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I am extremely grateful to all my commentators for their very careful engagement with my book.[1] Some disagreements, I think, may stem from my failure to be sufficiently clear and so are only apparent. Other objections are not and seem to be spot on. I will not be able to give fully adequate answers to all the objections, since some require sustained discussion of some very fundamental issues that is simply impossible in this forum.

Response to Schliesser

Schliesser's comments concern (a) my discussion of philosophical and natural relations and their connection with reason, and (b) my reading of Hume's attitude regarding the external world.

In my reading of "reason" in Hume I make some abstract distinctions. We can think of reason as a *faculty* (reason$_F$) that is at once sensitive to normative considerations and explanatory of the inferences we make. We can further think of *a* reason as a normative consideration (a reason$_N$) that reason$_F$ grasps and reason*ing* as the mental transition from idea to idea (reasoning$_I$). I also note that Hume talks of reasoning in a way that suggests that it is an *activity* of some sort. Thus, he writes that all "kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a *comparison*, and a discovery of those relations, constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other" (T 1.3.2.2). In light of these distinctions, I then consider T 1.3.6, "Of the inference from the impression to the idea." A potential source of reasons$_N$ comprises the philosophical relations that are the objects of comparison, detected

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by reason$_F$. But in fact this source yields no such reasons. Demonstrative reason has constant relations as its objects and probable reason the inconstant relation of causation. However, none of the available relations is such that it is a normative reason for the inference from cause to effect, and so no reason$_N$ enters in the causation of our inference. So reason$_F$ cannot be what causes reasoning$_I$ since there are no reasons$_N$ for it to discover or detect. Causal inference—reason$_I$—is causally determined, then, not by reason$_F$ grasping reasons$_N$ but instead by the natural associative relation of cause and effect. Hence, "Tho' causation be a *philosophical* relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a *natural* relation, and produces an union among our idea, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it" (T 1.3.6.16; SBN 94). Schliesser writes I offer no textual support for these claims (000), but I am a bit puzzled by what it is he is demanding and what I am missing. The distinctions are mine of course, and I consider Hume's texts in the light of them. I take them to illuminate his text, so I am not sure what is required. Let me, however, take his three criticisms head on.

First, he points to texts that, if I have him right, suggest that probable inference need not involve any reflection upon causation *qua* philosophical relation. The first passage he cites (70) reads "'Tis therefore necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, either seen or remember'd; and that from this we infer something connected with it, which is not seen nor remember'd" (T 1.3.6.6; SBN 89). I do not see this as in conflict with my suggestion, which was that it is *necessary* that associational tracks are in place in order to reason. Hence causation is a philosophical relation, but "we are [not?] able to reason upon [that relation], or draw any inference from it" (T 1.3.6.16; SBN 94). Indeed Schliesser writes later (70) that "philosophical relations are rather impotent without the presence of the appropriate natural relations," and I write Hume holds that "our capacity to reason upon the *philosophical* relation of cause and effect presupposes that we have habits of inference" (Kail, 42–43).

Perhaps more potentially threatening to my reading, Schliesser raises an objection based on this passage: "we may exert our reason without employing more than two ideas . . . . We infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others, and more convincing than when we interpose another idea to connect the two extremes" (T 1.3.7.5n; SBN 97). The point, I take it, is that in such cases there is no reflection on the philosophical relation. I agree. The basic cause of inferring—reasoning$_I$ or the exertion of our reason—is unreflective natural association, and natural association does not involve a conscious *activity* of reasoning *qua* comparison of ideas. But here are two further points. First, whilst such inferences do not involve reflection upon the philosophical relation, they nevertheless might constitute *sensitivity to* that relation. Our unreflective inferences mirror natural causal relations, constituting,

as Hume puts it, "a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas . . . [so that] our thoughts and conceptions have still . . . gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected" (EHU 5.21; SBN 54–55).

Second, though this is the "strongest" species—which I understand to mean that which produces the greatest vivacity—a good deal of causal reasoning *does* involve reflection and activity, which I take to mean reasoning *qua* the activity of comparison and the discovery of the philosophical relation. When discussing the "rules by which to judge of causes and effects" (T 1.3.15), Hume writes that the first three rules listed jointly *constitute* his definition of "cause" as a philosophical relation. Subsequent reasoning and experiment is premised on the "discovery" of the relation. Furthermore, when "we have discover'd the causes or effects of any phenomenon, we immediately extend our observation to every phenomenon of the same kind" (T 1.3.15.4). I do not see how this is not anything but a "comparison and discovery" of a philosophical relation that enters into extending a judgment.

Mentioning such rules leads me to the third of Schliesser's worries about reason. He notes that "curiously," I do not discuss these rules (73). I did not because I had other fish to fry, but perhaps I should have said more. I assumed (and I am now sure) that they fit with my account. Schliesser notes that these "regulate" our judgment. I agree: but as noted above, rules 1, 2, and 3 comprise the analysis of causation as a philosophical relation! There is no conflict at all between what I say and Schliesser's quite correct claim that the rules govern our causal reasoning.

The key misunderstanding is, I think, revealed in another of Schliessier's objections. He worries about "how inconstant philosophic relations can function as a 'reason qua a normative consideration in favor of a judgment'" (71). I am puzzled because I took myself to be arguing that the philosophical relation of causation *cannot* so function. That is because its ultimate normative ground—the uniformity principle—cannot be discovered through any comparison of the available relations. Its truth is not something of which reason_F can be made aware, and so we have no reason_N. My introduction of reasons_N was an attempt to understand Hume's argument of T 1.3.5, whereby a view of reason_F as the detector of reasons_N is rejected on the grounds that no such reason_N is detectable. Instead we can compare—perform the activity of reasoning—but doing so cannot reveal normative reasons in favor of the relevant judgment. The activity of reasoning cannot discover reasons and so cannot be what drives our inferring. The key point, for me—and for others—is that Hume's interests concern the *causation* of inference. This leaves open the question of whether the inference is epistemically acceptable, in contrast to the old idea that Hume leaves us with a negative *evaluation* of the inference. In the book I said the warrant question was closed by practical considerations (Kail, §3.4.2). I want now to record that at least in the case of probable reason, I was simply wrong about that, and I now think that the externalist reading is the best one.[2]

The second area over which Schliesser voices concern is my discussion of Hume's attitude toward the external world. Schliesser is brief, and I will be, too. I take Hume to have a stable and positive attitude toward the assumption of continued and distinct existents. Schliesser reminds me that this does not seem to be Hume's attitude at the end of T 1.4.2, and indeed it is not. But the thrust of my reading involves the idea that this is a temporary state in the dialectic of "Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy." Schliesser notes this and also that I appeal to the Title Principle. He then offers some standard objections to the interpretation I favour, and it is simply not possible to adjudicate this dispute here since it would involve a full-scale discussion of the Title Principle. I will content myself by repeating that Hume's answer to Berkeley in the first *Enquiry* seems to me an instance of the Title Principle. Berkeley's arguments "admit of no answer and produce no conviction" (EHU 12.15n; SBN 155). We have an instance of a piece of reasoning that is not mixed with a lively propensity and the instance of reasoning "never can have any title to operate on us" (T 14.7.11; SBN 270). Reason suggests that we should not believe, but we are not obliged to follow reason in every respect.[3]

Response to Garrett

An age-old one-liner runs: I used to be an agnostic, but now I am not so sure. I used to think that Hume's view on the existence of necessary connexion was agnostic. On this view, Hume is agnostic in the sense that he did not rule out the possibility of *in re* necessary connexions, but he did not positively assume their existence either.[4] This is a form of realism—or anti-anti-realism—when the relevant contrast is a Hume who moves from strictures on the contents of thought to an austere ontology that would have it that the very possibility of the existence of powers cannot be raised, since no thought of any kind is possible. One cannot even wonder if there are powers, since one is wondering nothing.

Getting to an agnostic reading requires understanding properly both Hume's reasons for why we lack an impression of power "drawn from the objects" and his positive account of the idea of necessity. According to me, his target is the possibility of grasping of necessary connection, a modality of absolute necessity. He argues that we lack an impression of necessary connection because having a genuine impression would equip the mind with the capacity to infer a priori what effect such and such cause has and close down our capacity to conceive cause without effect. We can have no such impression because our ideas are distinct, and we can conceive any putative cause and effect separately. I interpret "distinct" as a phenomenal notion, thereby evading the well-known objection that the famous (but misattributed) "no necessary connection among distinct existences" dictum is circular. Ideas are separable because they are thus distinct, and their phenomenal distinctness owes itself—must owe itself, given the Copy Principle—to the

phenomenal distinctness of impressions. So it is the phenomenal distinctness of impressions, and the sensory character of our representational capacities, which grounds concept identity and the relations among those concepts. None of this tells about *in re* necessity. To do so would require that what we *find* conceivable licenses conclusions regarding that which lies beyond experience. But Hume's position implies our impressions at best reveal the surface qualities of objects and that what we can conceive reveals *epistemic*, and not metaphysical, possibility. So, we can understand what Hume writes about the connection between conceivability and absolute necessity, on the one hand, and understand why he can talk of such connections as hidden, rather than rejected, on the other.

My agnosticism, however, was disturbed by reflecting on the *Appendix* puzzle. We all know that Hume writes that he cannot render consistent two principles, namely that (1) "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences," and (2) "The mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences" (T Appendix 19; SBN 636). He then tells us that did our "perceptions inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case" (T Appendix 21; SBN 636). On the face of it, this has to do with real connections and the binding of perceptions. On this basis, I developed the following idea. Given that what he writes in the *Appendix* seems to relate to real connections, what kind of problems for his account of self might be faced by a Hume who *did* assume more than my previous agnostic reading, namely that causation must involve necessary connexion, albeit one we cannot detect? My suggestion was that the kinds of reasoning Hume exploits in denying the simplicity of the soul lead to the conclusion that there could be *nothing* that "unite[s] our successive perceptions." The reasoning eliminates real connections and hence, on the realist assumption, causation. Hume does not *believe* the conclusion is the right one, but that something has gone wrong in the arguments in "Of the immateriality of the soul" and "Of personal identity."[5] Given that we have now something that relates directly to the principles at the center of Hume's problem, we have a reason to think that Hume thinks causation involves unknowable connections after all. Hence, I saw a reason to shift from my prior reading of Hume as an agnostic.

Now, there are a number of more or less obvious objections to this reading, which I address in the body of the book. Garrett suggests some others, and I will try to address those here. His objections are presented against a number of criteria he proposes that any account of the *Appendix* puzzle should meet. First, there are worries that it meets the Crisis Criterion. One aspect of this objection concerns the differences between partial and complete causes (see Garrett, 80), but I think my account undercuts this objection. Hume's reasonings have the implication that perceptions cannot be *effects* because the absence of powers means there are no causes, be they partial or total. The more serious issue relating to the Crisis

Criterion is as follows. I understand Hume as maintaining the theoretical unimportance of necessary connection (a point I emphasize in another publication).[6] But how could there be a crisis for Hume if he is forced to admit the absence of something of theoretical unimportance?

To answer this we need to distinguish between the general assumption, presupposition, or conviction, that causation involves necessary connection and its *theoretical* unimportance in any particular causal judgments we can make. Hume has, as it were, an assumption that necessity is required for causation, but this assumption does nothing in our ordinary judgments of cause and effect because necessity is something that we can neither detect nor understand. Because necessity is not detectable, it cannot be marshalled in disputes that hang on the metaphysics of causation, where the preference cannot be defended theoretically. Any judgment must be guided solely by what is given in the two "definitions" of cause, as is the case in Hume's discussions of liberty and necessity and the immateriality of the soul.[7] Since these exhaust all that we can know of causation, they exhaust all that we can judge.

However, that sense of theoretical indifference is consistent with the strong conviction that if there is causation, it must involve powers even if they transcend our particular capacities. If Hume does have *that* conviction, then what I say does generate a crisis. Does this meet the Crisis Criterion? Here I should say I find Garrett's description of the Crisis Criterion rather brief, and it is difficult to know what it rules in or rules out. But his worry seems to be there is no independent evidence of Hume's conviction being that deep. That is something, again, with which I agree. The difference between Garrett and myself is dialectical. I take it that we can find a crisis if we make the realist assumption, and so the reason I take my reading to be a good interpretation must, therefore, be independent of the Crisis Condition. My view squarely fits with the principles Hume mentions, principles that concern precisely the epistemology of real connections. That is something that few other readings do.

Things are more problematic for my account with respect to Garrett's Origin Criterion, something, as Garrett notes (86n), I already recognized in *Projection and Realism*. On the reading I offered, I took the worry to originate in the application of separability to perceptions *qua* vehicles of content rather than perceptions *qua* representations or copies of their objects. Hume then recognizes that applying separability to perceptions so understood implies metaphysical independence, which is squarely against his view that perceptions are dependent: "our perceptions are not possest of any independent existence" (T 1.4.2.45; SBN 211). The problem Garrett and I raise is just why the worry does not occur to him earlier. I wrote that Hume is still guided by a view of perceptions as representations (Kail, *Projection and Realism*, 141), and Garrett writes that this is implausible (87n11). I admit I have no answer on this one. However, it is interesting to note that commentators

understand Hume's discussion to have the consequence that perceptions are independent items,[8] despite the fact that Hume explicitly denies this. So why then does not Hume embrace the independence of perceptions if separability has that consequence? I do not know. But the criterion of independence is clearly laid out by Hume and should have the consequence that perceptions are independent. Yet he holds them to be dependent.

Garret has two further objections, one based on the Solution Criterion, the other on the Scope Criterion. With respect to the first, Garrett argues that if perceptions were modes of a substance, there would still be no causal connections among perceptions. I do not see why not. For if perceptions were modes, the causal sequences among them would be expressions of the substance and change would be immanent. Hume *believes* none of this of course, but there is a strong tradition in the discussion of causation that renders all efficient causation intra-substantial. If the headache is that there is no tie or bind, then the notion of a substance is one that many have thought to be the cure, and so it is one way in which the difficulty would be resolved.

With respect to the Scope Criterion, the worry is that the problem I identify concerns something wider—indeed much wider—than simply the concerns in "Of personal identity." Well, I take it that there the self requires either a substance or "real connections," and that the "seeming evidence" (T Appendix 10; SBN 633) of his discussion in "Of personal identity" lands him with this problem (Kail, *Projection and Realism*, 138–39). The problem is still a problem *with Hume's discussion of the self*, since it leads to a *reductio*. He needs to fix that account to avoid the problem. And for reasons stated above, I do not share the reservation about the appeal to a substance as dialectically relevant to this reading. So I do not find either of these objections compelling.

Do I accept Garrett's offer to recant? I plead the privilege of the skeptic about my own account and hope that others might find some other hypothesis about the Origin Criterion.

Response to Taylor

Taylor's objections turn on (a) relational value, (b) the relation between what I say and uncultivated morality, (c) my reading of the comparison between virtue and vice and the doctrine of modern philosophy, and (d) a remark I make about "Of the standard of taste." Much of what she writes, I think, indicates that there is much more to be said about the way I read things, but I am quite happy to admit this. I do not, however, see any genuine sense in which what I say is in conflict with many of the correct observations Taylor makes. I will begin with her first objection, namely on the notion of relational value, since I think it is premised on a misunderstanding.

In *Projection and Realism*, I draw a distinction between the way in which some valued object is presented and the value of what is thus presented. An object is "discovered" to us as a certain way by its being presented as essentially valuable—desirable of its own account—in virtue of the peculiar sentiment of pleasure in a way analogous to an object's being presented to us as red in virtue of the experience's having non-intentional properties or qualia.[9] *What* is presented, however, is not essentially valuable but relationally so: it is conducive to some other end. Hence, for example, aspirin is valuable, not of its own account, but because it cures headaches. I take Humean virtues to be relational in character inasmuch as they contribute to the well-being of their possessors and others, and it is these qualities that are gilded and stained in their modes of presentation. We, as it were, experience relational values as essential values, and that involves a certain error of feature projection. However, it is still true that what is thus presented is a value, and hence the error is mitigated.

Taylor's worry is that the category of the immediately agreeable cannot be a relational value. Thus, for example, as Taylor points out, Hume writes that "there is another set of mental qualities, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good, either of the community or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders" (EPM 7.2; SBN 251) and "no views of utility or of future beneficial consequences enter into this sentiment of approbation" (EPM 7.29; SBN 206; see also EPM 8.1 and 8.7; SBN 261 and 263). Indeed he does, but this does not mean virtues like wit are not relational values. Wit is a dispositional property. To be witty is to possess the capacity to amuse, which requires a sensitivity to situations and a whole host of other abilities. We value wit *per se* because it is the tendency to produce something we *value*, namely the hedonic state of being amused. In other words wit is valuable because it has the tendency to produce something we value. Its *effect* is not something that we value only because it can contribute to some other end. It might of course do so; being amused can distract you from irritations. But we value that state independently of other effects it has. In other words, wit and all the other immediately agreeable virtues are those which are conducive to producing immediately agreeable states. If one takes the hedonic products of immediate agreeableness to be a constituent of one's welfare, then wit and the other immediately agreeable virtues are relational values inasmuch as they are so conducive. What might be misleading is my use of the term "welfare," or rather the fact that I did not spell it out. Taylor's worry, I think, is based on the assumption, not shared by me, about the *first-order* ethical question about what constitutes well-being. She may hold that immediate agreeability—either to one's self or others—is not a constituent of well-being. Hence the virtues that have the tendency to be immediately agreeable cannot contribute to well-being. But I take a different view of the first-order question, whereby part of our well-being includes a life full of the immediately agreeable. Such states constitute *part* of our good. The virtues

have no "tendency to *farther* good" or have no "*future* beneficial consequences" (my emphasis), but they have a tendency to immediate beneficial consequences or goods. This is squarely within Hume's cheerful and rich hedonist account of well-being, and our moral approval of wit is approval of a feature that contributes to human well-being; for a life without it is an impoverished one.

I agree with much of what Taylor writes about the role of reflection, but I do not see that it is at all at odds with what I wrote.[10] My point about the "gradual awareness" of what a sentiment renders salient to us does not commit me to thinking that the process of gradual awareness is merely first-personal as opposed to a cultural and historical process. Individual persons can move from uncultivated states to cultivated ones, as can moral communities. I couched it in first-personal terms for expositional reasons, but Taylor's way of emphasizing the cultural and social—as she has done in her own work—is continuous with, rather than in conflict with, what I write. The point can be made vivid by the comparison I draw in chapter nine of sentiments to bodily sensation. In our rude, uncultivated state bodily pain is correlated with bodily damage and issues in appropriate behaviour. But history, society, and culture have now deeply informed this, allowing for richer concepts (like that of arthritis for example), and different practices. We are all aware of the fact that if one's body hurts, it is likely that there is something wrong, and indeed one might have enough information to judge what is wrong. Nevertheless, it is the pain that "discovers" the problem to us. What I did not do is emphasize the role of culture and history. All I can say is that I was interested in the content and nature of the judgment and how this combines with the projective-sounding metaphors, rather than tracking in detail the many different and subtle ways that it makes itself felt in Hume's writings. The aim was, as it were, to show the parallels with bodily responses and to situate Hume's moral sense in that context. But I fail to see any conflict here—only a need to integrate what I write into wider debates.

I find it difficult to comment on Taylor's alternative suggestion about how we might understand the gilding metaphor, since it is rather briefly put. What she writes strikes me as a plausible view of aspects of Hume's moral philosophy, but I do not see any textual evidence that this connects to the gilding metaphor, nor I am able to judge how we are to understand what is meant by "gilding" or "staining" here. She first suggests that we might understand it in terms of the "practical" function of moral sentiments rather than their indicator function. Of course I recognize the practical aspect of moral sentiments, but I tried to spell out a take on that which involved considering them as constituents of evaluative judgments that exhibit the kind motivational internalism, broadly construed, associated with value. After all, the point of the parallel with bodily pleasure and pain was not only that they indicate but also that they dispose the subject to appropriate action. It is not that the burning in one's hand is *merely* a sign for potential damage, like an "x" on a map is merely a sign for treasure: it is a sign

whose character pushes the subject in the right direction. In the moral case, aspects of the world are presented under characteristic modes of experience and thought which dispose us appropriately.

Second, in connection with the practical effects, Taylor suggests, if I have her right, that our shared moral responses somehow have some role in constituting one's moral self: in "gilding a character with our admiration . . . we render him reputable or trustworthy" (94). But the problem is that this is simply a *use* of the gilding metaphor not an explication of it. In what sense are we gilding? Are we judging? If so, what is the content? I see no evidence that in contexts in which the colour and virtue parallels are made by Hume he has anything like this in mind.[11]

NOTES

1 *Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

2 See Louis Loeb, "Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument about Induction," *Synthese* 152 (2006): 321–38 for such a reading. I describe the reasons for my change of mind in "Hume's Naturalisms" which will eventually appear in *Essays on Hume's* Treatise, ed. P. J. E. Kail and Marina Frasca-Spada. I, however, think that the justification for the external world belief is practical.

3 For more on this, see my "Hume's Naturalisms."

4 See my "Projection and Necessity in Hume," *European Journal of Philosophy* 9 (2001): 24–54.

5 Despite making this unabtruse point perfectly clear in the book (*Projection and Realism*, 136–37), Annette Baier misses it. She then takes me to hold that Hume believes the conclusion and so that what I say "makes nonsense" of what Hume has to say. See her *Death and Character* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 236n.

6 See "How to Understand Hume's Realism" in *The New Hume Debate*, 2nd ed., ed. Kenneth Richman and Rupert Read (London: Routledge, 1998), 253–69.

7 Compare someone who is prepared to assume the existence of God, but does not let that decide their practice of science or their daily lives. They know appeal to it will not make any difference to their interlocutors.

8 See, for example, Robert Anderson, *Hume's First Principles* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 90.

9 Taylor's gloss on this as a "sensation of greenness" (90) does not properly capture the point since it is ambiguous. The phrase is ambiguous between a representational state with a particular character that represents greenness—a sensation *of* greenness—which is Descartes view, *or* a sensation that has the phenomenal character of green—a green sensation—but which is not intrinsically representational (Malebranche's view). It is the latter notion with which I am working.

10 I do find it odd that she talks about the need for reason in a way that suggests that I deny it; compare what I write in *Projection and Realism*, 9.4.4. My point is that early correction can be made in line with what reason *would* deliver, but in later stages—either in personal or cultural history—a more explicit grasp of utility is involved in reasoning. Compare one's first attempt at trying to sit up when one's back aches, and then the proper exercises one is given by the chiropractor who has an explicit grasp of what is wrong with one's back.

11 Taylor quotes Annette Baier, and Baier makes a similar suggestion in her *A Progress of Sentiments* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) 194–95. But this is at best suggestive: Baier says nothing that connects the context of Hume's use of gilding to this constituting role, nor has she anything to say about the texts which appear to imply error theory. See my *Projection and Realism*, 149.