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David Hume. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Oxford World's Classics, ed. Peter Millican. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. lxv + 238. ISBN 0-199-21158-2. Reissued 2008. ISBN 0-199-54990-7. Paper, $16.95.

Of these two new editions of Hume's *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* [*Enquiry* or EHU], Stephen Buckle's was published in early 2007, Peter Millican's a few months later. Buckle follows the usual prelims (Acknowledgments, Contents), with a 12,500-word "Introduction"; a "Chronology" (1711–1779) of Hume's life and publications; a helpful presentation of "Further reading"; and a "Note on the text." Then, following a lightly annotated text of the *Enquiry* (with Hume's endnotes converted to footnotes), he adds these other items from the Hume corpus: *A Letter from a Gentleman*; three essays, "The Sceptic," "Of Suicide," and "Of the Immortality of the Soul"; eight "Selections from Hume's letters"; and *My Own Life*. A nine-page index of names and topics completes the volume.

Those familiar with Buckle's highly original monograph, *Hume's Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of* An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding [HET] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) will find little to surprise them in his Introduction to the *Enquiry*. After brief accounts of Hume's early life and the lack of success of what is characterized as his "decidedly Sceptical" *Treatise*, a work that describes humans as guided in thought and action by custom and habit rather than by reason, and of his failure in 1745 to win appointment as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh (ix–xvi), Buckle turns to the *Enquiry*. Unlike the *Treatise*, which he describes as presenting "itself as contributing to a new spirit of philosophy already abroad among English philosophers," the *Enquiry*, he argues, "presents itself as a defence of serious thinking against shallowness, obscurity and superstition." It is with this aim in mind that the *Enquiry* is said to begin with a defence of serious philosophy joined to an attack on the shallowness of the Christian Stoicism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and a further attack on "superstition," Hume's code word, in his 1741 essay, "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm" [E-SE], for Roman Catholicism. This attack on superstition and Hume's focus on Catholic miracles in EHU 10 (from his opening attack on the recurring miracle of the real presence in the Eucharist to his objections to the well-attested miracles at the tomb of the Abbé Paris), coupled with the inclusion of "school metaphys-

ics" among the books said to be deserving of the flames at the close of EHU 12, lead Buckle to suggest that the "official target" of the *Enquiry* is Catholicism. But while Catholicism may have been the official target of the work, Buckle goes on to say that the anti-Catholicism of the *Enquiry* was only "a defensive smokescreen," some modest misdirection that Hume could hope would, in the late 1740s, play positively in a Britain at war with Catholic France and Spain and still recovering from the panic produced by the 'Forty-Five' (a pro-Stuart attack on Hanoverian Britain). The *Enquiry*, Buckle concludes, has as its primary purpose a critique of religion in general (xvi–xx). (Buckle does not mention that in his *Natural History of Religion* [NHR] Hume routinely treats a wide variety of religions as "superstition." NHR was first published in 1757, nine years after the first edition of EHU, but beginning with the 1758 edition of Hume's collected works, *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* [ETSS], was published coincidentally with EHU and E-SE.)

Buckle next argues that the account of the relation of the *Enquiry* to the *Treatise* found in Hume's *My Own Life* is selective and misleading. This account claims that the later work is a recast version of the "first part" of the earlier one. But we find that only about one-half of the *Enquiry* can be traced to Book 1 of the *Treatise*. The later work has a decidedly different introduction, its discussion of liberty and necessity is taken from *Treatise* 2, it includes two entirely new and hostile discussions of religious issues, and it closes with "a radically recast treatment of Scepticism." According to Buckle, the *Enquiry* is more aptly understood as "a concise introduction to Hume's general philosophy," an introduction said to be aimed at a wider British audience which, in comparison with the projected audience of the *Treatise*, had, because of the grand achievements of Newton, decidedly less interest in the detailed psychological analysis of "Cartesian rationalism" found in this earlier work (xxii–xxiv). Buckle sums up by suggesting that the *Enquiry* is "a concise restatement of Hume's central Sceptical principles and their implications: the intellectual credibility only of empirical enquiry of matters affecting human life, and the impossibility of credible systems of religious knowledge," along with a less direct but equally important indication of Hume's commitment to "Newtonian principles of reasoning." These principles he supposes are fully consistent with Hume's scepticism because, in contrast to that of Bacon, "Newton's version of experimentalism" is characterized not only by its rejection of "hypotheses" or "*a priori* principles," but also by its rejection of "any claim to establish fundamental truths [about the nature of reality] by experimental means." Buckle concludes his Introduction by indicating how the twelve sections of the *Enquiry* work together to produce this result (xxv–xxx).

Granting that Buckle's is a helpful overview of the *Enquiry*, any suggestion that the wider British audience sought for the work would have shared the view that Newton and Newtonian science were fundamentally sceptical is made doubtful

by the fact that Hume found it necessary, in the *Enquiry* itself, to point out the theoretical shortcomings of two allegedly experience-based foundations of Christianity, "proofs" that were, with few philosophical demurrals other than Hume's, taken to be sound in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain. I refer to the argument from miracles and the argument from design, arguments that each in its distinctive way ignores the limitations of experience made explicit by Hume's analysis of experimental reasoning.

So far as his choice of a copy-text edition is concerned, Buckle accepts Tom Beauchamp's argument that the most representative version of Hume's final intentions for the text of the *Enquiry* is produced by a combination of the accidentals (punctuation and capitalization, for example) of the 1772 edition that Hume *saw through the press*, and the substantive readings of the posthumous edition of 1777 that he only *prepared for the press*. (See *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, ed. T. L. Beauchamp [Clarendon EHU] [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2000], xlii–xlv, 209–19. Beauchamp is also editor of the Oxford Philosophical Texts [OPT EHU] edition of this work [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], an edition that uses the Clarendon text.) Buckle and Millican both praise Beauchamp's Clarendon EHU. Buckle describes it as "an indispensable work for all serious students" (xxxv), and Millican speaks of it as an "excellent critical edition" (lx). (Full disclosure: The author of this review is Co-General Editor of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, to which the Clarendon EHU belongs.)

There are, however, other features of Buckle's text that make it noticeably different from Beauchamp's. The volume is in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series, and consequently the text is "modernized" in several ways. The elimination of some eighteenth-century printing conventions—names or Latin phrases printed italic or in cap/small cap combinations in 1772, for example—does not appear to have altered the connotation of the text. Other modernizations, however—changing 'apostles' to 'Apostles' (96.6) or '*Faith*' to '*faith*' (115.33)—may have altered the weight or feel of these terms or the connotation of the text. Among the other modernizations of the text I question are those of spelling. Why is it that the series editors or publishers of the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy think that our younger contemporaries, many of whom know the meaning of hundreds of texting terms (enter 'texting dictionaries' on your favorite search engine; lol!), cannot easily learn the meaning of such minor eighteenth-century spelling variations as 'atchieving,' 'cloaths,' 'chace,' 'enow,' 'subtile,' and 'cotemporary' for the modern alternatives substituted for these words (see pages and lines 9.17, 51.15, 93.15, 104.35, 106.32, and 108.10, respectively)? And why is it that these same editors or publishers apparently suppose that those who teach the texts of another age, including those of philosophy, politics, and religion, as much as those who teach

(among many others) Shakespeare and Milton, have no responsibility to inform their students about the changing, plastic nature of language in general, and of the relevant changes to the language, English, used by the readers of this Cambridge series? These are not merely rhetorical questions. They are questions of substance to which the publishers or series editors owe their readers replies.

The program of Millican's edition of EHU is even more ambitious than Buckle's. The typical prelims are followed by a page of "Abbreviations," an "Introduction" of about 20,000 words, a four-page "Note on the Text," a "Select Bibliography," and "A Chronology of David Hume" (1707–1779). Then following what is intended to be a "diplomatic edition" of EHU, the reader is provided with the *Abstract of* A Treatise of Human Nature; "Of the Immortality of the Soul"; excerpts from Parts I and II of the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*; excerpts from Hume's letters; *My Own Life*; "Textual Variants"; "Explanatory Notes"; a "Glossary"; a "Glossarial Index of Major Philosophers and Philosophical Movements"; "Hume's Index" of EHU; an "Index of Major Themes, Concepts, and Examples"; an "Index of Names Mentioned in the *Enquiry*"; and an "Index of References to Hume's Works."

Millican's Introduction resembles his essay, "The Context, Aims, and Structure of Hume's First *Enquiry*," found in *Reading Hume on Human Understanding*, ed. P. Millican (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 27–65. His aim in both pieces is to place the *Enquiry* in the philosophical context of the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-centuries. The opening paragraphs of his Introduction succinctly sketch his point of view. It was during this early modern period that "scholastic Aristotelianism . . . began to be overshadowed by a recognizably modern scientific perspective," that of Descartes, who, "building on the discoveries of Galileo," was "the first philosopher seriously to threaten Aristotle's dominance." This development, alongside the experimentalism and corpuscularianism of Boyle, Newton, and Locke, may have resulted in substantial disagreement about the origin and nature of the world (about metaphysics) and about how we are able to come to understand this nature (about what we now call *epistemology* or *philosophy of science*). On the other hand, despite their disagreements over these important fundamentals, Millican finds that prior to Hume those major philosophers attempting to save scholasticism or to create new philosophical syntheses "all shared . . . a view of the world as created by divine reason, and . . . as potentially 'intelligible' to human reason." He then suggests that Hume's "special significance" can be traced to the fact that he challenged both of these assumptions. In contrast to his predecessors, Hume argued "that human reason is fundamentally similar to that of other animals, founded on instinct rather than [on] quasi-divine" reason, and thus "that science must proceed by experiment and systematization of observations, rather than by metaphysical theorizing or a priori speculation." He also raised equally serious doubts about the more fundamental view that the universe is the product of divine agency (ix–x).

A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume's first effort to expand the role of the experimental method into a broad range of philosophical subjects, Millican characterizes as a confusing jumble of "psychological generalizations and . . . unresolved sceptical paradoxes" which left "*everything* . . . equally doubtful." But even if this description is meant to apply only to Book 1 of the *Treatise*, it is clearly an unsupportable exaggeration. Hume describes the "philosophy" of his first two volumes as "very sceptical" (*Abstract*, 27), but this scepticism does not prevent him from discovering by means of his "cautious observation of human life" (*Treatise* Intro. 10) at least thirty-five fundamental features of human thought or behavior in Book 1, and more than that number in Book 2. (See "science of human nature. . . ," Index 2, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, ed. D. Fate Norton and M. J. Norton, 2 vols. [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2007] 2: 1154b–1157a.)

The *Treatise* thus disposed of, Millican goes on to argue that it was only in his second major work, the first *Enquiry*, that Hume became sufficiently discriminating in his efforts to set out the "relatively humble basis" of our reason. It is in this work that Hume takes "human reason seriously for what it is, and builds on it a persuasive structure that can vindicate disciplined modern science while condemning traditional metaphysics and irrational superstition" (ix–xi). To demonstrate the magnitude of this achievement, Millican fills in his outline of this currently conventional account of the changing philosophical paradigms of the early modern period with a half-dozen historical sketches, including "From Ancient to Modern Cosmology"; "From Aristotelian to Cartesian Intelligibility"; "Free Will, and the Dangers of Infidelity"; and "God's Design, and Human Reason" (xi–xxiii). These sketches are followed by an iteration of "The Humean Revolution," and a section-by-section summary designed to show the unity of the *Enquiry* (xxix–lvi). The unsympathetic will criticize these historical sketches as merely potted accounts of their subjects, but knowledgeable instructors may well find them useful starting points for more detailed explorations, especially when used in conjunction with the "Glossarial Index of Major Philosophers and Philosophical Movements."

Millican is to be complimented for the detail provided by his "Note on the Text," but I have doubts about some of his fundamental claims. First, not content to say that his goal was not to produce "a *critical* edition, but an entirely *accurate* edition" of the 1777 text, he goes on to indicate that he has produced a "so-called 'diplomatic' edition" that replicates "even the inconsistencies of Hume's originals" (lviii). A standard bibliographical guide says that a diplomatic edition is "A scholarly edition that [among other things] presents, without emendation, the text of a particular document." (W. P. Proctor and C. S. Abbott, *Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, 3rd ed. [New York: MLA, 1999], 144.) Millican's edition cannot be said to meet this standard. In his account of his text he acknowledges that he

has intentionally changed his copy-text in two ways: he has deleted certain sets of full stops and corrected three typographical errors. But he has omitted to mention at least four other sets of intentional changes to his text. He has, for example, (1) numbered each paragraph of the volume in the manner that they are numbered in Beauchamp's editions of EHU; (2) inserted the page numbers of the Selby-Bigge edition in the margins of the text; (3) inserted asterisks (just as Beauchamp has inserted obelisks in his OPT EHU) as markers of relevant materials in the "Explanatory Notes" found in the back-matter of his volume; and (4), altered slightly the text of the footnotes that direct readers to Hume's endnotes. In addition, he or his compositor has made minor changes of spelling or punctuation. In Sect. 10, for example, the only section I have checked even cursorily, Hume's standard spelling, 'phænomenon,' is replaced by 'phaenomenon' (¶¶ 31, 36, and 37), and the parentheses in ¶23 are changed from italic to roman. I do not doubt that these changes, given the purpose of this edition, are likely to be thought either salutary or unimportant. It may also be that Millican's is among the most accurate editions ever of the 1777 text. But, as valuable as this edition may be, it does not qualify as a 'diplomatic' edition.

More importantly, Millican tells his readers that Hume, speaking of the forthcoming 1777 edition of ETSS, "expressed satisfaction with his final editorial changes (*including the Section III deletion*)" (lviii; italics added). The unitalicized portion of this statement is undeniably correct. Less than three months before his death in August, 1776, Hume told his friend and printer, William Strahan, that he had made the text of his planned new edition of ETSS "extremely correct . . . if I were to live twenty Years longer, I shoud never be able to give it any further Improvements" (*The Letters of David Hume*, Ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols. [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1932], 2: 329–30). But the italicized portion of Millican's claim is misleading. Hume did explicitly direct Strahan to take text from Section 3 of his *second Enquiry*, his *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, and print it, as it has since been printed, as Appendix 2 of that work. But neither I, nor, more importantly, Beauchamp, have found any evidence that Hume so much as mentions, not to say expresses "satisfaction" regarding, the fact that the forthcoming 1777 edition of the *first Enquiry* is to omit from its Section 3 what had been the final sentence of paragraph 3 and paragraphs 4–18 in each of the ten previous editions of this work. Hume may have intended that this portion of the text be deleted, but Beauchamp, following a painstaking study of the available evidence, says that the reason for the omission of this material is "unknown" (Clarendon EHU, 218). Perhaps Millican has misremembered Hume's directions to Strahan regarding Section 3 of the second *Enquiry*. Perhaps, too, he has allowed his *interpretation* of EHU to determine his *editorial* conclusion, for he tells us that this "substantial deletion" from Section 3 of EHU is "well-motivated in my view since the deleted material distracts from, rather than contributing to, the central thrust of the work" (lvii).

Given the number of relatively inexpensive paperback editions of Hume's *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* any informal survey will show to be currently in print, there can be little reason to doubt that this is the work of Hume most often adopted for classroom use. But a brief inspection of many of these editions reveals that most of them fail to offer basic information about the provenance of the text they provide. Even worse, it appears that little effort has gone into making many of these texts accurate reproductions of Hume's final versions (those published in 1772 and 1777) of this popular work. As Millican points out, even the widely used edition of the first *Enquiry* edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch (*Hume's Enquiries*, 3rd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975]), is marred by "well over a thousand editorial intrusions or errors (mainly of punctuation)" (lvii). In consequence, few of these editions can be recommended for classroom use or for the interested general reader. In significant contrast, the editions of Stephen Buckle and Peter Millican, although neither achieves the standard of textual accuracy set by Beauchamp's Oxford Philosophical Texts edition, have a discussion of their editor's choice of copy-text and at least a brief statement of the editorial principles their editors have adopted, and both of these editors have taken pains to publish texts of EHU that are, in different ways, textually adequate for classroom use. Moreover, each editor has included in his edition of EHU not only an introduction, annotations, and other editorial materials that are of potential use to those studying the *Enquiry*, but also the texts of related shorter works and letters by Hume. As a result, despite the shortcomings mentioned, both of these editions can be recommended to general readers or for classroom use.

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