There Is Just One Idea of Self in Hume’s *Treatise*

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Abstract: Hume’s mysterious words, “we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves” have been the focus of a variety of different interpretations, some more creative than others. But the solution to this interpretative problem is indeed very simple, too simple to occur to most readers. What Hume has in mind is actually nothing but the different ways association works with regard to, on the one hand, imagination, and, on the other hand, passion. Hence, one may easily read the entire Treatise as containing just one idea of self, that is, the bundle of perceptions discussed in “On personal identity.” Contrary to what many scholars have recently suggested, this idea may very well be “the idea, or rather impression” of self at play in the mechanism of sympathy, as well as the object of pride and humility. This faithful but dull reading makes Hume coherent, probably more coherent than any two-ideas interpretation does.

1. Introduction

Since the publication of Annette Baier’s seminal A Progress of Sentiments, with its emphasis on Hume as a naturalistic philosopher mainly interested in the social and passionate aspects of our lives, we have witnessed an explosion of interpretations arguing that there are two ideas of the self in the Treatise. On the one hand, the
idea of self as a bundle of perceptions discussed in “Of personal identity” at the end of Book 1, and, on the other hand, an idea of self produced by the passions and of relevance to Hume’s practical philosophy dealt with in Books 2 and 3. Just to mention a few, we have Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, who is actually a forerunner to Baier, Pauline Chazan, Susan Purviance, and less clearcut, Eugenio Lecaldano and Donald Ainslie. Many of these two-ideas interpretations are interesting and subtle, and maybe Hume ought to have two ideas of self, in order to make his theory of the human mind plausible, or less implausible. Nonetheless, I will argue that in the Treatise, there is just one idea of self, the bundle of Book 1. Maybe it is because I am neither a historian nor a native speaker of English that I find this way of understanding Hume on this particular topic the natural one. I suspect many readers will find it flatfooted and too simple an interpretation, though.

After closing Book I with the annihilation of a continuous or substantial self, Hume surprisingly introduces the impression of self in Book 2:

"'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. (T 2.1.1.4; SBN 317–18; cf. T 2.1.1.6; SBN 318)"

Some decades ago this mention of an impression of self was regarded an outright contradiction. But a more careful reading shows it does not have to be so, and Hume needs the impression, or near-impression, of self in his account of sympathy, upon which his moral philosophy is built. Apart from the descriptions of the workings of sympathy, the passages providing inspiration, and, according to some writers, evidence for the two-ideas view, are the following two:

"[W]e must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. (T 1.4.6.5; SBN 253)"

And,

"Whatever changes he [a person] endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures. (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261)"
Sometimes the “Appendix,” too, contributes to the two-ideas interpretation. In it Hume expresses his worries about his theory of personal identity.

Thus the trajectory of this paper is as follows: I start with discussing the two passages quoted from Book 1, and then turn to the mechanism of sympathy, where “the idea, or rather impression” of self has its function. At this step, I shortly answer five questions formulated by Donald Ainslie, in order to confirm my reading (Ainslie, 150–53). Ainslie’s paper is the most systematic treatment of this topic I have come across, and I agree that Hume’s explanation of the mechanism is challenged by seeming inconsistencies and the many variations of sympathy. Finally, I say some very few words about Hume’s worries in the “Appendix,” without claiming to make any original contribution on that issue.

It should be pointed out from the start that attributing two ideas of self to Hume does not solve every interpretative problem. Why does Hume not announce the introduction of another idea of self? Of which impression is the second idea of self a copy? Why is he undecided about this impression: “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves” (my emphasis)? Or, in Book 2, why does Hume on several occasions all the same insist upon the bundle-idea of Book 1?

It is evident, that pride and humility, though directly contrary, have yet the same object. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. (T 2.1.2. 2; SBN 277)

Or,

Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing. (T 2.2.2.17; SBN 340–41)

2. “[P]ersonal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves”

Here is the first quotation from Book 1 in a fuller context.

What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thr’ the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. The first is our present subject. (T 1.4.6.5; SBN 253)
As I understand it, what Hume wants to say is the following. This “propension” of ours has a twofold cause: Thought or imagination makes us believe in a continuous self—in personal identity over time—in one way, and the passions or the concern we take in ourselves makes us believe in a continuous self in another way. In Book 1, Hume explains how thought or imagination makes us believe in a continuous self, and in Book 2, he explains how the passions do the same thing. The words “The first is our present subject . . .” signals Hume’s intention to discuss the second topic later on, as we know he did.

Thought or imagination makes us believe in a simple self identical over time, since we mistake the succession of distinct perceptions related by causation and resemblance for identity: “identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in imagination” (T 1.4.6.16; SBN 259–60). In a similar manner, passion contributes to the belief in an identical, continuous self. One passion is reflected into another, resembling the first one, and thus they are related by resemblance.

The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like association of impressions. All resembling impressions are connected together and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections. (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283)

As in the case of ideas, we mistake the train of resembling but in fact distinct passions for a unity. Actually, this is what Hume’s expression “personal identity as it regards the passions” refers to. Hence, these two different kinds of association—causation and resemblance among sense impressions and ideas, and resemblance among bodily sensations and passions—are the reason why we have to distinguish between personal identity with regard to imagination and with regard to the passions, in order to explain why we believe in a continuous self.

3. “[O]ur identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to imagination”

We are not, however, supposed to think of the ideas and the passions as constituting two separate selves. The same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes
he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making of our distant perceptions influence each other. (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261)

The idea of a continuous self, which is identical over time, is a product of the relations of causation and resemblance among all of our perceptions (T 1.4.6.18–19; SBN 260–61). There are relations of causation and resemblance between the perceptions—original impressions and ideas—belonging to the understanding, that is, thought or imagination, and there are relations of resemblance between the passions “and other emotions resembling them” (T 2.1.1.1; SBN 275). And we have causation and resemblance between these two groups of perceptions. Sense impressions cause ideas, and these ideas cause new impressions, impressions of pleasure and pain. These impressions of pleasure and pain are then reflected into passions with resembling hedonic qualities, which in their turn produce ideas. In this sense, our identity with regard to imagination corroborates our identity with regard to the passions.

Now I have observ’d, that those two faculties of the mind, the imagination and passions, assist each other in their operation, when their propensities are similar, and when they act upon the same object. The mind has always a propensity to pass from one passion to any other related to it; and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to the object of the other. The two impulses concur with each other, and render the whole transition more smooth and easy. (T 2.2.2.16; SBN 339)

The corrobororation of personal identity as it regards the passions and personal identity as it regards the understanding is most obvious in the so-called double relation of impressions and ideas at work in the indirect passions, that is, pride and humility, love and hatred, and their variations. An idea of something nice gives rise to an impression of pleasure. This impression is reflected into a similar passion, if the nice thing is closely enough connected to ourselves etc., pleasure is reflected into pride, and pride makes us think of ourselves: We are proud of ourselves. Hence we have one relation of ideas—the idea of the nice thing belonging to ourselves is related to the idea of ourselves—and one relation of impressions, pleasure is related by resemblance to pride. This so-called double relation is extremely important to Hume. Apart from contributing to the production of these indirect passions, it contributes to the production of the moral sentiment, which is actually a special kind of indirect passion (T 3.1.2.5; SBN 473). Finally, as already stated, the double relation shows how personal identity with regard to imagination corroborates that with regard to passion. Hume even compares the double
relation to his hypothesis about causal belief formation, and seems to ascribe the same importance to both of them.

To illustrate this hypothesis [the double relation], we may compare it to that, by which I have already explain’d the belief attending the judgments, which we form from causation. . . . There is evidently a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis, and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation: Which analogy must be allow’d to be of no despicable proof of both hypotheses. (T 2.1.5.11; SBN 289–90)

Furthermore, personal identity with regard to the passions gives us our concern in ourselves; something we would not have, did we not believe in an identical self.10 Since we are pleasure-seeking beings wanting to avoid pain, our past but also our anticipated pains and pleasures influence our present perceptions. At present we are concerned with at least some of our pains in the past, because they are reflected in passions with negative hedonic quality, and so on. And since we do not want to experience pain in the future, we may feel fear today of going to the dentist tomorrow, and so on.11

4. “[T]he idea, or rather impression of ourselves”

There is, in fact, no real inconsistency between the idea of self in Book 1 and “the idea, or rather impression” of self in Book 2.12 An impression of a continuous, simple and identical self would indeed be inconsistent with Book 1, but Hume never says that “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves” is an impression, if it is one, of such a self. He needs a lively idea of self in his account of sympathy; an idea lively enough to transfer vivacity to the idea of the other person’s passion, so that this second idea may convert into an impression. And he thinks we have such a lively idea of ourselves.

The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person. (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318)

Ainslie argues that the idea of self at play in sympathy cannot be the bundle, since sympathy is common among all mankind, even among animals, and the self as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse philosophical idea (Ainslie, 155). But Hume probably thinks that the ordinary man has a vague idea of himself as his perceptions (T 1.4.2.6; SBN 189–90),13 and that he, when asked about the self,
would “enter most intimately into what” he calls himself and “stumble on some particular perception or other” (T 1.4.6.3; SBN 252). Those perceptions would for instance be vivid memories and thoughts about who he is, knowledge about his personal history or perceptions of his body and its present position and location (T 1.4.6.18–20; SBN 260–61).

Of course, the vulgar person does not think of himself as a bundle of perceptions—he does not say to himself, “I am nothing but a bundle of perceptions”—but he probably, at least according to Hume, identifies with some of his perceptions. And no one, not even Hume, could think of himself as every single perception in the cross-time bundle, since we cannot remember every perception that has ever appeared in the mind (T 1.4.6.20; SBN 261).

Now it is time for Ainslie’s questions (Ainslie, 150–53). Can the vague idea of the self as one’s perceptions, a “proto-bundle,” pass Ainslie’s test?

(1) “What is the status of the ‘idea, or rather impression’ of self in the sympathy mechanism? How does it cohere with Hume’s earlier rejection of an ‘impression of self’?”

The idea of self at work in sympathy is the ordinary man’s vague idea of himself as his perceptions. The liveliness of this idea nearly amounts to the liveliness of an impression. And since the only difference between an impression and its idea—their causal histories exempted—is the degree of force and vivacity or liveliness by which we conceive of it, the liveliness of the idea of self makes it approach the status of an impression (T 1.1.1.1; SBN 1). This explains Hume’s hesitant attitude.

The following sentence, too, might be read as an explicit mention of an impression of self. “All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of the other” (T 2.1.11.6; SBN 318). But here again Hume hesitates: “the impression or consciousness.” This time the hesitation probably signifies that he does not have any ordinary impression in mind, but our self-awareness, that is, the consciousness of our own person.

Some scholars have suggested that “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves” is an impression of the body (Baier, 130–31). But if it were, why then would Hume hesitate? We have impressions of our bodies. Besides, the idea of self as the mind seems to work for at least many—perhaps most or even all—of the topics of Books 2 and 3. For example, we do not have to include the body in the idea of self, in order to be proud of its beauty or humiliated by its deformity: “Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves, or assent to those philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be allowed to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double relations” (T 2.1.8.1; SBN 298; cf. T 2.1.1.2; SBN 276). It is as abstract persons or minds with near enough connected bodies that some people own houses or equipages of which they are proud (T 2.1.10.2; SBN 310),
and the mind’s dependence on the body for its perceptions localizes the self or person in space, thus we can be contiguous in both space and time to others, in order to sympathize with their passions (T 2.1.11.4; SBN 317).

(2) “Why does Hume think that this perception of self is always present to us? Why is it always intimately present to us?”

“‘Tis evident, that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of sentiments and passions of any other person” (T 2.2.2.15; SBN 339). But, “self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference” (T 1.4.6.2; SBN 251). On my reading, Hume thinks that we are always aware of ourselves in the sense of having self-awareness: We are not just aware or have perceptions, but aware of having perceptions. And the perceptions that we are aware of having belong or have a reference to us. In other words, we are aware of our perceptions as ours.

Hume’s problem is that we have no impression of this self or person to which our perceptions are supposed to belong. Thus “ourselves” in the quotation from T 2.2.2.15 (SBN 339) refers to nothing but the idea of self as the bundle.

It could be the case that the idea of self is intimately present to us, because the self is “that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference.” Phenomenologically, self-awareness might well be described as more intimate than the awareness of any other perception. But Hume actually seems to think that we have an intimate awareness of many of our perceptions: “[S]elf or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are intimately conscious” (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329). On the contrary, we are not intimately aware of other persons’ perceptions, for example, passions, but have to infer them from external signs.

(3) “Why is ‘the idea, or rather impression’ of self the special repository of vivacity?”

Hume never explains why the intimate awareness of our own person makes “the idea, or rather impression” of self a lively idea, but seems to think this is evident.

There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us, either in space or time, shou’d be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object, in its influence on the imagination. Ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality. (T 2.3.7.1; SBN 427)

Since we are always intimately aware of ourselves, though strictly speaking as the bundle, the ideas of our own sentiments and passions are livelier than the
ideas of other peoples’ sentiments and passions. The ideas of our own sentiments and passions get their liveliness from our intimate self-awareness or idea of self. However, it should be noted that even though liveliness attracts our attention, we do not attend to every lively idea. We cannot simultaneously attend to all lively ideas of our simultaneous sentiments and passions, nor do we always attend to the lively idea of self.

Ainslie writes, “The third problem is the most intractable. . . . In particular it is hard to see how Hume can think both that vivacity brings with it attention (T 2.2.2.15; SBN 340–41) and that attention to the idea of self precludes sympathy (T 2.2.2.17; SBN 318)” (Ainslie, 162). There is, though, no attention or fixation on the lively idea of self, when the idea of self is not the object of any passion (T 2.2.2.15–16; SBN 339).

Some may, perhaps, find a contradiction between this phenomenon [the double relations of pride and humility] and that of sympathy, where the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us. But this difficulty will vanish, if we consider that in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves; as in the present case, where we are supposed to be actuated with pride and humility. Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing; and ‘tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us. But when self is the object of a passion, ‘tis not natural to quit the consideration of it, till the passion be exhausted; in which case the double relations of impressions and ideas can no longer operate. (T 2.2.2.17; SBN 340)

One may wonder how we can be attentive to the idea of self in pride or humility when the self independent of every other object is in reality nothing. The answer is that in pride or humility, we think of the self as the bearer of this or that quality of which we are proud or humiliated: “the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and make us think of our own qualities and circumstances” (T 2.1.5.6; SBN 287). When proud of my beautiful house, I think of myself as the owner of a nice house.

(4) “How is ‘the idea, or rather impression’ of self able to account for pure contagion, human sympathy, and social sympathy? In particular, how can it explain sympathy’s differential nature?”

Sympathy is the sharing of another person’s passion. One person’s idea of another person’s passion, inferred from expressions, actions, or circumstances,
is converted into an impression of that passion, that is, into a passion (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 319). This mechanism presupposes a general resemblance among mankind with regard to passions and their expressions, and Hume believes that we all share a common human nature (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318). The conversion of the idea into an impression, a passion, is possible in virtue of the “force and vivacity” of the sympathizer’s “idea, or rather impression” of herself, which is transferred to the idea of the passion (T 2.1.11.3–4; SBN 317). Thus she feels the same passion as the person sympathized with.

Can the vague idea of the self as one’s perceptions, the proto-bundle, explain all three variations of the sympathy mechanism that Ainslie finds in the Treatise, viz. pure contagion, human sympathy, and social sympathy? (Pure contagion is what happens when we sympathize unconsciously with someone physically present to us; we are influenced by the other person’s passion without being aware of it. Human sympathy is conscious sympathy based on contiguity; we are aware of taking over a physically present person’s passion. Social sympathy, finally, is sympathy with someone who is physically absent; hence the relation at play is not contiguity, but causation or resemblance.)

Yes, I think it can. Pure contagion and human sympathy are explained by the fact that the other person is physically present (contiguity in space and time). We perceive her expressions and unconsciously or consciously infer that she feels this or that passion, which we as sympathizers, too, are disposed to feel. Social sympathy, on the other hand, requires that relevant resemblances between self and other are picked out, if based on resemblance. But why would manners, character, country or language (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318), count as relevant similarities, and not just any shared perception in the bundle? “As we have seen, relations between someone’s idea of self and his idea of someone else will ease the sympathetic communication of sentiments between them. But how does the idea of mind as a bundle of perceptions capture the socially articulated features that the idea of self seems to display here? . . . It would seem that if the idea of self is to be understood in these terms, then any common perception shared by two persons would create a resemblance between them” (Ainslie, 155). The obvious answer is that we do not have direct knowledge about other persons’ perceptions. We have to infer their sentiments from what is perceivable, for instance manners, character traits, country or language. These things are supposed to be signs of a person’s emotional make-up. Hume probably believes that those who are our fellow-countrymen are more similar to us in their reactions and expressions, perhaps also in experiences, than are people from other parts of the world.

Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation
is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person. (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318)

We are similar to all mankind, perhaps even to some animals, but we have even more in common with our family or fellow-countrymen than with others.

(5) “How can the sympathy mechanism apply to animals, which, Hume says, also communicate sentiments sympathetically?”

Since Hume thinks that non-human animals sympathize with each other and feel pride and humility, he must attribute an idea of self to them. Arguably many animals have a rudimentary self-consciousness. As Christine Korsgaard writes, a hunting animal may intentionally stand downwind of her prey, thus she is aware of its spatial location in relation to herself. A social animal makes gestures of dominance or submission, thus she is aware of her social location in relation to other individuals of her species (Korsgaard, 7). The hunting animal is aware of herself as someone who smells her prey from the same direction as the wind blows from. The social animal is aware of herself as someone who is domineering or subordinated by, say, her mate. In other words, animals have perceptions and many animals are in some rudimentary sense aware of themselves as having a certain perceptual or literal perspective on the world, viz. as a certain bundle of perceptions.

5. Hume’s Worries in the “Appendix”

(6) “Why does Hume seem unconcerned about his explanation of sympathy—especially its reliance on the ‘idea, or rather impression’ of self—when, in the ‘Appendix’ to the Treatise, he reconsiders much of the original account of the self that he offered in ‘Of personal identity’?”

On my view, Hume is dissatisfied with his explanation of why we mistake our distinct perceptions for a simple and identical self, that is, why we attribute identity to our perceptions. He cannot explain this by saying that our perceptions are connected to each other, since they are not, on his account. Our perceptions are distinct existences and as such they are not really connected to each other, at least not by any connections discoverable by human minds (T Appendix 20–21; SBN 635–36). In “Of personal identity,” Hume tells us that we associate one perception to another when reflecting upon them. Maybe he is dissatisfied because he cannot explain how these associations emerge, or because he cannot explain why each of us is a distinct bundle apart from other bundles, when there are no real connections between our perceptions, or because of something else.
It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose the mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other. . . . The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought and consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. (T Appendix 20; SBN 635–36; my emphasis)

Anyhow, Hume does not reject the bundle-theory of the self (“The present philosophy, therefore, so far has a promising aspect”). Thus, he has no reason either to reject the vague proto-bundle of the vulgar, which I have argued is the idea of self at work in sympathy.

6. Conclusion

None of the passages providing inspiration for a two-ideas interpretation of Hume is difficult to explain assuming just one idea of self, that is, “that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self” (T 2.1.2.3; SBN 277). And I believe that this way of reading Hume’s Treatise makes for a higher degree of coherence than does any reading attributing two ideas of self to Hume.

NOTES

I am very grateful for helpful suggestions made by anonymous reviewers and the editors of this journal.


2 The idea of self as the bundle is problematic to Hume, because the perceptions constituting the bundle are connected to each other by the relations of resemblance and causation, and not by identity. The identity of the bundle is thus fictitious (T 1.4.6.15; SBN 259). References to Hume’s text will be made according to the convention “T” for Treatise followed by the number of the Book, part, section, and paragraph as given in A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). References to pages (“SBN”) are made to A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).


5 Actually, Ainslie poses six questions, but the last one concerns Hume’s worries in the “Appendix,” which I discuss under a special heading.

6 Baier suggests that the perceptions in the bundle are connected to one another, because of the relations or ties of vivacity between them, and discusses why Hume does not want to accept or cannot recognize that. “[Hume] is wrong in thinking his solid principle licensed him to ‘loosen’ the perceptions in a person’s bundle in such a way as to deny vivacity ties between them. When earlier perceptions determine both the content and vivacity of later perceptions, then they no longer, as existences, can be called distinct and independent of each other. They are really connected. Why does he deny this?” Baier, Death and Character: Further Reflections on Hume (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 174–75.

7 The first property is the association of ideas.

8 The “relations of ideas” are resemblance, causation, and, of course, contiguity. But Hume thinks the latter relation is irrelevant when explaining our sense of identity and simplicity among the perceptions (T 1.4.6.17; SBN 260). Since we have not “the most distant notion of the place, where” our perceptions occur, contiguity in space is irrelevant (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 253). And when one perception produces another by association we have contiguity in time, hence that relation is rather an effect of association, than a particular kind of association.

9 Some authors, for instance Rorty, “‘Pride Produces the Idea of Self?’” suggest that the idea of self produced by pride and humility is the second idea of self, the idea of self as an embodied social being. Then they have to explain how pride, which presupposes the idea of self, might produce the very same idea, viz. the type-idea of the embodied social person. If we attribute two ideas of self to Hume, the cause of pride ought to be something closely related to the self in the sense of the embodied social person, not in the sense of the metaphysical self of Book 1. Chazan, “Pride, Virtue, and Self-Hood” tries to solve this problem.

11 Jane L. McIntyre, “Personal Identity and the Passions,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27.4 (1989): 545–57, gives a similar reading of this passage, though her focus is on how we come to recognize our actions as *ours* (557).


13 Hume *is* a little messy on this point, I agree. But that is not reason enough for ascribing to him an intentional or semi-intentional second idea of self.

14 In “Of the causes of beliefs,” Hume explains that an idea of a forgotten impression is considered not “as the representation of any absent object, but as a real perception in the mind” and thus it is “able to bestow on whatever is related to it . . . the same *vivacity*, with which the mind reflects upon it, and is assur’d of its present existence” (T 1.3.9.15; SBN 115). Maybe the same goes for the idea of self, although that idea is not the idea of any forgotten impression?
