



Hume's Cognitive Stoicism

Fred Wilson

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HUME'S COGNITIVE STOICISM

Several writers¹ have emphasized the role in Hume's ethics of belief of the principle that must implies ought - the converse of ought implies can²: we must make causal inferences, and therefore, contrary to the Cartesian ethics of belief, we ought to do so, that is, it is the reasonable way to conduct our mental life.³

If we let 'N' represent necessity and 'O' obligatoriness, then the must implies ought principle can be symbolized as

$$(1) \quad Np \supset Op$$

Hintikka⁴ has wondered whether this principle should be accepted -- indeed, he wonders whether ought implies can should be accepted -- but he is prepared to defend the thesis.

$$(2) \quad O(Np \supset Op)$$

that it ought to be the case that must implies ought. Without going into the issue of whether (1) is defensible, I propose in this note to suggest a Humean defence of (2).

(I) On "Ought"

For Hume, 'ought' (a) expresses an impulse that tends to move the will and also (b) tends to elicit in others the same impulse. The affinity to emotivism is clear enough -- indeed, for many purposes it is important to emphasize this emotivism -- but at the same time it is in its background psychology and social psychology infinitely more sophisticated than the crude hedonism of Stevenson.⁵

As for (a), Hume makes this clear in his argument with the rationalists who would derive an "ought" by a priori reasoning, i.e., comparing ideas alone.⁶ The thrust of the argument is that belief by

itself does not move the will, but moral judgments do move the will; they therefore cannot be derived from reason alone: "Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent action. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."⁷ Since moral judgments are not relations of ideas, they are perceptions or impressions: "Morality ... is more properly felt than judg'd of..." (T 470). As for what kind of impression, Hume proceeds immediately to the conclusion that since they must be motivating, they cannot fall on the side of "sensations" but on the side of "passions and emotions," to use the classification with which the Treatise opens (T 1): "...we ... must pronounce the impression arising from virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy" (T 470).

Moral judgments are not, however, just any expression of a pro or con attitude. They more specifically express a disinterested point of view, one that we can share with others.

In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable.... But these variations we regard not in our general decisions.... Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable.... Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses; and indeed 'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present situation (T 582, emphasis added; cf. T 603).

Both stable thought for an individual person and communication with others require that moral language be used to reflect a general, or disinterested point of view.⁸ The imperative force of moral language does not

lie simply in the emotive meaning of the word 'good,' its capacity to function as a general re-inforcer, as Stevenson held,⁹ but rather because when one "bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he ... expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him" (EPM 272; cf. EPM 228-9; T 582-3, 591). Moral language is used by speakers and is expected by listeners to express a disinterested point of view, and it is this that gives moral language its peculiar motivating power.

Nonetheless, once this is said, it remains true that moral language -- "ought" -- is inseparable from motivation, both in its function of expressing one's own sentiments and in its function of eliciting the same sentiment in others.

(II) On Pride

Suppose, now, that we wished so to organize our moral discourse that we did not accept the must implies ought principle (1). In that case we would have both

Np

and either

O ~ p

or

P ~ p

where 'P' represents permission and is connected to obligatoriness by the rule

Op ≡ ~ P ~ p

Hume encountered a situation like this in his own life.

The Treatise is pervaded by the spirit of Cicero.¹⁰ In particular, the picture of human virtues and vices is the humane one of the pagans rather than that of the stern Calvinism of the Whole Duty of Man.¹¹ As Hume observed to Francis Hutcheson, "I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from Cicero's Offices, not

from the Whole Duty of Man."¹² Nor was this merely theoretical; Hume actively cultivated the sentiments he discovered in the ancients. As he wrote in a letter to Dr. Cheyne, he was as an earnest young student so captivated by the "beautiful Representations of Virtue & Philosophy" that he found in Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch, that he "undertook the Improvement of my Temper & Will, along with my Reason & Understanding. I was continually fortifying myself with Reflections against Death, & Poverty, & Shame, & Pain, & all the other Calamities of Life."¹³

This classical programme of soul-testing and character building may be contrasted with an earlier attempt of his at living according to the precepts of the Whole Duty of Man. This popular Calvinist work condemns many sins, and among these is pride. We should take no pride in the "Goods of Nature" by which is meant "beauty, strength, wit, and the like; and the being proud of any of these is a huge folly."¹⁴ It is folly, first, because we are liable to err in thinking ourselves handsome or witty when we are not; second, because there is little in them worth being proud of, since animals have most of these endowments too; and third, because, even if we have them, they are easily lost and impaired as a frenzy will destroy wit and sickness beauty. It is equally folly to be proud of the "goods of fortune," e.g., wealth or honour, or to be proud of the "goods of grace," that is, any virtue a man has.¹⁵

Having shewed you thus much of this sin [of pride], I suppose it will appear very necessary to be eschewed; to which purpose it will be useful to consider what hath been already said concerning it, and that so seriously as may work in thee not some slight dislike, but a deep and irrecncilable hatred of the sin: secondly, to be very watchful over thine own heart, that it cherish

not any beginnings of it; never suffer it to feed on the fancy of thine own worth, but whenever any such thought arises, beat it down immediately with the remembrance of some of thy follies or sins, and so make this very motion of pride an occasion of humility. Thirdly, never to compare thyself with those thou thinkest more foolish or wicked than thyself, that so thou mayest like the Pharisee, Luke xviii. 11, extol thyself for being better; but if thou wilt compare, do it with the Wise and Godly; and then thou wilt find thou comest so far short as may help pull down thy high esteem of thyself. Lastly, to be very earnest in prayer, that God would root out all degrees of this sin in thee, and make thee one of those poor in spirit, Matt. v. 3. to whom the blessing even of Heaven itself is promised.¹⁶

In Hume's own words, he was "religious when he was young."¹⁷ As part of his acceptance of the Kirk and its Calvinism, the young Hume was attracted to the task of soul-searching and soul-building. He did this to the extent, he relates from the perspective of age 65, that he abstracted from the Whole Duty of Man a list of the vices therein catalogued, and of testing his character against them, "leaving out Murder and Theft and such vices as he had no chance of committing, having no inclination to commit them." This, he recalled, "was strange Work; for instance, to try if, notwithstanding his excelling his schoolfellows, he had no pride or vanity." Hume proceeded to give the reason why he thought the effort so foolish: "He smiled in ridicule of this as absurd and contrary to fixed principles and necessary consequences...."¹⁸ Excelling our schoolfellows is necessarily accompanied by pride, so it is foolish to try, as the Whole Duty of Man requires one to try, to cease feeling pride.

Hume explains in detail in the Treatise why the attempt to eliminate pride is so odd. There he argues

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that the passion of pride (or humility), on being excited, leads the mind by "an original quality or primary impulse" to the idea of self.

Unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, it cou'd never have any secondary ones; because in that case it wou'd have no foundation for action, nor cou'd ever begin to exert itself. Now these qualities, which we must consider as original, are such as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolv'd into no other: And such is the quality, which determines the object of pride and humility (T 280).

This object is the self; that is, the qualities which excite pride are either (i) some valuable quality belonging to the self, e.g., wit, courage, justice, learning, or (ii) some bodily endowments or dexterity belonging to the self, e.g., beauty, strength, or (iii) whatever is in the least allied or related to us, e.g., children, relations, houses, gardens, clothes, our country, and even our climate (T 279; cf. 306). That which is related to the self is the "cause" of the passion, the self is the "object" (T 278). The self is naturally and of necessity the object of pride, in the sense that, as a matter of (scientific) law, it is a universal and unlearned characteristic of humans that we are thus self-conscious.

...we must suppose, that nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign'd a certain idea, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce.... All this needs no proof. 'Tis evident we never shou'd be possess of that passion, were there not a disposition of the mind proper for it; and 'tis as evident, that the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances (T 287).

For this I pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality (T 286).

The causes of pride (and humility) are, of course, many and varied, often products of human art. These can't be consequences of nature; it can't be by an original quality of human nature that a craftsman takes pride in the production of the first piece of a new kind of furniture he has invented (T 281). Such an assumption would leave the science of human nature in a state comparable to that of astronomy prior to Copernicus (T 282). It is, rather, the laws of association that are basic (T 282-4), and these then account, via learning, for the variety of causes of pride (T 285ff).

These details are not our present concern. The point is that Hume argues that as a matter of lawful necessity men must feel pride and must refer this to themselves. Thus, the project of his youth, the project of the Whole Duty of Man, to eliminate pride is impossible to complete.

If "p" is the proposition that "David feels pride with respect of himself," then (argues the Treatise)

Np

while the young Hume and the Whole Duty of Man propose that

O ~ p

What is wrong with this, of course, is that in proposing a goal impossible to achieve one condemns oneself to the pain of unsatisfied desire.

One's interest consists in maximizing one's goods (T 418), that is, ultimately, maximizing one's pleasure, or, at least, the balance of pleasure over pain (T 574). One can achieve a higher maximum if one eliminates necessarily unsatisfiable desires, for then one will have eliminated the pain that would accompany

their non-fulfillment. Momentary passions, of course, often come into conflict. My passion to eat chili comes into conflict with my passion to avoid heart-burn: both cannot simultaneously be fulfilled, and thus, with respect to one at least, one must suffer the pain of unfulfilled desire. It is precisely this sort of conflict that leads us to develop general rules to tell us which of the possibly conflicting passions one should give up (T 581, 586). It is, of course, experience that tells us which rules are most conducive to our interest; on the basis of such experience we learn which ends we ought, in our own interest, to give up. The man who is concerned about his long term interest will not only adjust means to ends, but will adjust ends to means, and in particular, will eliminate as an end any goal that cannot be achieved.

Thus given our general interest in maximizing our pleasure, then it is reasonable, as a means to that end, so to adjust our goals that we never attempt to act contrary to what is necessary.¹⁹ Hence, if

Np

then we should never purpose that

$\sim p$;

it would be reasonable to do so. But, as we saw, for Hume the language of obligation is inseparable from the context of motives, goals and purposes. Hence, to say that we are never to purpose $\sim p$ means that we can have neither

$O \sim p$

nor

$P \sim p$

Or, more briefly, given our interest in our long run pleasure, the reasonable thing to do is to adjust our goals and, in parallel with that, our moral language, so that it satisfies

(3) $\sim [Np \& (O \sim p \vee P \sim p)]$

But (3) is logically equivalent to (1)

$$Np \supset Op^{20}$$

Since this is the must implies ought principle, what Hume has established is that it ought to be the case that must implies ought, i.e., he has established

(2)

$$O(Np \supset Op)$$

The moral sentiments and moral discourse of reasonable men conform to the must implies ought principle.

(III) On Belief

The first rule of the Cartesian method is this:

...to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it.²¹

Now, Hume argues that there are no objective necessary connections;²² logical atomism follows.²³ Furthermore, humans are not omniscient: in general, all we ever know is a sample, not the total population. Given logical atomism, that is the absence of any objective guarantee that what holds in the sample will hold in the population, it follows that any inference from sample to population will be hazardous and fallible, and therefore dubitable. The Cartesian ethics of belief condemns all causal inferences under these conditions as unreasonable: given logical atomism, limited experience, and the Cartesian ethics of belief, suspension of all causal inference is the only reasonable practice.

However, Hume also argues that each of us is subject to an irresistable impulse to make causal inferences. I must make causal inferences.

Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forebear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes toward them in broad sunshine (T 183).

Even if I try to live as a Cartesian, I cannot. An uncontrollable necessity leads me to make causal inferences, no matter how determined I am to forever suspend judgment. It is a felt necessity. It is instinct that prevents me from being a Cartesian. That is the way I am, that is the sort of person I am. But the Cartesian proposes absolute certainty as a cognitive goal. For him, it is instinct rather than reason that prevents me from being a Cartesian. For me to accept the Cartesian standard would be for me to attempt to reject what I cannot reject, to wonder about the rational acceptability of what I cannot but accept. I do, in a sense, not really believe what I cannot but believe. I do wonder about what I am unable to wonder about. I do this by wondering about my rationality. As I go about the business of living as I must, I reflect upon that way of life, and wonder about it: perhaps (T 264ff) it is all quite unreasonable?

Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning (T 265).

Not that such wonder really affects me:

...I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life (T 269).

Far from affecting me, what I am wondering about goes on as before, goes on as it must, in a way over which I

have no control. There is a divorce between instinct and sentiment, on the one hand, that leads me to live and to believe as I do, and reason, on the other, that leads me to wonder about the rationality of it all. But, now, as I go on living as I must, coping with the world in a way that is agreeable to instinct and to sentiment, I gradually come to separate causal beliefs upon which I can rely and those upon which I cannot rely.²⁴ What I discover soon enough is that, so far as concerns causal inference, others in the world are no different from myself: we are all controlled by this instinct determining us to make causal inferences.

...we learn, that this connexion, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that determination of the mind, which is acquir'd by custom, and causes us to make a transition from an object to its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the other.... (T 266).

I come to recognize the universality of the uncontrollable necessity that leads men to make causal inferences. I even come to assert the generality as a law. I even pursue it as a curious man:

At the time ... that I am tir'd with amusement and company, and have indulg'd a reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river-side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally inclin'd to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation (T 270).

I become uneasy about not knowing the principles I use to decide truth and falsehood (T 271) and therefore undertake the study of man: "Human Nature is the only science of man...." (T 273; cf. xv). But the principle that men must make causal inferences is consistently confirmed by experience; it resists all my attempts to refute it. So far as I can tell, it is indeed a lawful

and universal truth. My felt must, I discover, so far as I can, is a genuine human must. But if that is so, then I need hardly excuse myself to the Cartesian. It is he who is unjustified: he is asking the humanly impossible.

When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented; tho' we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and extra-ordinary phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles (T xviii).

No longer do I wonder about the rationality of what I cannot help being: rather, I see that my way of being is as humanly justified as it could reasonably be. Here, then, we have Hume's justification of causal reasoning in terms of the principle that must implies ought. Or rather, what we have is an argument why, with respect to reason, it ought to be that must implies ought, that is, why it is reasonable in our ethics of belief to adopt the principle that a cognitive practice that as a matter of lawful and universal fact about humans we must engage in is, for that reason, one it is reasonable to engage in. Here, too, precisely because it cannot be reasonable, even in our cognitive concerns, to attempt the impossible, we ought to accept that

~ [Np & (O ~ p ∨ P ~ p)]

or, what is the same, to accept that

Np > Op

Note, by the way, that this does not imply any sort of pragmatism, where criteria for belief are set relative to non-cognitive purposes. Hume emphasizes the motive of "curiosity, or the love of truth" (T II, III, X; cf. I, III, XV and also I, IV, VII 270-1), where he clearly understands 'truth' in objectivist terms. Cognitive standards are set relative to this cognitive interest.²⁵ What Hume's argument requires is not that we abandon curiosity, the search after objective truth, but merely that we be reasonable in its pursuit.²⁶

Instinctually we reason. But reason can question itself: reason can find reasons for doubting itself. However, as reason reflects upon itself and upon the instincts that lead men to reason, it comes to recognize its own self-doubts are unreasonable and should be put aside as longings or wishes to be other than what is humanly possible. Nature compels us not to live with inhuman standards for our reason. Reason can still set such standards. But the self-understanding that reason also yields establishes that the standards really are inhuman, that humans are incapable of living up to them, and that they are, therefore, unreasonable.

If, like the Cartesian, I set myself cognitive goals that I am caused to violate by the uncontrollable propensity that is part of my human being, to make causal inferences, then that propensity requires me to act against my own standards; it is felt as a compulsion, forcing me to do what I do not want to do. But if I recognize it as a genuine human must to which it is only reasonable that my goals and purposes are to be adapted, and if I so adapt my cognitive goals, then the uncontrollable propensity is no longer felt as a

compulsion: since my purposes have been adapted to that fact of human nature, I no longer aim to resist that fact, to strive against it; the uncontrollable propensity no longer forces me to do something other than what I want but is rather simply the propensity to do what I, as a reasonable man, ought to do.

It is the spirit of Stoicism that bids one aim to live the good life, to so discipline oneself that one accepts, rather than resists, what is necessary. The young Hume, the admirer of Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch, undertook to fortify himself with "reflections against ... all the ... calamities of life."²⁷ The Stoic prescription was successful. Le bon David in the end could face even death with equanimity. Hume, the academic sceptic, knew that all causal inference was fallible, not knowledge in the Cartesian sense, but Hume, the man, nonetheless felt the uncontrollable propensity to causal inferences, and Hume, the student of human nature, had the best of -- fallible -- reasons for believing that that felt necessity was an inescapable part of human nature. The Stoic reflections that produced Hume's equanimity in the face of death were perhaps the same Stoic reflections that led him to accept with equal equanimity rather than resistance the inescapable fact of his, and human, fallibility. In any case, it is his example, not that of the Cartesians, that I would recommend: the world would be a far better place were we all to accept with Hume's equanimity his basic conclusion that to reason fallibility is not vicious, not even cognitively vicious.²⁸

Fred Wilson
University of Toronto

1. For example, J. Lenz, "Hume's Defense of Causal Inference", in V.C. Chappell, ed., Hume (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966); N. Capaldi, David Hume: The Newtonian Philosopher (Boston, Twayne, 1975), p. 128; Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1982), p. 151, p. 162, p. 173, pp. 174-5; F. Wilson, "Hume's Defence of Causal Inference", Dialogue, forthcoming. The last criticizes certain aspects of the interpretations of Lenz and Capaldi.
2. Cf. F. Wilson, "Mill's Proof that Happiness is the Criterion of Morality," J. of Business Ethics, 1 (1982), pp. 59-72.
3. The role of "reasonableness" as virtue is discussed in P.S. Ardal, "Some Implications of the Virtue of Reasonableness in Hume's Treatise", in D.W. Livingston and J.T. King, eds., Hume: A Re-Evaluation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), pp. 91-106. See also fn. 19, below.
4. J. Hintikka, "Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic", in R. Hilpinen, ed., Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1970), pp. 84-5.
5. For a discussion of the difference between Hume and Stevenson, see R.J. Glossop, "Hume, Stevenson, and Hare on Moral Language", in D.W. Livingston and J.T. King, Hume: A Re-Evaluation, pp. 362-85.
6. This has been usefully discussed in J.L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), Ch. IV.
7. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888), p. 457. Hereafter this text will be referred to as T, followed by page references in parentheses.
8. D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Second Edition, (Oxford University Press, 1902), p. 274. Hereafter this text will be referred to as EPM, followed by page references, in parentheses.
9. And as R.M. Hare holds; cf. D. Lewis, "'Good' and Naturalistic Definition", Analysis, 24 (1964) pp. 144-7.
10. This has been argued convincingly in Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments.

11. The Practice of Christian Graces; or the Whole Duty of Man, Laid Down in a Plain and Familiar Way for All but Especially the meanest Reader, with Private Devotions for Several Occasions, attributed to Richard Allestree, first published 1658. Page references are to the edition with a Preface by the Rev. William Bentinck Hawkins (London: William Pickering, 1842).

On Calvinism, cf. G. Ryle, "Jane Austen and the Moralists", in S.P. Rosenbaum, ed., English Literature and British Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

12. Hume to Frances Hutcheson, July 1739, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982), vol. I, p. 34.
13. Hume to Dr. George Cheyne, March 1734, in Greig, The Letters of David Hume, vol. I, p. 14.
14. Whole Duty of Man, p. 117.
15. Ibid., pp. 118-9.
16. Ibid., pp. 119-20.
17. James Boswell, "An Account of My Last Interview with David Hume, Esq.", in G. Scott and F.A. Pottle, eds., Private Papers of James Boswell from Malahide Castle (New York: Privately Printed, 1928-34), vol. XII, p. 227. Boswell goes on to note that "He said he never had entertained any belief in Religion since he began to read Locke and Clarke."
18. Boswell Papers, vol. XII, pp. 227-8. Boswell, never failing to miss a chance at self-justification, notes that Hume said this "not adverting that Religious discipline does not mean to extinguish, but to moderate, the passions; and certainly an excess of pride or vanity is dangerous and generally hurtful." That view of religious discipline may have suited his Anglican friends in London and even his Scots compatriots who belonged to the Episcopal Church of Scotland, but it would not have suited the Calvinists of the Scottish Kirk: the Whole Duty of Man, as we have seen, is quite clear on this, that pride is not to be moderated but extinguished.
19. A quality of a person is reckoned a virtue if it is either "immediately agreeable to others" or "immediately agreeable to the person himself" (T

590); "the utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of virtue as well as its agreeableness to others" (T 596). Adjusting our goals to fit what is necessary, that is, being reasonable, is thus a virtue because of the utility to the actor (cf. Ardal, "Some Implications of the Virtue of Reasonableness in Hume's Treatise", p. 105).

20. This is easily seen. (3) = ' \sim [Np & (O \sim p v P \sim p)]' is logically equivalent to ' \sim Np v \sim (O \sim p v P \sim p)', which is in turn logically equivalent to 'Np \supset (\sim O \sim p & \sim P \sim p)', i.e., 'Np \supset ((Pp & Op)'; and, given that 'Op \supset Pp', the last is in turn logically equivalent to 'Np \supset Op' = (1). Thus, (3) is logically equivalent to (1).
21. R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, in Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. R.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955). vol. I, p. 92; emphasis added.
22. Cf. F. Wilson, "Hume's Theory of Mental Activity", in D.F. Norton et al., eds., McGill Hume Studies (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979), pp. 101-120.
23. Cf. F. Wilson, "Acquaintance, Ontology, and Knowledge", The New Scholasticism, 54 (1970), pp. 1-48; and "Weinberg's Refutation of Nominalism", Dialogue, 8 (1969), pp. 460-74.
24. Cf. Wilson, "Hume's Theory of Mental Activity", p. 117; and in more detail, Wilson, "Hume's Defence of Causal Inference".
25. Cf. Wilson, "Hume's Defence of Causal Inference".
26. Cf. Ardal, "Some Implications of the Virtue of Reasonableness in Hume's Treatise".
27. Cf. fn. 13, above.
28. Cf. F. Wilson, "Review of Jay Newman, Foundations of Religious Tolerance", Bulletin of the Canadian Association of University Teachers, (Feb. 6, 1984, no. 1, vol. 31), p. 62.