material from [Archibald] Constable, none of it is from the 1820s.”

NLS Ms 678/f.176. “Duncan” is most likely John Duncan, another London bookseller who occasionally published philosophical works.

Intelex reports that it “carefully checked [its text of the Treatise] against the 1886 Green and Grose edition.” What can this mean when the orthography of that edition is not followed? And why was the Green and Grose edition of 1886 chosen for this comparison? That edition may have been a reset version of the text of the edition of 1874–1875, the text that Grose would more likely have carefully compared to the first edition text. The answer to this question is probably that the edition of 1886 had been, from 1964, readily available in a facsimile reprint published by Scientia Verlag.

Hume requested that the Advertisement be added to unsold copies of his Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (of which 1768, 1770, and 1772 copies were available) as well as any future printings of this work; see the Clarendon EHU, xcix, cvi, 1.

Taylor quotes from the cited section in the second paragraph of her comment.


We generally except from this charge journals explicitly focused on the history of philosophy or the work of a given philosopher, but even the editors of these journals are sometimes inexcusably lax about requiring their contributors to use accurate texts, and to use them accurately. As recently as 2005 a history of philosophy journal on whose masthead one is told that “Citations of primary texts should be to standard editions” published a discussion of Hume that quoted EHU and “A Dialogue” from the 1903 issue of the SB Enquiries—from, i.e., the text in which Nidditch had found and corrected, as we note above, some eighty instances of faulty text.

Nidditch is quoting a comment he makes in his revised version of Hume’s Enquiries, ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. Nidditch, Notes, 348n1, in his later pamphlet, An Apparatus of Variant Readings for Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, Including a Catalogue of Hume’s Manuscript Amendments [hereafter Apparatus] (Sheffield: Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, 1976), 33. This scarce and valuable pamphlet is inadvertently omitted from the Bibliography of the Clarendon Treatise. It is, however, cited in CT, ETT, 2: 590n4, 613n64, and 654n148.
39 Nidditch reports only two such corrections; see Apparatus, 36. These may be seen at CT, ETT, 2:653n142; 654n149.

40 Nidditch marks the intended locations of those passages with asterisks. To read the Appendix as originally printed, see CT, ETT, 2:674–84.

41 Nidditch also uses asterisks for a different purpose in Book 3 of the Treatise. Writing about Hume’s corrections and amendments in his own copy of volume 3, a copy found in the British Library, Nidditch says: “Many of Hume’s manuscript amendments are incorporated into the present text and noted below [in an apparatus of variants]; places in the text affected by amendments not thus incorporated are marked by an asterisk and the notes below record these amendments” (SBN, 666, italics added). James Harris has misunderstood or misremembered this explanation, for he reports that in Book 3 of SBN “asterisks are placed [by Nidditch] in the text to indicate passages which were substantially modified by Hume in that copy,” in, i.e., Hume’s own copy of volume 3 (“Editing Hume’s Treatise,” Modern Intellectual History 5.3 (2008), 633–41, 635). But while there are by our count no more than a dozen asterisks in Book 3 of the SBN Treatise, a review of the amendments Hume made to this Book and recorded by Nidditch (SBN, 669–73, Apparatus, 20–30) or by us in our parallel apparatus (Register B, CT, ETT, 2:654–61), shows that Hume made at least fifty substantial amendments—amendments that clearly and significantly change the meaning of the text of his copy of Book 3. Clearly, then, Nidditch did not in his revision of this part of SBN use asterisks to mark the places where Hume had substantially modified the text. He used them, rather, on roughly twelve occasions to notify readers that substantive amendments Hume had made to his copy of the text have not been incorporated into Nidditch’s revised version of the printed text. On some forty or more other occasions Nidditch made substantive changes based on Hume’s manuscript amendments without placing an asterisk or any other form of notice in his revised version of Treatise 3. Neither did Nidditch mark in any way the substantive changes made in response to the Errata of the Treatise or in response to the additional amendments made in the Kames copy.

42 Five examples: 58.25, evolution should read revolution; 80.33, irrefutable s.r. irresistible; 92.26, parts of inferior ideas s.r. parts or inferior ideas; 135.10, receiving s.r. conceiving; 161.15 confident s.r. consistent (Apparatus, 38–9).

43 Apparatus, 45. Nidditch goes on to point out that the edition of the Treatise ed. D. C. C. MacNabb and P. Árdal (London: Fontana, 1962 [Treatise vol. I, Appendix], 1972 [Treatise vols. II, III]) modernizes spelling and punctuation and is based on the Selby-Bigge text, not the first edition. In conversation with David Norton, Árdal pointed out that the publisher had unwarrantedly claimed that his edition of these volumes was based on the first edition text although Árdal both knew and told the publisher that it was based on the SB text.

44 The Mossner/Pelican (now Mossner/Penguin) edition is not the only unacceptable version of the Treatise now in print. The Great Books in Philosophy edition (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1992) is an enlarged reprint (5.375 x 8.5 in.) of an early Selby-Bigge printing, without (1) Hume’s “Advertisement” to volume 1 or that to volume 3, (2) the marginal Part and Section guides, (3) the index, and, of course, (4) the corrections made by Nidditch as well as the corrections and amendments derived from the manuscript changes Hume entered in the Kames and Hume copies.
For the simple reason that indexing is clearly a form of classification and thus requires that the indexer(s) classify passages, that he or she decide what given passages mean in order to know where to place them in the index.

See the second paragraph of Taylor’s comment.

And that despite the fact that one of us is known to have articulated, and to have held—and perhaps even now still holds—interpretive views of Hume that are sufficiently clear and pronounced to be the subject of discussion, refutation, and, occasionally, approval.


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