David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Taylor, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, Second Edition

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Hume Studies Volume 36, Number 1 (2010), 118-122.

Hume Studies
Volume 36, Number 1, 2010, pp. 118–122

David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Taylor, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. xx + 554. ISBN 978-0-521-67734-9, Paper, $32.99. ISBN 978-0-521-85986-8, Cloth, $95.00.

The second edition of *The Cambridge Companion to Hume* replaces Norton's 1993 edition. In addition to Norton's synoptic introductory essay the new edition contains fourteen essays, four more than its predecessor, that fall into one of three groups: those concerned with Hume's metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind (hereafter *metaphysics*); those concerned with his moral philosophy; and those concerned with politics, economics, aesthetics, history, and religion. Nine of the original ten essays make a second appearance, six in an essentially unrevised form. Importantly, the second edition contains four new essays in metaphysics and one in moral philosophy. Given limitations of space and the likelihood that many readers are already familiar with the unrevised essays, I shall focus my remarks on those that are new or revised.

In "Hume's New Science of the Mind" (revised), John Biro provides a crisp representation of Hume's associationist psychology and of his efforts to provide an account of the genesis of beliefs that eschews purported philosophical justifications. In doing so, Biro suggests important links both to Quinean naturalized epistemology and to contemporary (non-connectionist) cognitive psychology.

The first of the four new essays in metaphysics is David Owen's "Hume and the Mechanics of Mind." In Owen's words, the essay "is a study of how Hume's theory of impressions and ideas and his principles of association feature in the empirical methodology he uses to establish some of his most important positions" (102) in Books 1 and 2 of the *Treatise* and in the first *Enquiry*. It is these that do "all the real work of the mind" (103). Owen's painstaking delineation of the terms, and so the entities, in Hume's mechanical theory of mind imposes very strong interpretive constraints and generates some striking results: that sense impressions are not mere sense data but judgments; that having a passion (an impression of reflection) is not akin to making a judgment; that when passions are considered in their relational context their alternative form of intentionality becomes apparent. This is a bracing, hard-nosed, very impressive piece of work.

In "Hume's Theory of Space and Time in its Skeptical Context," Donald Baxter identifies two seemingly problematic dimensions of *Treatise* 1.2: its purported results appear not to comport with mathematics and physics; and Hume's method of arguing, applying features of our mere ideas of space and time to space and time themselves, seems philosophically inept. But, he argues, *Treatise* 1.2 displays central features of the skeptical approach Hume develops in the rest of Book 1. Those

features taken into account, the force of Hume's arguments concerning space and time can be appreciated and much influential criticism of those arguments can be seen to miss the mark. Hume's system concerning space and time is a consequence of his Pyrrhonian Empiricism, which is to say his exclusive concern with views forced on him by appearances. Baxter's detailed elaboration of Hume's route from Pyrrhonian Empiricism to his views about space and time is an interpretive *tour de force*: it makes what can seem a baffling stretch of the *Treatise* intelligible, and it contributes substantially, by treating the hardest of hard cases, to the characterization of Hume's skepticism.

Martin Bell's "Hume on Causation" is notable not so much for interpretive novelty as for the deftness with which it manages so many distinct questions about the interpretation of Hume's views. For Bell, Hume's investigation of causality is an attempt to answer two main questions: How do human beings come to have the idea of causation? and How do they come to be able to infer effects from causes and causes from effects? Hume's answer to the first question depends, he suggests, on his answer to the second. Hume's is "a causal explanation of the ability to make causal inferences, an explanation that presents this ability as the effect of a fundamental principle of human nature, custom, or habit" (154). What of the idea of necessary connection? Rejecting often intimated ties to nomologicality, Bell finds Hume linking causal necessity with ideas of causal powers and forces. Not the *observation* of causal powers, however. "What Hume's positive theory does," Bell writes, "is make experience of constant conjunction, together with the principle of custom and habit, sufficient in the circumstances of human nature to give rise to the idea of causality as a necessary relation" (164). Hume's famous two definitions of cause are definitions in a specifically Humean sense: they are identifications of the impressions from which a particular idea arises. And they are as much definitions of necessity as they are of cause. Emphasizing how difficult it is to be confident that one has succeeded in reaching Hume's point of view, Bell ends with a clarifying map of current "readings" of Hume on causation: regularity readings, skeptical realism, causal realism, the readings of Garrett or Baier, and the antirealism of Blackburn.

Jane McIntyre's "Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity" is a subtle and compelling representation of Hume's first-stated views on personal identity and his puzzling second thoughts. McIntyre's Hume distinguishes the question of the nature of the self from that of the identity (and so continuance) of the self. He further distinguishes two tasks: that of explaining why we tend to believe in the identity of the self, and that of explaining the concern that a present self takes in its past or future pains or pleasures. He distinguishes, that is to say, personal identity as it regards the imagination and personal identity as it regards the passions. In McIntyre's rendering, Hume addresses the nature of the self at *Treatise* 1.4.5

and personal identity (as it regards the imagination) at 1.4.6. The self's concern for past or future pains or pleasures is a matter for Book 2 of the *Treatise* ("Of the Passions"): concern for the past in the treatment of pride and humility in part 1, and concern for the future in the treatment of intention and action in part 3. What of sections 10–21 of the "Appendix" to the *Treatise*? These constitute not retraction but expression of a hope dashed. "I had entertained some hope," Hume writes, "that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it wou'd be free from some of those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world" (196; T App. 10; SBN 633). Hume has come to realize, McIntyre suggests, that his treatment of the self "recapitulates the dilemma he articulates concerning belief in the existence of body" (199), and comes to think that "[t]he internal world is beset by the same contradiction discovered in the theory of the material world" (201). Both McIntyre's explanatory conjecture and her main argument on its behalf seem to me just right.

Robert J. Fogelin's classic essay, "Hume's Skepticism," unrevised, constitutes the sixth of the six essays on Hume's metaphysics. It touches, of course, on Hume's skepticism with regard to the senses. Unfortunately, and surprisingly, the second edition of the *Companion* contains no companion essay on Hume's constructive theory of the external world.

It does, however, contain three essays, each notable, one of them entirely new, on Hume's moral philosophy. David Fate Norton's "The Foundations of Morality in Hume's *Treatise*" (bearing, its author correctly notes, little more than a family resemblance to its predecessor in the *Companion*'s first edition) takes seriously the task of showing that Hume made good on his commitment to take human nature as "the Source from which . . . [he] wou'd derive every Truth in . . . Morality" (307; letter to a physician). Norton ends with a summary list of those human features that, in Hume's hands, serve to explain the origin and basic workings of morality. It is of course the *assemblage* of the several elements in a certain way that would constitute Hume's derivation of morality from human nature. Norton does much to represent that assemblage, and he does so with deep scholarship and interpretive-cum-critical skill. My own misgivings concern his neglect of what may be termed *the regularization of sympathy* and his admittedly ingenious invocation of expectation to explain the motivating sense of obligation.

Jacqueline Taylor's new essay "Hume's Later Moral Philosophy" focuses on the second *Enquiry* and a number of later essays. Concerned to show that these later works have independent philosophical significance, she effectively draws attention to differences from the *Treatise* in argument strategy, in sequences of discussions, and in emphasis. What is distinctive in the later writings? Taylor emphasizes two things: Hume's attention to the role of language and reason in morality; and

what he has to say about the universality and relativity of morals. In the matter of language and moral sentiment her later Hume holds three things: that our terms of praise and blame of character traits are "moulded upon" (336; EPM 9.8; SBN 274) corresponding sentiments of praise of useful and agreeable qualities, and of blame for harmful and disagreeable ones; that we may employ the moral terminology of common life, in particular those terms used to name character traits or mental qualities, to guide philosophical investigation into the general principles and foundations of morality; and that moral language is something in which we must *acquire* a competence. In this Taylor has nicely caught a many-dimensional difference between the *Treatise* and the second *Enquiry*. She appears to neglect the language of moral *agents*, however. And her later Hume appears to substitute a rather thin account of sympathy for the robust account, elaborated in the *Treatise*, of the correction of sympathy and thus of the objectivity of moral judgments.

Neither Norton nor Taylor attends closely to the theories of the passions and the will that serve, in Book 2 of the *Treatise*, as a preface to Hume's theory of morality. Terence Penelhum's unrevised essay, "Hume's Moral Psychology," succinctly addresses aspects of Hume's views on both topics.

Five essays that appeared in the original *Companion*, one of them significantly revised, address matters that for the most part fall outside the range of the *Treatise* and the two *Enquiries*: Knud Haakonssen's "The Structure of Hume's Political Theory," Andrew S. Skinner's "Hume's Principles of Political Economy," Peter Jones's "Hume on the Arts and 'The Standard of Taste': Texts and Contexts," David Wooton's "David Hume: 'The Historian,'" and J. C. A. Gaskin's "Hume on Religion."

In revising his 1993 essay (entitled "Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory"), Peter Jones has substantially expanded his opening account of the eighteenth-century context of writing on the several arts (and in doing so has added copiously to the original endnote lists of writings on the several arts in several languages). But what I take to be the central claims of his essay remain unchanged and are persuasively elaborated and argued. Jones sees Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" as extending the second *Enquiry*'s investigation of the respective roles of reason and sentiment with respect to values. He holds that, for Hume, both making and responding to works of art are human actions subject to Hume's analysis of other actions. More particularly, for Hume, criticism is a "factually based, rational, social activity, capable of being integrated into the rest of intelligible human discourse" (433) with sentiment as a criterion.

Each of the remaining four essays amply repays the close reading it demands. Each enhances our grasp of Hume's conception of his science of human nature and of the intersection of that conception with his skepticism. Taken together, the five essays make patent the extraordinary range and seriousness of Hume's intellectual achievements: his interrelated reflections on politics, economics, and

history; his seminal work on criticism; his unsurpassed scrutiny of the content and claims of religion.

I have noted an important gap or two in the *Companion*'s coverage. I have also drawn attention to an unusual conjunction of the old, the revised, and the new. Those caveats registered, I find the new *Cambridge Companion to Hume* to comprise a wide-ranging collection of individually significant, collectively quite welcome, essays, none of them introductory, each of them seriously exploratory and critical, on a philosopher whose work demands the attention of many hands.

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