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The title of my book, *Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), might mislead. One might protest, with some justification, that since neither "projection" nor "realism" is Hume's term and that both carry a severe threat of anachronism, discussing them in connection with Hume is misguided. Why might the readers of this journal wish to read such a work?

Well, the first thing to note is that Hume's name has come to be associated with the metaphor of projection, understood as having some kind of "non-realist" connotations, and, at the same time, he attracted readings that make him a "realist" of some sort or another in different areas.[1] So, there seems to be some tension here. Furthermore, the terms themselves can add unnecessary noise, not least because there is no such thing as "realism" *per se*, let alone any settled way of understanding the metaphor of projection. Attempts to define "realism" fall foul of different objections, and in any case what is a non-realism for some (behaviorism, say) is a realism for another.[2] Simon Blackburn's use of the metaphor of projection differs greatly from Freud's.[3] And even if there were fixed contemporary points, an exercise in taxonomy is not a thing of great fascination and is, indeed, damaging with respect to a thinker such as Hume whose very brilliant uniqueness is one of the things exerting its pull on us. My question, then, is what is it about Hume's discussions that occasion labels such as "projection" and "realism," labels that appear to connote very different attitudes? The exercise provides a focus for understanding these two apparently different directions in Hume's philosophy. How are we to understand Hume's talk of "gilding and staining" in the context of claims

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that seem to make straightforward identifications of virtue with the useful and agreeable? My aim, then, is to understand key aspects of Hume, not by bringing to the text preformed notions of what "projection" or "realism" consist in, but by looking at the arguments and texts that occasion those terms.

What emerges is, I think, a nuanced reading of aspects of Hume's philosophy that is illuminating, even if sometimes a little unusual. But I was equally interested in interrogating the projection metaphor on independent philosophical grounds. Hume and the metaphor of projection are constantly joined, and so it seemed that his text afforded the occasion to discuss a term that throws as much shadow as light. (I am pleased that it has made some impact on discussions in areas as diverse as Kant on the experience of time and sexual objectification.)[4]

The book is divided into three parts, one concerning religious belief and belief in the external world, the second on modality and the self, the third on sentiment and values. I begin by considering projection. An initial thought about projection is that it is a matter of representing something "in here" to be "out there." I call this "feature projection." If one turns to the *Natural History of Religion*, talk of feature projection might be appropriate, because Hume's explanation of the emergence of polytheism appeals to our disposition to ascribe psychological states to natural objects and events. But this initial thought, though not mistaken, misses different and equally interesting ways of understanding projection, and furthermore, it cannot account for other elements of Hume's thought that involve projection. For example, when we say that belief in God is a projection of our fear, we are not representing the world to contain our fear but saying that we hold the belief *because* we are fearful. A belief or some other way of taking the world might be a projection *of* a feature of our mental life in the sense that it *explains* why the subject has that belief. I call such uses instances of explanatory projection. The relevant explanations are projective because they implicitly contrast with alternative "detective" explanations, where the subject holds the world to be thus and so because they are appropriately responsive to it. Now, *what* is trying to be explained, *how* it is explained, and *in what way* and by *what* mental state or process is a highly context-sensitive matter, and so, in chapter 1, I distinguish a number of questions with which to approach such matters in the remainder of the book. But I argue that much can be gained by understanding things in the light of a detective/non-detective contrast.

The remainder of chapter 1 compares the causal-explanatory account of religious belief offered in the *Natural History of Religion* with the causal-explanatory account of external world beliefs offered in "Of scepticism with regard to the senses." I argue that both are explanatorily projective. In doing so, I bring to the fore hitherto unnoticed parallels between the texts. Both beliefs emerge first in primitive forms (polytheism and the vulgar view) *via* the manifestation of an independently identifiable psychological disposition triggered by psychological

discomfort. Both (false) beliefs are replaced by more sophisticated versions (monotheism and the doctrine of double existence) that are explained causally not by the operations of reason but by the same psychological processes that produced the earlier versions. I also show how and why the causal accounts *destabilize* the beliefs they explain. That is to say, the causal origins of the beliefs provide reasons to suspend those beliefs unless and until some further justification can be provided. Chapter 2 discusses the senses, reason, and the imagination in Hume in order to provide a more detailed account of the relevant detective/non-detective contrast underpinning explanatory projection. Chapter 3 returns to religious and external world beliefs and develops further parallels between them. I argue that Hume allows for the assumption of an external world but not for any significant religious belief, and that this marks a form of realist/non-realist contrast.

Part II concerns Hume's treatment of necessary connection. Our commitment to necessary connection is explanatorily projective: chapter 4 explains why it cannot be *detective*, why, that is, we cannot explain why we believe in causal powers by an appeal to a capacity to detect them in experience. I draw out the sophisticated considerations behind Hume's discussion and try to show that the account is epistemic in its leanings, and thus does not amount to a rejection of the existence of necessary connections. Chapter 5 considers Hume's explanation of the idea of necessity. The account is explanatorily projective but also involves elements of feature projection—the attribution of something "in here" to something "out there"—to explain the phenomenology of causal experience.

The "realism" at work in chapters 4 and 5 is motivated by Hume's avowals of hidden connections, and "realism" is understood by contrast to non-realisms motivated by restrictions on thought. Roughly, the non-realist position is that since we have no idea of necessity "in the objects," we cannot even think—let alone assume—that there is such necessity. On this realist/non-realist contrast, even agnosticism would count as realism. I argue that agnosticism is a reasonable reading of Hume on the basis of what I say in chapters 4 and 5, namely that Hume could allow for the bare thought of such powers, and nothing he says rules them out. The view I hold is a marked contrast from the dominant view of Hume as moving to negative ontological conclusions from restrictions on the contents of thought. In chapter 6, I venture a reading of the Appendix puzzle that provides a reason to think Hume to be committed to, rather than agnostic on, the existence of unknowable connections. The suggestion is that if we assume a realist reading, we can make more sense of his famous comments on the "inconsistency" between his two principles which on the face of it, concern necessary connection and its epistemology.

Chapter 7 examines Hume's comparison of values to secondary qualities. I argue that this comparison is made in light of a conception of secondary qualities held by Malebranche and Bayle and not in response to Locke's particular version,

the doctrine of modern philosophy. From this, I argue that a) Hume is not misreading Locke, and b) Hume makes the comparison not to identify values with powers but to point to a misleading aspect of our evaluative experience.

Chapter 8 considers sentiments as particular pleasures and pains that provide the constituent contents for evaluative beliefs. I argue that Hume allows that beliefs can motivate action. The joint conclusion of chapters 7 and 8 is that Hume holds that we have evaluative experiences and thoughts of objects as essentially valuable, desirable or aversion worthy on their own account, and that these thoughts are the products of feature-projection, where features of experience are represented to be features of the objects that nevertheless lack those qualities. This projection involves an error but not an error that undercuts evaluative thought.

In Chapter 9, I show how to integrate the conclusions of the two previous chapters into a view, prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, of the function of pleasure and pain. On this view, pleasure and pain figure in a form of sensitivity to features that are naturally conducive or deleterious to bodily well-being, and the pleasures and pains of the moral sense are analogously a form of sensitivity to that which is conducive to the moral well-being of one's self and others, in the case of the pleasure of virtue, or harmful to it in the case of the pain of vice. This allows for a form of moral realism, understood as an anthropocentric naturalistic identity claim between the dispositional properties of the useful and the agreeable and moral virtues. Virtues are "discover'd" to us—rendered salient in thought and deliberation—through the peculiar modes of experience provided by the moral sentiments.

NOTES

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1 For a reading of Hume as a moral realist, see David Fate Norton, *David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), and for a reading of Hume as a causal realist see John P. Wright, *The Sceptical Realism of David Hume* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983).

2 For Michael Dummett, reductionisms like behaviourism are realisms because bivalence holds for the reduced class of sentences. See "Realism" in his *Truth and Other Enigmas* (Bristol: Duckworth Press, 1978).

3 For Blackburn on projection, see for example, *Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). For Freud, see for instance, his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, ed. Peter Gay (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990).

4 See Adrian Bardon, "Time Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant," *Kant Studien* 101 (2010): 59–74; and Rae Langton, "Projection and Objectification," in *The Future for Philosophy*, ed. Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).