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ALEXANDER BROADIE, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xvi + 366. ISBN 0-521-80273-3, cloth, £47.50/$65.00; ISBN 0-521-00323 7, paper, £16.99 / $22.99.

This book is explicitly about ideas canvassed during the Scottish Enlightenment, albeit with some preliminary attempt to anchor them in their original historical and social contexts. The editor insists on a distinctively Scottish dimension to the ideas discussed, and claims that the book tackles central issues from three viewpoints: the first emphasizes the social sciences, the second the natural sciences, and the third is more loosely inclusive, aiming to be more holistic and arguably describable as "cultural." There is nothing on technological ideas nor, in most cases, on how ideas were excited or modified by the ideas and practices in operation at the time.

At times the intended reader of the book is hard to identify, but since half of the contributions are very good, the book will provide a beginner with useful guides to many lines of enquiry. In most chapters the bibliographies are helpful, although the final "select bibliography" verges on the absurd—a reader of this journal who is recommended to three efforts by George Davie and three by Nicholas Phillipson, but reference to almost no former or current major scholars in the field must register surprise. Two of the chapters are very poor and are presumably last minute makeweights in the absence of a competent author: one is on "historiography," in which serious scholars are becoming more interested, and the other, by the editor himself, is on aesthetics and Hume's essay on the standard of taste. By completely ignoring the precise context in which Hume was writing—his essay is one of a group by five or six friends who discussed the topic among themselves—Hume's own knowledge of or interest in the arts, as well as the larger Scottish setting, he fails to explain both the point and the subtlety of Hume's essay. An essay on Scottish philosophy in America is slightly out of date in the light of recent work by, for example, Mark Spencer, among others, and restricts itself too narrowly to "philosophical" writings. Gordon Graham's very brief final piece on Scottish nineteenth-century reactions confines itself primarily to Ferrier, with reference to Bain and Hamilton, but again does not explore any wider "philosophical" context, or any of the scientific and technological ideas that can be linked to the Scottish Enlightenment itself.

Excellent opening chapters by Roger Emerson and M. A. Stewart set the overall social, political, and religious contexts of the time. Emerson suggests that, because of his extraordinary influence, and wealth, the third Duke of Argyll deserves the title of "father" of the Scottish Enlightenment. Stewart surmises that few of Hume's liberal clerical friends would have understood the force and implications of his arguments, that he seems to have secured little popular following and that he was

by no means the central figure in religious contexts. Discussion of evidence and testimony was entirely familiar to Reid, George Campbell, and Alexander Gerard and, of course, the topics had been prominent in logic courses in France and Britain since the mid-seventeenth century: in those contexts the burden of proof was assigned to those who challenge rather than accept testimony.

Broadie offers a brief chapter on '"The human mind and its powers," comparing the views of Hume and Reid, but with no comparative reference to relevant contemporary medical thinking and experimental work, nor to ways in which their philosophical views mirrored or conflicted with ideas canvassed on the continent. By contrast, Aaron Garrett's chapter on "Anthropology" refers to French writers such as Montesquieu, Lafitau, and Buffon, but makes no mention of the fierce debate about taxonomy which dominated many debates, and of which the Scottish philosophers themselves were not ignorant. His description of efforts to provide empirical analysis of the human passions signals the wide range of their interests and procedures but not, perhaps, its relative lack of rigour.

Paul Wood, aligning himself with Emerson and John Christie, outlines the growing prominence of the sciences and medicine throughout the eighteenth century. A proper understanding of Scotland and the Scottish Enlightenment certainly requires a grasp of these developments, and prominent authors who deny or ignore them are almost always willfully ignorant of the sciences. Of the Scottish philosophers themselves probably Hume evinced the least interest in or knowledge of the burgeoning sciences. Wood is correct to emphasise that the famous "moral Newtonianism" informing the "science of man" drew on many models of enquiry other than natural philosophy, including mathematics, anatomy, and natural history.

Hans Klemme outlines different meanings of skepticism in Hume, and the basic elements of Reid's critique, and Luigi Turco gives a useful outline of "Moral sense and the foundations of morals" in Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and Reid. Turco remarks, in passing, that Smith distinguishes desire for praise from desire to be worthy of praise. The distinction is based on the amount of information available to agent and spectator. If we are to be the natural judges of our behaviour, only desire to be worthy of praise can ground the verdicts of conscience. It is worth observing that Hume made precisely such a distinction in discussing the writing of history: agents know their intentions, but not the outcome, or consequences of their actions; spectators, after the event, know the outcomes, but rarely have access to the intentions. Turco observes that Smith replaces Hume's moral criteria of the pleasing and the useful with that of propriety; but Hume had fully embraced that criterion from Cicero, if not Aristotle himself, by incorporating it within his emphasis on the particularity of every context. It must be conceded, however, that neither Hume nor Smith discussed in detail how we come to agree upon the nature and limits of any particular context.

Contrasting Hume and Ferguson on politics, Fania Oz-Salzburger considerably over-emphasises what "Newtonian science" meant to Hume, at least as evidenced

from his texts. She also asserts that for Hume "politics" meant theory not practice, so that "politicians" were philosophers not statesmen; by contrast, for Smith they were crafty animals, and for Ferguson the task was to consider men of action. The contrast is forced. Hume, as an historian himself, and deeply versed in his mentor Cicero, clearly regarded politics as a practical endeavour and saw his own goal as that of characterizing a life of action.

Andrew Skinner offers a fine and carefully argued comparison between Hume's economics and those of his friends Sir James Steuart and Adam Smith. He underlines the importance of Smith's close encounter with the physiocrats in Paris in 1764, which enabled him to develop a system that was both descriptive and analytical. By emphasizing three distinct factors of production (land, labour, capital) and three categories of return (rent, wages, profit), Smith was able to give an account of the flow of goods and services between the sectors involved and different socio-economic groups.

Knud Haakonssen and John Cairns contribute outstanding chapters on, respectively, "Natural jurisprudence and the theory of justice" and "Legal theory." Haakonssen begins by sharply separating the views of Hume and Smith from those of Hutcheson: for the former "actions, systems and moral judgments were empirical occurrences to be understood like all other parts of nature." Moreover, unlike Carmichael, their theories of justice assign no fundamental role to rights. Smith sees moral personality as a product of socialization, in which the role of spectators is central. Christopher Berry supplements these chapters with a useful account of "Sociality and socialisation," showing how the Scots rejected claims for a state of nature, and made a powerful case for habit formation in childhood.

Throughout this book, readers can enjoy the diverse ways in which specialists in history, literature, and philosophy read philosophical texts: but, as usual, most contributors appear deaf to the achievements of disciplines other than their own. Quite justifiably in a book of this sort, few authors engage in contemporary debate with fellow scholars; very little that is said is, or could be, either new or original to the writers themselves. Philosophers are prone to claim propriety for their insights, and also to justify their ignorance of the varied contexts to which thinkers were reacting when working out their ideas, by assuming either that philosophical ideas are timeless, and fundamentally *a priori*; or that earlier philosophers were proto-scientists whose contingent contextual work has been superceded. Humeans must be encouraged to maintain their mitigated skepticism about all such enthusiasms and superstitions.

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