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Hume Studies Volume XXV, Number 1 and 2 (April/November, 1999) 83-100.

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Force and Vivacity in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*

FRANCIS W. DAUER

Hume's appeal to "force and vivacity" presents a challenge to those of us who try to render his views as plausible as possible. Of course, if we reject "folk psychology" or an appeal to our consciousness, the challenge becomes insurmountable. Fortunately, in today's philosophical climate such appeals are no longer universally rejected, and at least in some quarters there may be interest in discerning what such appeals may reveal. But even granting such an appeal, is there anything given to our consciousness that will do the kind of work Hume intends for force and vivacity? I shall attempt to make an affirmative answer as plausible as I can. Recall that Hume appeals to force and vivacity to distinguish (1) impressions from ideas, (2) memory from other ideas, and (3) beliefs from fictions of the fancy. In my defense of Hume, I shall urge that, taken separately, each of these appeals has some plausibility and to this extent provides some tentative suggestions on what it is like to perceive, remember, and believe. Before proceeding to this defense, several preliminaries are called for.

Hume's view on force and vivacity underwent changes in his writings, and no one view can be said to be his account of force and vivacity. His initial view occurs in Book I of the *Treatise* (which was published along with Book II). By the time the Appendix of the *Treatise* was published with Book III, we see Hume shifting away from his initial view. Further changes, as well as a full appreciation of the shift, can be found in the *Enquiry*. For most of this paper I shall primarily be concerned with his later views, though earlier views will

occasionally be mentioned for contrast. In the final section, I shall address the more exegetical issues concerning Hume's change of mind over the years.

While space constraints prevent a discussion that will do justice to the views of other commentators, a few words may be in order to indicate what I think is needed to render *Hume's* views plausible. Leaving aside commentators finding fatal defects with his account, those trying to salvage a tolerable reading of Hume more or less identify force and vivacity with belief (which Hume on one occasion says is the true and proper name for the feeling). One group focuses on Hume's use of 'force' and proposes a functionalist account of force and vivacity whereby it is a causal property of "perceptions" (in the wide sense) to produce such states as passions and actions which are functionally related to beliefs.¹ At least on the face of it, this is at odds with force and vivacity being available to consciousness, and I shall take it that Hume took force and vivacity to be so available. Beyond this, while I shall take it that Hume appealed to force and vivacity to distinguish impressions from ideas, a functionalist account has difficulties in preventing impressions from degenerating into mere beliefs (unless something quite foreign to the Humean framework is appealed to).² A second line of thought is due to Wayne Waxman, who identifies force and vivacity with something like a felt sense of reality or truth, with impressions having this quality in the highest degree.³ While this avoids the first defect of the functionalist account, I believe it fails to avoid a variant of the second problem: without appealing to something quite un-Humean, some impressions can become mere beliefs, and vice versa.⁴ I shall assume that force and vivacity must be consciously available, and that appealing to them, at least in one guise, must allow impressions and ideas to be distinguished.

Impressions

Hume introduces the distinction between impressions and ideas in the *Treatise* by saying:

The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name *impressions*; By *ideas* I mean faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. (T 1)⁵

The presentation in the first *Enquiry* (EHU 17)⁶ is much the same.

But there are two rather obvious problems with his account. First, pre-analytically, we know the distinction he is trying to make—it is experience versus everything else, including thoughts, memories, and mental images. But if we understand 'force' as agitation of the mind and 'vivacity' as vividness, then it is unclear that force and vivacity will mark the intended distinction. Indeed, both in the *Treatise* (T 2) and the *Enquiry* (EHU 17), Hume seems to be sug-

gesting that in sleep and madness, ideas could be as forceful and vivacious as impressions. In the *Treatise* (but not in the *Enquiry*) he goes so far as to say that sometimes “our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas” (T 2). The truth of the matter surely is that if ‘force’ and ‘vivacity’ are to be taken in their ordinary sense, nothing can prevent thoughts and images from being as or more forceful and vivacious than experience.⁷ I think it is clear that if we are to have a viable reading of Hume’s ‘force and vivacity’, it must not be understood in its ordinary sense but as a technical term—call it “Humean force and vivacity.” The problem is to assign this technical term a tolerable sense.

A second problem is that Hume seems to be making two distinctions—one in term of maximal versus less than maximal force and vivacity, and another in terms of original versus copy.⁸ But the distinction between original and copy seems to be a causal distinction; yet causal reasoning seems to presuppose our already having the distinction between impressions and ideas. One could dispense with the original versus copy distinction, but it would be desirable if we could give it a noncausal reading that would relate it to the distinction in terms of Humean force and vivacity.

In connection with the distinction between impressions and ideas, nothing in Book I or the Appendix of the *Treatise* suggests that Hume saw these problems and would welcome my programmatic suggestions. But in a key passage of the *Enquiry* Hume seems to have recognized the first problem:

All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the descriptions be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation. (EHU 17)

While qualifications of this nature are given in the Appendix in connection with the force and vivacity of beliefs, in this *Enquiry* passage they are extended to impressions. Hume distances Humean force and vivacity from ordinary vividness, and talks of its lack as a kind of “inferiority” that afflicts even the most vivid ideas; correspondingly, the “superiority” of impressions prevents their being confused with ideas. How then shall we understand this “superiority”—the Humean force and vivacity? I believe a hint occurs in his claim that a description, namely, a kind of representation, can never be taken for what is real.

Consider an example: before I ever saw the Acropolis, I had various ideas about it, or believed various propositions about it. And now, driving to Athens for the first time, I finally see the Acropolis from a distance. There it is, just as I believed it would be! My ideas did not necessarily become more lively (especially given the air quality of Athens), and my beliefs did not become more certain. I had no realistic doubts about the existence of the Acropolis or the

descriptions I read. What then did I gain that I didn't have before? Well, I finally saw it with my own eyes, that is, I encountered it. And isn't the encountering consciously given? That is, are we not flying in the face of common sense if we deny that there was a sense of presentedness or givenness? As Hume said, "Everyone of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking" (T 2). My suggestion, then, is that Humean force and vivacity be understood along the lines of a sense of presentedness. This, then, is a way of cashing out the hint of the key passage from the *Enquiry*: the liveliest poetic *representation* of a landscape can never be confused with its *presentation*. The distinction between ideas and impressions is principally a distinction between representations and presentations, where the latter must be recognizable as presentations by being possessed of a sense of presentedness.⁹ Seen in this light, the original/copy distinction is not so much a causal distinction but a distinction between presentation and representation, a distinction that is indicated to us by the sense of presentedness or Humean force and vivacity.

I believe that evidence for the correctness of the suggestion that experience is a presentation, rather than just another representation on a par with beliefs, comes from what is often used to characterize the appeal to consciousness. Ever since Nagel's groundbreaking "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"¹⁰ appeal to consciousness is thought to be revealed by questions like: What is like to see or hear something? Nagel suggested that we cannot even begin to fathom the subjective character of bat experiences. Of course, we know how sonar works, and we can use sonar or mathematical equations to determine shapes of objects on the basis of sounds. But this gives us no foothold on what it is like to hear shapes. I suggest that this failure is due to the fact that sound waves and mathematical equations at best give us only representations of shapes, something that can be mapped onto shapes. What we cannot fathom is how sounds can present shapes to bats in the way that colors present shapes to us. However we try to imagine hearing something to be trapezoidal, we only end up with a representation—something that can be projected or mapped onto the shape. Colors do not map onto shapes; they give us the shape, and this seems to be an essential feature of visual experience. In this way, a sense of shapes and colors being presented appears to be crucial to our visual experience. To the extent that we grant that the nature of consciousness is revealed through questions like "What is it like to perceive . . . ?," a sense of presentation appears to be an essential feature of conscious perception.

However, a complication must be faced. I can mistakenly take a representation to be a presentation: a holograph might be taken to be the real thing, and the condition for this is typically that the holograph is "lifelike," a feature in the same region as ordinary force and vivacity. On the other hand, I did have a presentation of color arrangements, and even in madness and sleep I need not be deprived of all presentations, although I may be mistaken in thinking I had a presentation of the king of France. Thus, I suggest the fol-

lowing modification: In the absence of any presentations, we cannot be so confused as to take mere representations to be presentations, and having an impression or experience always involves Humean force and vivacity, or a sense of presentedness. However (perhaps in the presence of ordinary force and vivacity, which Hume did not clearly distinguish from the Humean force and vivacity that was evolving in his thoughts), we can be mistaken in *identifying what* was presented. Correspondingly, the distinction between the original and copy is only provisionally given by the sense of presentedness. What that sense declares to be a copy is always a copy; and if we are having an original according to that sense, while something is an original, causal reasoning may be needed to determine what was the original and what was a mere representation. Qualified in this way, I think it is plausible that a sense of presentedness or Humean force and vivacity can play the central role in distinguishing impressions or experience from ideas or nonimpressions as well as in distinguishing originals from copies (or nonoriginals).

Memory

I have little to say about memory since most of what Hume says is unhelpful. The best thing Hume says about force and vivacity in connection with memory occurs in the Appendix to the *Treatise* (T 627–628), where Hume has *A* trying to get his friend *B* to remember something they did together. *A* runs over various circumstances in vain, “till at last he hits on some lucky circumstance, that revives the whole” (T 628). While Hume supposes the ideas *B* first receives to be fictions, we can suppose that *B* believes what *A* tells him. *B* might well say: “I’m sure you’re right, but I just don’t remember it.”

When our memories are revived in the manner described, I think it is difficult to deny that there is something like a consciously available sense of recognizing certain experiences *as our own*. This sense of recognition is not just belief, since, based on *A*’s testimony, *B* could have initially believed the experience to have been his own. Nor need it be any increased epistemic certainty—*B* may know that he is highly suggestible and, taking *A* to be highly reliable, *B* may put more weight on *A*’s testimony than on his own sense of recognition. Of course, the sense of recognition may be mistaken, and cannot be sufficient for genuine memory. But something like it does seem to be involved in the phenomenology of personal memory, and such a phenomenology may be necessary for genuine personal memory.

This sense of recognition is not a matter of vividness, since *A*’s most vivid descriptions may fail to revive *B*’s memory. However, it seems to be a plausible candidate for a “Humean” or nonordinary force and vivacity, which distinguishes some memories from fictions and other beliefs. While the sense of recognizing an experience as one’s own may well be a sense of recognizing something to have had a sense of presentedness to oneself, the sense of recog-

nition itself is not the sense of presentedness with which impressions strike us. At best there is a similarity between Humean force and vivacity in connection with impressions and memory, in that what is so presented or recognized is noninferentially believed. I shall leave it open whether the phenomenology of personal memory can be extended to factual memory, whereby remembering that the Battle of Actium occurred in 31 B.C. involves a sense of recognizing the belief to have been one's own.

Belief

The outlines of Hume's view in the *Treatise* is clear. Belief must be a manner of conception, since the believer and the incredulous person both conceive a proposition or idea with the same content. Finding force and vivacity to be the parameter that can be varied without affecting content, he identifies belief with having a forceful and vivacious idea. The body of the *Treatise* again tends to use 'force' and 'vivacity' in their ordinary senses. For example, Hume says, "a vigorous and strong imagination is of all talents the most proper to procure belief and authority," and "[w]e are hurried away by the lively imagination of our author and even he himself is often a victim of his own fire and genius" (T 123). But in the Appendix, there is a change of heart. He tells us, "whatever emotions the poetical enthusiasm may give to the spirits, 'tis still the mere phantom of belief or persuasion" when compared to the "*feeling* which arises when we reason, tho' even upon the lowest species of probability" (T 630). This is a welcomed shift: his theory avoids a refutation by a vivid imagination, and it was also questionable whether added vividness only varied the manner of conception without affecting the content. (While Hume speaks of a shade of color acquiring "a new degree of liveliness or brightness without any other variation" [T 96], such a shift in ideas seems to involve a shift in content from dull vermilion to bright vermilion.) The *Enquiry* follows the Appendix account, but we shall see in the next section that it is only in the *Enquiry* that he faces up to the consequences of his change of heart.

But how are we to understand the nonordinary or Humean force and vivacity this time around? There are two strands in Hume's thinking, the first of which is that Humean force and vivacity is a sentiment or a consciously available kind of awareness that is virtually impossible to define and yet is identified with belief:

Were we to attempt a *definition* of this sentiment, we should, perhaps, find it very difficult, if not an impossible task; in the same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or passion of anger . . . Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term; because every man

is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. (E 48-49)

The second strand is to explain the feeling or belief in terms of functionally related states. He tells us Humean force and vivacity is

an act of the mind which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought . . . gives them a superior influence on the passions and the imagination . . . enforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our actions. (EHU 49, cf. also T 629)

A gloss would be: Humean force and vivacity is the feeling with which ideas or propositions strike us that makes us assent to them, act on them, use them in our reasoning, and makes them the basis of our fears, desires, and so on.

These two strands do not sit together comfortably, and one response is to drop the consciously available kind of awareness that Hume is at pains to define, and to identify believing a proposition with being suitably disposed (perhaps because of a brain state) to reason on it, act on it, and so on. But I believe it would be hasty to dismiss the idea that a consciously available kind of awareness is essential to beliefs of a certain kind. An example of what I shall call paradigm beliefs is this: Suppose that I hear the forecast that it will rain, infer that I had better look for my umbrella, and start rummaging about in the closet. My inference is from "It will rain" to "I had better look for my umbrella," but, as an inference from one proposition to another, this inference is as good or bad as the inference: "It will be hot; so, I had better look for my shorts." What could lead me to infer that I should look for my umbrella rather than my shorts? Isn't because I am aware of my belief that it will rain, while I have no such awareness of a belief that it will be hot? At least as a first shot, I suggest that although it is not a premise of the inference, the contextual feature of my engaging in one of two equally good propositional inferences is my awareness of my beliefs. Something like this seems plausible because the "inner dialogue" surrounding my inference might well be: "It looks like it's going to rain; so I had better . . ." But since there is no "look" of tomorrow's rain, this dialogue involves an idiomatic version of, "I've been led to believe *p*," although the inference is of course from *p* rather than from my believing that *p*.

It might be admitted that, even if the phenomenology of belief involves an awareness of a belief, it is dispensable because the belief alone will account for my inferences and actions. But this doesn't seem right, because my believing that it will rain tomorrow is what makes my inference and action *intelligible*, and this intelligibility requires my being aware of my belief in the paradigm case. If I just "found myself" inferring the need for an umbrella or

looking for an umbrella, I would find my inference and my behavior puzzling and verging on the unintelligible. The fact is that I have a *reason* for having inferred the need to look for my umbrella, and in the paradigm case the reason, that is, my belief, was available to me. Put another way, from a third-person perspective, the point of attributing a belief is to make an agent's actions not only predictable but intelligible. No belief needs to be attributed for a literal knee-jerk reaction. But attributing beliefs in order to make sense of the agent's actions would be an unwarranted projection if, even in the paradigm case, the same explanation in terms of the agent's belief were not available to the agent.¹¹

Of course, not all beliefs are paradigm beliefs, but I think it would be in keeping with Hume to take such beliefs as dispositions to articulate one's belief as in the paradigm cases if and when the need arises. Thus, to the extent that the function of belief attributions is to make the agent's inferences and actions not only predictable but intelligible, there are grounds for claiming that it is intrinsic to beliefs that their awareness is explicitly present or in the offing (in less or more complex ways). We can therefore focus on the paradigm beliefs that underlie the phenomenon of belief in general.

Provisionally, my suggestion, then, is that Humean force and vivacity for beliefs, or the "feeling" that Hume identifies with belief, is a consciousness or awareness of one's belief, where it is intrinsic to a belief that this awareness be explicitly or dispositionally present. But there is an obvious difficulty in saying

- (1) Believing *p* involves being aware that one believes *p*.

Since awareness itself is a way of believing, (1) becomes

- (2) Believing *p* involves believing that one believes that *p*.

Apply (2) itself to the second-order belief in (2), and we have

- (3) Believing *p* involves believing that one believes that one believes that *p*.

Clearly, if belief (explicitly or dispositionally) involves an awareness of it, a staggering infinity of (explicit or dispositional) beliefs seems to be in the offing. This is unwelcome both because it complicates the mind and because, if belief is the "proper name" for the feeling and I am right in taking the "feeling" to be the awareness of the belief, I will have attributed an infinite regress to Hume's account. Can we avoid the unwelcome result?

Consider a slightly different case—consciously deciding to kill her. What could this be if it isn't going through some reasoning process like: I want her

money but I can't get it without killing her; so, I'll kill her? Consciously deciding isn't a matter of there being an act of deciding which is then made the object of consciousness. Consciously deciding is an adverbial modification of the act of deciding; it is a way of deciding, namely, consciously. Just as eating quickly is a way of eating that is part and parcel of the eating, so, too, consciously deciding is part and parcel of the deciding. While there can be a higher-order awareness of consciously deciding, there is an antecedent act of consciously deciding that is a way of deciding that carries consciousness or awareness with it. What is to be noted is that while the construction 'consciousness of X' carries the obvious possibility of unending iteration, the adverbial construction does not. One does not know what to make of 'quickly, quickly eating' unless it be a very quick way of eating, and we face a similar blank when faced with 'consciously, consciously deciding.'

I suggest we should think of the self-intimating nature of paradigm beliefs along similar lines, that is, as an adverbial modification of an action or a happening rather than on the act (of consciousness)/object (of consciousness) model that threatens a regress. And this is exactly what Hume's analysis prepares us for. Belief is supposed to be a manner of conception, that is, a way of conceiving an idea or proposition where the true and proper name for this manner is "belief." For Hume, then, believing *p* is to be understood as "believingly conceiving *p*," which can be contrasted with desiringly conceiving *p*, wishfully conceiving *p*, merely conceiving *p*, and so on. For Hume, believing is an adverbially modified act of conceiving, and this sets it up for further adverbial modifications so that the self-intimating nature of believing becomes *consciously* believingly conceiving *p*; indeed, the modification "consciously" might be redundant, since it is difficult to see how one can conceive something without doing it consciously. Given this revised understanding of Humean force and vivacity for belief, no obvious regress is forthcoming, and I think it is plausible that for paradigm beliefs there is something answering to "(consciously) conceiving *p* in a believing way." Upon hearing the weather forecast, my inner dialogue might well include something like, "I guess it's going to rain tomorrow," or "I had better count on its raining tomorrow," and the like. Surely such pieces of inner dialogue can be taken as expressing consciously conceiving the claimed rain for tomorrow in a believing way.

Earlier, we noted an uncomfortable fit between Hume's claim that belief is a feeling and his attempt to explain the feeling in terms of functionally related states. I have urged that the discomfort should not lead us to reject the consciously available kind of awareness that is essential to paradigm beliefs. Though I have indicated a nonparadoxical way of understanding the kind of awareness involved, the discomfort of fit between Hume's two lines of thought persists. If pressed, Hume might well claim that the functionally related states are not part of the *analysis* of belief but mere heuristic devices for locating the sentiment of belief.¹² On the other hand, it may be possible partially to accom-

modate the functionalist insight within Hume's outlook; but this is beyond the scope of our current discussion.¹³

Unity of Force and Vivacity and the Hydraulic Model: Hume's Evolving Thoughts

Without claiming complete success, I hope that a measure of plausibility has been given to Hume's appeals to force and vivacity—a sense of presentedness (for impressions), a recognition of an experience as one's own (for certain forms of memory), and consciously conceiving propositions or ideas in a believing way (for beliefs). The problem is that having proposed three relatively disparate accounts of force and vivacity, I cannot do justice to a central feature of the *Treatise* that calls for a univocal reading of 'force and vivacity' so that the force and vivacity of impressions fade in memory and are conveyed to the associated ideas in belief. Indeed, a central principle that underwrites much of Hume's discussion in the *Treatise* is announced shortly after his definition of belief:

when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. (T 96)

I think it is not inappropriate to think of Hume as offering something like a hydraulic model of force and vivacity. Observed constant conjunctions create canals in our mind, and a new impression comes with a fresh amount of the force and vivacity fluid which is transported across the canal to the idea at the other end.¹⁴

One use of this model occurs in Hume's discussion of the probability of chance. We throw a die where sides 1–4 are marked with 'L' and sides 5 and 6 are marked with 's,' and we suppose that none of the six sides is favored over the others. He claims: "the original impulse, and consequently the vivacity of thought, arising from the causes [namely, the die toss], is divided and split in pieces by the intermingled chances" (T 129). Evidently, the force and vivacity fluid attending the thought of the cause divides into six canals, one for each of the six sides. Bringing the figures 'L' and 's' into play, "as the same figure is presented by more than one side; 'tis evident, that the impulses belonging to all these sides must re-unite in that one figure" (T 130); as a result, the idea of a side with 'L' and that with 's' end up with $4/6$ and $2/6$ of the force and vivacity, respectively. "But as the events are contrary the impulses likewise become contrary, and the inferior destroys the superior, as far as its strength goes" (T 130). The idea of a side with 'L' ends up with $(4/6 \text{ minus } 2/6)$ or $2/6$ of the original force and vivacity (which is the "right result" if we think of 1 as full confidence and 0 as indifference).¹⁵ Clearly my tripartite account of force and

vivacity cannot accommodate the hydraulic model that underlies this account.

I believe this problem is an inescapable feature of the *Treatise* because Hume wants force and vivacity to play two roles—to distinguish between impressions, memory, and mere belief, and to underwrite the hydraulic model. A univocal account is needed for the second role, but it is implausible that such an account can perform the first role by claiming impressions, memory, and belief to be distinguished by differing degrees of the univocal force and vivacity. Vividness clearly failed, but so would conviction. When a conviction about what “must” be the case conflicts with what we take ourselves to perceive or remember, sometimes our belief overrides our memory and experience, and sometimes the belief is undermined. I think Hume must choose between a univocal account of force and vivacity that underwrites the hydraulic model and a disparate account that would allow one to distinguish among impressions, memory, and mere belief.

Given the empiricist perspective where memory is based on experience and mere belief on experience and memory, the first order of business is to make these distinctions. I suggest that Hume eventually came to see this need in his evolving thoughts about force and vivacity: While Book I of the *Treatise* presents a univocal account (more or less in terms of ordinary force and vivacity) that underwrites the hydraulic model, when he came to write the Appendix a few years later, he abandoned this univocal account and introduced (what I have called) Humean force and vivacity for beliefs. In the *Enquiry*, in addition to having distinguished Humean force and vivacity from its ordinary cousins, I suggest he finally came to abandon the hydraulic model.

That the univocal account is discarded in the Appendix might be seen in his introduction of Humean force and vivacity for beliefs. Failing to find any word to explain the manner of conception, he says:

And this different feeling I endeavor to explain by calling it a superior *force* or *vivacity* . . . This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions. (T 629)

If a univocal account of force and vivacity and of the hydraulic model it underwrites were correct, then, since the Appendix expresses no misgivings about his account of impressions, he could just say that the manner of conception involved in a mere belief is the same sentiment attending impressions, only in a weaker form. Why settle for making “use of words that express something near it” (T 629)?

In fact, in the Appendix, Hume says:

I shall also take this opportunity of confessing two other errors of less importance, which more mature reflexion has discover'd . . . The sec-

ond error may be found in Book I, page 96, where I say, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended under those terms. Had I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different *feeling*, I shou'd have been nearer the truth. (T 636)¹⁶

Since T 96 claimed belief to be a forceful and vivacious conception because that is the only way in which the manner of conception can be varied, the confessed error undercuts the argument that belief involves the force and vivacity of impressions in a weaker form. All that can now be claimed is that belief involves a particular feeling with which the idea is conceived, and the Appendix attempts to explain this feeling, not in terms of a lesser degree of force and vivacity of impressions, but by a variety of terms that express something near it. But if this much is conceded, the hydraulic model collapses, and this would entail a major revision of the *Treatise*. Precisely because of this, it is understandable that in the Appendix, Hume did not renounce the hydraulic model and face up to the consequence of his revised account of belief.

The *Enquiry* account of force and vivacity is much the same as in the Appendix with two changes that may be noted. First, while the force and vivacity of impressions continues to be seen as relatively unproblematic, as we have noted, Humean force and vivacity of impressions is distinguished from ordinary force and vivacity. ("The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation" [EHU 17].) Second, as in the Appendix, finding difficulty in defining the sentiment of belief (which again indicates it is not a weaker version of the force and vivacity of impressions), Hume says:

It may not, however, be improper to attempt a *description* of this sentiment; in hopes we may by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may afford a more perfect explication of it. I say, then, belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively . . . (EHU 49)

Here he explicitly tells us that force and vivacity only provide *analogies* for the peculiar manner of conception. A way to read this is that the manner of conception has analogies to the force and vivacity of impressions, the sense of presentedness that prevents a representation from being taken as a real landscape. But if only analogies are at stake, my disparate account can accommodate them. In seeing the rain, the sense of rain being presented can be expected to carry my noninferentially conceiving the rain in a believing manner. If I have a sense of recognizing the perception of the rain as having been my own, while the sense of presentation is lost, I still noninferentially conceive the rain in a believing manner. And if I infer the rain from the wet ground, then conceiving the rain in a believing manner remains, although noninferentiality goes by

the wayside. These might be pleaded to be differing degrees of analogy that a manner of conception can have with the force and vivacity of experience.

Turning to the hydraulic model, while the *Treatise* claimed an impression conveys part of the force and vivacity to the associated idea, the *Enquiry* formulation occurs in this rhetorical question:

Does it happen, in all these relations [resemblance, contiguity, and causation], that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it, than what otherwise it would have been able to attain? (EHU 50–51)

It is no longer being suggested that part of an impression's force and vivacity is conveyed to the believed idea; rather, it is being claimed that when we have an impression with its force and vivacity, the associated idea is conceived in the peculiar manner beliefs are. I believe this is characteristic of his discussion of part ii of Section V of the *Enquiry*: typically, we do not find a statement of the hydraulic model where the force and vivacity of an impression is conveyed to the believed idea.

The one possible exception is the following passage:¹⁷

[Given an object present to the senses, the] thought moves instantly towards it [the idea of the effect], and conveys to it all that *force of conception*, which is *derived from the impression* present to the senses. (EHU 54, my italics)

But what this passage explicitly claims is that the force and vivacity of belief is caused by the impression (and perhaps by its force and vivacity). To be a statement of the hydraulic model, the passage would have to claim: The thought conveys to the idea of the effect all that force of conception (the belief has) *from the force of the impression* present to the senses. But the passage does not claim this, and is structurally analogous to:

[Thinking about my cousins, the] thought moved instantly towards the idea of my backyard and conveyed to it all that sense of nostalgia which is derived from the memory of our having played there together.

The memory and its vivacity are the cause of the nostalgia, but it would be absurd to suggest here that the feeling of nostalgia (a Humean secondary impression) is a mere conveyance of the felt force and vivacity of memory (of a primary impression of the senses). Thus, I suggest that even the passage in question cannot be taken as a statement of the hydraulic model.

Even if it is granted that there is no statement of the hydraulic model in the *Enquiry*, this need not show that Hume abandoned it. After all, the *Enquiry* was not written in the mode of an anatomist and was intended for a larger audience than the *Treatise*; and nothing I have cited so far is inconsistent with the hydraulic model. However, I believe that Hume's *Enquiry* account of the probability of chance is at odds with his continued acceptance of the hydraulic model. Rather than the impression's force and vivacity dividing into canals and reuniting, the *Enquiry* account is:

finding a greater number of sides [to] concur in the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to that event in revolving the various possibilities. . . . This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind. (EHU 57)

Evidently, in considering each of the six equiprobable sides, we are more often led to the idea of a side with 'L' than to that of a side with 's.' This more frequent concurrence of views immediately and by *an inexplicable* contrivance of nature begets the sentiment of belief. While the hydraulic model provided an explanation in the *Treatise*, its abandonment in the *Enquiry* is indicated by the appeal to an inexplicable contrivance.¹⁸

I think we may conclude that the *Enquiry* does abandon the hydraulic model and the crude psychology it underwrites. Given that only analogical similarities between the force and vivacity of impressions and beliefs remain, the way is open for a disparate account of Hume's several appeals to force and vivacity. While my suggestion on how to give such a disparate account is not without problems, I suggest that it at least gives some measure of plausibility to Hume's several appeals to force and vivacity as a consciously available feature of our cognitive activity.¹⁹

NOTES

1. Stephen Everson ("The Difference Between Feeling and Thinking," *Mind* 97 [1988]: 401-413) urges that "Hume is explaining force and vivacity in *functional* terms. One 'perception' has greater force or vivacity than another if it is such as to produce a stronger effect on the mind" (406). Applied to memories and beliefs, Trudy Govier ("Variations on Force and Vivacity in Hume," *Philosophical Quarterly* 86 [1972]: 44-52) urged a similar view some years earlier: "To say that an idea is forceful is to say that it will influence or determine or affect subsequent ideas in certain specifiable ways" (52). She tries to account for the introspective availability of

forcefulness by appealing to the felt determination of the mind as a way of cashing out the causal feature of forcefulness. However, it seems to me that for Hume, forcefulness is directly available independently of our causal inferences.

2. Acknowledging that it would be un-Humean to take being caused by the external environment as the distinctive feature of impressions, Everson ("The Difference Between Feeling and Thinking") suggests that impressions are distinguished by being *believed* (albeit without justification) to be caused by one's physical environment. But it seems to me that within Hume's framework, the account of causation and the vulgar belief in the external world is posterior to the distinction between impressions and ideas. Govier ("Variations on Force and Vivacity") suggested that unlike 'force', 'vivacity' should be understood as clarity and degree of detail; it is this vivacity that distinguishes impressions from ideas. While this approach is in keeping with Hume's overall framework, unfortunately it is far from clear that an impression of X always has greater clarity or detail than the idea of X.

3. Wayne Waxman, "Impressions and Ideas: Vivacity as Verisimilitude," *Hume Studies* 19 (1993): 75–88. Insisting that vivacity must be an immediately detectable quality, he suggests that vivacity is verisimilitude or "our *sense* (feeling, belief) of reality" (81); impressions have the greatest amount and ideas have lesser degrees of this sense or feeling of reality.

4. Waxman has an ingenious answer to this obvious problem. He urges that there are two logically independent distinctions: a directly discernible qualitative distinction between thoughts and sensations ("Impressions and Ideas," 78), and the distinction between impressions and ideas in terms of verisimilitude; it is a contingent fact that normally sensations are impressions, but in madmen, thoughts can become impressions without thereby becoming sensations. While this would overcome the problem, I think there is virtually no textual evidence that Hume thought sense impressions and sensations to be logically distinct concepts. I shall assume hereafter that by impressions Hume meant experience in a broad sense—sensations, passions, etc.

5. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). All references to the *Treatise* are indicated by "T" followed by the page number in this edition.

6. David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1975). All references to the *Enquiry* are indicated by "EHU" followed by the page number in this edition.

7. I believe this is the most obvious objection and can be found, for example, in Barry Stroud, *Hume* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1997), 28 ff.

8. Because of the first difficulty with Hume's appeal to force and vivacity, Norman Kemp Smith (*The Philosophy of David Hume* [London: Macmillan, 1941], 210) favors the original/copy distinction for distinguishing impressions and ideas. Given Kemp Smith's acknowledgment that this option goes against much of the text, surely it would be desirable not to abandon some phenomenologically given feature to isolate impressions.

9. It might be noted that this suggestion accords with Hume's view in "Of scepticism with regards to the senses" (T I iv 2):

That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something *distinct, or independent, and external*, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. (T 189)

10. Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 165–180.

11. My suggestion here about the self-intimating nature of paradigm beliefs has some obvious similarities with the views of Sidney Shoemaker (in, for example, his "Self-Knowledge and 'Inner Sense,'" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54 [1994]): 249–269. However, quite different morals seem to be involved. Shoemaker takes it that for rational beings self-intimation makes no essential addition to belief that can be understood as a functional state which is realized in brain states. My suggestion is that, insofar as self-intimation is essentially a conscious activity that is phenomenologically available, having paradigm beliefs is also a conscious activity that is introspectively or phenomenologically available. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to determine with any finality what is the right moral to draw from the self-intimation of beliefs, and the issue may well be as deep as the issue of what separates Kant from Hume.

12. This is very close to the suggestion of Patric Maher ("Probability in Hume's Science of Man," *Hume Studies* 7 [1981]: 137–153; see 139.

13. The functionalist insight that seems irresistible is that no act of the mind could properly be called believing unless under suitable conditions one was led to infer and to feel and to act in certain ways. To accommodate this insight, I think one might plead something like a mentalistic (or dualistic) variant of standard functionalism. Just as standard functionalists claim mental states to be realized in our brain states, a conscious activity might (also) be said to realize the functional state of conceiving in a believing way if the conscious activity is causally or in other appropriate ways related to the realizations of the functionally related states of inferring and acting. One would then have to learn that an introspectively given manner of conception is a believing manner of conception; brutes may well not be able to learn this, despite conceiving in a believing way, and may thereby be deprived of the self-intimation of those beliefs. Any development of this sketchy suggestion is beyond the scope of this paper.

14. An interesting attempt to align Hume's force and vivacity to the fluid mechanics of Hume's day can be found in Robert Feinsein, "Some New Thoughts on David Hume," *Second Order* 5 (1976): 44–50.

15. This accords with Maher's account ("Probability in Hume's Science of Man" 141).

16. I owe this quotation to David Owen who argued for a thesis similar to mine at the 25th International Hume Conference, Stirling, Scotland, 1998, the meeting at which an earlier version of the present paper was also presented.

17. I owe this citation to Peter Sullivan who commented on my paper at the 1998 Hume Conference, and confessed that except for this passage he could find no statement of the hydraulic model in the *Enquiry*.

18. It is true that he immediately adds:

If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigor; renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion. (EHU 57)

To the extent that there is any explanation at all, it would rely on the (alleged) fact that each time we consider a possible outcome in our survey of the possible outcomes, a degree of vivacity or belief attaches to an idea that is realized by that outcome. Assuming the attached vivacities are additive, the idea of a side with 'L' gets "imprinted more strongly" because several possible outcomes realize that idea. (Given the alleged fact, further elaborations are suggested by Maher, "Probability in Hume's Science of Man.") This may "perhaps in some measure" explain the "inexplicable contrivance of nature." But only in *some measure*, as Hume acknowledges, because no explanation is provided for any degree of vivacity attaching to an idea by our considering an outcome that realizes that idea. This is what the hydraulic model explained by an impression's unit of force and vivacity dividing (before reuniting). Just because the *Enquiry* only claims to provide a (possible) *partial* explanation, the *Enquiry* seems to have abandoned the hydraulic model.

19. In writing this paper, I am indebted to my colleague Noel Fleming for numerous comments and suggestions, and I have also benefited from discussions with my colleague Kevin Falvey and comments by David Owen, Peter Sullivan, Peter Millican, Ted Morris, and Phil Cummins at the 1998 Hume Conference.