

## ERRATA

Corrections to G. Streminger, "Hume's Theory of Imagination", Vol. VI No. 2, page 101

Delete paragraph beginning:

Given that the future....

Insert:

Given that the future has so far always resembled the past, would it not nonetheless be possible to maintain that the thesis of the uniformity of nature is more probable than its negation? Hume advances another argument which is crucial for interpreting his analysis of causation as a pyrrhonic argument. He demonstrates that past experiences cannot justify the probability of predictions, since the inference: 'the future has resembled the past so far, therefore the future resembles the past' is also circular. We justify the conclusion by presupposing its justification. For the micro-structure of this inference is as follows: 'the future has resembled the past so far, and since the future is like the past, the future will resemble the past'. The conclusion can only be obtained with the help of this second premise. In inductively justifying the inductive principle we justify it by presupposing its previous justification.

Insert footnote:

11. The topics of this article are further developed in E. Topitsch/G. Streminger, Hume, Darmstadt 1981".