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The Anatomist and the Painter: The Continuity of Hume's *Treatise and Essays*

John Immerwahr

The three volumes of Hume's first and most famous work, *A Treatise of Human Nature*,¹ were followed almost immediately by two volumes of *Essays, Moral and Political*. What is the relationship between these two early projects? Modern readers of Hume have, at least implicitly, read these two works as discontinuous and largely unrelated. In this article I argue that much can be learned by reading the *Essays* as the natural continuation of a chain of thought that is begun in the *Treatise* but not completed there. My interpretation relies on Hume's discussion of two different roles for the philosopher, the "metaphysician" and the "moralist," and two different styles of philosophical work, which he metaphorically describes as the "anatomist" and the "painter."

A detailed argument for this thesis would require an interpretation of the *Essays* in their entirety. In this article I focus only on the very first of the essays, "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion." As I read it, this brief essay serves as a bridge between the *Treatise* and the *Essays*, spelling out the connections to the earlier work and pointing to the themes that will be developed in the following essays.

The Case for Discontinuity

Both the *Treatise* and the *Essays* emerge from a highly productive period in Hume's life. The first two volumes of the *Treatise* appeared in 1739, followed by a third volume in 1740. The first volume of *Essays, Moral and Political* appeared in 1741 and the second volume was published in 1742. All of these works were published anonymously.

Despite the fact that all of these works were completed within a few years of each other, scholars have treated Hume's early projects as having little direct relationship to one another. Most have emphasized the continuity between the *Treatise* and the later *Enquiries* and paid little attention to the *Essays* at all.² Even those who do read the *Essays* have sometimes stressed their differences from the *Treatise*. M. A. Box, for example, compares Hume's behaviour to that of Samuel Johnson, who diverted himself from the intense effort of writing the *Dictionary* by turning out occasional essays for the *Rambler*. Box sees Hume's

Essays as a way of providing relief from the efforts of the *Treatise* and also generating much needed income:

After the intellectual rigors of the last few years, the writing of [an essay] might easily have seemed, in the contemplation, a diverting and potentially remunerative project.³

A comparison of the style of the two works tends to support the idea that the two projects have little to do with one another. The *Treatise* provides an extended analysis in a dense and technical style; the *Essays* are comparatively light (sometimes even frivolous) in tone, and discuss a variety of seemingly unrelated topics.

Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the discontinuity of the two projects comes from what Hume himself says about them. Each work begins with a prefatory "advertisement" where the anonymous author lays out his goals and intentions. These two short passages suggest a picture of an author who abandons his ambitious youthful project for a less challenging one that may be more rewarding.

The Advertisement of the *Treatise*

In the 1739 advertisement to the first two volumes of the *Treatise*, Hume sketches out an ambitious philosophical program:

If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of morals, politics, and criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of human nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determin'd to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction. (T xii)

If we are to take Hume at his word, the original project would have consisted of five volumes. The 1740 publication of book 3, "Of Morals," might have been followed by two more volumes, book 4, "Of Politics" and book 5, "Of Criticism." But Hume's promise to deliver on this ambitious project also seems to have been contingent on public acceptance of his work.

The *Treatise* was not, of course, the success that Hume had hoped for. Rather than extending the *Treatise* into additional volumes, Hume seems to abandon it for a totally different and discontinuous project, since in 1741 he publishes not another volume of the *Treatise* but a collection of brief essays.

The Advertisement of the *Essays*

The advertisement to the *Essays* suggests that Hume has listened to the public's "instruction" and taken it to heart. Hume indicates that, as a result of the public reaction, he has temporarily or permanently abandoned his "serious Compositions" and turned to a totally different project. In opposition to the lofty goals set out for the *Treatise*, this advertisement describes the *Essays* as unimportant trifles, to which even the author is unwilling to dedicate a great deal of time and energy.

Most of these essays were wrote with a View of being published as WEEKLY-PAPERS, and were intended to comprehend the Designs both of the SPECTATORS & CRAFTSMEN. But having dropped that Undertaking, partly from LAZINESS, partly from WANT OF LEISURE, and being willing to make Trial of my Talents for Writing, before I ventur'd upon any more serious Compositions, I was induced to communicate these Trifles to the Judgment of the Public.⁴

Whereas the *Treatise* advertisement emphasizes the systematic aspects of the work, in which the first two volumes make a "complete chain of reasoning," the *Essays*' advertisement warns the reader against looking for a system:

The READER must not look for any Connexion among these *Essays*, but must consider each of them as a Work apart. This is an Indulgence that is given to all ESSAY-WRITERS, and is an equal EASE both to WRITER and Reader, by freeing them from any tiresome stretch of Attention or application. (*Works*, 3:42)

Hume's letters also emphasize the different character of the two projects; in a letter to Henry Home the *Essays* are compared to fertilizer:

They may prove like dung with marl, and bring forward the rest of my Philosophy, which is of a more durable, though of a harder and more stubborn nature.⁵

Putting the two advertisements together, it is possible to reconstruct a sequence of events something like this: Hume originally plans a five-volume *Treatise*. Because of the poor reception of Volumes I-III, he abandons this project and turns his hand to an unrelated project, originally conceived as something that would be both diverting and financially rewarding. He returns to his main project only a few

years later when he prepares the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* for publication in 1748.

The alternative interpretation advanced here is that the *Essays, Moral and Political* are not the abandonment of Hume's original program but its natural continuation. To see what this would mean, let us assume for a moment that the anonymous publication of the *Treatise* had achieved all of the attention that Hume had hoped for it. Would he have continued turning out more volumes in the style of the *Treatise*? My hypothesis is that even under those conditions Hume might well have felt that the continuation of his agenda would require a different kind of writing, much more like what we see in the *Essays*.

In fact there are a number of hints both in his letters and in the *Treatise* itself that suggest that the *Essays* represent the natural outgrowth of the *Treatise*, rather than a departure from it. Hume tells us that there are important topics that have not been covered by the end of *Treatise* III. Specifically, the *Treatise* has not dealt with questions of practical morality. Hume also indicates that the style of the *Treatise* is not appropriate for what he still has to say. Practical morality requires a totally different kind of style which is incompatible with the style of the *Treatise*.

The Unfinished Agenda of *Treatise* III

In the very last paragraph of *Treatise* III, Hume tells us that his system is also capable of providing insights into other aspects of morality:

The same system may help us to form a just notion of the *happiness*, as well as of the *dignity* of virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality. (T 620)

Here Hume is referring to what he calls "practical morality." The theoretical discussions of morality that have been completed so far in the *Treatise* explain the nature and source of our conceptions of virtue, but they do not address other questions. Specifically, they do not answer the question, "Why should one be virtuous?" in a way that will help individuals actually find their way to a happy and virtuous life.

We know from Hume's earliest letters that one of the things that drove him to philosophy in the first place was not just a desire to understand human nature, but a need to find a path to personal happiness. In Hume's earliest extant letters, he is preoccupied with this search.⁶ We might therefore expect the *Treatise* to include an extended discussion of human happiness and the means to achieve it.

The Two Kinds of Philosophy

Although Hume feels that his system can answer these questions, he also explains that they cannot be discussed in a work such as the *Treatise*. He continues the last paragraph by saying:

But I forbear insisting on this subject [practical morality]. Such reflections require a work a-part, very different from the genius of the present. (T 620)

The style of the *Treatise*, in other words, is appropriate for the topics Hume has covered there, but is not appropriate for the subjects he alludes to at the end of the *Treatise*.

What is the very different “genius” that would be required to discuss practical morality? Hume answers this question by explaining two different species of writing, using the metaphor of the anatomist and the painter. This metaphor first appears in a 1739 letter to Hutcheson, where Hume writes:

There are different ways of examining the Mind as well as the Body. One may consider it either as an Anatomist or as a Painter; either to discover its most secret Springs & Principles or to describe the Grace & Beauty of its Actions. I imagine it is impossible to conjoin these two Views ... An Anatomist, however, can give very good Advice to a Painter or Statuary: and in like manner, I am perswaded, that a Metaphysician may be very helpful to a Moralist; tho’ I cannot conceive of these two Characters united in the same Work.⁷

The same concept is developed in the last paragraph of the *Treatise* and in the Introduction to the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.⁸

There are several main differences between the work of the metaphysician and that of the moralist.

1. Different Purposes. The purpose of metaphysical writing is to describe human nature. It is essentially dedicated to uncovering “hidden truths” (E 6). The purpose of moral writing is to make us “feel the difference between vice and virtue” (E 6). The moralist, in other words, is a rhetorician whose writing “moulds the heart and affections; and by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes” (E 7).

2. Different Techniques. Metaphysical writing is by nature “abstruse” and “difficult.” It does the messy work of the anatomist by dissecting the human mind to understand the human mind, and this requires detailed scientific investigations. Such reflections typically

seem "unintelligible to common readers" (E 6). Moral writing is "easy," and "obvious." Since its purpose is to actually make people be virtuous it must be engaging and attractive.

Hume insists strongly that these two approaches cannot coexist in the same work; the work of the moralist and the metaphysician are stylistically incompatible. As he says in the *Treatise*,

The anatomist ought never to emulate the painter: nor in his accurate dissections and portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body, pretend to give his figures any graceful and engaging attitude of expression. There is even something hideous, or at least minute in the views of things, which he presents. (T 620-21)

3. Different Justifications. Hume also believes that the two approaches have different justifications. Specifically, he argues that the metaphysical philosophy is primarily justified because of the assistance it can provide to practical morality, to which it is "subservient" (T 621). Even in writing an abstruse work like the *Treatise*, Hume tells us, he is ultimately concerned with being "servicable to virtue."⁹ The writing of the moralist, however, can be justified by its direct effect on helping people to live virtuous and happier lives. Hume, in other words, seems to regard popular works as ultimately more important than theoretical ones, because the popular works actually create virtue. It is the easy writing of the moralist, he tells us in the *Enquiry*, that has the "justest fame" (E 7).

The Place of the *Essays* in Hume's Overall Schema

Comparing the "Advertisement" of each work suggests, as we have seen, that Hume is engaged in two very different projects. Suppose, instead, that one were to read Hume's writings in their order of publication. On this reading, one would compare the last page of the *Treatise* with the first pages of the *Essays*. This comparison points toward a much greater unity to the two works.

The last page of the *Treatise* sets up a clear expectation for both the style and the content of what should naturally follow. Morals and politics have already been discussed abstractly in the *Treatise*. What is now required is a discussion of practical morality. Such a discussion would be of a different style. Rather than severe, forbidding dissections, it would need to include attractive and engaging descriptions. These descriptions should be entertaining and easy, rather than demanding the concentration required by the *Treatise*. Unlike the *Treatise*, these discussions would be designed to change the feelings of the readers rather than to describe the psychological realities. They should not

dissect politics and morality but should encourage moral and political virtue. Lastly, these discussions would be more important than the *Treatise*. They would be the end, for which the *Treatise* was the means.

Suppose our reader were to put down *Treatise* III and pick up the first volume of *Essays* (knowing that it was by the same author), and read only the title and the advertisement. A very justifiable response from such a hypothetical reader might be something like the following:

Well, here it is, a set of essays, "Moral and Political." This is just what our author promised only a year ago. In the end of the last book he says that what is needed is "a work a-part," to discuss practical morality. Here I find a series of essays described in the advertisement as "works apart" on moral and political topics. First we had the anatomy, and now we have the painting.

What would the reaction of our reader be to the self-deprecating comments in the "Advertisement," which describe the essays as "Trifles"? Perhaps our reader might give a quiet laugh and think:

Of course, our clever author disparages these essays, describes them as "Trifles," and assures his reader that they are not "serious compositions." For the popular audience he is trying to reach now, describing these essays as serious compositions which follow an extended chain of argument would be exactly the wrong thing to say. For this material he has deliberately chosen the easy style, and he emphasizes its approachability, rather than its systematic nature.

Approaching the *Essays, Moral and Political* with this framework would call our attention to the continuity of Hume's work. This suggests that we read the *Essays* as the logical next step in Hume's master plan, rather than a discontinuous diversion caused by the lack of popular success of the *Treatise*.

Can this hypothesis be sustained when we turn to the *Essays* themselves? In what follows, I argue that the interpretation suggested above is amply supported by a reading of the very first of these essays, "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion."¹⁰

"Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion"

Hume begins the first volume of the *Essays* with a brief and graceful piece contrasting two different kinds of "delicacy." I believe that this essay fulfils the expectations created at the end of the *Treatise* in two ways. First, although the essay is not at all technical, it does rely on

the detailed work done in the *Treatise*. It paints a picture of the passions, in other words, which is based on the anatomy provided by the *Treatise*. But the essay also goes beyond the *Treatise* into the domain of practical morality, by explaining how people can in fact become happy and virtuous. The essay makes three main points:

1. Some people have a delicacy of passion that makes them more likely to feel both greater joys and sorrows at the good or ill "accidents of life."¹¹ Despite the fact that such people feel greater joys, this is not a desirable condition; because the accidents of life are generally not in our control, such people will experience great pains more frequently than great pleasures.

2. Other people have a delicacy of taste, that makes them more susceptible to both greater joy in beauty and greater disgust with ugliness. This kind of delicacy is desirable, since our aesthetic experiences are much more likely to be in our control, and people with a delicate taste will have greater enjoyment in life than those with less sensitivity.¹²

3. Increasing our delicacy of taste has the effect of decreasing our delicacy of passion; "nothing is so proper to cure us of this delicacy of passion, as the cultivating of that higher and more refined taste."¹³ One key to human happiness, in other words, is to increase our delicacy of taste. This will give us the greater joys associated with delicate taste and also mitigate our delicacy of passion.

Calm and Violent Passions: Anatomy and Painting

If Hume is to fulfil the expectations created by the painter/anatomist metaphor, we would expect his "works apart" to give a superficial depiction of material that had been deeply dissected in the *Treatise*. This is precisely what happens in "Of Delicacy." Specifically, the description of taste and passion in "Of Delicacy" is predicated on the detailed discussion of calm and violent passions in the *Treatise*.

1. **Calm and Violent Passions in the *Treatise*.** One of the central themes of books 2 and 3 of the *Treatise* is the distinction between calm and violent passions. Hume draws this distinction in two separate ways.

Hume sometimes uses the calm/violent distinction to describe the way in which we experience a passion. Calm passions are those which cause "no disorder in the soul" and "little emotion in the mind" (T 417). When we experience passions violently we feel an "uneasiness" (T 418). This is what we might call an adverbial use of the calm/violent distinction; a calm passion in this sense is a calmly felt passion.

Hume also uses "calm" and "violent" as categories which pick out two different classes of passions. In this sense calm passions are those which are usually experienced calmly, such as "the sense of beauty and

deformity in action, composition, and external objects” (T 276). The violent passions are those which are usually experienced violently, such as “love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility” (T 276). But passions which are classified as calm can sometimes be experienced violently. Our love of music is a calm passion, but it can be experienced violently in that it can “rise to the greatest height” (T 276) and indeed a “calm passion may easily be chang’d into a violent one” (T 438). Passions in the violent group, such as anger, can also be experienced calmly (there is also a “calm anger or hatred”).¹⁴

In the *Treatise*, Hume makes it clear that he prefers the calm category of passions to violent ones, and calmly felt passions to violently felt ones. He sets great stock by what he calls “sagacity” (T 492) or “strength of mind” which he defines as the “prevalence of the calm passions above the violent” (T 418). The doctrine of calm passions is also fundamental to what it means to live a virtuous life.¹⁵

2. Taste and Passion in “Of Delicacy.” Hume’s discussion in “Of Delicacy” follows the *Treatise* exactly, although he changes his terms somewhat. In the essay, Hume uses the term “passion” only to describe those emotions categorized as “violent passions” in the *Treatise*. In the essay, the calm passions are not called passions at all. Instead calm passion is now referred to as “taste.” The following chart compares calm and violent passions in each text:

<i>Treatise</i>	“Of Delicacy”
Violent Passions	Passions
love and hatred	friendship, resentment
grief and joy	piercing grief, lively joy
pride and humility	“[a]ny honor or mark of distinction elevates them above measure: but they are as sensibly touched with contempt”
Calm Passions	Taste
“the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects” (T 276)	“[s]ensibility to beauty and deformity of every kind” ¹⁶

In the essay, Hume also relies on the distinction between calmly felt passions and violently experienced ones. Here again he uses different language. Hume’s term “delicacy” captures the adverbial

sense of “violence” in the *Treatise*. Those who have a delicacy of taste or passion feel emotion more intensely and violently.

In some ways the language of “Of Delicacy” is more precise than the language of the *Treatise*. Hume no longer uses the words “calm” and “violent” to capture both the class into which a passion should be placed and the intensity with which it is experienced.

The essay also reiterates Hume’s earlier preference for calm passions and calmly felt passions. “Tender and agreeable passions” are clearly preferable to “the rougher and more boisterous emotions,” and “[d]elicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated as delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible.”¹⁷

The “Sovereign Antidote”

So far the essay merely summarizes the *Treatise* but does not move beyond it. Hume’s third major point is a new step. He not only distinguishes between the two types of delicacy, and states his preference, but he raises the practical question of how to increase human happiness. This is a question about which Hume the metaphysician/anatomist is predictably silent, but which is of fundamental concern to Hume the moralist/painter.

Specifically, Hume argues that cultivating our delicacy of taste will decrease our delicacy of passion. This is desirable for several reasons. First it will make us happier. And it will also make us more virtuous. It is, after all, the violent passions that cause us to be “transported beyond all bounds of prudence and discretion, and to take false steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.” This essay is thus designed to make morality more attractive and possible, by showing us how to achieve it and why it will make us happier.

In this essay, then, Hume returns to a more Hellenistic sense of philosophy that sees it as a cure for misery and a path to happiness. As such, philosophy is not just a description of the underlying causes of human happiness and morality, but a path to a more virtuous life. In this sense, Philosophy becomes, as Hume says elsewhere, “*the medicine of the mind*”¹⁸ and the “sovereign antidote” to pestilences such as superstition and false religion.¹⁹

The Role of the *Essays*.

If we keep Hume’s therapeutic goal in mind, it becomes clear that “Of Delicacy” has an important message for Hume’s readers. If we want to be happy and virtuous we must increase our delicacy of taste. Conveniently, one of the most effective ways to do this would be to read precisely the type of essays that follow in the two volumes of *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*. The Latin motto in “Of Delicacy” could thus have served equally well as a motto for the entire *Essays: emollit*

mores, nec sinit esse ferus (“a faithful study of the liberal arts humanizes character and permits it not to be cruel”).²⁰ “Of Delicacy” serves as an outline of the therapy that will be accomplished by reading the essays. Those who read Hume’s essays will find their passions made softer, and their delicacy of taste increased.

Once again the abstract theory of how to soften the passions is developed at length in the *Treatise*.²¹ In general, passions can only be moderated by other passions. But the interaction of two passions is a delicate matter, which Hume at one point compares to mixing two liquids. In some cases one passion will be absorbed and redirected by the other, in some cases the passions will have no effect on one another at all (like oil and vinegar), but at other times the two passions may be like “an *alkali* and an *acid*, which, being mingled, destroy each other” (T 443). In this last case, the contrary passions “exactly rencounter” and the mind attains a “calm situation” and is left in “perfect tranquility” (T 442).

The essays are designed to accomplish this balancing task. This is clearest in Hume’s treatment of political topics. Hume is highly concerned to reduce the violence of political passions. The essays do this by counterpoising different views. Whig passions will be opposed by a different view of Tories, and Tory passions opposed by a different view of Whigs. The result will be a cancelling out of these violent passions, and a corresponding growth in the delicacy of taste. As Hume points out in the fourth essay, “there are enow of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions of their partizans.” Hume describes his own program as “more fond of promoting moderation than zeal.”²² The purpose of these essays is precisely to help the readers form what “Of Delicacy” calls “juster notions of life” so that “[m]any things, which please or affect others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our attention.”²³ The essays themselves, in other words, will help us find oppositions to our strong passions, and will have the effect of producing moderation in us.

In a much later set of essays, Hume spells out his approach to essay writing even more explicitly. In “Of the Coalition of Parties,” where Hume tells us that his essays are “calculated” to achieve political moderation by opposing passions:

There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end, than to prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be sometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praise and blame, which we bestow on either side.²⁴

It can also be argued that this approach can be found in the moral *Essays* as well as the political ones. They also appear to be designed to produce calm and reflective passions. The extended dialogue between four different philosophical approaches to happiness ("The Epicurean," "The Stoic," "The Platonist," and "The Sceptic") is a good example. It has been argued that the purpose of this group of essays is not to advance any one position, but to increase the sensitivity of the reader by playing them off against each other.²⁵

"Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion" is, in effect, a promise of things to come. Hume believes that those who take the time to read the essays that follow it will find that their judgement is improved, and that they develop a keener sense of taste and discernment. They will become both happier and more virtuous. The essays are not so much designed to describe the process as to lead the reader through a regimen of growth and refinement. This first essay acts as an introductory map to show the reader what is to come and how the process works.

Conclusion

Many intellectuals in the twentieth century have expressed contempt for popularizers. This way of thinking may also have infected our reading of Hume, causing us to see his writing in two separate categories of uneven value. In this mind-set, the real Hume lives in the difficult works such as the *Treatise* (which Hume himself never acknowledged). The popular works represent an embarrassment, revealing Hume as having "sold out," deserting his serious work to write popular trifles for fame and profit. As M. A. Box says,

We moderns have grown so accustomed to the notion that great minds are inevitably alienated from their societies that we are suspicious of any writer not following solely the dictates of his own genius in scorn of popular tastes. Hume would have thought this alienation a species of enthusiasm.²⁶

For Hume, the two different styles reflect two different aspects of the same overall agenda. Hume does believe that it is impossible to do anatomy and painting in the same work, but he never concedes that the same writer cannot accomplish both tasks in separate works. Hume's goal is to emulate artists such as Leonardo, who were accomplished in both. For what Hume wanted to do, it was necessary for him to be both anatomist and painter.

Villanova University

1. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed., rev., ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1978) (hereafter cited as "T").
2. There are, of course, many exceptions. Some recent studies that draw heavily on the *Essays* include: David Miller, *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought* (Oxford, 1981); Donald W. Livingston, *Hume's Philosophy of Common Life* (Chicago, 1984); Frederick G. Whelan, *Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy* (Princeton, 1985); and Donald T. Siebert, *The Moral Animus of David Hume* (Newark, 1990). But much recent research on Hume does not rely on the *Essays* at all. A survey of the last two years of the journal *Hume Studies* (1989-90), for example, indicates this lack of attention. Two articles specifically on Hume's economics draw heavily on the *Essays*, and one other article is specifically about a problem in the *Essays*. Most of the rest of the articles, however, have no references to Hume's *Essays* at all.
3. M. A. Box, *The Suasive Art of David Hume* (Princeton, 1990), 114. Social historian Nicholas Phillipson stresses the discontinuity in the reverse way by dismissing the *Treatise* and emphasizing the *Essays*. For Phillipson, the Hume of the *Essays* is the real Hume, who has finally returned home after a "long sojourn in a disturbing metaphysical wilderness." Nicholas Phillipson, "Hume as a Moralist: A Social Historian's Perspective," in *Philosophers of the Enlightenment*, ed. S. C. Brown (Sussex, 1979), 140-61.
4. Reprinted in "History of the Editions," in David Hume, *The Philosophical Works*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4 vols. (London, 1882; reprint, Darmstadt, 1964), 3:41 (hereafter cited as *Works*).
5. See letter 17, 1742 in David Hume, *The Letters of David Hume*, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932), 1:43 (hereafter cited as *Letters*).
6. Letter 1, 1727, *Letters*, 1:10; see also Hume's autobiographical self-diagnosis in letter 3. Hume's long-standing interest in practical morality is also emphasized by Phillipson (above, n. 3), 145.
7. Letter 13, 1739, *Letters*, 1:32-33.
8. See also David Hume, "Of the different Species of Philosophy," in *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3d ed., rev., ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), 5-16 (hereafter cited as "E").
9. Letter 13, 1739, *Letters*, 1:33.
10. David Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, rev. ed., ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987) (hereafter cited as *Essays*).
11. "Of Delicacy," in *Essays*, 3.

12. *Ibid.*, 5.
13. *Ibid.*, 6.
14. Letter 19, 1743, *Letters*, 1:46.
15. In his discussion of the passions in book 2 of the *Treatise*, Hume gives a list of examples of the calm passions. This list is virtually identical with lists Hume gives of the natural virtues in book 3 of the *Treatise* ("Of Morals") and in other works on morality. Hume's list of calm passions includes, "benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such" (T 417). The list of natural virtues includes "[m]eekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, [and] equity" (T 578).
16. "Of Delicacy," in *Essays*, 3-4.
17. Hume's own later usage is inconsistent. In his 1757 collection *Four Dissertations*, Hume returns to the *Treatise* language in one essay ("Of the Passions") while he follows the "Of Delicacy" language in another essay ("Of the Standard of Taste"). The equation between the terms in the *Treatise* and the terms in "Of Delicacy" and "Of the Standard of Taste" is partially worked out by Eugene F. Miller in a footnote to "Of Delicacy"; see *Essays*, 3n. Miller's footnote, however, blurs the distinction between calm passions and calmly felt passions. On my reading, this distinction is essential to Hume's analysis in "Of Delicacy."
18. "The Stoic," in *Essays*, 169.
19. "Of Suicide," in *Essays*, 577.
20. According to Miller, this motto is taken from Ovid's *Epistulae ex ponto*. The Loeb translation is by A. L. Wheeler. See *Essays*, 6n.
21. The general theme of the conflict of the passions is discussed at length in Albert O. Hirshman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton, 1977).
22. "That Politics May be Reduced to a Science," in *Essays*, 27.
23. "Of Delicacy," in *Essays*, 6.
24. "Of the Coalition of Parties," in *Essays*, 494.
25. See John Immerwahr, "Hume's Essays on Happiness," *Hume Studies* 15, no. 2 (November 1989): 307-25.
26. Box (above, n. 3), 165. Box believes that Hume's ultimate goal was to fuse the two styles, and that he finally did so in the second *Enquiry* (Hume's own personal favourite of all of his works).