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Substantive Differences between Two Texts of Hume's *Treatise*

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Because our student edition of Hume's *Treatise*¹ has appeared before publication of our critical edition of the same work, scholars using the former will find it difficult to determine how and where the text of the *Treatise* found there differs substantively from other editions, and from, most importantly, the widely used version of the text edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch.² Fortunately, we now have this opportunity to report the substantive differences between the text found in the OPT *Treatise* and the text found in SBN. In addition, this report allows us to focus on many of the substantive emendations we have made to the copytext and to bring to these emendations a level of attention they might not otherwise receive.

Some preliminary clarifications are in order. We are currently in the process of producing, as one part of the planned *Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume*, a critical edition of the *Treatise of Human Nature*.³ As one part of this effort, we have established a *critical text* of this work. In doing so, we have with great regularity followed the readings provided by a *copytext*. We have also prepared for this critical edition a critical apparatus that reports in comprehensive detail how the critical text differs from the copytext. In doing so, we have distinguished between what bibliographers typically call *substantive differences* and *accidental* or *formal differences*. While many scholars are generally familiar with these terms, a brief review of them will help to avoid misunder-

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standings about our larger purposes and our purposes in this relatively brief article.

Two of the terms mentioned, *critical edition* and *critical text*, may appear to be synonyms, but they are not. A text is a *critical text* only if at least one editor has exercised principled and systematic editorial judgment over the *substantive* components of the text (over each word and each related set of words—each sentence or paragraph, for example) and also over each *accidental* or *formal* component of the text (over orthography, capitalization, punctuation, italics, etc.). This judgment will be “principled and systematic” only if it explicitly includes a thorough examination of all available historical evidence, including evidence of variant readings, concerning the text.

The process that produces a critical text of a modern author ordinarily starts from an authoritative printed text—from, where such a copy exists, a particular copy of the text produced as part of an edition seen through the press by the author.⁴ In the past it was typically the *edition* chosen that was designated the *copytext*, but at least some bibliographers now use this term in a narrower sense. By *copytext* these scholars mean a *particular copy* of an authoritative edition of the text, namely, that particular copy from which an editor begins the process of producing a critical edition. We here use *copytext* in this earlier, less restricted sense.⁵

From what has been said, it will be seen that the copytext provides editors intent on producing a critical text with a starting point. It provides editors with that version of the text over which principled and systematic judgment is to be exercised. Moreover, the copytext provides editors with substantial guidance in their efforts to establish a critical text, for, having settled on a copytext, editors follow the readings and forms of that text *unless they find good reasons to do otherwise*. These “good reasons” may be many and varied, but they include such things as the evidence provided by any holograph corrections or amendments in the hand of the author, the recognition of misprints of several kinds, and changes in printing style (the discontinuance of the use of small caps at the beginning of each paragraph, for example). Clearly, then, the critical text of an early modern author such as Hume will be decidedly different from a facsimile of the copytext and also in many ways different from what is sometimes called a *diplomatic edition* of that text.⁶

Editors who have established a critical text will go on to produce a critical edition of the work in question only if they also provide, along with this text, several other items: a history of the text; explanation of the choice of copytext;⁷ a report of variant readings; and an explanation or rationale for, and a complete record of, each emendation of the copytext. (Meticulous oversight of the printing of the text and these associated materials is taken for granted.)⁸ The OPT edition of the *Treatise* uses the critical text prepared for the Clarendon edition of the same work. But because the OPT edition was prepared for stu-

dents, it includes none of these required, additional features. Consequently, it is not a critical edition.

It should also be noted that, although the present article does list many of the substantive differences between copytext and critical text, it is not the complete critical apparatus that will constitute an essential part of the forthcoming critical edition of the *Treatise*. As we have already said, this article records (with the exception noted in item 1 of the next paragraph) only the substantive differences between our critical text and the widely used SBN text. Further differences between the critical text and the copytext, including accidental differences, textual variants, and those substantive emendations in which the critical text and the text of SBN agree, will be recorded in the forthcoming Clarendon *Treatise*.

In addition, it is important to note that:

1. Because the critical text indicates, by a superscript^{App}, where material from the Appendix originally published in volume 3 of the copytext is incorporated into the critical text of Book 1 in accordance with Hume's instructions, we say nothing more about these incorporations here even though they are not made in SBN.⁹

2. Although the critical text incorporates virtually all of the authorial holograph corrections found in two separate copies of volumes 1 and 2 of the copytext, and the authorial holograph amendments found in a copy of volume 3 of the copytext, alterations based on these holograph materials are discussed here only when the critical text differs from the text of SBN.¹⁰ The same proviso holds for the corrections called for by the Errata found in volumes 1 and 3.¹¹

3. The distinction between accidental or formal and substantive changes is not always clear. An alteration of singular to plural or plural to singular is on some occasions clearly significant. At other times, as when a subject and verb are made to agree in number, the change may seem to be only formal. We have here chosen to err, if we do err, on the side of inclusiveness, leaving it to the reader to decide whether the changes listed are or are not substantive.

4. No matter how principled and systematic its editors may be, the establishment of a critical text is a matter of judgment. On such matters other editors and other scholars may sometimes reasonably disagree, as we have ourselves sometimes disagreed with each other or even with a decision we ourselves took at another time. In preparing this article we have assumed that discussion of the proper substantive form of the text of the *Treatise* (and of the rest of Hume's works) is an important aspect of Hume scholarship deserving greater attention than it has received, and thus we anticipate learning of such reasoned disagreement.¹²

The entries in the list below *generally* follow the form of entry 1. First we give page and line numbers of *the critical text* (now available only in the OPT edition) of the *Treatise*:

9.27;¹³

followed by, in parentheses, book, part, section, and paragraph numbers as found in the critical text:

(1.1.1.8);¹⁴

followed by the *lemma*—the relevant word or phrase of the critical text—and a right-hand square bracket:

impression];

followed by the unemended text as found in the copytext and in SBN:

impressions;

followed, in curly brackets, by the volume, page, and line number of the unemended text in the copytext and then by the page and line number of the text of SBN:

{1739 1.17.29; SBN 5.13};

followed, on the few occasions that Green and Grose emend the text exactly as we have, by a second appearance of the emended text, with volume, page, and line number in that edition:¹⁵

impression {GG 1.314.32};

followed by an excerpt of the critical text showing the emended text in context, with the word(s) in question shaded:

On the other hand we find, that any **impression** either of the mind or body is constantly follow'd by an idea, which resembles it . . .

Whenever the reason for the emendation has not been explained previously, we provide a brief statement of our reasons for making the change in question. See entry 1 for an example.

Some changes follow a common pattern and thus can be explained *en bloc*. These changes, and the explanations of them, are:

A. Changes from plural to singular or from singular to plural. Some such emendations are needed to produce subject-verb agreement or for other equally obvious reasons; see entries 30, 33, 36, 39, 41, 43, 48, 63, 66, 67, and 85.

Changes of this type resulting from more complex considerations are individually explained.

B. Minor changes (adding or deleting a preposition, for example) required to make the critical text syntactically correct; see entries 18, 25, 34, 47, 52, 59, 62, and 71.

C. Changes from 'these' to 'those' or from 'those' to 'these'.¹⁶ Among the more common compositorial errors found in texts set from holograph copy are substitutions of 'those' for 'these' and 'these' for 'those'. Compositors would occasionally have had difficulty, especially when working in poor artificial light, distinguishing between these two words. If aware of an uncertain letter (Is that an 'e' or an 'o'?) a compositor would have had to make a judgment, and on some occasions would have judged contrary to the author's intention.¹⁷ On other occasions a compositor would simply have misread a manuscript or have had ill-sorted type. Finally, authors do occasionally miswrite, and 'these' and 'those' are at least as likely to be miswritten as any other words.

We have concluded that errors involving 'these' and 'those' have occurred on ten occasions in the copytext. Hume himself has corrected two such errors: at 130.4 (1.4.2.18) and at 175.28 (1.4.7.10), where he inserts an 'e' and deletes an 'o'. Both of these corrections are incorporated in SBN; see 194.32 and 269.30.¹⁸ On five other occasions we have judged the context to require 'these' rather than 'those' (see entries 64, 65, 69, 78, 82). On three occasions we have judged the context to require 'those' rather than 'these' (see entries 17, 23, 35). In reaching these conclusions we have most often been influenced by the relative proximity of the antecedents to which 'these' or 'those' refer,¹⁹ and also by finding in the immediately preceding or following text the pronoun in the form we have adopted. Entries 64 and 65 taken together provide an apt illustration of these factors.

1. 9.27 (1.1.1.8) impression] impressions {1739 1.17.29; SBN 5.13} | impression {GG 1.314.32}

On the other hand we find, that any ~~impression~~ either of the mind or body is constantly follow'd by an idea, which resembles it . . .

That 'impression' should be singular is indicated by the fact that the perception in question is said to give rise to a singular 'idea' and is referred to by a singular pronoun, 'it'. Nidditch suggested (SBN 668) that the plural form might be in error, but did not alter the text of SBN.

2. 23.20 (1.2.1.2) quantity] quality {1739 1.54.23; SBN 27.4}

It requires scarce any induction to conclude from hence, that the *idea*, which we form of any finite **quantity**, is not infinitely divisible . . .

Hume goes on in the next paragraph to focus on our ideas of fractional parts or quantities (thousandths and ten thousandths) of grains of sand, and to insist that these ideas, although nominally different, are indistinguishable. The remaining paragraphs of the section discuss the parts of entities (ink spots, mites), but not the qualities of these entities. The phrase 'finite quantity' is repeated at 34.9 (1.2.4.14); at 39.32 (1.2.4.32) we are told that 'no idea of quantity is infinitely divisible'. There are no relevantly similar discussions of finite qualities.

3. 24.17 (1.2.1.5) these] there {1739 1.56.26; SBN 28.13}

Nothing can be more minute, than some ideas, which we form in the fancy; and images, which appear to the senses; since **these** are ideas and images perfectly simple and indivisible.

It is not simply that some ideas are perfectly simple and indivisible. It is, rather, that the very ideas under discussion, the smallest ideas of the imagination and the smallest images of the senses, are perfectly simple and indivisible.

4. 24.21–2 (1.2.1.5) of those minute parts] of these minute objects {1739 1.57.4–5} | of those minute objects {SBN 28.18–19}

This mistake we are not sensible of; but taking the impressions **of those minute parts**, which appear to the senses, to be equal or nearly equal to the objects . . .

We follow here the correction found in Hume's Errata rather than his holograph corrections in the Kames and Pope copies. These latter amend the text to read 'of those minute objects', the reading accepted by Nidditch in SBN. This reading, which makes certain 'minute objects . . . nearly equal to the objects', we find less likely than that which makes certain 'minute parts . . . nearly equal to the objects'. Supporting this judgment is the discussion of 'minute parts' in the previous paragraph (1.2.1.4), the reference to 'parts' at the end of the previous sentence, and Hume's insistence, near the end of 1.2.1.5, that, to have a 'just notion' of mites or even smaller insects, 'we must have a distinct idea representing every part of them'.

5. 26.35 (1.2.2.7) reasoning] reason {1739 1.63.21-2; SBN 32.14}

... I will here take them in a body, and endeavour by a short and decisive **reasoning** to prove at once, that 'tis utterly impossible they can have any just foundation.

Hume goes on in 1.2.2.8–10 to provide an argument, not merely a single reason, in support of his position. Thus 'reasoning' more clearly captures what he goes on to do. In addition, Hume on several occasions speaks of 'decisive' arguments (see 1.2.3.12, note 12.2, 1.4.6.16, for example) and once of a 'reasoning' that is the 'shortest and most decisive imaginable' (1.3.14.24).

6. 50.15 (1.3.1.1) ideas] idea {1739 1.126.14; SBN 69.20}

And as the power, by which one object produces another, is never discoverable merely from their **ideas**, 'tis evident . . .

There will be, on Hume's account of things, a distinct idea of each of the distinct objects (a cause and an effect) mentioned, and hence a plural form is needed here.

7. 70.32 (1.3.8.5) impression.²¹] impression. {1739 1.179.19 and 3.294.23–4; SBN 100.24}

... for want of some immediate impression.²¹

The Appendix calls for the note marker for *Treatise* note 21 to be added at 70.32. SBN adds an asterisk calling attention to the note in the Appendix (SBN 630), but adds it at the wrong place—at 100.24 (the equivalent of OPT 70.23), where the words 'immediate impression' also occur.

8. 75.41 (1.3.9.5) objects] object {1739 1.194.01; SBN 109.2}

As to the influence of contiguity and resemblance, we may observe, that if the contiguous and resembling **objects** be comprehended in this system of realities . . .

We judge that the relevant noun here refers to the objects related to the idea of Rome, and not to the idea of Rome itself, and thus conclude that this noun should be plural. (Those familiar with Hume's manuscripts will know that it is sometimes difficult to tell whether he has or has not added an 's' to make a plural.)

9. 81.9–30 (1.3.9.19–1.3.10.2) {1739 1.208.28–1.210.15; SBN 117.29–118.22}

. . . tho' in reality it be built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our **experience or reasonings** from causes and effects.²²

Sect. 10. *Of the influence of belief*

1 But tho' education be disclaim'd by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion, it prevails nevertheless in the world, and is the cause why all systems, **upon whatever convincing arguments they may be founded**, are apt to be rejected at first as new and unusual. This perhaps will be the fate of what I have here advanc'd concerning *belief*, **and our reasonings from causes to effects**; and tho' the proofs I have produc'd appear to me perfectly conclusive, I expect not to make many proselytes to my opinion

2 Nature **has** implanted in the human mind a perception of **good or evil, or in other words**, of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions . . . They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling and experience, or only in idea, as at present when I mention them.

In order to make room to insert, by means of a cancel (by means, that is, of a substitute leaf) at the end of 1.3.9.19, a footnote (*Treatise* note 22) amplifying his use of 'imagination', Hume abbreviated the text of three paragraphs. Previous posthumous editions of the *Treatise* have used this abbreviated text. Our critical text restores that part of the original text not made redundant by the inserted footnote. Above we give the relevant parts of the critical text with all substantive differences to SBN shaded.

10. 84.41–85.44 (1.3.10.10–12) {1739 1.218.22–1.219–5; SBN 123.27–36}

Following Hume's directions, we have inserted three paragraphs that were first printed in the Appendix to volume 3 (1739 3.295.18–298.22). Although Hume did not take note of the fact, this addition makes the paragraph printed below redundant and thus it has been omitted from our text. (The omitted text will be printed in the critical apparatus of the Clarendon edition.)

We may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree; only with this difference, that the least reflection dissipates the illusions of poetry, and places the objects in their proper light. 'Tis however certain, that in the warmth of a poetical enthusiasm, a poet has a counterfeit belief, and even a kind of vision of his objects: And if there be any shadow of argument to support this belief, nothing contributes more to his full conviction than a blaze of poetical figures and images,

which have their effect upon the poet himself, as well as upon his readers.

11. 85.35 (1.3.10.11) external] eternal {1739 3.298.05; SBN 632.2}

This observation makes us only lend ourselves, so to speak, to the fiction: But causes the idea to feel very different from the external establish'd persuasions founded on memory and custom.

It may seem unlikely that Hume meant to speak of those beliefs that derive from memory and custom, in contrast to the fictions of poetry, as 'external' persuasions, but it is even less likely that he meant to speak of 'eternal' persuasions. He makes the remark in question in the midst of a discussion that contrasts what he calls loose fictions, chimeras of the brain, and the ideas of poetry with those beliefs that arise from experience. In this context, a contrast between internal and external beliefs makes good Humean sense, while a contrast between internal and eternal beliefs, whatever these latter might be, does not. Moreover, although it is clear that Hume supposes all perceptions are in the most fundamental sense internal, at 1.4.2.7 (127.8) he distinguishes between 'external and internal' impressions.

12. n23 (96) Sects. 9, 10] Page 9, 10 {1739 1.248n; SBN 140n}

This note has evoked a variety of responses. The editor of the 1825 edition (reissued 1826; reprinted Boston, 1854, and as the Everyman edition), apparently found the reference to pages 9–10 (to, in effect, the final *paragraph* of the Introduction) so puzzling, or so unlikely, that he deleted the note altogether. Other editors have supposed the original note to be correct and have sent readers to the final two pages of the Introduction to the *Treatise*. SBN sends readers to two non-existent pages, xxii and xxiii.

The solution to the difficulty lies in noting two things. First, with the exception of a single note printed in the Appendix to volume 3, a note that refers to a precise page in volume 1, a work printed nearly two years earlier, no other note in the copytext cites a page number. All other notes refer to some segment of the work, a section; a part and section; or a section, part, and book. When the intended section is within the part where the note occurs, a section and its number typically constitute a complete note (for examples, see the notes to 1.4.7.4–5). This manner of cross-referencing is exactly what one would expect in a mid-eighteenth-century work. Authors typically would not have seen page proofs and would not have been able to use page numbers when making internal or cross-references.

Second, it is implausible to suppose that Hume intended to send the reader to the final paragraph of the Introduction to the *Treatise*. Neither in that paragraph nor elsewhere in the Introduction does he discuss the voluntary rep-

etition of ideas or the other topics of 1.3.12.23, the paragraph in which the reference is found. This means that we must look elsewhere for the targeted discussions. We find these in 1.3.9 and 1.3.10 (sections 9 and 10 of Part 3, the part in which the note occurs). At 1.3.9.17 Hume speaks of the 'frequent repetition' of ideas; at 1.3.10.6 he speaks of their 'constant repetition'. We conclude, therefore, that 'Sects. 9, 10' is the correct reading.

13. 101.15 (1.3.13.11) unphilosophical] philosophical {1739 1.262.11-12} | [unphilosophical] {SBN 149.4}

But why need we seek for other instances, while the present subject of **unphilosophical** probabilities offers us so obvious an one . . .

The subject of 1.3.13 is unphilosophical probability; Hume also calls it the 'present subject' of 1.3.13.11, the paragraph in which the emendation is made. Nidditch alters Selby-Bigge's query, '[unphilosophical?]', found in a footnote to the unrevised Selby-Bigge edition at p. 149, to '[unphilosophical]'.²⁰

14. 102.1 (1.3.13.12) reasoning] reasonings {1739 1.264.9; SBN 150.9}

But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of **reasoning**; which is the cause of our rejecting it.

Although Hume does often use the plural form, 'reasonings', we judge him here to be speaking of reasoning in general, and thus to have intended to use the singular form, as he has in 1.4.4.1 (148.40).

15. 103.37 (1.3.13.17) passions] passion {1739 1.269.11; SBN 153.8}

The labour of the thought disturbs the regular progress of the sentiments . . . The idea strikes not on us with such vivacity; and consequently has no such influence on the **passions** and imagination.

The context indicates that Hume means to make a comment about the passions in general, about the 'sentiments' of which he has just spoken, a comment parallel to that made about the imagination. Consequently, the plural form is needed.

16. 107.35 (1.3.14.9) inactive] unactive {1739 1.280.5–6; SBN 159.26}

Matter, say they, is in itself entirely **inactive**, and depriv'd of any power . . .

We emend to match the otherwise entirely consistent usage of the *Treatise*; see 1.4.5.35, 3.1.1.7, and 3.1.1.10. For cognate forms of 'inactive', see 1.3.2.7 and 1.4.5.31

17. 119.6 (1.3.16.4) those] these {1739 1.310.15; SBN 177.19}

. . . and see whether it will equally account for the reasonings of beasts as for **those** of the human species.

18. 124.38 (1.4.1.11) to render] render {1739 1.325.26} | [to] render {SBN 186.11}

. . . but even the disposition chang'd, so as **to** render us incapable of a sudden transition from one action to the other . . .

19. 131.5 (1.4.2.20) upon opening] {1739 1.343.16–17}| upon opening it {SBN 196.22}

I receive a letter, which **upon opening** I perceive by the hand-writing and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two hundred leagues distant.

On the grounds that the resulting change would be stylistically undesirable and fail to add clarity, we have chosen to follow the copytext rather than to make the change (adding the 'it', to produce 'upon opening it I') called for by Hume in his Errata and inserted by him in the Kames and Pope copies.

20. 134.7 (1.4.2.29) identity] unity {1739 1.351.25; SBN 201.18}

Or on the other hand, we may trace the succession of time by a like succession of ideas, and conceiving first one moment, along with the object then existent, imagine afterwards a change in the time without any *variation* or *interruption* in the object; in which case it gives us the idea of **identity**. Here then is an idea, which is a medium betwixt unity and number; or more properly speaking, is either of them, according to the view, in which we take it: And this idea we call that of identity.

1.4.2.29 is intended to explain how we arrive at the idea of the relation of identity, a relation that is said to 'lie in something that is neither' number nor

unity, a seemingly impossible position (1.4.2.28). To this end, Hume begins ¶29 by reminding us that the idea of time is dependent on a succession or change of objects and thus that it is only by means of a ‘fiction of the imagination’ that an unchanging object gives rise to the ‘notion of identity’, the notion of remaining the same over time. He then tells us that we may consider any two points of time or moments as simultaneous, ‘in which case they give us the idea of number’. Or we can think of these two moments as succeeding one another in the normal way (as instantiating the required change of object that produces the idea of time), and then *imagine* that this succession has taken place without the required succession or change of object. This exercise of the imagination gives rise, Hume says, to an ‘idea, which is a medium betwixt unity and number . . . And this idea we call that of identity’. In the interim, however, he or his compositor has written that it is the ‘idea of unity’ that is the ‘medium betwixt unity and number’. This is a mistake. To reply to the question, “What idea occupies the middle ground between the idea of unity and the idea of number?” with “The idea of unity” is either to fail to answer the question or to begin an infinite regress. Given that (1) Hume has undertaken to provide the provenance of the idea of identity; (2) he goes on to say of the idea that occupies the middle ground in question that it is ‘this idea we call that of identity’; and (3) this response is an intelligible answer to the question raised, we conclude that the text should be emended as we have emended it.

21. 141.39 (1.4.2.50) interrupted] uninterrupted {1739 1.373.02; SBN 213.32}

Our perceptions are our only objects: Resembling perceptions are the same, however broken or **interrupted** in their appearance: This appearing interruption is contrary to the identity: The interruption consequently extends not beyond the appearance . . .

This passage occurs near the beginning of Hume’s explanation of how it is that the imagination leads us to believe that certain of our ‘sensible perceptions have . . . a continu’d and uninterrupted existence’. More precisely, he hopes to explain why we take sets of ‘resembling perceptions’ to be identical even though our experience of these perceptions is always of discrete or discontinuous units. The only reading supported by this context is ‘broken and interrupted’. That Hume in the following sentence twice refers to the ‘interruption’ that affects our perceptions supports this conclusion.

22. 143.31(1.4.2.54) *perceptions*] *perception* (1739 1.378.10–11; SBN 216.34)

That opinion, therefore, is deriv'd from nothing but the quality of the fancy above-explain'd, *that it borrows all its ideas from some precedent perceptions*.

The preceding explanation is at 1.1.3.2. There Hume argues that 'neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination . . . can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent *impressions* have gone before to prepare the way for them . . .' (italics added).

23. 147.10 (1.4.3.8) those] these (1739 1.388.15; SBN 222.30)

. . . and yet is deriv'd from principles as natural as any of those above-explain'd.

24. 147.39 (1.4.3.9) punishments] punishment (1739 1.390.10; SBN 223.32)

. . . and such as the poets have given us but a faint notion of in their descriptions of the *punishments* of *Sisyphus* and *Tantalus*.

Sisyphus and *Tantalus* had each his own punishment, and thus a plural form is needed.

25. 163.24 (1.4.5.32) aught] ought (1739 1.434.12; SBN 249.34)

. . . it follows, that for *aught* we can determine by the mere ideas, any thing may be the cause or effect of any thing . . .

26. 169.23 (1.4.6.16) co-temporary] contemporary (1739 1.450.25; SBN 259.25)

. . . and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either *co-temporary* or successive.

We have emended to match the otherwise entirely consistent usage of the *Treatise* (see 1.3.2.7, where 'co-temporary' is used three times, and 1.4.5.12) because we suppose that 'co-temporary' is Hume's preferred form and that it better captures the intent of the passage in question. We note, however, that the OED, entry 'contemporary, a. and n.' suggests that 'co-temporary', the prevalent eighteenth-century form in the decades following 1725, is merely another form of 'contemporary'. If this suggestion is correct, then this emendation is not a substantive one.

27. 185.7 (2.1.3.5) passions] passion {1739 2.13.1; SBN 281.26}

But tho' the causes of pride and humility be plainly *natural*, we shall find upon examination, that they are not *original*, and that 'tis utterly impossible they shou'd each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision, and primary constitution of nature . . . 'Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these was foreseen and provided for by nature, and that every new production of art, which causes pride or humility; instead of adapting itself to the **passions** by partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the mind; is itself the object of an original principle . . .

The context indicates that Hume is here discussing two passions, pride and humility, and hence the plural form is required.

28. 185.23 (2.1.3.6) passions] passion {1739 2.14.1; SB 282.12}

How much more must this be true with regard to the human mind, which being so confin'd a subject may justly be thought incapable of containing such a monstrous heap of principles, as wou'd be necessary to excite the passions of pride and humility, were each distinct cause adapted to the **passions** by a distinct set of principles?

Again, the context indicates that Hume is discussing the causes of both pride and humility.

29. 186.36–187.2 (2.1.4.5) {1739 2.17.19–18.13; SBN 284.15–30}

Hume's citation of *Spectator* 412 differs from the original substantively as well as in punctuation and spelling. We have emended the text of the *Treatise* so that it conforms to the text of *The Spectator* found in the Hume library.²¹ The individual substantive differences that result are:

- 186.38 is it] it is
- 186.40 water] waters
- 186.43 pleasures] pleasure
- 187.2 their] the

The complete passage from the *Spectator*:

As the fancy delights in every thing that is great, strange, or beautiful, and is still more pleased the more it finds of these perfections in the *same* object, so **is it** capable of receiving a new satisfaction by the assistance of another sense. Thus any continued sound, as the musick

of birds, or a fall of **water**, awakens every moment the mind of the beholder, and makes him more attentive to the several beauties of the place that lye before him. Thus if there arises a fragraney of smells or perfumes, they heighten the **pleasures** of the imagination, and make even the colours and verdure of the landskip appear more agreeable; for the ideas of both senses recommend each other, and are pleasanter together than when they enter the mind separately: As the different colours of a picture, when they are well disposed, set off one another, and receive an additional beauty from the advantage of **their** situation.

30. 196.3 (2.1.8.2) makes] make {1739 2.43.22; SBN 299.32}

. . . and since the power of producing pain and pleasure **makes** in this manner the essence of beauty and deformity . . .

31. 198.14 (2.1.9.1) of] or {1739 2.50.13; SBN 303.21}

But tho' pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is *self*, for their natural and more immediate causes, we find by experience, that there are many other objects, which produce these affections We found a vanity upon houses, gardens, equipages, as well as upon personal merit and accomplishments; and tho' these external advantages be in themselves widely distant from thought of a person, yet they considerably influence even a passion, which is directed to that as its ultimate object.

Hume is contrasting, as causes of pride and humility, the qualities of the self with 'external advantages'. Given this context, and the singular 'to that' of the concluding clause, we conclude that 'of' is the correct reading.

32. 200.33 (2.1.9.9) the] their {1739 2.57.9}; [the] {SBN 307.21}; the {GG 2.103.11}

The beauty, address, merit, credit and honours of their kindred are carefully display'd by the proud, as some of **the** most considerable sources of their vanity.

33. 215.16 (2.2.1.6) *produces*] *produce* {1739 2.98.21–2; SBN 331.6}; *produces* {GG 2.122.39}

. . . and that the cause of the former **produces** a separate pleasure, and of the latter a separate uneasiness.

34. 216.1 (2.2.1.9) those they] those {1739 2.100.20; SBN 332.10}

. . . nor cou'd men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those ~~they~~ themselves have entertain'd.

35. 216.16 (2.2.2.1) those] these {1739 2.101.19; SBN 332.30}

But that we may place this system beyond doubt both with regard to love and hatred, pride and humility, 'twill be proper to make some new experiments upon all these passions, as well as to recal a few of ~~those~~ observations, which I have formerly touch'd upon.

36. 226.42 (2.2.3.6) passions] passion {1739 2.131.16}; [passions] {SBN 350.7}

But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the ~~passions~~ of love and hatred?

37. 239.41 (2.2.7.6) is the] is {1739 2.168.10; SBN 371.20}

. . . that he is ~~the~~ more worthy of compassion the less sensible he is of his miserable condition.

Nidditch did not make the correction called for by Hume's holograph insertion in the Kames copy of the *Treatise*.

38. 240.4 (2.2.7.6) {1739 2.168n; SBN 371n}

Because they have misperceived the physical evidence, previous editors have supposed that Hume arranged to add at the end of 2.2.7, by means of a cancel, a second note on the imagination. While it is true that a cancel was printed to replace pp. 167–8 (M4) of volume 2, this cancel *removes the note*, apparently because Hume had found it inadequate and had replaced it with the longer note (note 22) inserted at 81.11.²² The two copies of volume 2 that we know Hume to have taken pains with, the copies presented to Henry Home (Lord Kames after 1752) and Alexander Pope, are both amended in this way. The stub of M4 is clearly visible, and the new leaf (the cancel) includes no note. In addition, careful examination of copies including the note show that in them M4 is not a cancel but a conjugate leaf—it is an integral part of the folded sheet that constitutes gathering M. The text of the deleted note is included in the Annotations of the OPT edition; see p. 515.

39. 241.3 (2.2.8.4) excites] excite {1739 2.171.26; SBN 373.23}

. . . any very numerous collection of objects, such as an army, a fleet, a crowd, ~~excites~~ in the mind a sensible emotion . . .

40. 243.18 (2.2.8.12) pursuits] pursuit {1739 2.178.20; SBN 377.18}

. . . when they perceive their inferiors approaching or overtaking them in the **pursuits** of glory or happiness.

Nidditch did not make the correction called for by Hume's holograph insertion in the Kames copy of the *Treatise*.

41. 246.23 (2.2.9.4) motive] motives {1739 2.187.25; SBN 382.22}

A man, who from any **motive** has entertain'd a resolution of performing an action, naturally runs into every other view or motive, which may fortify that resolution, and give it authority and influence on the mind.

42. 247.16 (2.2.9.8) have] has {1739 2.190.11; SBN 384.1}

. . . and if in the one case, the cause and effect **have** a farther relation of resemblance, they have that of contrariety in the other . . .

Nidditch did not make the correction called for by Hume's holograph insertion in the Kames copy of the *Treatise*.

43. 257.27 (2.3.1.3) is] are {1739 2. 221.11; SBN 400.12}

. . . we shall begin with examining matter, and considering on what the idea of a necessity in its operations **is** founded . . .

44. 260.38 (2.3.1.15) takes] makes {1739 2.230.17; SBN 405.15}

A general, who conducts an army, **takes** account of a certain degree of courage.

This correction may seem both obvious and uncontroversial, but the OED (see *account* 13) records a relevant seventeenth-century use of the phrase 'make account of'. However, nowhere in his philosophical works does Hume use 'make account of' in the relevant sense, but he does use 'taking an account of' in "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," ¶13.

45. 269.33 (2.3.4.3) caprices] caprice {1739 2.256.27; SBN 420.13}

When a person is once heartily in love, the little faults and **caprices** of his mistress, the jealousies and quarrels . . .

Nidditch did not make the correction called for by Hume's holograph insertion in the Kames copy of the *Treatise*.

46. 277.13 (2.3.8.2) gives] give {1739 2.279.22}; [gives] {SBN 432.27}

. . . the mere view and contemplation of any greatness, whether successive or extended, enlarges the soul, and **gives** it a sensible delight and pleasure.

As Hume here and elsewhere appears to treat 'view and contemplation' as a single unit (see 2.1.7.5, 3.1.2.11, and especially 1.3.8.4), we have brought about subject-verb agreement by changing 'give' to 'gives'.

47. 284.1 (2.3.9.19) side, you'll] side, and you'll {1739 2.299.28–300.1; SBN 444.1}

. . . by diminishing the probability on that **side, you'll** see the passion clear every moment, till it changes insensibly into hope . . .

48. 284.13 (2.3.9.20) probability] probabilities {1739 2.300.22; SBN 444.16}

Both these kinds of **probability** cause fear and hope . . .

The emended text follows the usage found at 1.3.13.1 and in the *Dissertation on the Passions* 1.5, where this sentence is repeated.

49. 288.32 (2.3.10.8) familiar] similar {1739 2.313.21; SBN 451.23}

To illustrate all this by a **familiar** instance, I shall observe, that there cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other, than those of hunting and philosophy . . .

Three considerations support this correction: (1) no 'similar instance' precedes the one Hume goes on to mention—the comparison of hunting and philosophy is the first illustration of the point he wishes to make; (2) assuming Hume did not mistakenly write 'similar' when he meant 'familiar', the compositor could easily enough have misread the manuscript and made the error; (3) the comparison of hunting and philosophy had been made familiar by Erasmus' popular *The Praise of Folly*.²³

50. 298.5 (3.1.1.16) actions] judgments {1740 3.14.5}; [actions] {SBN 463.1}

And as to the judgments, which are caus'd by our **actions**, they can still less bestow those moral qualities on the actions, which are their causes.

That Hume meant 'actions' is clear from the remainder of the sentence.

51. 300.9 (3.1.1.23) requisite] required {1740 3.19.21; SBN 466.12–13}

Thus it will be impossible to fulfil the first condition **requisite** to the system of eternal rational measures of right and wrong . . .

By emending 'required to' to 'requisite to' we substitute for an unidiomatic phrase uncharacteristic of the *Treatise* a more idiomatic phrase that the copy-text uses in the first line of the preceding paragraph (3.1.1.22), and more than thirty times elsewhere.

52. 310.20 (3.2.1.13) for] to {1740 3.46.21; SBN 482.23}

What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something **for** my family?

53. 315.29–30 (3.2.2.11) words . . . them] words . . . it {1740 3.61.10–12} | word . . . it {SBN 491.5–7}

Those, therefore, who make use of the **words** *property*, or *right*, or *obligation*, before they have explain'd the origin of justice, or even make use of **them** in that explication, are guilty of a very gross fallacy, and can never reason upon any solid foundation.

Our emendation of this passage follows the directions given in Hume's Errata to volume 3, rather than the holograph amendment found in his copy of this volume. SBN conforms to the holograph amendment.

54. 318.22 (3.2.2.18) man] men {1740 3.69.4; SBN 495.29}

*that 'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of **man**, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin.*

That Hume wrote, or meant to write, the generic singular is indicated by the subsequent use of *his*. He speaks of the 'generosity of man' again in the second paragraph following (3.2.2.20).

55. 320.45–321.4 (3.2.2.24) [1740 3.76.8–11; SBN 499.35–500.2]

Thus *self-interest* is the original motive to the *establishment* of justice: But a *sympathy* with *public* interest is the source of the *moral* approbation, which attends that virtue. **This latter principle of sympathy is too weak to controul our passions; but has sufficient force to influence our taste, and give us the sentiments of approbation or blame.**

The critical text italicizes only the words underlined by Hume in his holograph amendment to his copy of the *Treatise*, while SBN reverses the roman and italic found in the first sentence quoted here. The critical text also incorporates in appropriate form the additional holograph sentence Hume inserted at the end of 3.2.2.24. By the addition of an asterisk at the end of the first sentence quoted here ('. . . virtue.*'), Nidditch refers the reader to a transcription of Hume's amendment found at SBN 670.9–15.

56. 323, n71.11 (n71¶2) an] any {1740 3.83n; SBN 504n}

. . . when two objects appear in a close relation to each other, the mind is apt to ascribe to them **an** additional relation, in order to compleat the union . . .

Later in the same paragraph Hume argues that 'we can feign *a* new relation, and even an absurd one, in order to compleat any union' (italics added); at 1.4.5.12 he says that, if we have come to think of certain objects as related, we then have 'a strong propensity to add *some* new relation to them, in order to compleat the union' (italics added). At 1.4.2.34 he says that the 'very nature and essence of relation is to connect our ideas with each other, and upon the appearance of one, to facilitate the transition to its correlative'. In each case, in other words, he argues that it is some particular idea, not just *any* idea, that completes the process of thought.

57. 327, n75.1 (n75.¶1) imagination] imaginations {1740 3.91n; SBN 509n}

This source of property can never be explain'd but from the **imag-**
ination; and one may affirm, that the causes are here unmix'd . . .

That Hume is discussing the imagination as a faculty, not its diverse productions, may be seen from note 71.6–7 where he argues that the rules determining property 'are principally fix'd by the imagination, or the more frivolous properties of our thought and conception'.

58. 328, n75.43 (n75 ¶4) effect] affect {1740 3.93n}; [effect] {SBN 510n}; effect {GG 2.280n}

... the ascribing of property to accession is nothing but an effect of the relations of ideas, and of the smooth transition of the imagination.

The discussion preceding and following this sentence indicates that Hume is here concerned with *effects*, not *affects* (mental states or feelings).²⁴

59. 328, n75.66 (n75 ¶7) accession to] accession {1740 3.94n; SBN 511n}

... which seem too large to the imagination to follow as an accession to the property of the neighbouring fields.

60. 328, n75.94 (n75 ¶11) videtur] videtur id {1740 3.95n; SBN 512n}

... vel Titius id miscuerit sine tua voluntate, non videtur commune esse . . .

The omitted word is not found in standard editions of the *Institutes* of Justinian, including some of those from which Hume may have taken this quotation.

61. 329, n75.98 (n75 ¶11) iudicis continetur] iudicis {1740 3.95n; SBN 512n}

Arbitrio autem iudicis continetur, ut ipse aestimet quale cujusque frumentum fuerit.

Hume omits a word found in standard editions of the *Institutes* of Justinian, including some of those from which he may have taken this quotation.

62. 332, n77.14 (n77 ¶2) for its] for {1740 3.105n; SBN 518n}

The new volition has for its object a new obligation . . .

63. 337.6 (3.2.5.14) requires] require {1740 3.116.23; SBN 525.3}

... the external form of words, being mere sound, requires an intention to make them have any efficacy . . .

64. 337.32 (3.2.6.1) these] those {1740 3.118.14; SBN 526.4}

We have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature, *that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises*. 'Tis on the strict observance of **these** three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor is

there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among men, where these are neglected. Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the support of society.

Note that the text following the emendation twice uses 'these' to refer to the same three laws.

65. 338.3 (3.2.6.1) these] those {1740 3.119.16; SBN 526.22}

Whatever restraint they may impose on the passions of men, they are the real offspring of those passions, and are only a more artful and more refin'd way of satisfying them. Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions; and nothing is more obvious, than the convention for the observance of these rules. Nature has, therefore, trusted this affair entirely to the conduct of men, and has not plac'd in the mind any peculiar original principles, to determine us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame and constitution were sufficient to lead us. And to convince us the more fully of this truth, we may here stop a moment, and from a review of the preceding reasonings may draw some new arguments, to prove that **these** laws, however necessary, are entirely artificial, and of human invention; and consequently that justice is an artificial, and not a natural virtue.

The text cited here follows directly from that found in entry 64. Note that the emendation, 'these laws' is preceded by 'these rules' and, in the text cited in entry 64, two uses of 'these' refer to the same laws or rules.

66. 340.32 (3.2.6.8) obligation] obligations {1740 3.126.27; SBN 531.3}

. . . oblige us, when we reflect on the matter, to acknowledge, that all property and **obligation** are entire. But on the other hand, when we consider the origin of property and obligation . . .

67. 340.37 (3.2.6.8) leaves] leave {1740 3.127.8; SBN 531.10}

. . . the consent of the parties **leaves** the referees entire masters of the subject . . .

68. 340.44 (3.2.6.8) tribunals] tribunal {1740 3.127.19; SBN 531.19}

Half rights and obligations, which seem so natural in common life, are perfect absurdities in their **tribunals** . . .

The word in question is used following a discussion of the role of referees and judges who are called upon to decide distinct and multiple cases in, presumably, distinct and multiple tribunals.

69. 341.35 (3.2.6.9) these] those {1740 3.130.1; SBN 532.33}

But 'tis easy to observe, that this wou'd produce an infinite confusion in human society, and that the avidity and partiality of men wou'd quickly bring disorder into the world, if not restrain'd by some general and inflexible principles. 'Twas, therefore, with a view to this inconvenience, that men have establish'd ~~these~~ principles, and have agreed to restrain themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public interest. These rules, then, are artificially invented for a certain purpose . . .

Note that the text following the emendation uses 'These rules' to refer to the same principles.

70. 347.26–7 (3.2.8.3) yet as soon as the advantages of government are fully known and acknowledg'd, it immediately] yet it quickly {1740 3.146.11} | yet it quickly* {SBN 542.16}

. . . and I maintain, that tho' the duty of allegiance be at first grafted on the obligation of promises, and be for some time supported by that obligation, yet **as soon as the advantages of government are fully known and acknowledg'd, it immediately** takes root of itself . . .

The critical text incorporates in appropriate form the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.2.8.3. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 671.10–12

71. 348.27 (3.2.8.5) the performance] performance {1740 3.149.6; SBN 544.2}

. . . yet the *first* motive of the invention, as well as ~~the~~ performance of both . . .

72. 349.33–4 (3.2.8.7) to our own interest, or at least to that of the public, which we partake of by *sympathy*.] to public interest, and to our own in particular. {1740 3.152.8–9} | to public interest, and to our own in particular.* {SBN 545.31–2}

. . . it takes not place with regard to those of others; nor hinders them from appearing in their true colours, as highly prejudicial to **our own**

interest, or at least to that of the public, which we partake of by *sympathy*.

The critical text incorporates in appropriate form the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.2.8.7. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 671.14–16.

73. 353.29 (3.2.9.3) subjects, not in disputes betwixt themselves and their subjects;] subjects; {1740 3.163.3} | subjects;* {SBN 552.8}

But besides that this interest is only more immediate in the execution of justice among their subjects, *not in disputes betwixt themselves and their subjects*; besides this, I say . . .

The critical text incorporates in appropriate form the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.2.9.3. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 671.19–20.

74. 355.3 (3.2.10.2) the rules of justice] the laws of society {1740 3.167.2; SBN 554.19–20}

. . . they naturally run into the invention of government, and put it out of their own power, as far as possible, to transgress the *rules of justice*.

SBN does not incorporate, draw attention to, or record the holograph amendment Hume made to 3.2.10.2.

75. 360.33 (3.2.10.16) a particular exercise] an exercise {1740 3.183.5} | an exercise* {SBN 563.31}

. . . in the vast variety of circumstances, which occur in all governments, a *particular* exercise of power, in so great a magistrate . . .

The critical text incorporates the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.2.10.16. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 671.34.

76. 361.28 (3.2.10.18) legal authority] legal {1740 3.185.18; SBN 565.11}

But shou'd the king, by his unjust practices, or his attempts for a tyrannical and despotic power, justly forfeit his legal *authority*, it then not only becomes morally lawful . . .

The clause, 'justly forfeit his legal', fails to make sense. The context indicates that 'authority' is the appropriate term to fill the syntactical gap found in the copytext and in SBN. Much of 3.2.10 is given over to the question of who, legitimately, has political authority, while Hume goes on in 3.2.10.18 to consider what follows when 'a king forfeits his authority'.

77. 366.3–4 (3.2.12.7) stream, and are also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interests of society.] stream. {1740 3.198.4} | stream.* {SBN 572.29}

Those, who have no interest, are carry'd along with the stream, and are also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interests of society.

The critical text incorporates in appropriate form the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.2.12.7. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 671.36–7.

78. 366.11(3.2.12.7) these] those {1740 3.198.18; SBN 573.3}

And tho' all these maxims have a plain reference to generation, yet women past child-bearing have no more privilege in this respect, than those who are in the flower of their youth and beauty. Men have undoubtedly an implicit notion, that all ~~these~~ ideas of modesty and decency have a regard to generation; since they impose not the same laws, *with the same force*, on the male sex, where that reason takes not place. The exception is there obvious and extensive, and founded on a remarkable difference, which produces a clear separation and disjunction of ideas. But as the case is not the same with regard to the different ages of women, for this reason, tho' men know, that these notions are founded on the public interest . . .

Note that the text first speaks of 'these maxims', and then, following the emendation, of 'these notions'.

79. 369.10–12 (3.3.1.9) society. The inventors of them had chiefly in view their own interest. But we carry our approbation of them into the most distant countries and ages, and much beyond our own interest.] society. {1740 3.207.6} | society.* {SBN 577.20}

All these are mere human contrivances for the interest of society. ~~The inventors of them had chiefly in view their own interest. But we carry our approbation of them into the most distant countries and ages and much beyond our own interest.~~ And since there is a very strong sentiment of morals . . .

The critical text incorporates in appropriate form the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.3.1.9. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 672.1–4.

80. 370.19 (3.3.1.11) in characters which are useful or pernicious to society,] in the characters of others, {1740 3.210.5} | in the characters of others,* {SBN 579.15}

. . . and consequently 'tis that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in **characters which are useful or pernicious to society**, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss.

The critical text incorporates in appropriate form the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.3.1.11. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see Nidditch, *Apparatus of Variant Readings*, 28 (SBN 672.7–8 misdescribes the amendment).

81. 370.34 (3.3.1.12) society and to every individual;] society; {1740 3.211.3} | society;* {SBN 579.33}

The whole scheme, however, of law and justice is advantageous to the society **and to every individual**; and 'twas with a view to this advantage . . .

The critical text incorporates in appropriate form the holograph amendment made by Hume to 3.3.1.12. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 672.9.

82. 371.32 (3.3.1.15) these] those {1740 3.213.22; SBN 581.16}

To this I answer: The approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv'd from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of particular qualities or characters. Now 'tis evident, that **these** sentiments, whence-ever they are deriv'd, must vary according to the distance or contiguity of the objects . . .

83. 380.10 (3.3.2.6) places] pleases {1740 3.237.18; SBN 595.21}

Our judgment does not entirely accompany him in the flattering conceit, in which he **places** himself; but still is so shaken as to receive the idea it presents, and to give it an influence . . .

This change will strike some as debatable, but we judge it more likely that Hume wrote, or meant to write, 'places' than 'pleases'. In the previous sentence he says that sympathy, giving pride the same effect as merit, makes 'us *enter into* those elevated sentiments, which the proud man entertains of himself' (italics added). He then qualifies this claim by saying we do not go quite so far as the proud man goes: we do not fully *enter into* the flattering scene in which he has placed himself. Moreover, had he meant to write 'pleases' he would more likely have written 'with which' rather than 'in which'.

84. 391 title (3.3.5 title) *abilities*] *virtues* {1740 3.269.title; SBN 614.title}

Sect. 5. *Some farther reflections concerning the natural abilities*

The first paragraph of this section, in so far as it restates Hume's account of the origin of approbation and disapprobation, does make passing reference to the natural *virtues*. But, having finished this brief summary, Hume, 'in order to justify more fully' his theories about this origin, goes on to observe 'that the advantages or disadvantages of the body and of fortune [certain natural *abilities* or *disabilities*], produce a pain or pleasure from the very same principles'. He then devotes the balance of the section to further reflections on these natural abilities. In short, the section is about the natural abilities. In so far as this is the case, it is an extension, as the word 'farther' indicates, of the previous section, 'Of natural abilities'. Consequently, we judge that the only appropriate title of 3.3.5 is '*Some farther reflections concerning the natural abilities*'.

85. 395.21 (3.3.6.6) advantages] advantage {1740 3.280.3; SBN 620.22}

. . . when he considers, that beside the **advantages**, which immediately result from these acquisitions . . . And who can think any advantages of fortune a sufficient compensation . . .

86. 396.13 (App. 2) effect, direct or collateral,] effect, {1740 3.284.3} | effect,* {SBN 623.16}

We can never be induc'd to believe any matter of fact, except where its cause, or its effect, **direct or collateral**, is present to us . . .

The critical text incorporates the holograph amendment made by Hume to App. 2. For a report of the precise form of this amendment, see SBN 672.36.

POSTSCRIPT

A. Since the publication of the OPT *Treatise* we have concluded that there is a further substantive error in 1.4.6. As our emendation of this error will be found in all future printings or editions of the OPT *Treatise* (and in the Clarendon *Treatise*), we take this opportunity to report the emendation in the form used above.

87. 166.27 (1.4.6.6) plants and animals] plants and vegetables {1739 1.443.1; SBN 255.1}

But we may farther observe, that where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation;⁵⁰ and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and **animals**.

That the text of the *Treatise* is here in need of emendation was, so far as we know, first suggested by Roland Hall.²⁵ In support of this suggestion Hall points out that ‘plants and vegetables’ constitutes a “senseless reiteration . . . when surely what Hume meant to write was ‘plants and animals’.” He then points out that the phrase ‘plants and animals’ does occur in the previous paragraph and in a footnote (note 50 in our critical text) attached to the very sentence being emended. In 1.4.6.5 Hume, setting out what he is to do in this section, says that ‘personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination . . . is our present subject; and to explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals . . .’. In the footnote he writes about ‘my Lord *Shaftesbury*’s reasonings concerning . . . the identity of plants and animals’. In short, both sense and context support the decision to make this emendation.

B. We have also concluded that our grounds for making three changes are inadequate or inconclusive, and thus we will in subsequent editions restore the copytext reading (shaded in the citations that follow) in these three cases.

i. 275.9 (2.3.7.4) An *East-India*] A *West-India* {1739 2.273.9–10; SBN 429.14}

Twenty years are certainly but a small distance of time in comparison of what history and even the memory of some may inform them of, and yet I doubt if a thousand leagues, or even the greatest distance of place this globe can admit of, will so remarkably weaken our ideas, and diminish our passions. **A *West-India*** merchant will tell you, that he is not without concern about what passes in *Jamaica*; tho’ few

extend their views so far into futurity, as to dread very remote accidents.

Hume is explaining that distance in space has less effect on the imagination than does distance in time. Twenty years have a greater effect (will result in a greater diminution of feeling) than 'a thousand leagues, or even the greatest distance of place this globe can admit of'. He then illustrates his point with an example of a merchant who is a thousand leagues (c. 3000 miles) or even halfway around the globe from Jamaica. A West-India merchant present in the West Indies must fail to fulfill the condition of the example because Jamaica is one of the West Indies. This led us to suppose that Hume meant to refer to an East-India merchant, for the East Indies are roughly 180 degrees of latitude, the greatest distance of place the earth admits of, from Jamaica. Perhaps, however, Hume was thinking of a West-India merchant present in Britain (in Bristol, where Hume had briefly worked for a merchant). This merchant would not be separated from Jamaica by half the globe, but he would be at least a thousand leagues away, and thus we have elected to restore the reading of the copytext.

ii. 322.31 (3.2.3.2) favour] favours {1740 3.80.27–8; SBN 502.29} | favour {GG 2.273.39}

Whether a man be generous, or a miser, he is equally well receiv'd by her, and obtains with the same facility a decision in his **favours**, even for what is entirely useless to him.

The brief discussion of Scotticisms included in some editions of Hume's works (see note 19) reports that 'in favours of' is Scottish usage for the English 'in favour of'. Consequently, we have concluded that changes to 'favour' here and at 344.42 are probably not justified, and have again elected to follow the copytext.

iii. 344.42 (3.2.7.7) favour] favours {1740 3.138.27; SBN 538.5}

. . . so it hinders them from seeing that equity itself, and gives them a remarkable partiality in their own **favours**.

In addition, review of the text of the OPT *Treatise* has revealed some typesetting errors introduced between our reading of third proofs and the printing of copies, as well as some editorial oversights and matters of form about which we have had second thoughts. We here report these errors, oversights, or changes of mind and provide the readings that will be incorporated into the third printing of the present OPT edition of the *Treatise* and also into the first printing of the Clarendon edition of the work. Readers who detect what appear

to be additional textual errors are invited to submit these to us.²⁶ The emendations in question:

page.line

38.6	<i>plain sr (should read) plane</i>
50.28	<i>degrees of any quality sr degrees of any quality</i>
117.1	phæomenon sr phænomenon
117.2	phæomenon sr phænomenon
117.40	phæomenon sr phænomenon
120.1	phæomenon sr phænomenon
258.41	parent's sr parents
261.24	gaoler sr goaler
265.17	tis sr 'tis
278.20	stil'd sr styl'd
311.35	peopl'd sr peopled
316.21	controlling sr controuling
318.10	married sr marry'd
336.15	with-hold sr withhold
350.4	dependent sr dependant
350.5	the <i>artifice sr the artifice</i>
359.43	mingl'd sr mingled
361.24	settl'd sr settled
389.10	entitl'd sr entitled
397.35	settl'd sr settled
n. 89 (400)	p. 171 sr pp. 169–70

C. We have also found several substantive errors in the Introduction and back-matter of the *OPT Treatise*:

147.3	eternal sr external
434.42	3.2.1 sr 2.3.1.4
435.12	2.13.9 sr 2.15.9
460.41	432 sr 821
473.46	to argue sr argues
565.42	170 sr 169–70
579.16	others sr other
591.30	1675–5 sr 1674–5
594.16	Ward, Ward sr Ward, Seth

NOTES

We wish to thank Tom L. Beauchamp, M. A. Stewart, and Kenneth Winkler for advice regarding this article, and Phillip Cummins for suggestions regarding errors in the text of the first edition of the *Treatise*.

1 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). In this article, this edition is referred to as the OPT *Treatise* or the OPT edition.

2 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd. ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). In this article, referred to as SBN. The Selby-Bigge edition of the *Treatise* was first published in 1888.

3 Two volumes of the Clarendon edition, both edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, have been published: *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), and *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). Note that there are at present no paperback versions of these critical editions. There are also OPT (Oxford Philosophical Texts) editions of EPM and EHU, both edited by Beauchamp.

4 Where no such copy exists, editors may also begin from an authoritative manuscript (as they may in the case of Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*) or from a text first printed posthumously.

5 The copytext of the critical edition of *A Treatise of Human Nature* comprises copies of volumes 1 and 2, published by John Noon (London, 1739), and of volume 3, published by Thomas Longman (London, 1740). The copies used as the basis for our critical text are those found in the David Hume Collection, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, McGill University Libraries. In this article, the chronologically distinct portions of the first edition are referred to as 1739 and 1740, respectively.

6 A *diplomatic edition* is an edition in which the representation of the text seeks to emulate as far as modern typography allows the physical appearance of the original—not just in the characters used but in their relative placing on the page.

7 No further edition of the *Treatise* was published until 1817, and thus there is no need to discuss the edition to be used as copytext.

8 For a brief discussion of these matters, see The Center for Scholarly Editions, *An Introductory Statement* (New York: Modern Language Association, 1977).

9 See OPT *Treatise* 565, for the locations of these incorporations.

10 For reports of these holograph materials, see W. Nethery, "Hume's Manuscript Corrections in a Copy of *A Treatise of Human Nature*," *The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* 57 (1963): 446–7; R. W. Connon, "Some Manuscript Corrections by Hume in the Third Volume of his *Treatise of Human Nature*," *Long Room: Bulletin of the Friends of the Library* 11 (1975): 14–22, P. H. Nidditch, *An Apparatus of Variant Readings for Hume's Treatise of Human Nature* (Sheffield: Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, 1976), 7–30 (for an abbreviated version of this discussion, see SBN, 665–73); and D. C. Yalden-Thomson, "More Hume Autograph Marginalia in a First Edition of the *Treatise*," *Hume Studies* 4 (1978): 73–6. Nethery was the first to report on the corrections found in the three volumes of the *Treatise* that belonged to Kames, volumes which are now in the Hoose Library, University of Southern California. Connon first reported on the corrections and amendments found in what appears to have been Hume's own copy of volume 3; this copy is now in the British Library. Yalden-Thomson reported on the corrections found in the three volumes of the *Treatise* presented by Hume to Alexander Pope; this copy was then (and may still be) in a

private collection in Somerville, New Jersey. Details regarding these holograph materials will be included in our critical edition of the *Treatise*.

11 The Errata constitute *corrections*. Hume's holograph insertions in copies of the *Treatise* are sometimes corrections (the correction of a typographical error that affects the sense, for example) and sometimes *amendments* (the substitution or addition of words). We accept this distinction while referring to the changes we have made as *emendations*.

12 See, for example, D. D. Raphael, "Critical Editions," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 8 (2000): 163–4. Raphael, reviewing the Clarendon edition of *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (see note 3), argues that *contemn* is not a variant form of *condemn*, and hence that it should not have been replaced by the latter. Phillip Cummins, in "A Puzzling Passage in 'Why Utility Pleases,'" *Hume Studies* 26 (2000): 179–81, does not avail himself of the Clarendon edition of EPM, and thus overlooks a historical collation (see EPM, Clarendon edition, "Editorial Appendix," 223) that bears directly on the textual question he raises.

13 The page and line numbers of the OPT and Clarendon editions of the *Treatise* are to be identical. The Clarendon edition will show line numbers (1, 5, 10, etc.) in right-hand margins, with paragraph numbers in the left-hand margins. The OPT edition shows only paragraph numbers.

14 With very few exceptions, the paragraphs of other editions of the *Treatise* correspond to those of the OPT and Clarendon editions. (The exceptions arise because, in Book 1, of the addition of material from the Appendix or, in Book 3, of paragraphing changes in note 73, the note to 3.2.3.7.) Ordinarily, then, finding a reference such as 1.1.1.8 is simply a matter of counting paragraphs.

15 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, 1886; facsimile reprint Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag, 1964). In this article referred to as GG. This edition of the *Treatise* was first published in 1874. See entries 1, 32, 33, and 58.

16 In this article, punctuation is placed outside single quotation marks unless the item inside the quotation marks itself includes punctuation that we are citing. This convention enables us to present and discuss words and phrases or longer excerpts from the *Treatise* without the distraction of ambiguous or inaccurate punctuation.

17 Eighteenth-century compositors were typically independent journeymen paid for the amount of type set. They would not have been expected to agonize over uncertain holograph text. On the other hand, they would often have had a sense of the material they were setting and would then have been able to guess correctly an author's intention—they had, in other words, a better than 50/50 chance of guessing correctly.

18 See also entry 4 below.

19 Hume is credited with preparing a brief discussion of Scotticisms. This reports that "*These* is the plural of *this*; *those* of *that*. The former, therefore, expresses what is near: the latter what is more remote." See "Scotticisms," in Green and Grose, 2: 461–2.

20 Nidditch, as he explains at SBN 663, uses square brackets, [], to "enclose editorial readings or insertions." To make the record set out in this article complete, we

here treat all SBN text in square brackets as substantively different from the critical text. Note, however, that Nidditch does not enclose in square brackets those editorial emendations that he derives from Hume's holograph marginalia.

21 See D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, *The David Hume Library* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, 1996), 70.

22 Those who have supposed that the cancel adds the note include W. B. Todd, "David Hume. A Preliminary Bibliography," *Hume and the Enlightenment*, ed. W. B. Todd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1974), 190; P. H. Nidditch, *An Apparatus of Variant Readings*, 32, and SBN 664.

23 See *The Essential Erasmus*, ed. J. P. Dolan (New York: New American Library, 1964), 124–8, 133–4.

24 The line numbers of notes are counted from the beginning of each note.

25 "Hume's Use of Locke on Identity," *The Locke Newsletter* 5 (1974), 69.

26 These may be sent to the addresses found on 245 above.