Review of James Fieser, ed. *Early Responses to Hume*, Vols. 1 and 2: *Early Responses to Hume's Moral, Literary, and Political Writings*

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James Fieser, ed. *Early Responses to Hume*, Vols. 1 and 2: *Early Responses to Hume's Moral, Literary, and Political Writings*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2005. Pp. 819. ISBN 1-84371-117-6, Paperback, $120.

Hume's Moral Philosophy is the first volume of the first pair in the ten volume series, *Early Responses to Hume*. Edited by James Fieser, this series brings together eighteenth- and nineteeth-century reactions to Hume's philosophical, literary, political, religious, and historical writings as well as observations on his life and reputation. *Early Responses* contains material that originally appeared in a variety of formats—critical reviews, essays, pamphlets, and chapters or excerpts from books—written by philosophers, historians, economists, and clerics. Although some of the selections, especially those written by such well-known philosophers as Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and Henry Sidgwick are readily available to scholars, the series includes selections that have not been reprinted since they were first published, some of which were tracked down by Fieser, and some first translations into English.

Originally published between 1999 and 2003, a revised edition of *Early Responses* appeared in 2005. Fieser added new pieces and proofed all of the responses against their originals for this edition. Unfortunately, he failed to correct a number of mistakes, which mars the volume. Since the new edition is available in paperback, it should be easier for scholars to purchase selected volumes of interest to them. Fieser's *Bibliography of Hume's Writings and Early Responses* is available on the Thoemmes Press and the Hume Society websites.

Hume's Moral Philosophy follows the format adopted for the series. In his introduction to the volume, Fieser summarizes Hume's moral philosophy and provides a short overview of the responses. In addition, prior to each response, he provides a few biographical details about the author, tells us when and where the piece was first published, and briefly summarizes the reaction. If critical reviews of the author's work were published, or if Hume and the author corresponded, Fieser includes excerpts, many of which I found especially interesting.

Covering, as do all the volumes, a 160-year period, *Hume's Moral Philosophy* begins with an anonymous critical review of *A Treatise of Human Nature* that was published in 1741 in *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, a French journal devoted to reviewing new books; it ends with the American professor, Ernest Albee, whose *A History of English Utilitarianism* was originally published in 1901 and includes a chapter on Hume. The first volume contains 37 responses, representing 34 authors. Understandably, the responses for the eighteenth century are more exhaustive than those for the nineteenth century.

Reading *Hume's Moral Philosophy* is an eye opener. Writing the year he died, Hume famously remarks in *My Own Life* that the *Treatise* "fell dead-born from the press." The selections in this volume support Hume's claim. Critics largely ignored the *Treatise*'s account of morality. During the period between the publication of Book 3 of the *Treatise* in 1740 and the publication of the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* in 1751, there seem to have been just one unpublished and three published reactions to the *Treatise*. The only writers to seriously engage with the *Treatise*'s account of morality after the publication of the *Enquiry* and whose work is included in this volume are Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and James Beattie.

The early respondents to the *Treatise* were a diverse group. As Fieser notes in his overview, the first response—one not intended for publication—was most likely Francis Hutcheson's letter to Hume, in which he reacts to a draft of Book 3 Hume had sent him. While we no longer have that letter, Hume's reply makes it clear what Hutcheson's criticisms were. The first published response is the anonymous review that appeared in *Bibliothèque raisonnée*. Complaining that only those steeped in metaphysics would be able to understand Hume's abstract speculations, the reviewer confesses he wasn't up to it, so he read only the first four sections of Book 3 of the *Treatise*—Hume's arguments against moral rationalism and his account of justice. Next is William Wishart's "Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality" which Hume includes in his pamphlet, "A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh" (1745). Fieser chose to put this in volume 3 of *Early Responses*. The third published response is from Hume's friend and relative, Henry Home, Lord Kames, whose *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion* was first published in 1751.

How was the *Treatise* account of morality received by these early critics? Not well. Hutcheson complains that "there wants a certain warmth in the cause of virtue" in Hume's moral philosophy, even though Hume explicitly rejects the task of inspiring people to be morally good. He also criticizes Hume for adding natural talents to his list of virtues. The anonymous reviewer chastises Hume for not responding to objections brought against Hutcheson's moral sense theory. "Erudite people" objected to Hutcheson's "supposition of a new mental Faculty," but according to this reviewer, Hume simply follows Hutcheson in basing morality in the "supposition of a Sense or Mental Taste" (9)— a reading of Hume that is easy to assume if you only read the first few sections of the *Treatise*.

More interesting is the fact that Hume's earliest critics were bothered by his claim that justice is "unnatural" or "artificial," that is, that it arises from human convention. Hutcheson was the first to make this complaint, and Hume replies somewhat curtly that he never called justice "unnatural, but only artificial." The anonymous writer complains that, on Hume's view, prior to the establishment of the laws of justice, there is no such thing as the "right of property" and, thus, no

justice or injustice. As he sees it, Hume's account of justice is simply Hobbes' "presented in a new form": human beings agree to establish laws because it is in their "mutual" interest to do so (10). After complaining that Hume's philosophical views are skeptical and lead to atheism, Wishart berates him for denying the "natural and essential difference between justice and injustice," making it artificial and arising from conventions. Wishart's worry is that by making justice artificial, Hume makes it arbitrary and so unreal which, in turn, threatens our commitment to morality. Kames says that he would not have had to write about justice if it hadn't been for Hume, who maintained that justice isn't a "natural virtue," but is established by means of a convention "founded on the notion of public interest" (12). All of these writers assume that justice is "natural" in some sense of that overworked term. Many of these complaints were to be repeated over the next 150 years.

After the *Enquiry* appeared, almost everyone focused on it, and responses to Hume's moral theory began to appear on a more regular basis. There was, however, little change in the reception of Hume's moral philosophy. Respondents remained critical of his theory, and many were unfriendly critics. One effect of their attention to the *Enquiry* was that writers concentrated more on the content of his theory than on its structure or the background theories that underwrite it, such as Hume's theory of the passions and his theory of motivation.

From the very beginning, critics targeted Hume's claim that the virtues are useful or pleasant traits, a hypothesis he defends at length in the *Enquiry*. Critics object that Hume's criterion of virtue is too broad. They repeatedly complain that Hume should not have included natural talents—intellectual and physical accomplishments—in his catalogue of virtues. James Balfour, writing in 1753, argues that moral virtues are voluntary, but natural talents aren't. (Hume, of course, had argued that the virtues/natural talents distinction doesn't line up with the voluntary/involuntary distinction. Courage is no more voluntary than wit or sagacity.) Hume appeals to ancient philosophers in support of his idea that natural talents should be included in the catalogue of virtues, but several respondents dismiss this as a gross misreading of the ancients.

A few critics claim that Hume's criterion of virtue is too narrow. Motivated by religious considerations, they complain that Hume should not have thrown out the "monkish" virtues. John Leland, writing in 1755–1756, thinks that by excluding the monkish virtues, Hume excludes traits that "are recommended by the Bible." He adds that this "is no doubt designed to cast a slur upon the Gospel scheme of morality" (110). He then appeals to the Bible to show why self-denial, mortification, sufferance and humility are important Christian virtues. Writing in 1875, James McCosh similarly complains that Hume excludes "all the higher virtues and loftier graces." Adoration of God is "represented as superstition" and humility is "disparaged" by Hume (374–5).

The most significant effect of the attention to the *Enquiry* was that Hume was identified as a utilitarian. Even before William Paley's *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* appeared in 1785, Hume was characterized as having reduced morality to one principle—utility—which critics found objectionable. According to some critics, his "love of simplicity" is what "betrayed" him in doing so. The anonymous author of the pamphlet *Some Late Opinions Concerning the Foundations of Morality Examined* (1753) charges Hume with having destroyed "moral distinctions altogether," since if the virtues are approved of merely because they are useful, they are on a par with useful inanimate objects. Twenty years later, another anonymous critic writing in *The Weekly Magazine* or *Edinburgh Amusement* (the *Utne Reader* of the eighteenth century) argues that if utility is the criterion of virtue, then "every inducement of the mind, every quality of the body, and every external ornament, and advantage of the body" should be counted as virtuous (148). While acknowledging that mental and physical accomplishments and external goods are useful, he notes that they may be put to both good and bad use. This shows, however, that they can't be virtuous, "for virtue, good and unchangeable in its nature, cannot be converted into evil" (149).

After the appearance of Paley's *Principles*, Hume is often discussed along with him and other early utilitarians, making it even easier to interpret him as a utilitarian. Hume is seen as inspiring Paley's utilitarianism, although a few realize that there are important differences in their moral theories. Dugald Stewart in his *The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man* (1828) notes that they differ about the source of the utility principle and the sanctions in terms of which moral rules are enforced. Almost everyone writing during the nineteenth century who is included in volume 1 simply assumes that Hume is a utilitarian. By the end of the nineteenth century, critics characterize Hume as having provided the best eighteenth century statement of the theory. Leslie Stephen in his *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (1876) maintains that in the *Enquiry* Hume states "the essential doctrines of utilitarianism . . . with a clearness and consistency not to be found in any other writer of the century" (377–8). In a similar vein, Albee claims that the *Enquiry* provides the "classic statement of English Utilitarianism" (418).

One exception is Sidgwick. In a footnote to his section on Hume in his *Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers* (1886), he says that those who think that Hume made utility the standard of right and wrong fail to notice that he doesn't use the term "'utility' in the wider sense of 'conduciveness to happiness'" (398). Instead, he "always employs it in the narrower sense of 'tendency to *ulterior* good'; distinguishing the 'useful' from the 'immediately agreeable'" (398).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, there is some discussion about how the *Treatise* and *Enquiry* accounts of morality are related. Albee says that this is an important interpretative issue Hume scholars need to address. He argues that

the *Enquiry* is a clearer and cleaner account since Hume eliminated doctrines that needed to be eliminated—the associationist account of sympathy, for example. He thinks Hume was aware that his earlier treatment of sympathy was mistaken and that, in the *Enquiry*, sympathy simply means "the general benevolent tendency." Stephen thinks that "all the essential principles" of the *Treatise* reappear in the *Enquiry*. What is different is the manner of writing—its "literary texture." Critics also perceive the need to justify their decision to focus on the *Enquiry* rather than the *Treatise*. In addition to thinking that the *Enquiry* provides a more thorough and clear statement of utilitarianism, they accept Hume's own assessment of the *Enquiry* that of all his writings it was "incomparably the best."

Objections to Hume's moral theory were now primarily objections to utilitarianism. Many of them are familiar to us. There are worries about whether we are able to accurately determine the consequences of actions and whether we are able to perceive without bias and prejudice what is truly in the public interest. Thomas Gisbourne in *The Principles of Moral Philosophy Investigated* (1789) opposes utilitarianism because he thinks that the utility principle may be used to justify horrible actions. Despots will decide for themselves what is useful, thereby imposing their will on others. In a similar vein, Daniel Dewar, writing in 1826, claims that expediency has been the "justification of the greatest inhumanity and injustice. It has been acted upon by persecutors and tyrants in every age of the world" (329). In his survey, *The Scottish Philosophy* (1875), James McCosh, president of Princeton College, complains that Hume's theory isn't able to provide an adequate answer to the question of the basis of the obligation to promote the good of others. Critics continue to object that on Hume's utilitarian view, there is no difference between a virtuous agent and, as Dewar puts it, a "steam engine," since both are admired for their utility. Some of these criticisms are ones to which J. S. Mill responds in *Utilitarianism*.

In the *Enquiry*, Hume doesn't emphasize the artificiality of justice or provide arguments for it, as he did in the *Treatise*. His primary concern in section 3 is to show that justice arises only because it is useful and that our approval of it is based on its usefulness. In Appendix 3, he takes up, once again, the topic of how justice differs from other social virtues, although he avoids the language of the *Treatise* where he categorized them as artificial and natural virtues, respectively. He now maintains that the debate about whether justice is natural or not is merely a "verbal dispute."

With these shifts in emphasis, it isn't surprising that after the publication of the *Enquiry*, only a handful of respondents examined Hume's account of justice or objected to the idea that justice is artificial—as did the earliest critics of the *Treatise*. Some of the criticisms of Hume's views on justice are directed towards the claim that we praise it on grounds of its usefulness. The anonymous writer of the pamphlet *Some Late Opinions* (1753) worries that, on Hume's view, justice is

approved because of its "public utility," but this puts it on a "loose and precarious bottom" and "degrades it into a lower class" (50). If utility were the only measure of justice, then what is just would constantly shift "according to mens different apprehensions of a public interest" (50). If the transaction is secret, consideration of public interest no longer has any place. Stewart grants that the practice of justice is useful and maintains that this is what tempts Hume into thinking that veracity and justice, indeed all our duties, may be explained in terms of their utility. He maintains, however, that we immediately perceive their "rectitude" and adds that if we had to "deduce their rectitude from the consequences which they have a tendency to produce, there would not be enough of virtue left in the world to hold society together" (340).

Even though Hume doesn't emphasize the artificiality of justice in the *Enquiry*—the term "artificial" appears only once in a footnote in Appendix 3—the few writers that discuss Hume's account of justice continue to characterize him as holding that justice is "unnatural" or "artificial." In his *Essays on the Active Powers of Man* (1788), Thomas Reid devotes an entire chapter, "Whether Justice be a Natural or an Artificial Virtue," to Hume's account of justice, mainly as it appeared in the *Enquiry*. A version of that chapter was published as an article, "An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice," in the *European Magazine and London Review* in 1793. (It was originally published anonymously, but Fieser argues that we should attribute it to Reid.)

In the chapter on justice in *Active Powers*, Reid says somewhat incorrectly that, for Hume, the "natural virtues are those natural affections of the human constitution which give immediate pleasure in their exercise," while artificial virtues are those that are "esteemed solely on account of their utility" (201). In the later version, Reid hints at why he takes Hume to have drawn the distinction in that way. According to him, on Hume's view, justice doesn't arise from "the constitution of human nature." It arises because of our need to live together in society and so is "regulated entirely by its use" (292). Nothing is just or unjust "by nature." What is beneficial—useful to—society is just and what is harmful to society is unjust. Reid's thinking seems to be that if it weren't for its usefulness, justice wouldn't exist and in this sense it isn't natural enough and so is artificial. Reid grants that we don't have a conception of justice until we have lived in society, but this doesn't imply that justice is conventional. He argues that concepts such as favor and injury are natural in the sense that human beings who develop in normal ways come to have them. Both concepts presuppose the concept of justice.

Similarly, Stewart misinterprets Hume's argument designed to show that justice is "an artificial and not a natural virtue." According to him, the argument is simply that "there is no implanted principle, prompting us by a blind impulse to the exercise of justice," as the similar principle that motivates us to act benevolently

(343). Stewart counters that this does not mark an essential difference between the obligations of justice and those of benevolence. Insofar as we act out of blind impulse, our actions can't be considered virtuous. The propriety or impropriety of our conduct depends upon whether we obey or disobey the dictates of reason and conscience.

Remarkably, Reid seems to be the only writer who criticizes Hume's concept of justice as being too narrow—confined to a concern with respecting property rights and fidelity to contracts. He points out that Hume leaves out important branches of justice, among them, the right of an individual to "the safety of his person," the safety of his family, and the right to his liberty (freedom of movement). While granting that the right to property is acquired, he argues that it is derived from our rights to life and liberty.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Hume's claim that justice is artificial receives more attention, but that is because writers think it necessary to compare and rank Hume's accounts of morality in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*. Stephen realizes that saying that justice is artificial doesn't imply that it is somehow unreal. According to him, Hume doesn't mean by "artificial" something that is "arbitrary." He means only that justice and the other artificial virtues are "derivative not primary; that they result from the operation of certain primary instincts working under given conditions" (384). He praises Hume for seeing that certain moral practices developed gradually. Albee thinks, not entirely accurately, that while for Hume both the natural and artificial virtues are grounded in utility, the utility of the natural virtues is direct or immediate, but the utility of the artificial virtues is indirect—useful only in the long run. He remarks that although the distinction between the two kinds of virtue is implicit in the *Enquiry*, Hume would have been better off dropping it altogether.

The *Enquiry* introduces topics not discussed in the *Treatise*; two of these received some attention. The first is Hume's discussion of our "interested *obligation*" to virtue in part 2 of the "Conclusion," in which he argues that we will find happiness in the "practice" of virtue. The second occurs in the course of that argument. Hume realizes that there is a problem with his account of justice. As the sensible knave points out, there are single acts of injustice that add considerably to a person's fortune without substantially harming the system of justice. So why shouldn't we act unjustly in such circumstances? Critics found Hume's answers to be unsatisfactory. Sidgwick, for example, thinks that in his response to the first objection, Hume ends up reducing the motive to act virtuously to self-interest. Others, such as George Gleig (1797), remark that even Hume acknowledges that he isn't able to show why the sensible knave shouldn't act unjustly. They believe the only answer that would sufficiently motivate the sensible knave is one that appeals to some type of religious motive—for example, belief in a future state.

There is renewed debate today both about the relationship between the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry* accounts of morality and about which work represents Hume's best effort. But, as the reactions to Hume in volume 1 show, much of what is distinctive and philosophically rich in Hume's moral theory was neglected because of the focus on the *Enquiry*. There is almost no mention of the sentimentalist idea that moral approval is a second-order reflective sentiment. The pared-down *Enquiry* account leaves out many of the background theories that are necessary to fully understand and appreciate Hume's moral theory: his theories of mind and passions, and his account of human motivation. While Hume traces the moral sentiments to sympathy (or humanity as he often calls it in the *Enquiry*) in both works, in the *Enquiry* he says there is no need to ask "why we have humanity?" In the *Treatise*, however, Hume provides an explanation of sympathy that shows that it is a deep principle of human nature. He traces it to the same associative principles that explain our ability to engage in causal reasoning. The *Enquiry* does not contain the detailed discussion of the general point of view or the ways in which sympathy is regulated that we find in the *Treatise*.

I was surprised that only a few of the respondents whose work is represented in this volume explicitly characterize Hume's moral theory as skeptical. Before reading *Hume's Moral Philosophy*, I had thought that this was not only a standard reading of Hume during this period, but also one that was widespread. Thomas Reid is among the philosophers who argue that Hume's philosophy is skeptical. But, somewhat ironically, nowhere in the selections from his *Active Powers* does Reid explicitly call Hume a skeptic. Fieser included the final four chapters of the 5th essay, "Of Morals," which is by far the most generous selection from any respondent—over 60 pages. The main target is Hume's moral theory.

Although Reid doesn't explicitly characterize Hume as a skeptic, it is fair to say that he thinks Hume's commitment to the theory of ideas inevitably leads him to the same sort of paradoxes and skepticism in ethics as it did in his account of our awareness of the external world. In chapter 7, "That moral Approbation implies a real Judgment," Reid says that, although moral approbation and disapprobation are familiar to us, in recent years philosophers have started a debate about their nature. As he sees it, there are two options: either they express real judgments that, like other judgments, are true or false, or else, they express "some uneasy feeling in myself," which is neither true nor false. Reid maintains that Hume opts for the second view; what drives him to it is his commitment to the theory of ideas. Interestingly, this was my understanding of Hume's moral theory before I had read any Hume.

According to Reid, the idea that when I condemn someone I am not passing judgment on them, but am only expressing an uneasy feeling is one that developed step by step by philosophers who accepted "the modern system of ideas and

impressions." René Descartes and John Locke maintained that secondary qualities are mere feelings or sensations in our minds, "there being nothing in bodies themselves to which the name applies" (235). Arthur Collier and Bishop Berkeley argued that the same is true of primary qualities. The next step was to say that beauty and deformity are "not anything" in objects, but are only certain feelings in the mind of a spectator. From there it is a short step to the view that approbation and disapprobation are only agreeable and uneasy feelings or sensations. Hume took the further step of claiming that belief is an act of the "sensitive" rather than the "cognitive" part of the mind.

Reid does not object to calling conscience a moral sense, since he believes that a correct analysis of sensing shows that it involves judgment and therefore reason. Hume's mistake, according to Reid, is that he failed to see that approval is a complex act of the mind with feeling as only one component. Reid insists that we all know the difference between feeling and judging. He grants that when I approve of someone, I experience an agreeable feeling, but this feeling is different from and dependent upon the prior judgment that the person's conduct merits esteem. Persuade me that the agent was bribed and both my esteem and agreeable feeling vanish. He argues that to say that your action is right is not the same as to say that your action gave me "a very agreeable feeling." One reason is that while you may contradict my first claim without offending me, if you contradict my second "speech" you are in effect accusing me of lying, since everyone knows what they are feeling.

Stewart tells a similar story. According to him, Hume is a skeptic, since he denies "the immutability of moral distinctions." The problem with Hume's theory, as he sees it, is that "the words *Right* and *Wrong* . . . signify nothing in the objects themselves to which they are applied, any more than the words sweet and bitter . . . but only certain effects in the mind of the spectator" (335). Morality, according to Stewart, should be "independent and unchangeable." Stewart adds insult to injury by claiming that Hume's skepticism doesn't even have the merit of being original: skepticism has been around since the Greek sophists.

Even if only a few of the writers whose work is included in this volume identify Hume as a skeptic, a number characterize his moral philosophy as dangerous. Several warn us that unless we are careful, reading his work may undermine our allegiance to morality. As Fieser tells us, one critic, George Anderson, tried to get *both* Hume and Kames excommunicated. Writing two years after the *Enquiry* appeared, he claims their attack on reason is an attack on religion, so both are atheists. In a letter to the editor that appeared in *The Weekly Magazine* in 1773, the author calls Hume a "monster of learning, so treacherous to the peace of mankind" (148). In 1777, John Priestly warns us that we need to read Hume with caution since he is sneaky: he delays considering counter evidence until readers have already been

lured into accepting his views. A few years later, Balfour says that it is necessary to expose Hume's dangerous views since the "elegance of his style, and his peculiar and subtile manner of reasoning, may give them too much credit with the inattentive and unwary" (169).

Much of the hostility to Hume is religiously motivated. James Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism* (1770) stands out as a sustained attack on Hume that is motivated primarily by religious considerations. Known in his own day primarily as a poet, Beattie thought that Hume was an enemy to religion and because of his philosophical talent and reputation he would weaken people's religious commitments. Not only was Hume's work a direct threat to religion, it was also dangerous to morality and society. At one point, Beattie comes close to identifying Hume with Satan. Whatever reputation Beattie's *Essay on Truth* possesses today is due to the bitterness of his assault on Hume and his philosophy. Fieser tells us that supporters of Hume were "bothered by the harsh attacks." (Hume in passing in a letter calls Beattie a "bigotted silly Fellow.")

It is unfortunate that the selections from the *Essay on Truth* in the first volume don't capture the acrimonious tone of Beattie's attack on Hume or the extent to which he was motivated by religious considerations. Beattie accuses Hume of engaging in what he calls "metaphysical" rather than "philosophical" reasoning. By "metaphysical" reasoning he means reasoning that is "founded, not on fact, but on theory, and supported by ambiguous words and inaccurate experience" (139). Hume and other modern philosophers, he complains, fail to follow the Newtonian method.

Some critics motivated by religious considerations were more moderate in their criticisms. Paley, for instance, argues that by failing to bring God into his moral theory, Hume was not able to point to a motive that was sufficient to get us to act morally. William Belsham, writing in 1789 and 1791, claims that divine sanctions are needed to show that private and public interest coincide. That religious considerations play an important role in the early responses to Hume's moral theory comes out clearly in these reactions to Hume's moral philosophy.

Many of the selections from the nineteenth century were written by professors and are surveys of moral philosophy or philosophy in general. Some were based on their lecture notes. The best known is Sidgwick's *Outlines*. By the end of the nineteenth century, Hume's moral philosophy is treated as one theory among many others. While writers still raise objections, his work isn't thought to pose a threat to our commitment to morality. The venom critics had for Hume is gone.

William Rose, the first to review Hume's *Enquiry* shortly after its publication in 1752 in the journal, *The Monthly Review*, is the only writer to support him wholeheartedly. He praises Hume for presenting abstract and metaphysical subjects

clearly and precisely and doing so with "propriety, elegance and spirit" (27). He thinks that the *Enquiry* account will "considerably raise his reputation" and that since it is "free from that sceptical turn which appears in his other pieces," readers should find it more acceptable (28). He then quotes extensively from the *Enquiry*, a common practice in reviews at this time. Later on, Rose, in his review of Beattie's *Essay on Truth*, claims that Hume wasn't "treated with any greater degree of . . . severity than he deserves" (133). So much for his allegiance to Hume!

Even the few who were sympathetic to Hume were critical of his theory. Adam Smith is one of the friendly critics represented in this volume and one of the few that discusses the *Treatise* account of morality. Hume was a major catalyst for Smith's thinking about ethics, although Smith transforms Hume's theory in important ways—for example, his accounts of sympathy and justice depart significantly from Hume's.

Fieser chose to include part 4 of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) in its entirety. Entitled "Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiments of Approbation," it has two sections. The first is a discussion of why we approve of and find beauty in animate things, while the second is why we approve of and find beauty in people's character traits. The question of the extent to which considerations of utility should enter into explanations of our moral judgments is a recurring one in Smith's moral theory. When it comes up, he often has Hume in mind.

Earlier in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith argued that his predecessors focused too much on the results of people's sentiments. He thinks that "in common life" when we judge someone's sentiments, we take into consideration not only whether they are useful or agreeable, as Hume thinks, but also whether they are appropriate to their causes. When we blame someone for their excesses of grief, for example, we consider not only the "ruinous effects" they produce, but also "the little occasion which was given for them." In "judgments of propriety and impropriety" we assess whether our sentiments are appropriate or inappropriate to the circumstances and objects that provoked them. In "judgments of merit or demerit" we consider whether someone's sentiments and actions deserve gratitude or resentment.

In part 7, Smith says that there are four sources of moral approval. The first two sources are connected with judgments of propriety and merit and the third—judging according to general rules— is derived from these. The 4th is the type of utility that Hume thought explained approval. In section 2 of part 4, Smith grants that nature has "happily adjusted our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, to the conveniency both of the individual and of society" (127). But utility is not "either the first or principal source of our approbation and disapprobation" (127). Interestingly, one review of Smith's book that appeared in the *Monthly Review* in 1759 takes this to be Smith's primary criticism of Hume.

The problem with Hume's theory, as Smith sees it, is not that it is false, but that it is incomplete.

Jeremy Bentham, another friendly critic—at least in his earlier works, famously said in his *A Fragment on Government* (1776) that he learned from reading Book 3 of the *Treatise* that "utility was the test and measure of all virtue." In an appendix to a later work, *Chresthomatia: Being a Collection of Papers . . .* (1816), from which Fieser includes excerpts, Bentham proposes that we should reserve the term "deontology" for the part of ethics that concerns itself with the question of moral obligation. He applauds Hume for showing us how important it is to distinguish facts from values. But in a short extract from *The Rationale of Judicial Evidence* (1827), Bentham claims that Hume sometimes fails to heed his own advice. While Hume takes utility to be the measure of what is right and wrong, sometimes he thinks that our moral judgments are based on the pronouncements of the moral sense, which, according to Bentham, are factual.

In a series as ambitious as *Early Responses to Hume*, there are bound to be omissions. Not everything can be included and in some cases—especially excerpts from books—there is room only for portions of a work. I was puzzled, however, by Fieser's failure to include anything from Richard Price's *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, which was first published in 1758. This is a serious omission, since Price's response to Hume is as least as philosophically sophisticated and thorough as Reid's.

Price is the first to directly challenge Hume's "theory of ideas." According to this empiricist view, all simple ideas come from the senses. What reason does is to compare and relate ideas. By itself, reason never generates simple ideas or motivates action. Agreeing with Hume and other sentimentalists that moral ideas are simple, Price's strategy is to criticize the empiricist picture of the mind that implies that reason by itself isn't able to generate simple ideas or motivate action. He argues that the understanding, and not just sense, is a source of some important simple ideas, including the simple ideas of right and wrong.

We need to be especially careful when reading excerpts from books, since attending only to them may distort our understanding of their authors' overall reactions to Hume. Here are two examples. Fieser includes the entire section of Sidgwick's *Outlines* devoted to Hume. But earlier, at the beginning of his discussion of Lord Shaftesbury's moral theory, Sidgwick says that he "marks a turning-point" in the British moralist debate. He is the first to make "psychological experience" the foundation of ethics. Sidgwick thinks that Hutcheson took over this project and developed it into "one of the most elaborate" systems of ethics. Francis Hutcheson, in turn, influenced Hume. Sidgwick sees Hume as following Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in providing a psychological rather than philosophical basis for morality.

Similarly, it is only when we turn to Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation* and *Deontology*—and Fieser doesn't provide selections from these—that we see how deeply he came to oppose the entire tradition of modern British moral philosophy. After collapsing the rationalists and sentimentalists into one school, he dismisses it on pragmatic grounds. According to him, Hume and everyone else fails to provide a non-coercive and non-prejudiced way to figure out what our duties are and to provide sufficient sanctions to ensure that we will do our duty. Bentham has effectively redrawn the moral debate as being between utilitarians and what we would now call intuitionists. Mill follows Bentham in taking the debate to be between these two schools.

In his overview of the responses contained in volume 1, Fieser observes correctly that many of the commentators read Hume "with an eye towards defending their own visions of morality" (xix). This explains why so many of the criticisms of Hume were external to Hume's own theory rather than internal to it, and why so many were based on misinterpretations of his moral philosophy. He suggests—again correctly—that we should take the responses to Hume's moral philosophy to "mirror the history of British moral theory during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" (xix). Similar observations may well apply to Hume scholarship in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

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