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Those who have used David and Mary Norton's Oxford Philosophical Texts (hereafter abbreviated "OPT") edition of Hume's *Treatise* will have benefited substantially—whether in teaching and research, or in their novice or more advanced student encounters with Hume—from what the Nortons there did towards establishing a critical text of the *Treatise*, and towards the exposition and interpretation of that difficult work. Anyone, philosopher or other, with a serious research interest in the history of early modern philosophy, and in Hume's philosophy in particular, now stands indebted to this redoubtable team of scholars for the publication (Clarendon Press, 2007) of their finished critical edition of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter From a Gentleman*, and for the remarkable scholarly contributions revealed or constituted by the 740 pages of materials supporting the critical texts themselves. (For brevity's sake I will focus on the *Treatise* in what follows.) The supporting materials in this Clarendon edition comprise (amongst other things): a brilliantly informed, engaging, and humanizing historical account of the *Treatise* "from its beginnings to the time of Hume's death" (2:433–588); an exhaustive rendering of the Nortons' derivation of critical text from copy text, together with an exhaustive register of both minor and major emendations to the copy text; nearly 300 pages of editors' annotations to the text; a four-part bibliography; and two indexes, the first focused on the historical account and the editing of the text, and the second directed to the text itself and to the editors'

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annotations. The whole constitutes a masterly scholarly achievement, one which must have a profound effect on continuing efforts to grasp and assess the contents of Hume's demanding masterpiece.

Ignoring more broadly historical, textual, and bibliographical matters, and dividing the more philosophical labor with my co-symposiasts, I shall focus on Book 1 of the *Treatise*. I shall attend in particular to the editors' annotations to Book 1 and to the second index, Index 2. My concern is to characterize and comment on the contributions the editors make therein, and—in a critical vein—to indicate a few important lacunae.

The annotations of the Clarendon edition, the editors say, "provide materials intended to illuminate, but not interpret, Hume's texts" (2:685). For exposition or interpretative suggestions the reader is directed to the OPT edition. (There, of course, one finds David Norton's 90-page "Editor's Introduction," 150 pages of "Editors' Annotations" that include textual summaries "intended to be descriptive rather than interpretative" (421), and a "Glossary.") In just what ways are exposition and interpretation, on the one hand, and illumination, on the other, supposed to differ? If different, how are they related? The editors remark, with a suggestive caution, that the distinction between interpretation and illumination is one that, "however difficult to maintain in practice, provides a useful ideal" (2:685). The materials they offer in illumination, though abundant and generous, have, as we shall see, a striking and principled austerity. While presumably intended to *contribute* to the projects of exposition and interpretation of the *Treatise* (projects that are not, in the Clarendon edition, the editors' own projects) the annotations and accompanying index do not, themselves, *constitute* instances of exposition or interpretation. How precisely do they serve to illuminate the *Treatise*? How might they *forward* exposition and interpretation? To approach an answer to these questions let us turn to the annotations and to Index 2 themselves. I shall begin by registering the several purposes the Nortons explicitly intend the Clarendon annotations (complemented by the entries in Index 2) to serve. I shall also, as needed, look to linked annotations, annotations of an expository (and perhaps interpretative) sort, in the Nortons' OPT edition of the *Treatise.*

Several sorts of Clarendon annotations serve one or other quite basic purpose: to explain some archaic, obsolete, or otherwise puzzling word or phrase; to provide translations of Hume's Latin quotations; to amplify Hume's references to other authors by providing relevant bibliographical information. I mention these only to set them aside. Other annotations—let's call *these* the illuminating ones—fall into one or other (or several) of three groups. Some amplify Hume's own often-inexplicit cross-references within the *Treatise*, or supply the locations of earlier or later passages, or passages in others of Hume's works, or of earlier or later editors' annotations, bearing on the topic (the target) of the annotation in question. Illuminating annotations in a second group identify authors not explicitly identified

by Hume but whose works espouse or discuss the views Hume mentions. Finally, many annotations are designed to provide substantive information about the intellectual background of views expressed in the *Treatise*. As the editors have it, "any defensible interpretation of Hume's texts requires attention to, and thus appreciation of, the intellectual and philosophical context that gave rise to the issues dealt with in these texts" (2:686), and the editors are, it seems, chiefly concerned to do just this. Their representation of intellectual and philosophical context takes two principal—but each largely quotational—forms: citations from standard reference works or textbooks of the period (and so Ephraim Chambers's *Cyclopedia* of 1728 and Isaac Watts's *Logick* of 1725); and quotations, from authors both ancient and early modern, both notable (Cicero, Seneca, Descartes, Malebranche) and not so notable (Derham, Houtteville), that "prefigure positions that appear in the *Treatise*" (2:686), whether as positions Hume accepts (perhaps in modified form) or as positions he opposes.

Why quotation rather than paraphrase? For two reasons. The editors have come to think that, when writing the *Treatise*, Hume "was relatively close to some of the philosophical materials that helped to inform or motivate his work" (2:686). There is clear reason, in such cases, to avoid editorial intrusion. In any event, "the original articulations of the classical and early modern literature available to Hume, preserve, even in translation, their semantic and conceptual character to a degree that no paraphrase can" (2:687).

Why do I say that the editors' contextual representations are *largely* quotational? Because even essentially quotational annotations go some distance towards locating the positions articulated with respect to one another (if, in some cases, not explicitly with respect to Hume). See, for example, the first Clarendon annotation to 1.4.6.20 (SBN 261) in which, while quoting extensively from Locke, Collins, and Butler (and referring to Clarke, Sergeant, and Lee), the editors *assemble* the quoted passages in such a way as to provide a structured backdrop to Hume's claim that memory is the source of personal identity. To be sure, there are less spare annotations of the kind in question—and these amongst the most valuable—in which the editors, efficiently and economically, combine quotation with explicit representations of the elements of a particular philosophical problem or the ingredients in the lines of argument in question. See, for example, the annotation for 1.4.6.12 (SBN 257), "*sympathy* of parts to their *common end* . . . reciprocal relation of cause and effect," on Locke's and Butler's discussions of identity over time for plants. And then, too, there are annotations of the kind in question in which quotation plays (almost) no role, as in the annotation for 1.4.7.3 (SBN 265), "truth . . . by what criterion shall I distinguish her."

To be sure, there are annotations of what I have called (more narrowly than the editors) the illuminating kind in the OPT edition as well. There are lists of Humean cross-references, for one thing, but these are typically shorter than those in the

Clarendon, and (importantly) are restricted to the *Treatise*. And there are references to other authors, indeed not infrequent quotations such as those indicated above. (Again, of course, much shorter.) But the OPT edition includes, in addition to an expository introduction, a wealth of straightforwardly expository annotations and textual summaries: items simply absent in the Clarendon edition. The differences in the character and point of the annotations in the two editions can be quickly registered by comparing the annotations in each to 1.2.2.3 (SBN 30), "existence in itself belongs only to unity, and is never applicable to number"; or to 1.4.2.26 (SBN 200), "principle of individuation"; or to 1.4.6.20 (SBN 261–2) and its surroundings, on memory and personal identity. So it's not a strict division of labor between the two editions: it is rather a matter of the absence, in the scholarly Clarendon edition, of expository and perhaps interpretative materials needed in an edition for students, and the presence, in the Clarendon's many pages, of a wealth of citations suited to the needs, not of students, but of a diversity of scholars (if mainly philosophers and intellectual historians).

Intended for illumination, the Clarendon annotations, especially when taken in conjunction with appropriate index entries directed both to the editors' annotations and to Hume's text itself, provide a simply astonishing amount of information that could—that will—provide invaluable assistance to scholars of very diverse interests including, it goes without saying, philosophers. The annotations provide such information on just about every topic on which Book 1 of the *Treatise* touches, and they do so extraordinarily well, in my opinion, on such core topics as experimental philosophy, the ideas of space and time, causation, probability, belief, skepticism, skepticism in particular with regard to the external world, and personal identity. In particular, they succeed remarkably, in their largely quotational way, in establishing, as the editors aim to do, the intellectual and philosophical context of the *Treatise*.

And, even while eschewing exposition and interpretation, the Clarendon annotations (again, with accompanying index) must provide invaluable assistance to those whose concerns are expository, interpretative, and, yes, critical. If in no other way, they must do so by their painstaking identification of the multiple locations at which Hume introduces, defends, or deploys a given concept, distinction, or argument—or part of an argument. Consider, as a relatively modest example, the network of interconnected annotations and index entries locating Hume's deployment of the linked concepts of difference, distinguishability, and separability—a network displaying the use of the linked concepts in Hume's discussions of abstract ideas, of space and time, of causation, of skepticism with regard to the senses, of the "antient" philosophy, of the immateriality of the soul, and of personal identity. (I write gratefully here as one the margins of whose crumbling Selby-Bigge are filled with penciled cross-references garnered often by chance, and only over many, many years.) And in the thousands of obviously apt—and

illuminating—citations to other authors that the editors supply they both provide a thick textual context for constructive reflection, interpretative and critical, on Hume's own views and raise a substantial barrier—again I write in a personal vein—against an all-too-easy anachronism. Consider, in this connection, the rich and stimulating supply of annotations and index entries for the notoriously difficult section "Of the immateriality of the soul." Any committed reader of the *Treatise*, whether practised or more novice, whether philosophical or other, is clearly in the editors' debt.

I am sure that any practised reader of the *Treatise*, at least any philosophical one, will also, for some *Treatise* passage or other, look for something, if only something more, that the editors do not supply towards the illumination of that passage. There would be nothing surprising in this: the editors *couldn't* undertake to illuminate *every* passage on which *some* reader, even some *practised* reader, might hope for light—or *more* light—to be cast. And such a reader might well be helped by the expository and interpretative materials in the OPT edition.

That granted, I must add that as a practised reader of the *Treatise*, I can think of several passages, or groups of passages, that appear to be of central interpretative importance and that are clearly problematic, but that are not, or not adequately, illuminated by the Clarendon annotations, even when those annotations are amplified by index entries to other annotations and to other passages in the text. In the cases I have in mind recourse to the OPT edition provides little or no help. I shall briefly comment on four such.

The members of a first group of passages involve the idea of existence, the group including two passages at 1.2.6 (SBN 66–7), the *Treatise* section entitled "Of the idea of existence, and of external existence." The editors provide two annotations, the first locating Hume's ostensible claim amongst things said by Locke and Berkeley, with additional references to Watts and Chambers, the second citing a remark from *A Letter to a Gentleman*. These are, austerely, illuminating annotations of kinds noted earlier. For greater illumination, of course, the reader must supplement these annotations on the idea of existence with consideration both of other annotations pertinent to that idea and to passages (annotated or not) in the text in which the idea makes an appearance. To supplement what the initial annotations provide, the reader must consider entries in the second Index, that providing references to related annotations and related passages. Assiduously pursuing such a course in the present case would indeed draw attention to numerous other places in the *Treatise* (only one of *them* annotated) where the idea of existence makes an appearance. But that single additional annotation focuses on the division of acts of the understanding, not on the idea of existence; one finds no cross-reference to the first *Enquiry*, 12.29; and the search would not very readily lead to the important 1.1.5.8. In effect, the annotations, even when supplemented by use of the Index 2, do not (at all readily) effect links between what Hume says

about the idea of existence and what he says of judgment and of negation. To that extent, the editors' annotations, while undoubtedly illuminating, do not *forward* exposition and interpretation.

A pair of passages, the first at 1.4.2.2 (SBN 188), the second at 1.4.2.44 (SBN 210), express a biconditional linking continued and distinct or independent existence. (The second reads: "I have already observ'd, that there is an intimate connexion betwixt those two principles, of a *continu'd* and of a *distinct* or *independent* existence, and that we no sooner establish the one than the other follows, as a necessary consequence.") The first passage receives no annotation; the annotation to the second passage simply refers to the first; and none of the italicized adjectival terms appears in its own guise, or under the headings of "existence" or "Idea of existence," in the Index. On the face of it, the biconditional has a crucial structural role in Hume's chapter "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," the second occurrence apparently marking a turn from explanation of belief in a world of physical objects to critique of that belief. Apart from the single (one-way) cross reference no form of illumination is provided. And interpretation is in no way *forwarded*.

My third case concerns the possibility of what I would term *narrowly* structural links amongst the arguments concerning skepticism with regard to the senses at 1.4.2.44f. (SBN 210–8) and 1.4.4 (SBN 225–31) in the *Treatise*, and between those arguments in the *Treatise* and the arguments Hume presents in the first *Enquiry* at 12.5–15 (SBN 150–5) and represents in summary fashion at 12.16 (SBN 155). The Nortons provide an extraordinary wealth of illuminating annotations and index entries, an exceptionally complicated network of cross references, for these sections of the *Treatise*. Their index references include five to *Enquiry* 12.5–16 (albeit only one, an inclusive one, that mentions the seemingly summary 12.16). What goes unnoted in the Nortons' annotations and indexes, however, is the presence, across the two sections of the *Treatise*, of a crucially three-stage argument developed at *Enquiry* 12.4–15, one summarized, if somewhat misleadingly, at *Enquiry* 12.16. Hume writes at *Enquiry* 12.16:

> Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that [1] such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and [2] if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and [3] represents this opinion as contrary to reason; at least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. (The inserted numerals are mine.)

The *Enquiry* arguments I have numbered [1] and [2] appear to correspond to the two principal lines of argument at *Treatise* 1.4.2.44f., and the *Enquiry* argument

numbered [3] appears to correspond to the argument of *Treatise* 1.4.4. I do not here want to claim it is obvious that this is so. What I do suggest, however, is that an illuminating annotation (with accompanying indexical entries) should here draw attention to elements in the texts that could well have significant bearing on the exposition and interpretation of Hume's views on belief in an external world. Here, again, annotations and index do not *forward* interpretation. The *narrowly* structural feature to which I would here draw attention make no appearance, it must be added, in the expository and interpretative materials in the OPT editions either of the *Treatise* or the first *Enquiry*.

My fourth case concerns the *absence* of independent annotation at Appendix 21 (SBN 236), where Hume writes: "In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all of our distinct perceptions are distinct existences*, and *that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences*." The editors' index entries and annotations will provide enormous help to any reader who is interested in Hume on personal identity and who consults the index entries for "the distinguishable," "mind," "perceptions," "the separable," "necessary connexion," and "cause and effect." But surprisingly only one of these entries (under "mind," sub-heading "component perceptions of, distinct and separable") refers to Appendix 21; and, while the only other relevant passage in the Appendix (App 12) is briefly annotated, that annotation makes no reference to App 21. As already mentioned, App 21 itself receives no annotation. Remarkably, the diagnosis Hume apparently provides in concluding his second thoughts about personal identity—a diagnosis that is, on the face of it, deeply puzzling—makes only a solitary appearance in the index and none in the annotations. An opportunity for *forwarding* or *contributing to* exposition and interpretation has, it seems, been lost. (In the Introduction to the OPT edition the editors do note that Hume states, in the Appendix to the *Treatise*, that "he cannot now see how to reconcile these two insights or 'principles', nor is he prepared to renounce either as false" (145). The editors there leave the matter at that.)

Illumination of the *Treatise*, the editors maintain, can be achieved by providing cross-references of several kinds and (largely) quotational citations that reveal its pre-1739 intellectual, including philosophical, context. I do not doubt that that this is so. Indeed, I marvel at how much light the editors have shed on the *Treatise*—and at the prospect of what a serious reader would learn were he or she to follow up the textual and contextual lines they have laid out. I admire a richness of historical narrative and of annotation that is stunning in the range of scholarship it displays, in the clarity and economy with which that scholarship is presented, in the illumination it does in fact bring to just about every page of the *Treatise*—and in the invaluable help it thereby provides towards exposition and interpretation on so many matters.

I have taken it that, while eschewing exposition and interpretation themselves, the editors are concerned to *forward* interpretation. And I have suggested that, for the passages on which I have focused, they have shed less light than they might have done—that they have not, in those cases, done all that they might well have done to illuminate the text, and thereby to assist interpretation. In a remark quoted at the start, the Nortons suggest that the distinction between interpretation and illumination, "however difficult to maintain in practice, provides a useful ideal" (685). Perhaps they take themselves to have, at least here and there in their annotations and index, crossed the intimated boundary. Perhaps, in objecting as I have, I have done nothing more than object, unwarrantedly, to their *not* doing so for the passages I have emphasized. I think it clear that I have not done *that* in my first and fourth cases. In stressing structural matters in my second and third cases, I have certainly hoped to avoid doing so in those cases as well. Perhaps the intimated boundary between illumination and interpretation is not a sharp one.

NOTE

A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on the Clarendon Edition of Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, held at the 34th International Hume Conference, Boston University, August 2007. I am grateful to David Norton for his very careful comments on earlier versions of this essay.