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The Idea of Chivalry in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Case of David Hume

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Abstract: It is generally assumed that in early modern Britain, chivalry—allegedly typified by the Crusades—was considered a negative or even ridiculous ideology until its rehabilitation by the pre-Romantic movement. However, this paper argues that Hume and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers had already shown a deep interest in its historical role and influence on modern civilization. That Hume shared a broad interest in chivalry with contemporary philosophers does not undermine the novelty of his thought on this topic. In fact, the pioneering and unique aspects of his contributions can be clarified by setting them in context.

Introduction

The topic of chivalry has been, and will continue to be, much discussed in studies of Romanticism and medieval history. Although few in number, articles devoted to the study of Hume's discussion of chivalry have been important in this debate. Many have focused on the manuscript entitled "An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour" (hereafter "Essay on Chivalry"), which was never published in Hume's lifetime.¹ Nevertheless, there has been scant recognition of the broader interest in the topic of chivalry among the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, resulting in a failure to ground Hume's argument

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in its contemporary context. This negligence is partly because the Enlightenment thinkers lambasted the folly of the Crusades as a part of their critique of religious superstition. Historians, in taking the Crusades as representing the epitome of chivalry for the Scottish thinkers, have therefore assumed that the Enlightenment thinkers dismissed the positive aspects of chivalry.² This rather impoverished image of thought on the topic during the Enlightenment has obscured the true breath and complexity of the discussions of chivalry by Hume and his contemporaries. While these philosophers certainly did not fail to note the negative effects of chivalry, their recognition of the wide-ranging impact of chivalric codes on the development of modern manners is also significant, especially given their assertion of the superiority of these modern manners. To place Hume's discussion in the context of contemporary discourses does not undermine the novelty of Hume's thought on this topic; the pioneering and unique nature of his contributions can in fact be clarified by setting them in context. Therefore, the aim of this paper is two-fold; to demonstrate the broader interest in chivalry among the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers and to determine Hume's unique contribution to this topic.

In what follows, I will demonstrate firstly that the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, including Hume, often represented "gallantry" and the "point of honor," terms which themselves require careful exploration, as illustrative of chivalric manners. This built on the work of their intellectual predecessors' characterization of the "point of honor" with dueling as its behavioral example. Secondly, I will show that Hume's manuscript "Essay on Chivalry" is pioneering in locating the historical origins of modern manners in the combination of the violent and gentle elements of chivalry. Hume's *Treatise*³ and several of the *Essays, Moral and Political*⁴ also provide some indication of his philosophical understanding of the role in modern manners of gallantry and the point of honor. Chivalry, according to Hume, consists of a strange mixture of love and courage, resulting in a form of convention that has a basis in human nature, but upon which artificial constraints have been imposed to allow its expression in a socially acceptable form. Thirdly, I will show that, although Hume developed a partially independent historical analysis of this theme in the *History of England*,⁵ by the latter half of the eighteenth century there was already a shared understanding of the historical significance of chivalry among Scottish historians such as Robertson and Lord Kames. Hume's contribution at this time lies rather in his contributions to the Ossian debate; by emphasizing the modernity of chivalric manners, he detached himself from the nostalgia associated with primitivism. At the end of this paper I will also touch upon the question of how subsequent events have obscured our understanding of the seemingly equivocal attitudes of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers toward the historical value of chivalry.

I

Firstly, it is necessary to define the range and scope of the notion of chivalry as conceived by the Scottish thinkers. In the *History of England*, Hume instantiates the effects of chivalry upon modern manners as follows:

These ideas of chivalry infected the writings, conversation, and behaviour of men, during some ages; and even after they were, in a great measure, banished by the revival of learning, they left modern *gallantry* and the *point of honour*, which still maintain their influence, and are the genuine offspring of those ancient affectations. (H 1:487)

In the passage quoted above, Hume discusses the continuing influence of both the point of honor and of gallantry, on everyday life. Both terminologies require some explanation. The term “point of honor” is now used in a more general sense to refer to a matter seriously affecting one’s honor, while in the early modern period it often implied a quarrel, offence or provocation that could be resolved only by a duel between the parties involved. The word “gallantry,” although it can be variously interpreted, has at least three elements: the first sense refers to courageous and humane behavior in the battlefield or in single combat; the second to the complaisance and politeness, often involving flattery and solicitousness, paid especially to women; and the third is used to describe love or amour (which Hume sometimes linked to French manners in particular).⁶ In the passage quoted above, Hume appears to refer to the second meaning of gallantry, although the third meaning is also implied. This is because the link between the two meanings is strong in male-female relationships as we will see below.

We can find a similar view in the writings of William Robertson. This Scottish historian claimed in his *Progress of Society in Europe* that, “the humanity which accompanies all the operations of war, the refinement of gallantry, and the point of honor, the three chief circumstances which distinguish modern from ancient manners, may be ascribed in a great measure to this whimsical institution.”⁷ Robertson seems to use the notion of gallantry in the second of the senses described above. The association of humanity with gallantry and the point of honor should not be regarded as contradictory; as mentioned above, gallantry implies brave and courageous behavior on the battlefield, which presupposes the strict observation of rules. Hence, the humanitarian attitude to the loser is an integral part of the emphasis on honor in chivalric manners. This humane stance is also connected to the polite and solicitous attitude that should be preserved towards the weak, which includes, but is not limited to, women. All these interactions between the gentle and violent aspects of chivalry were taken into account by the Scottish thinkers.

The interest in the topic of chivalry shown by the Scottish thinkers was not without precedent. The point of honor, and its enactment through the duel, had been frequently discussed by early eighteenth-century writers.⁸ Although summarizing the influence of these debates on the Scottish thinkers is no easy task, it is likely that they were familiar with, and influenced by, the earlier discussions of those who can be regarded as moralists in a broad sense, such as Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Addison. The rest of this section will review briefly the viewpoints of these authors regarding the point of honor and dueling and examine other possible sources of intellectual contributions to the Scots' discussions on the topic of chivalry.

One of the opinions on honor and dueling that seems to have influenced the Scottish thinkers can be found in an article in the *Spectator* by Joseph Addison. He discussed the significance of the "point of honor for men and women" in Issue 99 (June 23, 1711). While he dismissed books of chivalry, and romance in general, as anachronistic and nonsensical, he went on to explain how crucial to a man's reputation the point of honor had become in contemporary society: "The placing the Point of Honour in this false kind of Courage, has given Occasion to the very Refuse of Mankind, who have neither Virtue nor common Sense, to set up for Men of Honour."⁹ Here, Addison does not explore the historical origin of such manners, dealing instead with the contemporary problems caused by extreme behavior justified on the grounds of protecting one's honor. Moreover, in the same essay he proposed a plan to prevent dueling. Claiming that an appeal to the fear of death would be ineffective to prevent dueling, he proposed that one should appeal instead to the sense of shame of those involved by putting them in pillories.¹⁰ As the passage quoted above shows, dueling was considered by Addison and many of his contemporaries to represent a harmful vestige of a barbarous age.

Addison also recognized some of the more positive aspects of honor, however, arguing that "[w]hen Honour is a Support to virtuous Principles, . . . it cannot be too much cherished and encouraged."¹¹ Aiming to promote an urbane culture based on the principle of "refinement," Addison here acknowledges the potential benefits of a code of honor while criticizing its negative, and often destructive, effects such as dueling, which should be repressed.

Bernard Mandeville can be considered one of the other possible sources of the Scottish thinkers' discussions on the topics surrounding chivalry. In the first (1714) and second (1729) volumes of the *Fable of the Bees*, Mandeville took on the problem of how the vengeful and aggressive practice of dueling could be linked to ascetic, humble Christianity with its opposition to violence and murder.¹² In *An Inquiry into the Origin of Honor* (1732), he suggests that the development of chivalry had resulted from the hypocrisy of the Christian religion, which had become involved in secular struggles.¹³ He also, however, acknowledges the positive effects of honor, in his somewhat ironic statement that, since it is more suited to the natural

appetites of men, “[t]he Invention of Honour has been far more beneficial to the civil Society than that of Virtue.”¹⁴ He extends this claim to argue that to prevent the custom of dueling, which he depicts as the inevitable manifestation of such a sense of honor, would not be in the best interests of society.¹⁵ As the title of his book indicates, Mandeville’s discussion is more historically oriented than Addison’s. This is because, as we shall see, his intention lies in satirically revealing the artificiality and hypocrisy of human cultures. Nevertheless, his historical investigation of chivalry lacked the depth of those of Hume and other contemporary Scottish thinkers. It is, however, important to note that the argument concerning dueling and honor had already taken on an ambivalent tone: Addison and Mandeville acknowledged the beneficial effects of honor, while criticizing and proposing methods to restrain its pernicious effects.

Arguments for the partially positive effect of gallantry on moral life are also evident in the work of the early eighteenth century moralists. Interestingly, Francis Hutcheson, though generally critical of Mandeville, also acknowledged the sense of honor as evidence of a form of innate sense, and used dueling as a proof of its existence and influence.¹⁶ He observes that: “There is no Enjoyment of external Pleasure, which has more imposed upon Men of late, by some confused *Species of Morality*, than *Gallantry*. . . . But the Desires of this kind . . . arise in our Hearts, attended with some of the *sweetest Affectations*, with a disinterested *Love* and *Tenderness*.”¹⁷ Hutcheson here considers gallantry to be a “confused” set of practices: while acknowledging its favorable aspect of disinterested love and tenderness, he warns that capricious or sensual pleasure is inherently corrosive of these noble sentiments. However, Hutcheson neither extends this observation to an investigation of the historical development of chivalric manners, nor directly associates gallantry with dueling under the heading of chivalry.

Two further discourses preceding Hume and his contemporaries in Scotland should also be regarded as important intellectual sources for the Scots’ historical conceptualization of social customs in the middle ages: those concerning natural jurisprudence and legal feudalism. Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Carmichael touched upon the topic of dueling, while discussing how distinctions of ranks, titles, and honor are rooted in, and derived from, human nature. Not surprisingly, these thinkers often regarded the custom of dueling as an extreme and unnatural form of behavior, while the existence of honor and titles in society was seen as well founded upon human nature.¹⁸

The law-oriented antiquarians / historians of the seventeenth century who emphasized the social effects of feudalism provided perhaps the most important influences for Hume and his contemporaries. Henry Spelman and Robert Brady paid particular attention to how “feudal manners” differed from “ancient” custom.¹⁹ In England, before Spelman’s work, Sir John Craig had introduced discussion of the social effects of the new forms of continental feudalism into the historical

study of Scottish law.²⁰ This background is especially significant for Hume and Lord Kames, given Hume's training in law and Kames' discussion of feudal Scottish law, including honor and dignity, in his *Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities*.²¹ Although Hume's "Essay on Chivalry" (discussed below) did not reflect this legal background in terms of rhetoric, he takes on the broad historical depiction of the fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of feudal Europe laid out by his predecessors, which appears to have been widely discussed and taught in universities at the time.²² He also includes these antiquarians as sources in his mature work, the *History of England* (H 1:493nH, 2:536nQ).

In contrast to the exhaustive investigation of honor and titles in the legal history of feudalism, however, the topic of gallantry was seldom raised by these seventeenth-century thinkers. As described above, one of the main contributions of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers to the debates surrounding chivalry lies in their emphasis upon gallantry as the basis of modern manners. The influence of other literary sources on the synthesis of dueling and gallantry in the representations of chivalry by the Scots should also be noted. Hume's early letters profess devotion "to Poetry & the polite Authors" (L 1:13, Letter to Cheyne [Arbuthnot], March or April, 1734).²³ Although he named only Milton in his teenage letters (L 1:9, Letter to Ramsay, July 4, 1727), several of the "literary" essays in the *Essays, Moral and Political* leave the reader in little doubt that Hume was well aware of the work of Cervantes, Tasso, and Ariosto (E 192, 234, 551).²⁴ Amadis of Gaul and Lancelot of the Lake are also referenced in his juvenile manuscript "Essay on Chivalry" (59[5]), which will be discussed in the next section.

One of the ways in which the approach of Scottish thinkers to the topic of chivalry differed from that of those whose arguments they built on lay in the fact that the former regarded chivalry as the historical source of both gallantry and the point of honor. This meant that they tended to treat the two social phenomena as two sides of the same coin. Furthermore, while Hume and other contemporary Scottish thinkers would have been aware of the arguments regarding gallantry put forward by their predecessors, including the early eighteenth-century moralists, these later philosophers tended to focus more sharply on the role of gallantry as a civilizing factor, as we will see below. This is because the debate over the relative merits of "ancient" and "modern" forms of social organization underlies the discussion of Hume and his contemporaries of the influence of chivalry on modern manners. In the section "Of the Manners of Polished and Commercial Nations" in his *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, Adam Ferguson argues that chivalry "has probably suggested those peculiarities in the law of nations, *by which modern states are distinguished from the ancient*."²⁵ As the title of the section in which he deals with this topic shows, Ferguson was seeking to explain the germination of those manners he regarded as characteristic of modern social organization. Although he did not forget to criticize them as anachronistic, John Millar, discussing the man-

ners introduced by chivalry, stated that “[t]he great respect and veneration for the ladies . . . has occasioned their being treated with a degree of politeness, delicacy, and attention, that was unknown to the Greeks and Romans, and perhaps to all the nations of antiquity.”²⁶ Lord Kames also pointed out that “the true spirit of chivalry, produced a signal reformation in the manners of Europe,” while commenting that enthusiasm for chivalry “degenerated sometimes into extravagance.”²⁷

The interest of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers in chivalry stemmed from their exploration of history and the development of human nature. In their discussions of the influence of chivalry on modern manners, they generally placed less emphasis on the discontinuity between the periods later categorized as the Middle Ages and the Renaissance era than on the continual development of European manners after the fall of the Roman Empire. This search for the historical origin of “modern” as opposed to “ancient” manners was the framework within which the Scottish thinkers embarked on their analysis of the social value of what was considered the rather strange behavior of Europeans during the transitional period.

II

Among the contributions of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers to the topic of chivalry reviewed above, Hume’s position stands out as worthy of detailed examination. This is partly because of his evidently deep interest in the topic, both as a philosopher and as a historian, even at an earlier stage of his work. It is also partly because Hume’s works that deal with chivalry, such as the *Essays, Moral and Political*, were published a little earlier than the works of Kames, Robertson, Ferguson, and Millar, whom he seems to have influenced on this point. Hume’s judgment regarding both dueling and gallantry formed the keynote of the attitudes of the Scottish thinkers towards chivalry. In the essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” which was included in the second volume of his *Essays, Moral and Political* published in 1742, Hume refers to dueling as “not only *useless* . . . also *pernicious*” (E 626), while gallantry is described as the cause of “the superiority in politeness” of modern times (E 131). Similarly, although other Scottish intellectuals initially regarded the partial merits of both dueling and the point of honor in much the same way as their predecessors, Hume’s influence turned their attention towards the historical role of gallantry as a crucial civilizing factor in the transition to modern society. A close examination of Hume’s view of chivalry will therefore clarify the reasons for the interest of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers in this strange and extravagant phenomenon. Before entering into discussion of Hume’s *Essays, Moral and Political*, it is necessary to examine the unpublished manuscript, entitled “Essay on Chivalry,” in which Hume first devoted himself to the topic of chivalry.

Although the date of this manuscript has not yet been definitively established, M. A. Stewart recently estimated it to be about 1731 on the basis of Hume's handwriting and the watermark. Previously, Burton had suggested its date to be 1727, Greig 1729–34, and Mossner 1725–26.²⁸ According to any of these estimates, therefore, the manuscript dates to the period between the point at which Hume experienced what he referred to as “a new Scene of Thought” (L 1:13, Letter to Cheyne [Arbuthnot], March or April, 1734) and the publication of *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Hume scholars who discuss this essay usually focus on Hume's call for scholars to analyze the effects of human nature on all branches of knowledge: in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, this proposed discipline is described as a “science of MAN.”²⁹ Although it is not characterized as such in the “Essay on Chivalry,” Hume's approach can be considered to employ an embryonic form of this science to explain the birth of chivalry as a result of “the necessary Operation of the Principles of Human Nature” (EC 57[3]). However, few commentators have addressed the question of why the topic of chivalry attracted the young Hume. This is surprising considering that Hume's interest in the historico-philosophical origin of modern manners is evidenced by the very title of “An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour.”

In the “Essay on Chivalry,” Hume begins by discussing the collapse of the Roman Empire. He argues that the invading “barbarians” tried to imitate the arts and civility of the conquered Romans (EC 56[1]), but in the process invented instead a principle of chivalry, which developed “beyond the Original from which they drew their first Notion” (EC 57[2]). Hume turns his attention from historical facts to the operation of human nature. He explains that by the working of “inexperienced imagination,” the barbarian invented “a perfectly new World of [his] own, inhabited by different Beings & regulated by different Laws” (EC 57[2]). After comparing classical with Gothic architecture, Hume goes on to discuss the characters of heroes in ancient poems and romances (EC 58[4]). He points out that “Courage or Warlike Bravery” was a common feature in “all rude Ages, & in the Infancy of every State” (EC 58[4]). In his view, however, while the ancient heroes retained their barbarity and rudeness, “the first moderns” tried to instill “the most courteous & humane Air imaginable & that sublime Generosity” (EC 59[6]) into their behavior, even in combat. Hence, Hume argues that, after the spread of chivalric manners, everyday life was profoundly influenced by two things, namely “an extravagant Gallantry & Adoration of the whole Female Sex” and “the Introduction of the Practice of Single Combat” (EC 60[8]). This combination was, as argued above, the characteristic feature of the Scots' interpretation of chivalry.

To analyze the strange phenomenon of chivalry in terms of the study of human nature, it is essential to investigate the combination of the passions of courage and love. In his “Essay on Chivalry,” Hume explained that the mentality of ancient heroes was based on courage, and that chivalry consisted in “mixing Love with

their Courage” (EC 59–60[7]). According to him, chivalry is an amalgam of courage, which was the basic ideal of an ancient citizen, and love, which characterizes and promotes such modern values as generosity and humanity. According to Hume, the essence of the superiority of modern over ancient manners lies in the role of love and relationships between the sexes in the civilizing process.

This unpublished manuscript makes it clear that the young Hume had at this early stage already suggested the point central to the Scots’ grasp of chivalry: this demonstrates the primacy and importance of Hume’s strong interest in chivalry. It is true that the “Essay on Chivalry” was not published during the eighteenth century, and therefore any claim that this manuscript influenced other Scots should be somewhat qualified.³⁰ The topic of chivalry, however, continued to attract Hume. Indeed, his interpretation of the phenomenon is a good example of his general and consistent defense of modern social values, such as humane and gallant behavior, while at the same time adopting a pragmatic view of the diverse and fallible operation of the human imagination and passions.

In the *Essays, Moral and Political* in particular, Hume emphasizes the role of love and of men’s behavior towards women in modern civilization, through his focus on gallantry. In the essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” Hume returned to one of his favorite themes: his discussion of “gallantry” (again referring to the polite respect given by men to women). Moreover, in a footnote to this essay, he added a warning very similar to the views of Joseph Addison cited above:

The point of honour, or duelling, is a modern invention, as well as gallantry; and by some esteemed equally useful for the refining of manners: But how it has contributed to that effect, I am at a loss to determine. . . . By separating the man of honour from the man of virtue, the greatest profligates have got something to value themselves upon, and have been able to keep themselves in countenance, tho’ guilty of the most shameful and most dangerous vices. (E 626–7; these sentences were deleted after the 1770 edition)³¹

Addison’s influence is evident here: Hume discusses the dangers of separation of honor from virtue in similar terms to those used in the *Spectator*.³² The fact that this footnote was added to his argument concerning gallantry shows that Hume understood gallantry and dueling as a composite set of manners. Hume’s discussion of gallantry in this essay is somewhat complicated, in that he tries to account for gallantry as an artificial (though he uses the phrase “generous” here), as well as natural, form of behavior. A parallel can be discerned here between his theories of justice and of gallantry. As is well known, he maintained that the way to create justice was “to give a new direction to those natural passions [the selfishness and

ingratitude of men]” (T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521). Similarly, he says that art and education “only turn the mind more towards [the passion of gallantry]; they refine it; they polish it; and give it a proper grace and expression” (E 131).

Hume thought that a moral code could not subsist unless it had some reference to natural sentiments or passions: on the other hand, if all passions disagreeable to others were laid bare, society could not be maintained. In order to express these natural passions in a restrained form, to correct man’s naturally selfish and proud attitude, and to make social interaction agreeable, one must therefore invent artificial “good manners” or “refined breeding” (E 132). In the case of gallantry, this requires men to restrain their natural advantage, in terms of physical strength, over women. A similar explanation relating to courage can be found in the *Treatise of Human Nature*: “Courage, which is the point of honour among men, derives its merit in a great measure from artifice, as well as the chastity of women; though it has also some foundation in nature” (T 3.2.12.8; SBN 573). Although here he uses “the point of honour” not in its particular sense as involving an offense leading to a duel, but in a more general sense, this does not affect the significance of the artificiality Hume discerns in courage as a moral virtue. Both the point of honor and gallantry, according to him, are a kind of convention, which, while based upon human nature, have been molded by this “inventive species” (T 3.2.1.19; SBN 484) to keep the passions arising from human nature in check.³³

When we enlarge our perspective on Hume’s argument, we find that his view on the interaction of men and women as a civilizing factor is not confined to gallantry, but is more generally held. In the essay “Of National Characters” published in 1748, he argued that “the passion for liquor [is] more brutal and debasing than love, which, when properly managed, is the source of all politeness and refinement” (E 215). Hume was well aware, however, that love between the sexes produces not only refinement, but is also easily associated with caprice and passion. It should be remembered that Hume, who usually emphasized the role of women in a civilized society, also stipulated that this role, and their interaction with men, should be “properly managed.”

A parallel with Hume’s description of the contrast between love and courage is found in the *History of England* in his depiction of the conflict between religious devotion and heroic courage, the “two ruling passions” of the Crusades. Hume describes a scene where the Crusaders showed “soft and tender sentiment” and devotion to God, immediately after they had slaughtered their enemy, remarking: “So inconsistent is human nature with itself! And so easily does the most effeminate superstition ally, both with the most heroic courage, and with the fiercest barbarity!” (H 1:250) The example of the Crusades demonstrates that the two contrasting passions of courage and devotion were inextricably linked in the chivalric age. Although this passage does not strictly imply an inevitable connection between gallantry and devotion, Hume elsewhere argues that it is possible

to “mention Gallantry and Devotion as the same Subject, because . . . we may observe, that they both depend upon the very same Complexion” (E 537).³⁴ In other words, Hume considers that gallantry and devotion are equally vulnerable to the capricious operation of man’s volatile natural passions.

III

The previous section focused on Hume’s philosophical analysis of the manifestation and restraint of human nature through chivalric manners. In this section, the discussion will focus on two main points: the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers’ historical understanding of the origin of chivalry and its development, and Hume’s singular contribution to the Ossian debate, which is closely related to the topic of chivalry.

As discussed above, in his “Essay on Chivalry,” Hume explains the process through which the “barbarian” heirs to the Roman Empire constructed their chivalric code from the residue of its culture (EC 57[3]). However, he attributes elements of the later development of this creed to “the Moors and Arabians,” suggesting the possibility that the progress of chivalry was influenced by contact with Islamic culture at the time of the Crusades. In his mature work, the *History of England*, he does not directly deal with the origins of chivalry, merely explaining that it was introduced into England by the Normans (H 1:371, 486). This is probably because his aim in this work lay in writing, not a history of Europe, but a *History of England*, in the composition of which he relied to some extent upon the general opinion of his contemporaries. In Appendix 2 of the *History of England*, for instance, Hume acknowledged that his discussion of the feudal age owed much to seminal works of his predecessors, including Montesquieu’s *L’Esprit des Loix*, and Robertson’s *History of Scotland*, as well as the work of Spelman, Dugdale, and Brady. He adds that before the Norman introduction of feudalism and single combat, chivalry was unknown “among the plain and rustic Saxons” and that after its introduction, fantastic notions such as “giants, enchanters, dragons, spells, and a thousand wonders” became grafted onto the idea of chivalry and “still multiplied during the times of the Crusades” (H 1:486–7).

Robertson explains in detail the positive role of the Crusades in promoting European civilization through contact with Islamic culture.³⁵ Constantinople, regarded in Europe as the capital of a “Christian Empire” at the time of the Crusades, was not only the chief battleground but also the center of cultural contact with the Islamic world. Robertson admits with some reservations that “the Saracens and Turks” helped to keep alive the relish for the ancient arts and sciences to a level that was “considerable when compared with what was known in other parts of Europe.” He argues that contact with a different culture through the Crusades stimulated the awakening of Europe from the intellectual slumber of

the Dark Ages, prompting the subsequent increase in artistic and economic activity. Although he regarded the Crusader movement itself as a result of Christian superstition and folly, he contends that it unintentionally produced “the first gleams of light which tended to dispel barbarity and ignorance.” According to him, the Crusades were partially responsible for the subsequent changes in the economic structure of English society. Some noblemen who lost their fortunes in the venture were compelled to leave their family estates, or lost their lives in the expedition, whereupon their estates were transferred to the monarchy. As a result, Robertson argued, the establishment of autocratic monarchy in England could be explained as an unintended consequence of the Crusades.³⁶ A little later, Lord Kames followed a similar line of argument, stating that “[t]he crusaders were what first gave a turn to the fierce manners of our ancestors,” while also commenting that the barbarians had tempered their ferocity by adopting the “mild manners of the conquered [Romans].”³⁷

For Hume and his contemporaries, the historical search for the origins of chivalry appeared complex and reliant on fragmentary sources. This is partly because the historical origin of a set of manners is inherently disputable and can typically be traced to many different sources.³⁸ However, we can see from the passages cited above that the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers generally agreed to a rudimentary theory of two stages. That is, chivalry in Europe was developed first by the combination of the martial spirit of the “barbarians” and the residues of the culture of the conquered Romans and then reached maturity at the time of the Crusades.³⁹

After reaching this stage of maturity, according to Hume and other Scottish authors, chivalry underwent a significant metamorphosis or degeneration, which could be located in the transition between the manners of the feudal age and those prevalent in courtly life under the Tudor and Stuart monarchies. In the essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” Hume ascribed the development of gallantry during this period to the relatively high status of women at court (E 131, 134). This suggests that he allocated the decisive development to the age of the Tudors and Stuarts, rather than to the earlier period. In the *History of England*, he often refers to the prevalence of chivalry in the feudal age following the Norman Conquest, relating stories of knights contending for the “full liberty to boast of their mistresses’ beauty” (H 2:532nH, 3:169). Hume’s reference to “the obsequious devotion then professed to the fair sex” (H 2:236) was closely linked with the solemnity of single combat (although not always in isolation, as Hume remarks, in Edward III’s reign [H 2:532nH]).⁴⁰ To constitute chivalry, the relationship between the operation of the principle of gallantry in “bloody” and “ridiculous” combat and in the complaisance of men towards their “fairest mistresses” is essential (H 2:532nH, see also H 3:318).

According to Hume, a turning point came in the age of the reigns of the early Stuarts, when, although the mores of romantic chivalry retained a strong influ-

ence upon the English people, the monarchy had increased its control over land and resources, rendering courtly life increasingly important in political terms. Hume notes that “[t]he fury of duels too prevailed more than at any time before or since” in the reign of James I (H 5:133, see also H 5:238nN). At this time, however, he argues that the notion of gallantry underwent a negative transformation. He claims that, after the Restoration, “[l]ove was treated more as an appetite than a passion. The one sex began to abate of the national character of chastity, without being able to inspire the other with sentiment or delicacy” (H 6:539). Here the originally courteous, and sometimes extravagant, respect paid to ladies degenerated into the licentious love affairs of court life (H 5:182–3). At least the outward manifestations of the original two meanings of gallantry—courageous behavior and polite treatment of ladies on the part of men—were retained, however, forming the basis of modern manners (H 5:103, 108).

The other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers who discussed the question of the corruption of chivalric codes of behavior held similar opinions, but took Hume’s argument a stage further. Lord Kames followed through Hume’s line of argument more critically, concluding that “this change of manners was first visible in monarchy,” although, unlike Hume, he does not specify the dynasty during which this change occurred. Kames connected the shift in the meaning of gallantry—from what he called “high gallantry” to the “unlawful commerce between the sexes” resulting in the loss of female chastity—with the increasing luxury attainable in European society.⁴¹ John Millar emphasizes the role of luxury in this process to an even greater extent, arguing that “[t]he effect of great wealth and luxury, in a polished nation” created “an immoderate pursuit of sensual pleasure,” and degenerated into vice.⁴² Despite the complexity of the process of the evolution and degeneration of the principles of chivalry and the several explanations they posited, Hume and his contemporaries acknowledged that all forms of gallantry, whether “courteous” or “loose,” had shared origins in the collapse of the Roman Empire and underwent a common process of development in the period of the Crusades. This resulted in the mixed attitudes of the Scottish thinkers towards gallantry and the characteristics it bequeathed to modern manners.

Unlike his philosophical and cultural discussion of the subject in the *Essays, Moral and Political*, Hume’s historical explanation of chivalry in the *History of England* was neither pioneering nor original for its time. Nevertheless, its inclusion attests to the importance he attributes to the historical role of chivalry, an opinion shared with other Scottish intellectuals of the period. Such interest was also shared by a literary movement often called Medievalism, a form of which can be considered to have emerged by the mid-eighteenth century.⁴³ One example of this trend appears in the *Letters on Chivalry and Romance*, which Richard Hurd published in 1762. Hurd shared the opinions about the origins of the manners of the feudal ages and their influence on modern society, including chivalry, commonly

held by his Scottish contemporaries.⁴⁴ In particular, he employed a similar historical method, locating the origins of chivalry primarily in the practicalities of the feudal system. He explained that chivalry “seems to have sprung immediately out of the FEUDAL CONSTITUTION” as “the erection of a prodigious number of petty tyrannies,”⁴⁵ and the continual state of war rendered military discipline necessary even in peacetime. Moreover, in the feudal period, women could succeed to fiefdoms, so that “who should obtain the grace of a rich heiress” was an important economic matter.⁴⁶ Hence, the practices of tournaments and gallantry towards women were produced. Hurd therefore concluded that “[c]hivalry was no absurd and freakish institution, but the natural and even sober effect of the feudal policy.”⁴⁷ There is a sense, therefore, in which this shared historical interest in chivalry transcends any simple distinction between the thinkers of the Enlightenment, and of the Medievalist and Romantic movements.

The traditional periodization of these cultural movements has also been challenged by a recent study, which claims that “[i]n Scotland, ‘Classical’ and ‘Romantic’ cultural forms occupy the same historical moment and institutional base, rather than defining successive stages or periods.”⁴⁸ Furthermore, as Lionel Gossman points out, we should not make the naïve assumption of continuity between eighteenth and nineteenth-century forms of Medievalism.⁴⁹

The Ossian debate, occasioned by Macpherson’s fabrication, is an example of the bridging of conceptual divisions, which succeeded in exciting the primitivist and patriotic sentiments of many contemporary intellectuals, including those of the Scottish Enlightenment. When the poet Macpherson published Ossian’s poem, he claimed that it was passed down by word of mouth from the third century.⁵⁰ At first, this claim seems also to have excited Hume’s patriotism,⁵¹ but he soon recovered his skeptical attitude, in the process making an important contribution to the historical element of the chivalry debate of his day.

Hume’s final judgment on this poem can be found in his manuscript “Of the Authenticity of Ossian’s Poems,” which he did not publish for fear of hurting the feelings of his friend Hugh Blair, who supported the authenticity of the poems.⁵² Hume dismissed the antiquity claimed for the poem because, he claimed, in it “[w]e see nothing but the affected generosity and gallantry of chivalry, which are quite unknown, not only to all savage people, but to every nation not trained in these artificial modes of thinking.” Hume’s phrase “artificial modes” refers especially to gallantry: “The gallantry and extreme delicacy towards the women, which is found in these productions, is, if possible, still more contrary to the manners of barbarians.”⁵³ It is well known that the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers exploited literary works as indices of historical attitudes.⁵⁴ This is the case in their dealings with the topic of chivalry, many of their observations concerning which were derived from the study of romances. Importantly, in this case, Hume applied this method in a converse manner; when the dating of a certain literary work is not

determinable by other means, he argues, it can be inferred from the manners and characters depicted in that work. The passage cited above illustrates Hume's conviction, which he had expressed previously, that humanity and gallantry such as that shown by Ossian could not be traced back to the ancient world. The reason he was able to detect Macpherson's fabrication, unlike other Scottish thinkers, was his keen perception of the depiction of manners in literature. In addition, unlike those who held up the "noble savage" as the embodiment of uncontaminated human nature, the skeptical and pro-modern Hume rejected the idealization of primitivism in ancient history and its attendant false nostalgia.⁵⁵ It can be said, therefore, that Hume's penetration into the significance of the historical origins of chivalry was much deeper than that of other Scottish intellectuals.

As we have seen, while the trends towards antiquarianism, Medievalism, and Romanticism that can be discerned in the thought of the mid-eighteenth century are not necessarily incompatible with those of the Scottish Enlightenment, a certain degree of distinction can nonetheless be drawn between the standpoints of the different intellectual schools on particular issues. Unlike the Scottish thinkers, the concern of Richard Hurd, for instance, lay not in the search for the origin of modern manners, but in the defense of the rationality of chivalry, both as a social custom and as a literary device. What Hurd as a literary critic intended was to rehabilitate the use of chivalric symbolism in the work of writers such as Spencer and Milton. On the other hand, the aim of the Scottish thinkers, who maintained a critical attitude towards the barbarous and warlike aspects of chivalry, was to investigate historically the origin of modern manners, rather than to argue for the worth of chivalry *per se*.

It is worth mentioning that both the Scottish thinkers and Edmund Burke, who is often regarded as the founder of modern conservatism, evaluated chivalry as a modern phenomenon and a civilizing factor.⁵⁶ The revolution in France, however, served to widen the gap between radical or progressive and conservative thinkers: driving both to more ideologically-driven and morally-simplistic evaluations of social phenomena than those of their predecessors. Burke was to emphasize the traditional values of chivalry, together with those of the Christian religion, more positively and consciously than any who had discussed the subject previously. After the revolution, with the benefit of hindsight, the *ancien régime* was characterized as a model of, now vanquished, civility by Burke and as the epitome of an obsolete and corrupt social order by his radical opponents. Changing times, therefore, provoked more simplistic judgments on the values or otherwise of chivalry; Burke's famous lament, "But the age of chivalry is gone," met with Thomas Paine's mocking rejoinder that "the Quixote age of chivalric nonsense is gone."⁵⁷ This polarization has understandably led to the evaluation of Burke's thought as tending less towards that of Hume and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers than towards those of the mid-eighteenth-century Medievalist schools.

However, as mentioned above in the context of periodization, to assume a simple continuity between the latter and Burke, as indeed to paint the evolution of any school of thought as a simple historical progression, would also be naïve.

Conclusion

David Hume was pioneering in his philosophical and cultural analysis of the topic of chivalry, and the close examination of his use of the term in this paper has aimed to unravel the complex significance that the concept held for his analysis of modern manners. It is likely that Hume and other Scottish Enlightenment authors built on the arguments of their intellectual predecessors, including those who can be classed as moralists in a broad sense, antiquarians, and thinkers of a Romantic or so-called pre-Romantic bent. However, in both the juvenile manuscript “Essay on Chivalry” and in his later writings, Hume provided unprecedented insights by representing chivalry as a cultural amalgam of ancient courage and modern love. Because of its civilizing effects, Hume also characterizes chivalry not only as a distinguishing factor between ancient and modern societies, but also as a merit possessed by the latter over the former. Not all of Hume’s discussions of chivalry were published during the eighteenth century and therefore the claims concerning his influence on his contemporaries should be somewhat qualified. However, the earliest evidence for the evolution of the common stance of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment on the topic is evident in his work. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, many Scottish Enlightenment thinkers entered into the historical analysis of the origin and development or degeneration of chivalry. While Hume was influenced by his contemporaries, he used his own historical conception of the origins of chivalry in his contribution to the Ossian debate to correctly discern the modernity of the chivalric manners betrayed in Macpherson’s forgery. In terms of Hume’s own thought, the topic of chivalry provides a clear example of the working through of his consistent defense of modern social values while at the same time observing the diverse and fallible operations of the human imagination and passions.

NOTES

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1 David Hume, "An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour" (National Library of Scotland, MS. 23159, IX, 4), transcribed by E. C. Mossner, *Modern Philology* 45 (1947): 54–60 [1–8]. Hereafter referred to as "EC." The page numbers of Mossner's edition are given with the page numbers of the manuscript inserted parenthetically. Papers relating to Hume's discussion on chivalry include Ernest Campbell Mossner, Introduction to EC; Donald T. Siebert, "Chivalry and Romance in the Age of Hume," *Eighteenth Century Life* 21, n.s.1 (1997): 62–79; Ryan Patrick Hanley, "David Hume and the Modern Problem of Honor," *The Modern Schoolman* 84 (2006): 295–312. Mossner and Siebert both discuss the relationship between the "Essay on Chivalry" and the *History of England*. Ernest Campbell Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 2nd ed. (New York: Clarendon Press, 1980), 47; Siebert, "Chivalry and Romance in the Age of Hume," 64. Both Mossner and Siebert supposed that, in the "Essay on Chivalry" at least, Hume's ideas reflected the vulgar, and largely negative, view of the "Dark Ages" prevalent at the time. However, while he emphasized the absurdity and extravagance of chivalry, Hume also held that the "barbarian" of the early modern age attained "the Relish of some degree of Virtue & Politeness" (57[3]). His view, therefore, was ambivalent in both works; that is, Hume consistently sought the origins of some of the more positive aspects of modern civilization in chivalry, while simultaneously criticizing its extravagant and violent attributes. Hanley follows Mossner's depiction of Hume's view of chivalry, and regards Hume's "Essay on Chivalry" as "his first sustained expression of his trepidations regarding the modern corruption and degeneration of classical virtue." Hanley "David Hume and the Modern Problem of Honor," 295. However, this characterization seems insufficient, as it does not note Hume's recognition of the positive aspects of chivalry.

2 "Chivalry had no more typical or famous expression than the Crusades; but Hume, in his *History of Great Britain* (1761), wrote them off in a much-quoted phrase as 'the most signal and durable monument of human folly that has yet appeared in any age or nation.'" Mark Girouard, *The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 19. Other examples of this assumption include the following assessment of Hume's "Essay on Chivalry"; "The thesis is standard for the Age of Enlightenment: the degeneration of true classical virtue and the rise of false Gothic chivalry." Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 47. For a discussion of the general disgust the Enlightenment thinkers expressed with "the Gothic," see Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, Volume 2: The Science of Freedom (W. W. Norton & Company: New York and London, 1996), 217.

3 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, with an editor's introduction by David Fate Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2nd ed., edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). Hereafter referred to as "T" with numbers in parentheses referring to the Book, part, section, and paragraph number of Norton's edition, followed by the page numbers of the Selby-Bigge-Nidditch edition.

4 David Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987). Hereafter referred to as "E" with page numbers inserted parenthetically in the text.

5 David Hume, *History of England: from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to The Revolution in 1688*, 6 vols., rep., (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983). Hereafter referred to as "H" with volume and page numbers inserted parenthetically in the text.

6 For the latter two meanings, see also David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals: A Critical Edition*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); and *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and the Principles of Morals*, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), A Dialogue, 48n93 (SBN 340), 32 (SBN 335), and 47 (SBN 339) (The page, section, and paragraph numbers of Beauchamp's edition are given, followed by the page numbers of the Selby-Bigge-Nidditch edition). See also E 272, 536–7. In his letters, Hume described Paris as the “Center of Arts, of Politeness, of Gallantry, and of good Company” (*New Letters of David Hume*, ed. Raymond Klibansky and E. C. Mossner (New York: Garland Pub., 1983), 85, Letter to Colonel Isaac Barée, July 16, 1764. See also David Hume, *The Letters of David Hume*, ed. John Young Thomson Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1:497, Letter to Blair, and others, April 6, 1765. Lívia Guimarães, emphasizing the philosophical significance of the Humean notion of gallantry for the analysis of gender relations, demonstrates that “Hume’s solution to the problems of philosophy is especially congenial to women’s approaches.” “The Gallant and the Philosopher,” *Hume Studies* 30.1 (2004): 127–47, 129. Smith was also critical of the extravagance and unnaturalness of the language of the “Romance writers of the middle age and others on Love subjects” in *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, ed. J.C. Bryce, general editor A. S. Skinner, vol. 4 of the *Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 7 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1981–1987), 131, Lecture 22, paragraph 104).

7 William Robertson, *The Progress of Society in Europe: A Historical Outline from the Subversion of the Roman Empire to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century*. First section of the author’s *History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V* (1769; rep., ed. Felix Gilbert, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 59. He also emphasized that the spirit of chivalry inspired the progress of liberal and generous sentiments and aided the administration of justice. Robertson, *The Progress of Society*, 57. Although he does not refer directly to the influence of chivalry, Adam Smith expresses a similar opinion about the importance in modern manners of the sense of honor and polite behavior in wartime in the *Lectures on Jurisprudence*: “The practice of ancient and modern nations differs widely with regard to the length to which the outrages of war may be carried.” He acknowledges as one of the causes of modern refinement in the laws of nations “that courtesy, or rather gallantry, which takes place between hostile nations, by which even ambassadors are kept at their several courts.” Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, ed. Ronald L. Meek, David Daiches Raphael, and Peter Gonville Stein, vol. 5 of the *Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 548, 549–50. Smith employs the notion of gallantry with a more general meaning of politeness. See also his discussion of the rise of modern notion of honor and the law of defamation in *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (122–3).

8 For example, see Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, “The Moralists” (first published in 1709), in the *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1732; rep., with a foreword by Douglas Den Uyl, 3 vols., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 2:111 and Jeremy Collier, *Upon Duelling*. Vol. 1 of *Essays upon Several Moral Subjects, In Two Parts*, 6th ed., 3 vols. (Printed for George Strahan with Part IV, 1720). For a discussion of the relationship between the duel and civility in early modern English discourse, see Markku Peltonen, *The Duel in Early Modern England: Civility, Politeness and Honour* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

9 Joseph Addison, *The Spectator*, ed. Donald Frederic Bond, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 1:416–7.

10 Ibid., 1:419.

11 Ibid.

12 Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits*, 2 vols. (1729; rep. Commentary by Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988), 1:221. Collier also emphasized the contrast between the rude original form of dueling and Christianity, which, he argued, later fused together into the concept of chivalry. Collier, *Essays upon Several Moral Subjects*, 1:43.

13 Bernard Mandeville, *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, and the Usefulness of Christianity in War* (1732; rep. as vol. 6 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Mandeville*, 6 vols., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1990), 166.

14 Mandeville, *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*, 43.

15 Mandeville, *The Fable of Bees*, 1:218–9.

16 Francis Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affectations* (1728; rep. as vol. 2 of the *Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson*, 7 vols., Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990), 150.

17 Ibid., 2:169.

18 Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, edited with a preface and critical notes by Ferdinand Tönnies, 2nd ed. with a new introduction by M. M. Goldsmith (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1969), 52, part 1, chap. 10, sec. 9–10; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, in *The Collected Works of Thomas Hobbes*, collected and edited by Sir William Molesworth; with new introduction by Graham Alan John Rogers (London: Routledge / Thoemmes Press, 1992), 81, Part 1, chap. 10; Samuel Pufendorf, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books, written in Latin by the Baron Pufendorf translated into English, from the Best Edition, with a Short Introduction*, trans. Basil Kennett and William Percivale (Oxford: Printed by L. Lichfield, for A. and J. Churchil [etc.], 1703), 197–8, chap. 4, book 8, sec. 8; Gershom Carmichael, *Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: the Writings of Gershom Carmichael*, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne; texts translated from the Latin by Michael Silverthorne; foreword by James Moore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 68–9, 363. On the influence of the Natural Law tradition upon Scottish Enlightenment, see Duncan Forbes, “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment,” in *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. R. H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), 186–204.

19 John G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), chap. 5.

20 Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, chap. 4; John W. Cairns, T. David Fergus, and Hector L. MacQueen, “Legal Humanism and the History of Scots Law: John Skene and Thomas Craig,” in *Humanism in Renaissance Scotland*, ed. John MacQueen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 48–74.

21 Henry Home (Lord Kames), *Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities*, 2nd ed. (1749; rep. with a new introduction by John Valdimir Price, Routledge / Thommes Press, 1993), Essay 3: “Honour. Dignity,” 71–122.

22 Stair gives a historical overview from the fall of the Roman Empire to medieval Europe in his *Institutions*. Viscount Stair, *The Institutions of the Law of Scotland: Deduced from Its Originals, and Collated with the Civil, Canon, and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations* (1693; ed. David M. Walker, Glasgow: University Presses of Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1981), 81–2, Book 1, title 1, sec. 12–3.

23 Hume, *The Letters of David Hume*. Hereafter referred to as “L” with volume and page numbers inserted parenthetically in the text. Stevenson points out that several literary sources helped to shape chivalric ideas including romantic and moral literature, chronicles, chivalric manuals, and epic and court poetry. Katie Stevenson, *Chivalry and Knighthood in Scotland, 1424–1513* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), 131–69.

24 See also Hume’s mention of “Books of Gallantry” (E 537) and Smith’s references to “books of chivalry and romance, which describe the most dangerous and extravagant adventures.” (Smith, “Letter to the authors of the *Edinburgh Review*,” in *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, ed. W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce, vol. 3 of the *Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 251.

25 Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767; rep., edited and introduced by Duncan Forbes, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 203; my emphasis.

26 John Millar, *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks* (1771; rep., Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1990), 86.

27 Henry Home, Lord Kames, *The Sketches of the History of Man*, 4 vols. (1778; rep., with a new introduction by John Valdimir Price, London: Routledge / Thoemmes Press, 1993), 2:307–8.

28 M. A. Stewart, “The Dating of Hume’s Manuscripts,” in *The Scottish Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation*, ed. Paul Wood (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000), 267–314, 275; John Hill Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, 2 vols. (1846; rep., New York: Burt Franklin, 1932), 1:18–9; John Young Thomson Greig, *David Hume* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), 84–5; Mossner, Introduction to EC. For a discussion of the typological errors, see Stewart, “The Dating of Hume’s Manuscripts,” 308–9.

29 Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 47; David Fate Norton, “History and Philosophy in Hume’s Thought,” in *David Hume: Philosophical Historian*, ed. David Fate Norton and Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: the Bobbes-Merrill Company Inc., 1965), xxxiii; Donald W. Livingston, *Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 213; Paul B. Wood, “Hume, Reid and the Science of the Mind,” in *Hume and Hume’s Connexions*, ed. M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 119–39, 123.

30 To the best of my knowledge, there is no direct evidence that any of Hume’s contemporaries read this manuscript. Mossner inferred that this essay might have been composed for distribution either to some classes, or for one of the public disputations or prizes in Edinburgh College. Mossner, Introduction to EC 54–5; Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 50. However, Mossner’s dating of the piece has now attracted criticism from M. A. Stewart. See Stewart, “The Dating of Hume’s Manuscripts,” 275–6. Another possibility is that Hume referred to the content of the essay in another context, whether

in an assembly or in private conversation. For example, a likely instance would have been the occasion in 1754 on which Hume presided over one of the meetings of the Select Society, the topic of which was “Whether ought we to prefer ancient or modern manners, with regard to the Condition and treatment of Women?” Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 281.

31 See also Hume, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, A Dialogue, 34–5 (SBN 335); Hanley, “David Hume and the Modern Problem of Honor,” 304–5.

32 As Hume himself declared in the “Preface” of the *Essays, Moral and Political*, he sought to emulate Addison’s literary style when writing these essays. Hume, *The Philosophical Works*, ed. Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, 4 vols. (1882–1886; rep., Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), 3:41. See also M. A. Box, *Suasive Art of David Hume* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), esp. chap. 3; Nicholas Phillipson, “Politics, Politeness and Anglicisation of Early Eighteenth-Century Scottish Culture,” in *Scotland and England: 1286–1815*, ed. Roger A. Mason (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), 226–46.

33 Adam Smith mentioned dueling as a modern example of the virtue of “self-command”: “Modern manners, which, by favouring the practice of duelling, may be said, in some cases, to encourage private revenge, contribute, perhaps, a good deal to render, in modern times, the restraint of anger by fear still more contemptible than it might otherwise appear to be. There is always something dignified in the command of fear, whatever may be the motive upon which it is founded.” Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. D. D. Raphael and Alec Lawrence Macfie, vol. 1 of *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 240, Part VI. Sec. iii. Paragraph 10.

34 Elsewhere, he asks “[w]hat age or period of life is the most addicted to superstition? The weakest and most timid. What sex? The same answer must be given. The leaders and examples of every kind of superstition, says Strabo, are the women.” David Hume, “Natural History of Religion,” in *A Dissertation on the Passions; The Natural History of Religion*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 36. Berry notes that this is part of a long tradition of male disparagement of the female capacity for rational thought. Christopher J. Berry, *The Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 112. In “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” Hume attributes to environmental factors the limited nature of female empowerment: “Barbarous nations display this superiority, by reducing their females to the most abject slavery; by confining them, by beating them, by selling them, by killing them” (E 133). He even emphasizes the superiority of women over men in their literary judgments and sensibility (E 536). However, there is no textual evidence that he would assert that women in general are equal with men in the “strength both of mind and body” (E 133) or that women in general are weaker than men *only* because of their social condition. This does not exclude the possibility of feminist interpretations of Hume, however: see, for example, Annette C. Baier, “Hume on Women’s Complexion,” in *The Science of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment: Hume, Reid & Their Contemporaries*, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989), 33–53; Baier, “Hume: The Reflective Women’s Epistemologist?” in *Feminist Interpretations of David Hume*, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson (University Park; PA.: Pennsylvania University Press), 19–38; Guimarães, “The Gallant and the Philosopher.”

35 Smith's reference in the *Wealth of Nations* to the economic effects of the Crusades on Italian cities should also be noted. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Roy Hucheson Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner; textual editor William Burton Todd, vol. 2 of the *Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 406, Book III, chap. iii, paragraph 14.

36 Robertson, *The Progress of Society*, 25–7. Smith also acknowledged, in passing, that gallantry, which seems to mean here politeness in behavior, was introduced from the Islamic World: “The victorious arms of the Saracens carried into Spain the learning, as well as the gallantry, of the East.” Smith, “History of Astronomy” in *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, 69, IV. 23.

37 Kames, *The Sketches of the History of Man*, 2:82, 66. Although Kames and Gilbert Stuart are drawn from different camps on the long-standing debate of the origins of the feudal system, both tend to consider that the polished, or even corrupt by Stuart standards, Roman manners, including gallantry, were introduced to the originally simple and rugged culture of the Gauls. See Gilbert Stuart, *An Historical Dissertation concerning the Antiquity of the English Constitution*, 2nd ed., corrected (Printed for T. Cadel: London, 1770), 23–4, 55–6.

38 For example, some commentators included even Norse mythology as a possible influence on European chivalry. See “Chivalry,” *Edinburgh Encyclopaedia*, ed. David Brewster, 18 vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1830).

39 Hume first expressed this sequence of ideas in the “Essay on Chivalry” and Richard Hurd formulated the theory more clearly a little later. Hurd explained that, after the fall of the Roman Empire, the beginnings of the feudal polity “settled in the West, and operated so powerfully as to lay the first foundations, and to furnish the remote causes, of what we know by the name of Chivalry.” He goes on to outline a second period of the development of chivalry when feudalism was fully developed, leading, at its height, to the Crusades. Richard Hurd, *Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and Romance with the Third Elizabethan Dialogue* (1778; rep. with introduction by Edith J. Morley, London: Henry Frowde, 1911), 159.

40 In the Tudor volumes of the *History*, the notion of gallantry in the battlefield still figures occasionally in the narrative (H 3:101, 103). In a few cases, Hume represented adulterous relationships as instances of gallantry (H 3:234, 235). However, he did not associate these affairs with chivalric manners in particular.

41 Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man*, 2:87–90.

42 John Millar, *An Historical View of the English Government*, 4 vols. (1803; rep. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), 1:122. Millar's historical analysis of the changes in the social status of women, as well as their role in the introduction of civilizing manners, was to be developed to the full in *The Distinction of Ranks* (1771), in which he explained the establishment of chivalry as an eventual result of the introduction of agriculture. Millar, *The Distinction of Ranks*, chap. 1, sec. 4, 67–86.

43 The influence of Sainte-Palaye, the main figure of the French medievalists and traditionalists before the Revolution, was felt across the channel by many British medievalists in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Lionel Gossman, *Medievalism and the Ideologies of the Enlightenment: the World and Work of La Curne de Sainte-Palaye*

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 325–58, Part 4. The Stuart volumes of Hume's *History of England* were well received by these French traditionalists or royalists before and after the French Revolution, but Sainte-Palaye criticized Hume for his poor depiction of the Middle Ages in his *History*. Gossman, *Medievalism and the Ideologies of the Enlightenment*, 245. For discussion of the contrast between the reception in France of the Stuart volumes and of the Medieval volumes, see Laurence L. Bongie, *David Hume: Prophet of the Counter-Revolution*, with a foreword by Donald W. Livingston, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), 26.

44 Richard Hurd was clearly aware of Hume's work, and criticized the Tudor volume of Hume's *History* in the Appendix of *A Dialogue, Moral and Political* (1762). Hurd, *Moral and Political Dialogues; with Letters on Chivalry and Romance*, 4th ed. 3 vols. (W. Bowyer and J. Nichols, 1771), 2:326–8. See also 2:226. In the later edition, this appendix was inserted into the sixth dialogue, and Hurd's attitude toward the volumes on the Norman conquest and the feudal age of Hume's *History* became less aggressive. See Richard Hurd, *The Early Letters of Bishop Richard Hurd, 1739–1762*, ed. Sarah Brewer (Woodbridge: Boydell Press; Church of England Record Society, 1995), 381, Letter 252, to William Mason, November 27, 1761.

45 *Ibid.*, 83.

46 *Ibid.*, 105.

47 *Ibid.*, 84–5.

48 Ian Duncan, with Leith Davis and Janet Sorensen, Introduction, in *Scotland and the Borders of Romanticism*, ed. Leith Davis, Ian Duncan, and Janet Sorensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–19, 3.

49 Gossman, *Medievalism and the Ideologies of the Enlightenment*, chap. 5.

50 James Macpherson, *Fragments of Ancient Poetry collected in the Highlands of Scotland* (1760; rep. in *The Poems of Ossian, and Related Works*, ed. Howard Gaskill, with an introduction by Fiona Stafford, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).

51 Recently, Gerard Carruthers discovered Hume's (unsigned) draft letter on the Ossian controversy. In this fragment, Hume said "[t]hey are undoubtedly traditional Poems, composed long before the Memory of Man." Gerard Carruthers, "A manuscript fragment on an unsigned and undated draft letter by David Hume on the Ossian controversy in the Mitchell Library, Glasgow," *Notes and Queries* 246 n.s. 48.4 (2001): 419.

52 Hume, *The Philosophical Works*, 4:415–24. See also Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 414–7. Lord Kames expressed the opinion in his *Sketches of the History of Man* that Ossian was authentic (1:422). For the reactions of the Scots, see Berry, *The Social Theory of Scottish Enlightenment*, 178–9.

53 Hume, *The Philosophical Works*, 4:417.

54 For instance, Millar states that the romances of chivalry can be considered "as useful records, that contain some of the outlines of the history, together with a faithful picture of the manners and customs of those remarkable periods" Millar, *The Distinction of Ranks*, 82. See also Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 200.

55 “To declaim against present times, and magnify the virtue of remote ancestors, is a propensity almost inherent in human nature” (E 278). See also Hume’s letter to Thomas Percy (*New Letters of David Hume*, 199, January 16, 1773).

56 Pocock argued that Burke might have turned his attention to chivalry as a result of having read the work of Robertson and Millar. John G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 198.

57 Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Jonathan Charles Douglas Clark (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 238. Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man*, in *Political Writings*, ed. Bruce Kuklick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 63.