

Hume on the 'Distinction of Reason'
Harry M. Bracken
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HUME ON THE 'DISTINCTION OF REASON'*

In a 1959 paper, Richard H. Popkin[1] propounded what was then taken to be a most extraordinary thesis: Hume may never have read Berkeley. Popkin's paper marks the end of one of the stranger stories in the history of philosophy, the relationship of the British Empiricists -- Locke, Berkeley, Hume -- to one another. The thesis was hardly news either to Berkeley or Hume scholars because for several decades in careful studies of the historical contexts and sources they had relied less and less on any theory about significant common themes. In this paper I rehearse the arguments against the "partnership" doctrine and then turn to some ways in which Berkeley and Hume differ over abstractionism and the 'distinction of reason'. Finally, I discuss George Davie's suggestion that this 'distinction' may belong to a very different side of Hume's thought.

The linking of Locke with Berkeley is not a feature of early commentary on Berkeley. Berkeley was seen by his contemporaries as a product of Pierre Bayle's scepticism or of Malebranche's immaterialism.[2] The work of A.A. Luce, and to a lesser extent, of T.E. Jessop,[3] seeks to restore Berkeley to a place in those traditions and to reduce his indebtedness to Locke. The work of Hume scholars from Kemp Smith to Ardal, Davie, Norton, and Popkin[4] all places Hume outside the direct Berkeley line.

So far as the traditional epistemological picture was concerned, there was not enough internal evidence to support a Hume-Berkeley connection. The argument took a different turn when a new Hume letter came to light. Hume's letter to Michael Ramsay from Orleans is dated August 31, 1737.

> I desire of you, if you have Leizure, to read over La Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche, the Principles of

> Human Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the more metaphysical Articles of Bailes Dictionary; such as those /...of/ Zeno, & Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations wou'd also be useful....[5]

In 1973, Michael Morrisroe, Jr., surveyed the contributions of Wiener, Popkin, Mossner, Hall, Flew, and Conroy to the debate. Morrisroe takes the several Hume references to Berkeley as internal evidence that Hume read Berkeley. He then prints a new Hume letter to Michael Ramsay, dated "Rheims. Sep^{t}. 29 1734. N.S." A ten sentence letter, the eighth reads: "It is my Pleasure to read over again today Locke's Essays and the Principles of Human Knowledge by Dr. Berkeley which are printed in their original state and in French copy." Morrisroe explains in a footnote that he was granted permission to make a typescript of the letter, that it was sold at auction, and that its "present location ... is unknown." In addition, he thanks six graduate students: "Without their attention to bibliogaphical detail this letter might not have been made ready for publication until much later."[6] But the bibliographical detail does not include telling us whether he saw the original or how the Hume authorship was established; nor does it include speculation on what Hume means in that eighth sentence. Did Hume find one book containing Locke and Berkeley in French and in English which he then read in one day? A bilingual Locke plus a bilingual Berkeley? Or can he mean an edition of Locke's Essay in French and an edition of Berkeley's Principles in English? That seems to be the least likely interpretation, unless the reference to Berkeley is a mere parenthetical afterthought, and Hume had his hands on Locke in English and French plus an English edition of Berkeley. Whatever this letter means, we know that Locke's Essay was available in Pierre Coste's translation.

Berkeley is another story.[7] The Principles appeared in 1710. A revised edition, together with the Three Dialogues (also revised) was published in 1734. The first French edition appears to have been in 1889. The Three Dialogues first appeared in 1713 and the first French translation in 1750. The New Theory of Vision, first published in 1709, appeared together with the first edition of Alciphron in 1732. French translations appeared together in 1734. In any case, it can be granted, if only on the basis of the 1737 letter, that -- as Popkin granted in 1964 -- Hume read Berkeley. That the issue is resolved on the basis of external evidence indicates how completely the linkage between Locke, Berkeley and Hume has been destroyed.

Popkin's suggestion that Hume may not have read Berkeley was in part generated by the failure to find any satisfactory internal evidence to support the "partnership" claim. "No doctrine of Berkeley's is used by Hume to establish any of his own views."[8] It had often struck Hume students that Hume had remarkably little to say about Berkeley. For example, he never quotes Berkeley. The reference which probably is most often used to justify the Hume-Berkeley link is in the opening paragraph of the Treatise, Bk I, Pt I, § vii, on abstract ideas:

> As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries (i.e by Dr. Berkeley) that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy. (T17)

Hume, of course, does not confirm Berkeley's 'discovery'. Perhaps, as Popkin and I suggested, Hume picked up the ideas from reading Ephraim Chambers' Cyclopedia, article 'Abstraction'. In any case, despite his remarks on 'distinctions of reason' at the

end of the section,[9] Hume seems to think that his opposition to abstract ideas is compatible with, or perhaps even indistiguishable from, his own central doctrine: "Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination." (T, Green & Grose, 558; Mossner ed. 676) "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10)

Berkeley uses his anti-abstract idea principle when he argues that he cannot "distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived." (Pr § 5) And at Pr § 10 he argues that the anti-abstract idea principle precludes our conceiving "the extension and motion of a body, without all other sensible qualities.... In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all the sensible qualities, are inconceivable." To separate colour from extension is held to be a violation of his anti-abstraction principle in Three Dialogues (e.g. Works II, 194). Extension and colour are "inseparably united"; "It is impossible ever for the mind to disunite" them. (Pr § 10). If Hume is spinning out an idea he gets from Berkeley, it should be noted that he moves in a very different direction -- and he makes no effort to explain why Berkeley is wrong. As discussed below, the very things Berkeley finds "inseparably united" Hume proceeds to separate, e.g. colour and extension.

A second area where Hume seems totally unaware of Berkeley's position is the mind. The anti-abstractionism which lies behind Berkeley's relating colour and extension carries over into other sorts of necessary connections. Locke and Hume both deny that any metaphysical cement binds the qualities of a thing to one another or to the substance in which they inhere. Berkeley, on the other hand, gives an extended

defense of mental substance in the Principles and Three Dialogues; he gives a very detailed explanation of why mental substances can be said to exist although we have no ideas of them (e.g. II, 232 f.) But most interesting, Berkeley says that he chose the word idea, "because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term." (II, 235-6.) In brief, we have another case where a topic, mental substance, is discussed at great length by Hume without the least hint that he is aware of Berkeley's arguments. On the crucial question of our knowledge of mental substance, Reid, who did read Berkeley, writes: "The whole of Bishop Berkeley's system depends upon the distinction between notions and ideas."[10] Yet Hume has nothing to say even on this aspect of the topic.[11]

There is a third area where Hume does not follow Berkeley: scepticism. Admittedly, there is a relevant remark in Hume's text. At the end of Sect. XII, Part I of the Enquiry, Hume comments on the problem of conceiving a "triangle in general" and then comments on the "absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas." The famous footnote reads in part:

> This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted ... his arguments ... admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism. (EHS 155)

The bon mot is well known, but Hume does not discuss Berkeley's analysis of scepticism, or his diagnosis of the "very root of scepticism" (Pr § 86) or his attempt to refute it via esse is percipi. The

closest Hume comes to Berkeley is in his discussion of divisibility themes. But the context is clearly Bayle's Dictionnaire, article Zenon.

Pierre Bayle writes: "Here is what Zeno could have put forth. Extension cannot be made up of either mathematical points, atoms, or particles that are divisible to infinity; therefore its existence is impossible."[12] Thereupon follow delightful but devastating analyses of the mathematical continuum, atoms (indivisible), and infinitely divisible particles. Both Berkeley and Hume take seriously Bayle's formulation of these problems, but they resolve them in different ways. My view is that the account of minima sensibilia which Hume advances is so different from Berkeley's that one is entitled to question whether Hume read Berkeley with any care.

Berkeley's minima visibilia thesis seems to start from Locke's saying that if one takes the retina as the center of a circle, then a minimum visible subtends an arc of from thirty seconds to one minute.[13] Neither the distance of an object from a perceiver nor his visual acuity is a relevant consideration. In talking about minima visibilia, Berkeley is talking about the threshold of visual acuity. ["For, whatever may be said of extension in abstract, it is certain sensible extension is not infinitely divisible." NTV § 54. "For any object to contain several distinct visible parts, and at the same time to be a minimum visibile, is a manifest contradiction." NTV § 81.] They are crucial to his dissolution of Zeno's paradoxes. Berkeley takes minima visibilia as coloured atoms. Of course they are atoms of our experience; they are not material atoms. For both Descartes and Bayle an atom is a contradictory thing. It is at once a particle of determinate size, hence divisible, while also being said to be indivisible. However, Berkeley's

minima visibilia atoms are the bedrock of visual experience. They cannot be divided because if one tries to divide one it ceases to exist. They are also the foundation of Berkeley's account of extension. The key to Berkeley's immaterialist option is his considering extension a sensation, a sensation on a par with all other sensations. (Cf. PC 18)

Berkeley discusses minima visibilia at NTV §§ 80-86, Principles § 132. He discusses divisibility at Principles §§ 123 f. At NTV § 130 he denies that it is "possible for [one] to frame in his mind a distinct abstract idea of visible extension of figure exclusive of all colour: [or to] conceive colour without visible extension." At Principles § 10 he writes that "extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable." That inseparability claim is made as part of his attack (in § 10) on the primary/secondary quality distinction. There are also a number of relevant entries in Berkeley's notebooks, the Philosophical Commentaries; for example, entry 258: "Diagonal of particular square commensurable wth. its side they both containing a certain number of M:V:" At entry 273 he asks "whether a M.V, or T. be extended." At entry 276 he says: "It seems all lines can't be bisected in 2 equall parts...." That is, it seems that a line of an unequal number of minima could not be divided equally. Hence each minimum visibile is extended. (Cf. Luce's remarks on entries 58, 59.) In brief, I take Berkeley's remarks both about colour and extension and about minima visibilia being coloured extensions to be clear.[14]

Concerning Hume's doctrine of the relation of colour and extension, Norman Kemp Smith[15] writes: "Extension is the manner or mode of arrangement in which unextended sensibilia appear to the mind." (Phil. D.H. p. 297) He adds that Hume seems to be

saying that "two unextended sensibles, if contiguous, will generate what is genuinely extended!" (300) In other words, at Treatise Bk. I, Pt. II, Hume adopts a position radically different from Berkeley. Whereas Berkeley employs his anti-abstractionism to oppose the separation of colour and extension, Hume employs his own favorite principle: "Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination." (Green & Grose 558) Thus one can have unextended colour. (Cf. end of I, II, § iii; Green & Grose, 345. At p. 344, the idea of extension is a compound.)

Bayle may be the common source for the efforts of Berkeley and Hume to analyse problems of divisibility, penetration of dimensions, etc., but the fact is that Hume pursues a very different line from that articulated by Berkeley on a topic which clearly fascinated him.

Cutting across several of these issues is the question of abstract ideas. It is, I believe, what accounts for Berkeley and Hume taking such different lines with respect to minima sensibilia. "So far I will not deny I can abstract," writes Berkeley at Principles § 5, "if that may properly be called abstraction, which extends only to conceiving separately such objects, as it may be possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder." Reid, as Julius Weinberg[16] notes, understands this anti-abstractionism to be in conflict with Berkeley's willingness to talk about being able to consider[17] "'a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract.'" Weinberg goes on to argue (39-40) that Hume's talk about 'distinction of reason' is an analogous conflict with his 'distinguishable-separable' principle.

There may be no evidence that Hume, even when discussing abstract ideas, had Berkeley's actual views in mind, but abstractionism does offer us a way of looking at a fundamental difference between Berkeley, Reid, and Reid's students, versus Hume. I take abstractionism to be a thesis about concept formation. Cartesian rationalism can be seen as a clear rejection of abstractionism. Descartes and his followers find scholastic discussions of abstraction fail to provide a satisfactory basis for the objectivity of human knowledge, and so they appeal to rationalist (innate) structures to provide the requisite concepts. In this respect, the epistemology has some connection with the theory of human nature to which Berkeley subscribes. The language metaphor which Berkeley employs makes the point. We cannot abstract the 'meaning' of a 'word' from an examination of its constituent 'letters'. A category difference is involved. Berkeley never spells out the contrast between our awareness of what God is 'saying' in colours and our learning what He 'means'. This is what Berkeley's brief mentions of archetypes and notions may do for his theory, i.e., a domain for the category of 'meaning,' 'concept' or 'archetype' in contrast to the 'words' God speaks via sense-data. Not without reason did an early critic speak of him as a Malebranchiste de bonne foi (Mémoires de Trévoux, Mai 1713, p. 921).

In this respect, Berkeley belongs in the Cartesian tradition.[18] Indeed, anti-abstractionism goes hand in hand with occasionalism. That is, occasionalism can be interpreted as the claim that we have no insight into such questions as how the mind is 'about' the world, or how language is. In other words, occasionalism can be read as the denial that we have produced a real world semantics. In summary, it is clear that Berkeley and Hume hold very different views

about a variety of subjects. As for the Hume-Berkeley connection, I think it best to grant that the Scottish philosophical world in which Hume was educated was knowledgeable about Berkeley's philosophy and that Hume came to appreciate a number of philosophical issues in that environment.[19]

In his paper to the Hume Society (Dublin, 1981) George Davie calls attention to complex and fundamental differences between Berkeley and Reid on the one side and Hume on the other concerning the nature of abstraction. He holds that for Berkeley, colour and extension, although perceptually inseparable, can nevertheless be considered separately by shifts of attention whereas Hume introduces 'distinctions of reason' which enable us to distinguish between inseparables by way of an elaborate set of comparisons. Hence there is an unresolved tension between "distinction of reason" and "what is distinguishable is separable". Perhaps Hume advances the 'distinction of reason' thesis despite not having produced accounts of such relations as resemblance or spatial comparisons, because he is prepared (in Bk. I, Pt. iv) to introduce a fascinating doctrine about the creative imagination. As George Davie notes, Christopher Salmon talked about this in his influential The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.[20] I assume that properly developed, the creative imagination provides the source for the relations which must ground the resemblances required for saving distinctions of reason from the separability principle. If I am correct, the creative imagination, by doing the effective work of a traditional substance doctrine, supplies the base for 'distinctions of reason'. But it does so at the price of undermining the separability principle. It does that by imposing constraints on what can be. The most basic

constituents of experience must be structured; they are not "simples".

I have discussed some details of the abstraction issue for several reasons. First, because I remain convinced that Hume's account, particularly in reference to minima, differs profoundly from Berkeley's. Second, I believe that Reid and his followers are basically correct in seeing Hume's anti-abstractionism as part of a materialist and behaviorist theory of human nature. In an important sense, Hume advances a revised abstractionism in seeking to take the meaning of a word as its referent. That is, Hume generally seems committed, through his theory of impressions and ideas, to a referential theory of meaning, just as in his variant of abstractionism, we are said to acquire our concepts by turning to our senses. A dubious theory of meaning thus supports a dubious theory of concept formation -- and vice versa. Third, I believe that Davie is suggesting that there is another side to Hume's views on abstraction -- a side connected with his discussion of the 'principle of individuation' in Bk. I, Pt. IV, § 2.

Hume's discussion of 'distinction of reason' runs into difficulty because he has already ruled out the possibility of any distinction which is not a real distinction. "Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation." (T 2; Green & Grose 312) Hume may not see the conflict with his distinguishable-separable dogma because he is operating with two disparate accounts of the things being distinguished. As is clear in the history of nominalism, a radically reductive experiential atom seems to leave us trapped in a momentary experience unless we admit, contrary to dogma, resemblance. Hume does not appear to want the non-nominalist option of universals in things or to

attribute a universalizing capacity to minds in order to meet this difficulty. It is at Bk. I, Pt. IV, § 2 that we find one answer to Hume's questions about the coherence of our experience.

> In order to justify this system, there are four things requisite. First, To explain the principium individuationis, or principle of identity. Secondly, Give a reason, why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them. Thirdly, Account for that propensity, which this illusion gives, to unite these broken appearances by a continu'd existence. Fourthly and lastly, Explain that force and vivacity of conception, which arises from the propensity. (Green & Grose 489)

'Distinction of reason'[21] and 'principle of individuation' are both scholastic terms. They both presuppose some sort of substance or continuant doctrine. They both presuppose a doctrine which Hume must reject in terms of 'distinguishable-separable'. Christopher Salmon argues that in Bk. I, Pt. iv, Hume is breaking new ground. Hume is relying on the 'creative imagination' to 'construct' the identity of objects. In that fashion, Hume is rejecting his experiential atomism and offering a very different characterization of how our experience is bound together. He is not opting for a return to identity as a product of material substance. The failure of that route is clear to Hume. He is suggesting something, as Husserl realized, new and revolutionary. He appears to be anticipating the intentionality doctrines of Brentano and Husserl. And yet, as Salmon explains, Hume develops his new doctrine about the constructions of the imagination only to undermine it with sceptical arguments. Similarly with 'distinction of reason' talk. 'Distinction of reason' can be made intelligible

when one operates with the 'constructed continuants' of Bk. I, Pt. iv. Davie's suggestion can be put this way: the reason Hume found it easy to use 'distinction of reason' in Pt. i, is that it fits with the identity thesis elaborated in greater detail in Pt. iv. Or to be more precise, it fits with the phenomenological analysis of the principium individuationis which Salmon uncovers in Pt. iv.

Davie takes the Scottish Enlightenment to be driven by varying characterizations of the tension between the solitary and the social.[22] The Scots persisted well into the nineteenth century in believing that, although a commercial culture would seem to favor education with ever increasing specialization, it was essential that philosophy be accorded a central role. In that way atomisation and alienation, seen as by-products of specialization, might be overcome. And of course two very different doctrines of human nature are involved. Education 'creates' us if we are totally plastic; or it can encourage or inhibit natural propensities if we are already 'equipped' with common natures.

Davie has argued that the solitary/social tension which shows itself in the whole sweep of Scottish Enlightenment thought also bears directly on Hume.[23] Thus Davie argues that Hume struggles with an account of how we can reflect on our own behavior. The Treatise position seems to be that in self-observation we, in effect, must "see ourselves as others see us". The doctrine of sympathy which is essential to our 'seeing' the responses of others to our own conduct is weakened by Hume's insistence that "one cannot ... form the idea of another person's emotion unless one has had the corresponding impression."[24] However, the account

of mirroring is richer in the Dissertation on the Passions. Davie writes:

> In speaking of other people as providing *oneself* with a *mirror*, Hume is claiming that, by drawing attention to aspects of one's bodily behaviour and expressiveness incapable of being observed by oneself, one's experience of the others' reactions to oneself disabuses one of the idea, rooted in the natural limitations of self-observation that one has a privileged status in the world as compared with other people. One thereby, according to Hume, makes the vital discovery that one is as separable as are other people from a world which can get on perfectly well without us. (14. See footnote 23)

Davie's point is that Hume takes the mirroring analogy seriously. At the very least it is his way of casting light on the growth of self-understanding. That much is given by learning to "see ourselves as others see us". But mirroring also casts light on human communication. And that is essential to Hume's position because Davie takes the Hume/Reid (Berkeley) argument over abstraction and the distinction of reason to be an argument over the possibility of human interaction and communication. Communication requires that we achieve a measure of distance from ourselves. Davie finds that in Hume's revised use of mirroring, the Dissertation version, the required objectivity is given. Sympathy, in brief, functions without comparison (the natural relation) and with comparison (the philosophical relation).

And yet when all is said and done, although Hume's revisions earn him our respect as an insightful commentator on the structures of our self-understanding and self-awareness, it is the distinction of reason issue that finally fails him in Reid's eyes. One may think of Reid as a philosophical rustic next to Hume, yet I think Reid correctly sees that one cannot use

'distinction of reason' without a much enriched account. Davie, on the other hand, discerns that richer account in the mirror analogy. Instead of the behaviorist account of the self and what amounts to a materialistic conception of mind, there are signs of the sorts of phenomenological description of object identity Salmon finds in Hume.

The risk in using 'distinction of reason' in talking about inseparable dualities is that we may not achieve that distance, that objectivity, that capacity to see ourselves as others see us, which Hume takes as essential to his account of knowledge and communication. Despite his other doctrine, 'distinguishable-separable', Hume appeals to distinction of reason when talking about such inseparable dualisms as mind and body. Indeed, that is the only way he can keep them inseparable. But that raises a difficulty about objectivity. Objectivity seems to require a <u>real</u> distinction. Reid, Beattie and Ramsay take mind and body to be <u>really</u> distinct. Hume's difficulty is not only generated by tension with the distinguishable-separable principle (which led Ockham to reject distinctions of reason). On the straightforward reading, distinctions of reason, insofar as they can be made intelligible, seem to be based on accidents of our social order, on structures provided by our particular civilizations. Hume seems to appreciate that. Indeed, that is why it is plausible to see Hume hinting at the sort of alternative developed, albeit in a preliminary way, in Pt. IV.

In his dissertation [26] Davie carefully explores (among other things) the rich complexity of Hume's studies of points and lines, space and colour.[27] Reid approaches this framework with a very simple scheme. His alternative may be inadequate, but I think his doubts about distinctions of reason are, <u>prima facie</u>,

well-founded. However, over the years we have come to understand something about how Hume envisioned the complex and highly structured instinctive domain of human passions and feelings. Salmon's work marked a first step in a different direction. In reminding us of the central role played by distinctions of reason in Hume's philosophy, Davie is, in turn, opening up the possibility that the presuppositions for the intelligibility of Hume's 'distinction of reason' are precisely those which emerge in Salmon's account of 'principle of individuation'. In addition, Davie is suggesting that Hume's appeal to the mirror analogy in the Dissertation on the Passions contains the core of a non-behaviorist account of the other. Finally, although Davie does not say this, I take it that he finds Hume's revised doctrine of the other to be a first step in the direction of those phenomenological analyses which have come from Husserl's students.

Harry M. Bracken
McGill University

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1. In the Journal of Philosophy, LVI (1959), 535-45. Reprinted in his The High Road to Pyrrhonism, eds. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force. (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1980).

2. See my Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism: 1710-1733. Rev. ed.; (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).

3. The Works of George Berkeley, (9 vols; London: Thomas Nelson, 1948-57) eds. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop. See also T.E. Jessop, A Bibliography of George Berkeley, (Rev. ed.; Den haag, 1973).

4. Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, (London: Macmillan, 1941). Pall Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966). George E. Davie, "Berkeley, Hume, and the Central Problem of Scottish Philosophy," in McGill Hume Studies, eds. D.F. Norton, N. Capaldi, and W.L. Robison. (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979), 43-62. David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). Richard H. Popkin, the several Hume papers in The High Road to Pyrrhonism (op. cit.)

5. Printed in "So, Hume did Read Berkeley," Journal of Philosophy, LXI (1964), 773-778. Reprinted in High Road... 289-295.

6. M. Morrisroe, Jr., "Did Hume Read Berkeley? A Conclusive Answer," Philological Quarterly, LII (1973), 310-315. Cf. 314-5.

7. Cf. Jessop, Bibliography of George Berkeley.

8. High Road... p. 294.

9. "For it follows from thence (distinguishable = separable), that if the figure be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as well as distinguishable; if they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor distinguishable. What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation.

...'Tis certain that the mind wou'd never have dream'd of distinguishing a figure from the body figur'd, as being in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, nor separable; did it not observe, that even in this simplicity there might be contain'd many different resemblances and relations. Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos'd in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seem'd, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason; that is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they are in effect the same and

undistinguishable; but still view them in different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible." (T, Green & Grose, 332-3)

10. Thomas Reid, Essay II, ch. xi of Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. W. Hamilton, 2 vols. 8th ed. (Edinburgh: James Thin, 1895) I, 289.

11. As Kemp Smith also noted. PDH, p. 257n. See also my "Bayle, Berkeley, and Hume," Eighteenth Century Studies, XI (1977-78) 227-245.

12. Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, ed. & trans. R.H. Popkin, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p. 359. Article Zeno of Elea, rem. B.

13. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. xv, § 9. See also Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries, entry 175, in Works I or in the edition of PC by George H. Thomas (Alliance, Ohio: Mt. Union College, 1976).

14. In "Minima Sensibilia in Berkeley and Hume," Dialogue, XIX (1980), 196-200, David Raynor disputes this interpretation. He argues that Berkeley regards minima as extensionless. He cites a passage from Alciphron:

> EUPHRANOR: Tell me, Alciphron, is not distance a line turned endwise to the eye? ALCIPHRON: Doubtless. EUPHRANOR: And can a line, in that situation, project more than one single point on the bottom of the eye? ALCIPHRON: It cannot. EUPHRANOR: Therefore the appearance of a long and of a short distance is of the same magniture, or rather of no magnitude at all, being in all cases one single point. (Dial. IV, § 8. Works III, p. 150. Raynor's emphasis.)

Berkeley also talks about distance as a line turned endwise to the eye at NTV § 2. It is part of his thesis about the differences between the data of sight and touch spelled out in NTV, and still held in Alciphron. The magnitude Berkeley is referring to is the measure in the third dimension which is not given visually.

15. But see Antony Flew, "Infinite Divisibility in Hume's Treatise," in Hume: A re-evaluation, eds. Donald W. Livingston and James T. King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976) 257-269.

16. Julius R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965).

17. 'Consider' is a technical scholastic term, as in 'considerability'. They are used, for example, by Locke critic John Sergeant (mentioned by Berkeley in PC 840).

18. See my Berkeley (London: Macmillan, 1974).

19. Cf. George E. Davie, "Hume and the Origins of the Common Sense School," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, No. 20 (1952), 1-9; and "Berkeley's Impact on Scottish Philosophy," Philosophy, XL (1965), 221-234.

20. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, ed. Edmund Husserl (Halle: Max Niemeyer, X (1929)) 299-449.

21. Cf. Francisco Suarez, Disputaciones Metafisicas, Disp. VII, esp. §§ 1, 2.

22. In The Social Significance of the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, The Dow Lecture, University of Dundee, 1973 (Edinburgh: T. & A. Constable). See also his The Scottish Enlightenment, General Series 99 (London: The Historical Association, 1981).

23. For example, in his (unpublished) Hume Society Lecture (Dublin, 1981):

> Properly understood, says Salmon, the Humeian method of philosophy is summed up in the final chapter of Treatise, Book 1, in the movement from a solitary preoccupation with ideas and impressions to the sociability of the backgammon table, and the return thence to the study to resume the solitary struggle with impressions and ideas as applied to a fresh range of questions. No doubt the two stand-points, solitary and social, are not easily reconcilable, but it is in their tension, according to Hume, that the problem of philosophy lies. Ryle's social notion of philosophy as a kind of public dialogue is just as one-sided as the cartesian notion of philosophy as a solitary meditation. (4)

24. Páll Ardal, op. cit. p. 45.

25. Davie cites Dissertation II, 10. He also cites Enquiries 186, 225. In "Edmund Husserl and 'the as yet, in its most important respect, unrecognised greatness of Hume'", David Hume: Bicentenary Papers, ed. G.P. Morice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977) Davie writes that "if we want to get the most out of Hume, we must remember we are dealing with a man who to some extent hides his light...: (p. 69)

26. The Scotch Metaphysics. Edinburgh, 1953, unpub.

27. See also his remarks in "Berkeley, Hume, and the Central Problem of Scottish Philosophy," in op. cit. esp. pp. 46-47.