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Annette Baier stands out as a figure of prime importance on the contemporary philosophical horizon. This volume finally brings the proper recognition she deserves, presenting a rich collection of essays in her honor. *Persons and Passions* proves to be extremely interesting both for the discussion of Baier's own philosophical reflection and as an example of how Baier represents an unparalleled source of inspiration for anyone concerned with the philosophers who have been at the forefront of her interests. Although Baier's preference is surely for David Hume, her intellectual curiosity and scholarly mastery cover a wider area spanning from Descartes to Kant.

This is well represented by the structure of *Persons and Passions*: the volume is composed of sixteen essays which broadly fall into three groups, respectively concerned with the philosophy of Hume, Descartes or Kant. Lisa Shapiro, William Beardsley, Amy Morgan Schmitter, and Cecilia Wee are all concerned with the philosophy of Descartes, in particular as it is presented in the *Meditations on First Philosophy*. A major segment of the volume is devoted to examining diverse tenets of Hume's thought, with essays by Saul Traiger, Lilli Alanen, Donald Ainslie, Janet Broughton, Alasdair MacIntyre, David Gauthier, and Robert Shaver. Then, in their papers, Sergio Tenenbaum and Michele Moody-Adams defend a Kantian explanation of the notions of friendship and cruelty. Finally, Karen Jones and Jennifer Whiting close the book by exploring the specular notions of trust and distrust. Baier's lessons have been carefully absorbed by all contributors. A detailed analysis of the essays would take more space than a review allows, so I will concentrate only on those concerned with Hume, and try to single out from them the trace of Baier's teaching.

The notions of person and passion (as Christopher Williams explains in his useful introduction) are central to Baier's general approach to philosophy, and they play an important part in the section of the book dedicated to Hume. Traiger looks into the relation between reason and the passions starting from the example of the man hanging over a precipice in an iron cage Hume introduces in *A Treatise of Human Nature* 1.3.13, and investigates how other philosophers before Hume had explained the reason-passions relation by means of the same argument. Traiger's conclusion is that whereas for Montaigne, Pascal and Malebranche the precipice phenomenon proves that our passions will always overwhelm our best reasoning (in turn, demonstrating the separation of mind and body), for Descartes and Hume

it is not so. But whereas in Descartes this is because of the power reason possesses as a separate and independent faculty to silence the passions, in Hume the instance of the fear we feel before a precipice is a clear illustration of the interdependence of reason, passion, and imagination, which occupy "a shared arena, where regularities can be investigated and appropriate conclusions drawn" (114).

Many of the essays echo one of the main features of Baier's interpretation of Hume, namely the necessity of defining a peculiar kind of naturalism which has to be conceived within the frame of the reflective practices in which human beings are engaged as social animals. Alanen offers an analysis of the structure of the passions in Hume, starting from a consideration of the various ways the notion of reflection can help clarify the nature of passions and their intentionality. She defends a form of "natural intentionality" (133), according to which passions are intentional acts with bodily expressions which do not need to presuppose conceptually articulated propositions or judgments. In doing this Alanen discusses the role played by emotional exchange among human beings in the constitution of a unified notion of the self. A similar topic is at the center of Ainslie's essay, which presents a thorough exploration of the principle of sympathy and of the role the self occupies within its mechanism. Ainslie starts from Baier's conviction that the work of Hume is to be interpreted as an organic narration of human nature, which can be properly understood only by expanding our focus from the sole consideration of our cognitive capacities to a comprehensive picture that sees human nature as resulting from a wider "progress of sentiments" dependent on the social and passionate relations human beings establish with each other within the horizon of "common life." According to him, this perspective allows for a coherent explanation of the notion of the self which supplies a solution to the apparent difficulties Hume would encounter when he mentions the self in different and apparently irreconcilable ways within the three books of the *Treatise*. Through a detailed confrontation with the positions of Don Garrett and Nicholas Capaldi, Ainslie explains "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves" (as Hume expresses himself in *Treatise* 2.1.11) as a form of self-awareness which combines Hume's investigations of selves conceived as minds and as embodied passional beings sympathetically related in a social world. Leaving aside the question of which approach may better disentangle the Humean problem of the self, surely Ainslie's integrated version is an extremely interesting proposal for bridging the gap between Hume's account of personal identity and his consideration of the person as moral agent, one that presents Hume's ethics as a solution capable of guaranteeing both impartiality and consideration for the distinctive characteristics of persons which make them different one from the other.

The idea that Hume's thought can be framed as a coherent totality does not go without criticism. Like Ainslie, Broughton follows Baier in her project of reading

the *Treatise* as a whole; but in opposition to Baier, Broughton contends that this unified narrative does not constitute a progress. Making reference in particular to Book One, she believes that the *Treatise* does offer an enquiry which possesses a definite shape, a narrative order, and a structure which admits of revision as the story goes on, but she denies that all this eventually finds expression in a successful advancement, "one that moves from a less-good position to a better one by way of a sequence of intermediate steps aimed at doing just that" (175). For Broughton, Hume's naturalistic enquiry into human understanding does not withstand reflective scrutiny.

Another critique, not directed at Baier but primarily at Hume, is put forward by MacIntyre, who once more takes up his thesis of the superiority of Aristotle's ethics over the Humean. He focuses on Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues and claims that Hume does not succeed in presenting a convincing refutation of the "artificial lives," mainly because he seems to lack a notion of "rational desire" (200), a notion which, MacIntyre believes, finds its proper vindication in Aristotle's system of final causes. Many Humeans will probably ward off MacIntyre's blow by replying that it is exactly Hume's lacking a notion of a rational desire that makes his *a posteriori* position preferable to the Aristotelian teleological one. That said, MacIntyre's provocative contribution represents, nonetheless, an intriguing step in a debate which in all likelihood will not end here.

Gauthier and Shaver also discuss the role of reflection in Hume, and both of them take the cue, in different ways, from Christine Korsgaard's notion of "reflective endorsement." Gauthier asks whether Hume's theory of morals can show that duty is also the true interest of each individual, and suggests that this should be understood as a requirement that every dutiful disposition recommended by the theory be the true interest of every single individual. Even though Gauthier believes that Hume has failed to figure out the existing relations between moral approbation and interested obligation, he proposes that a conciliation may be found if Hume's account is amended by relating moral approval to deliberative endorsement; that is, if "the dutiful dispositions or virtues" put forward by Hume's theory are intended as "those dispositions to approve (and disapprove) which themselves are approved—which satisfy the reflective test of moral approval" (226–27). For his part, Shaver advances an original form of Humean reflective endorsement. He argues persuasively that the reflective endorsement method is attractive only when it is seen in connection with well-being, and that it is better stated within the contingent framework offered by Hume and Baier than by adopting the Kantian point of view Korsgaard defends.

To conclude, *Persons and Passions* is undoubtedly an important work for anyone who wishes to engage in the study of Annette Baier's philosophy as well as

for scholars of Descartes, Hume, and Kant and surely represents an engaging and instructive read for both categories of readers.

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