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Abstract: We can understand epistemic naturalism as the view that there are cases in which we are justified in holding a belief and cases in which we are not so justified, and that we can distinguish cases of one sort from cases of the other with reference to non-normative facts about the mechanisms that produce them. By my lights, Hume is an epistemic naturalist of this sort, and I propose in this paper a novel and detailed account of his epistemic naturalism. On my account, which I call the determinacy account, Hume characterizes epistemic justification in terms of the mind's feeling determined by the relation of cause and effect to move from one impression (or idea) to an(other) idea. I find a statement of this account, which Hume applies initially to what he calls the second system of realities, in *Treatise* 1.3.9. After rejecting other accounts of Hume's epistemic naturalism, I show how the determinacy account handles the cases Hume considers later in *Treatise* 1.3.

Epistemic naturalism, as I understand it here, is the view that there are cases in which we are justified in holding a belief and cases in which we are not so justified, and that we can distinguish cases of one sort from cases of the other with reference to non-normative facts about the mechanisms that produce our beliefs.[1] To those familiar with the literature on this subject, it might seem that the issue of Hume's epistemic naturalism has already been approached from every angle.[2] All the same, I think there is an as yet unnoticed and better angle from which to approach the

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issue, one that brings out the central role of feeling in Hume's account of epistemic justification.[3] On my account, Hume characterizes justification in terms of the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable.

An account that emphasizes feeling promotes the thought that Hume's epistemic naturalism contributes significantly to what Annette C. Baier calls "the crucial Humean turn, from intellect to feeling."[4] This turn is one of Hume's most distinctive contributions to philosophy. Moreover, so far as I know, everyone who sees Hume making this turn in his account of epistemic justification takes him to make it no earlier than *Treatise* 1.4.7.[5] For these commentators, Book 1 of the *Treatise*—the bulk of it, anyway—simply sets the stage for this turn, and feeling has no substantive epistemological role to play until the very end of Book 1. On my reading, however, Hume gives expression to his epistemic naturalism as early as *Treatise* 1.3.9, thus making the turn to feeling in his epistemology well before the last section of Book 1. Seeing this can help us see that the *whole* of the *Treatise*, and not just certain parts of it, to be found mainly in Books 2 and 3, is taken up with Hume's important turn from intellect to feeling. It can also help us comprehend the significant theoretical role that feeling plays in his philosophy.

I find a statement of Hume's epistemic naturalism, at least as it initially applies to what he calls the second system of realities, in *Treatise* 1.3.9, and so I begin by taking a careful look at that section. I then consider and reject other prominent accounts of his epistemic naturalism. Next, I examine a variety of cases from Hume—including cases involving credulity, education, beliefs produced by "the fables of tragic poets" (T 1.3.10.7; SBN 122), the probability of causes, and unphilosophical probabilities—and I show how my account of his epistemic naturalism can explain why we are justified or, as the case may be, unjustified in holding certain beliefs.

1. Hume's Determinacy Account of Epistemic Justification

To discover the foundations of Hume's epistemic naturalism, we must determine which non-normative facts are important for Hume when it comes to distinguishing cases in which we believe justifiedly from cases in which we do not. Louis E. Loeb contends that these non-normative facts are facts about belief-producing mechanisms,[6] and passages in the *Treatise* support his contention. For example, in *Treatise* 1.3.6.7 (SBN 89), Hume says, "The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because 'tis the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another." Hume's argument is an enthymeme. We can express the argument in the following way:

(1) If *x* is a relation that can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, then *x* is a relation on which we can found a just inference from one object to another.

(2) If *x* is a relation on which we can found a just inference from one object to another, then *x* is the relation of cause and effect.

(3) Therefore, if *x* is a relation that can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, then *x* is the relation of cause and effect.

(2) lets us know that when Hume expresses an epistemological preference for certain inferences—by saying, for example, that they are "just"—those inferences are founded on a relation of a certain sort and, in particular, on the relation of cause and effect.[7]

1.1 The Determinacy Account in Treatise *1.3.9*

This is not Hume's final word on the matter. He goes on to identify what he considers to be the epistemically significant features of the operations of cause and effect, the features in virtue of which those operations have the power to justify and that form the basis of the distinction between cases in which we believe justifiedly and cases in which we do not. We can see what Hume has to say about this in *Treatise* 1.3.9, which begins with an objection to his claim that "belief arises only from causation" (T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107). According to the objection, if resemblance, contiguity, and the relation of cause and effect "are deriv'd from the same principles," if "their effects in inforcing and inlivening our ideas are the same," and if "belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea, it shou'd follow that that action of the mind may not only be deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and resemblance" (T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107). So, since Hume argues that belief arises only from causation, there must be something wrong with his reasoning, or so the objection goes.

Hume's response to this objection begins with a distinction between two systems. The first system consists of the "impressions or ideas of the memory," which, along with "the present impressions, we are pleas'd to call a *reality*" (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108). The second system consists of ideas that are connected to the first system "by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause and effect" (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108). The mind "dignifies [these ideas] with the title of *realities*" when "it feels that 'tis in a manner necessarily determin'd to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or relation, by which it is determin'd, admits not of the least change" (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108). When the mind encounters an element, *i*, of the first system of realities, an idea, *o*, which is not an element of that system, becomes an element of a second system when the mind feels "in a manner necessarily determin'd," by a relation that feels unchangeable, to proceed from *i* to *o*.[8] (From now on, for brevity's sake, I

will use 'feels determined' to mean the same thing as 'feels in a manner necessarily determined'). Hume suggests that cause and effect can make the mind feel determined to proceed from *i* to *o*, and that only cause and effect can move the mind in a way that feels unchangeable. It follows that only the cause and effect relation is responsible for the second system of realities; this is among its effects in "inforcing and inlivening our ideas."

Resemblance and contiguity, on the other hand, when they act alone, do not have this effect: as Hume notes, "when single, their influence is very feeble and uncertain" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109). Imagine a case in which the relation of cause and effect is inactive, but in which we have an impression and give another object a particular relation to it. This relation, since we are working under the hypothesis that cause and effect is inactive, will be either resemblance or contiguity. Hume says, however, that "[t]here is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous objects" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109). Acting alone, neither resemblance nor contiguity can move the mind in a way that feels determined. He then says that "if it feigns such, there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same, without any difference or variation" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109). When resemblance and contiguity act on their own, the mind "feels . . . the weak hold it has of its objects" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 110), so that we can fairly easily see *different* objects as resembling or as being contiguous with the impression. That is, neither resemblance nor contiguity feels unchangeable. When they act on their own, then, neither resemblance nor contiguity can move the mind in a way that feels determined, and neither relation feels unchangeable. This means that neither relation can, all by itself, bring us to call any idea a reality; as Hume says, "the relation of cause and effect is requisite to perswade us of any real existence" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109).

Hume concludes that in cases in which cause and effect is inactive, "nothing but pure *caprice*" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109) can be responsible for "fictions" produced in the wake of an impression or an idea. And the text suggests that this conclusion follows from the fact that such fictions are "founded on so little reason" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109). Yet here, as Loeb says, "Hume seems to change the subject [to justified believing] and to do so without notice" (*Stability and Justification*, 63). The question arises, then, whether Hume has the right to speak in normative terms here and, if he does, what gives him that right. This brings me to my account of Hume's epistemic naturalism.

Hume's epistemic naturalism is rooted in the idea that "[t]o value something *epistemically* . . . is to value it . . . for its relation to truth or probability," as Don Garrett puts it.[9] In particular, it locates epistemic justification in properties or features that conduce to the truth or probability or—and this is a better way to put it—to the *reality* of our beliefs. My account of Hume's epistemic naturalism gives pride of place to those features that are, according to Hume himself, most fundamentally

responsible for our dignifying certain ideas "with the title of *realities*" (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108). According to Hume, certain ideas count as realities precisely because the imagination, in enlivening those ideas, speaks with a peculiar kind of authority, which in any particular case is characterized by the mind's feeling determined, by a relation that feels unchangeable, to move to a particular idea when it encounters some element of the first system of realities.[10] This, at least as it applies to the second system of realities, is Hume's epistemic naturalism:

> S is epistemically justified in assenting to an idea, *o*, which is not an element of the first system of realities, just in case, upon the appearance of some element, *i*, of the first system, the mind's movement from *i* to *o* feels determined by a relation that feels unchangeable.[11]

I call this *the determinacy account* of Hume's epistemic naturalism.

In considering *Treatise* 1.3.9, we noted that Hume says that when resemblance or contiguity acts on its own to produce psychological states, it produces fictions that are "founded on so little reason" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109). As we can now see, however, this isn't to raise the subject of epistemic justification without notice, for he serves notice of his determinacy account as early as *Treatise* 1.3.9.3. In *Treatise* 1.3.9.6, then, he can appeal rather explicitly to that account, as he does when he says, for example, that "[t]here is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous objects" (SBN 109). He claims, in fact, that "nothing but pure *caprice*" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109) can be responsible for the fictions produced when only resemblance or contiguity is active, and this claim makes perfect sense: 'Caprice' is a normatively charged term that refers to a mechanism that produces certain contentful psychological states even when there is no reason to do so. When resemblance and contiguity act alone, however, they do just that—they produce fictions that are "founded on so little reason." Unlike cause and effect, resemblance and contiguity cannot all by themselves bring us to call any idea a reality and, what's worse, they give us no reason to form any belief. This constitutes Hume's response to the objection raised at the beginning of *Treatise* 1.3.9; that objection fails because the effects of resemblance and contiguity in "inforcing and inlivening our ideas" are *not* the same as those of cause and effect (T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107).

For our purposes, however, what's significant about Hume's response to this objection is that it includes an account of his epistemic naturalism, in terms of which he can explain why the operations of cause and effect are relevantly different from those of resemblance and contiguity. The relation of cause and effect allows us to believe justifiedly. This is not the case, however, with resemblance or contiguity. In cases in which those relations act on their own to produce "fictions," the mind does not feel determined to move as it does. Furthermore, neither resemblance nor contiguity feels unchangeable; each admits of "difference or

variation" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109). Thus, neither resemblance nor contiguity alone will allow us to believe justifiedly.

1.2 The Details of Hume's Determinacy Account

There is still much to be said about the determinacy account. I begin by saying more about the nature of the feelings that lie at the heart of the account. To say that the mind *feels determined* to move from *i* to *o* is to say that it feels "in a manner force[d]" to move in that way (T 1.3.11.4; SBN 125), that it "feels a kind of impossibility" of failing to move in that way (T 1.3.11.12; SBN 129).[12] To put this differently, the mind feels that it "cannot without a sensible violence" fail to move from *i* to *o* (T 1.3.11.4; SBN 125).[13] The mind feels as if it is being forced to move from the impression to some idea. When this occurs, the mind feels as if it could not move otherwise without violence, that is, without considerable and painful effort. However difficult it is to characterize this feeling, those of us who have reached a certain age know how it feels when our minds move from an impression—say, hearing someone who holds a heavy object over the floor say that she will release it—to some idea—say, the idea that, on being released, the object will fall to the floor. In this and very many other cases, the mind's movement feels inevitable and unpreventable.

In addition to saying that the mind feels determined to move from an impression to an idea, Hume also says it feels that the "relation, by which it is determin'd, admits not of the least change" (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108). To say that a relation *feels unchangeable* is to say that when the mind is influenced by that relation, it feels as if it is being forced to move not simply from the impression to *some idea or other*, but "from that particular impression to *that particular idea*" (T 1.3.9.7; SBN 110; my emphasis). The mind feels as if it cannot change its course laterally, so to speak, away from that particular idea and toward some other idea. A relation feels unchangeable when, given that the mind moves from a particular impression, *i*, to a particular idea, *o*, it "feels a kind of impossibility," as Hume says when discussing "the throwing of the dye," of replacing *o* with any other idea at all, of moving from *i* to any idea other than *o* (T 1.3.11.12; SBN 129).[14]

Given all this, we can say that when the mind feels determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable, it feels as if it is being pushed along a sort of groove or canal that runs from *i* to *o*. When the mind now encounters *i*, it feels as if it is being pushed from one end of the canal to the other and, at the same time, it feels a kind of impossibility of moving to any idea other than the one situated at the end of the canal. The former feeling is distinguishable, at least phenomenologically, from the latter. Think here of what the body experiences when it is pushed down a tube slide, for example. It feels not only as if it is being pushed from one end of the slide to the other but also, since the slide's walls push against

and constrain it, a kind of impossibility of moving to any point other than the end of the slide. Still, even though these two feelings are distinct, they coincide exactly and overlap, as it were, whenever the body is pushed down a tube slide. Similarly, when the mind feels determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable, these two feelings—the feeling of being pushed from an impression to an idea and the feeling of being constrained to move to some idea in particular—coincide exactly.

Moreover, each of these feelings is associated with a different force, one that moves the mind from an impression to some idea and another that constrains it to move to some idea *in particular*. Movements for which the relation of cause and effect is responsible can be characterized, at least in part, by the fact that they involve both of these forces working together (see T 1.3.9.7, 1.3.11.4, 1.3.11.12; SBN 110, 125, 129). Given this, the feelings associated with these forces, when they coincide and overlap in a single movement, indicate that the relation of cause and effect is at work. In addition, as Hume maintains in *Treatise* 1.3.6.7 (SBN 89), cause and effect is the only relation "on which we can found a just inference from one object to another." Thus, the feeling of being determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable, which is characterizable in terms of the coincidence of the two feelings described above, serves to indicate those movements of the mind for which cause and effect, the only relation on which we can found a just inference from one object to another, is responsible. This is a fundamental element of Hume's normative epistemological project, a project which has as one of its principal aims the specification of norms of belief adoption.[15]

Having identified this fundamental element of his epistemology, we may attribute to Hume a principle of epistemic justification of the following sort: One is justified in assenting to an idea, *o*, as an element of reality beyond the impressions of our memory and senses, just in case the mind's movement to *o* from some impression, *i*, is indicated as one for which cause and effect is responsible, that is, just in case that movement feels determined by a relation that feels unchangeable. To put this somewhat more carefully: one is justified in assenting to an idea, *o*, which is not an element of the first system of realities, when and only when, upon the appearance of some element, *i*, of the first system, the mind's movement from *i* to *o* feels determined by a relation that feels unchangeable. These feelings are the non-normative features of cause and effect's operations that allow us to distinguish cases in which we believe justifiedly from cases in which we do not. The mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable justifies us in assenting to certain ideas, or in holding certain beliefs, because it indicates to us that we are being led to those ideas by cause and effect.

Hume realizes that it will not always be easy to tell whether a particular feeling is the kind of feeling that indicates the operation of cause and effect. How can we tell whether a feeling is of the right sort? Reflection is particularly important

here:[16] it can reveal whether a feeling is the mind's feeling determined by cause and effect to move as it does.[17] This issue comes up for Hume when he considers our propensity to believe on the basis of a cause's superfluous circumstances. He says that "we may observe" that these circumstances sometimes "have such an influence on the imagination, that even in the absence of the [cause's essential circumstances] they carry us on to the conception of the usual effect" (T 1.3.13.9; SBN 148). Yet, through "a reflection on the nature of those circumstances," we can *see* that they are superfluous, that they are conjoined with the usual effect "only . . . by accident" (T 1.3.13.9; SBN 148). In revealing this, reflection also reveals that the relation that moves the mind does *not* feel unchangeable: since a cause's superfluous circumstances are only accidentally conjoined with its usual effect, the mind does not feel "a kind of impossibility" of moving from an impression of a cause's superfluous circumstances to some idea other than that of its usual effect (T 1.3.11.12; SBN 129). Reflection can therefore reveal that the feeling the mind experiences in these cases is not the kind of feeling that indicates the operations of cause and effect, which means that it can reveal that we are not justified in holding beliefs when we do so on the basis of a cause's superfluous circumstances.

This is helpful in addressing another worry, one that arises when we note that the feeling that lies at the heart of the determinacy account might plausibly have been described as a feeling of *irresistibility* rather than as a feeling of inevitability or unpreventability. Describing it in this way would have brought to mind Norman Kemp Smith's irresistibility account of Hume's epistemic naturalism, according to which "'natural' beliefs" are "beliefs which ought to be accepted" in that "we have no choice but to accept them; they impose themselves upon the mind" (*The Philosophy of David Hume*, 388). But then how is the determinacy account different from Kemp Smith's irresistibility account? On the irresistibility account, a belief's imposing itself upon the mind is sufficient for our being epistemically justified in holding it. However, as Loeb points out, this account does not "explain how irresistible beliefs can fail to be justified" (*Stability and Justification*, 24). Consider beliefs held on the basis of circumstances superfluous to a cause, such as the man's belief that he will fall even though he is secure in a cage of iron as he hangs from a high tower. These beliefs can be irresistible but, as Hume suggests, we are not justified in holding them, which means that irresistibility alone is not sufficient for justification.

The determinacy account does not have this problem, however, for it does not maintain that a belief's simply imposing itself upon the mind is sufficient for our being justified in holding it. On the determinacy account, if we are to be justified in holding a belief, our minds must feel determined *by a relation that feels unchangeable*, that is, by the cause-and-effect relation. Yet even when the mind feels pushed from an impression of a cause's superfluous circumstances to some idea, it does not feel prevented, as reflection can reveal, from moving to an idea

other than that of the cause's usual effect. The relation that pushes the mind from the impression of the cause's superfluous circumstances to the idea of its usual effect does not feel unchangeable: There is no "necessity for [the mind] always to confine itself" to that particular idea, "without any difference or variation" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109). We are therefore not justified in holding beliefs, not even when they are irresistible, on the basis of a cause's superfluous circumstances.

One might also worry that justification, as the determinacy account characterizes it, is not connected to truth in the way it must be if it is to count as genuinely *epistemic* justification. Michael Williams, as I read him, holds that no account of epistemic justification is to be found in *Treatise* 1.3.9.3. On Williams's view, that paragraph provides evidence for the claim that Hume abandons truth as an epistemic goal. He notes that Hume says of the first system that "we are pleas'd to call" it a reality (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108) and of the elements of the second system that the mind "dignifies [them] with the title" of realities (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108). According to Williams, the phrase "pleas'd to call" strikes a skeptical note,[18] while the phrase "dignifies with the title" suggests some question as to "[w]hether, from the standpoint of Reason, [the elements of the second system] fully deserve th[e] title [of realities]" ("The Unity of Hume's Philosophical Project," 277). He maintains that these phrases suggest "a certain skeptical distance" on Hume's part (ibid.), a skeptical distance that can be explained by Hume's having abandoned truth as an epistemic goal. Indeed, since Williams has in mind the kind of truth that Hume suggests in *Treatise* 1.3.5.2 (SBN 84), a kind of truth that lies beyond the bounds of human understanding and about which we should remain skeptical, his claim that Hume abandons truth as an epistemic goal seems right. Hume says, "As to those *impressions*, which arise from the *senses*, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being" (T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84; cf. T 1.2.6.8; SBN 67–68).[19] In fact, when Hume says that this kind of truth is not in "any way material to our present purpose" (T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84), he himself seems quite straightforwardly to abandon it as an epistemic goal.

But things are not as clear-cut as this. For one thing, Hume never uses 'true' or 'truth' in *Treatise* 1.3.9.3, only 'reality' and 'realities'. So, even if that paragraph suggests that Hume abandons *truth* as an epistemic goal, the possibility remains that he does *not* abandon *reality* as such a goal. In fact, it seems to me that Hume embraces this very possibility. The first thing to note in this regard is that there is a distinction for Hume between reality and truth. Hume is unwilling to go so far as to call our impressions *true*. He says that "'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty . . . whether [impressions] be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses" (T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84). Nevertheless, he says in *Treatise* 1.3.9.3 that we call our impressions *realities* and, indeed, that

"we are pleas'd to" do so. I take him to be saying something to this effect: We are willing to call our impressions realities[20] despite the fact that we are not willing to call them true. Reality is therefore not to be identified with truth. This space between reality and truth is the skeptical distance Williams senses. Hume's skeptical attitude toward truth compels him to reject it as our epistemic goal, even though doing so means that we must throw in the towel on such traditional epistemological questions as those regarding the "ultimate cause[s]" of our impressions (T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84). Since reality is distinct from truth, however, nothing stands in the way of his saying that reality is our epistemic goal.[21]

The next thing to note here is that reality is a *legitimate* epistemic end. Hume is doing a normative sort of epistemology, a sort of epistemology that aims to specify norms of belief adoption. These epistemic norms are intended to guide us in our efforts to believe what we are epistemically permitted to believe. If we are to make successful use of these norms, we need to be able to see that, in doing what they instruct us to do, we have achieved—or, as the case may be, failed to achieve—our epistemic end. We cannot do this, however, if truth is our epistemic goal, for we cannot in any case "decide with certainty" whether an impression is true or false (T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84). Reality, on the other hand, does not lie beyond the bounds of human understanding; it is presented in our present impressions and represented in our memories and in the ideas to which those memories and impressions are connected by cause and effect. Unlike truth, reality is something to which we have access: it is an achievable epistemic end. Of truth and reality, then, only reality can occupy a place in epistemic norms like those Hume means to specify, norms that we can usefully and successfully employ.

Finally, reality is a legitimate epistemic end in that it is an *alethic* or truth-like notion, the sort of notion that is generally thought to characterize a pursuit as an epistemic one. There is ample textual support for the claim that reality is an alethic notion for Hume. First, he claims that cause and effect, in leading us to ideas that count as realities, persuades us of or acquaints us with *existences* (see T 1.3.9.4, 6; SBN 108, 109). To say that realities are existences is to suggest that they *are*, in a fairly robust sense of 'are'. It is to suggest that they have certain features or properties, both relational and otherwise, as a matter of independent fact. This means that, while reality is distinct from truth or, more precisely, from truth as Hume portrays it in *Treatise* 1.3.5.2, it is also distinct from that which we merely take to be true. For Hume, there are independent facts of the matter about reality, which is suggested by the fact that the notion of reality, as he sees it, is related as it is to the notion of existences.

Hume also contrasts realities with *fictions*.[22] He says that "whatever is present to the memory" and hence is an element of the first system of realities, "must easily distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination" (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 108), and that ideas "arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect

. . . distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination" (T 1.3.9.4; SBN 108). He also says that there is an "act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination" (T 1.3.7.7; SBN 629). This notion of reality is an alethic one, in that it is tailored to fit the real as opposed to the fictitious. This, along with the fact that realities are existences, suggests that reality is a legitimate epistemic end. Thus, justification, as the determinacy account characterizes it, does indeed have a legitimate, achievable epistemic end; it counts as genuine epistemic justification. We are epistemically justified in adopting certain beliefs because a certain feeling, namely, the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable, indicates that certain things are realities and has us embrace those realities in belief.

To understand the determinacy account better, consider an example from *Treatise* 1.3.9.12. There, Hume discusses cases of credulity, in which we have "a too easy faith in the testimony of others" and in which, according to Hume, we give our "assent beyond what experience will justify" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113).[23] The determinacy account explains why we are not justified in giving our assent in cases of credulity. Hume says that the words of others have "an intimate connexion with certain ideas in their minds" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113), which I take to mean that their words make manifest their ideas. For Hume, this "intimate connexion" involves words' being both images of and caused by the facts with which they are connected. He says that "the testimony of men [points out its cause] directly and is to be consider'd as an image [of its cause] as well as an effect" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113). Still, he thinks that the connection between words (or ideas) and facts "is generally much over-rated, and commands our assent beyond what experience will justify" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113). That is, there are cases in which a person's words are connected with a certain matter of fact, but in which their being an effect of that matter of fact runs contrary to the sort of "daily experience and observation" that gives us "assurance of the veracity of men" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113).

For example, when Bill tells me that there's a ghost in his house, his idea is connected with a putative matter of fact—namely, there being a ghost in his house. Typically, this sort of connection appears in conjunction with a causal relation between the idea and the fact. In this case, however, it is contrary to daily experience and observation that Bill's idea is an effect of the matter of fact with which it is connected. Still, I might "receive [that] matter of fact upon [Bill's] testimony" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113). Were I to do this, Hume maintains, I would not be justified in believing that there is a ghost in Bill's house. This is a case in which daily experience and observation have not established and do not support the proper sort of movement of the mind. In this case, my assent would have "proceed[ed] from nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN

113). Resemblance, however, is not a relation that feels unchangeable, and so my mind would not feel determined by such a relation, which is to say that it would not feel determined by cause and effect, to move from my impression of Bill's words to the idea that there is a ghost in his house.[24]

What has now emerged is a picture of Hume's epistemic naturalism, according to which we are justified in holding a belief when and only when the relation of cause and effect has a strong enough influence on the mind, in its production of that belief, to make the mind feel determined to produce it. There are two types of case in which cause and effect's influence is too weak. First, there are cases in which cause and effect has *no influence at all* on the mind's movements but in which something else *does* have an influence. In some of these cases, such as those in which the mind is influenced by the sort of custom involved in what Hume calls education, the mind's movements are influenced by something that is similar in certain epistemically significant respects to the relation of cause and effect. In other cases of this sort, however, including those in which a "poetical enthusiasm" generates psychological states, the mind's movements are influenced by something that is not similar to cause and effect in these epistemically significant respects. Second, there are cases in which cause and effect has *some* influence on the mind in its production of a psychological state but in which a lack of resemblance or a lack of contiguity keeps it from making the mind feel determined to produce that state. These cases include *Treatise* 1.3.13's first three unphilosophical probabilities, cases such as those concerning inferences carried through long chains of different connected arguments.

2. Competing Accounts of Hume's Epistemic Naturalism

At least three other accounts of Hume's epistemic naturalism have been developed.[25] One account suggests that, for Hume, we justifiedly believe when and only when our beliefs are produced by *mechanisms that are functions of healthy organisms*. For example, Nicholas Wolterstorff maintains that Hume's account of justifiedly held belief "is a 'proper functioning' account."[26] A second account, proposed by Frederick F. Schmitt, suggests that, for Hume, we justifiedly believe when and only when our beliefs are produced by *mechanisms that tend to produce reliable beliefs*, where such beliefs ascribe similar and unvarying relations to objects from one occasion to the next.[27] A third account, Loeb's stability account, suggests that, for Hume, we justifiedly believe when and only when our beliefs are produced by *mechanisms that tend to produce stable beliefs*, where "[a] belief is stable if it is steady in its influence on thought, the will, and action."[28] None of these accounts accurately identifies the features of belief-producing mechanisms that Hume takes to be epistemically fundamental.

Wolterstorff says, "The clearest expression of [his account of justifiedly held belief] that Hume ever gives in his published works—and they are quite unclear—[is] to be found in Book I, Part IV, Section IV of the *Treatise*. . . . What is clear, in spite of the unclarity, is that it is a 'proper functioning' account" (*John Locke and the Ethics of Belief*, 166n6). The passage to which Wolterstorff alludes is almost certainly to be found at *Treatise* 1.4.4.1 where Hume says that "one, who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too: But then it must be in the same sense, that a malady is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, tho' it be contrary to health, the most agreeable and most natural situation of man" (SBN 225–26). Wolterstorff suggests that Hume gives expression in this passage to a proper functioning account of justification, according to which one justifiedly holds a particular belief only if one arrives at that belief by reasoning both naturally and in a way that promotes health.

Wolterstorff's account fails to identify that in virtue of which we are justified in holding certain beliefs or, to put it another way, that which lies at the foundation of Hume's account of epistemic justification. Hume says that "the principles which are permanent, irresistible, and universal . . . are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin" (T 1.4.4.1; SBN 225). That is, if those principles were to be removed, our capacity for producing beliefs—naturally, healthfully, and otherwise—would be compromised. The proper functioning of our belief-producing mechanisms *depends on* these "permanent, irresistible, and universal" principles, among which is the relation of cause and effect. This suggests that the proper functioning of our belief-producing mechanisms can be explained in terms of cause and effect, which in turn suggests that the proper functioning of these mechanisms is not the foundation of Hume's account of epistemic justification.[29]

Frederick F. Schmitt argues that "T 1.3.9.6 (SBN 109) contains minor evidence" for the reliability account ("Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's *Treatise*," 305). He claims that the fourth sentence of *Treatise* 1.3.9.6 contains the tacit proposal that many of the contentful psychological states produced by resemblance or contiguity alone are false because the products of those mechanisms tend to ascribe "different and varying relations to objects from one occasion to the next" (ibid., 306). That is, Hume tacitly proposes that resemblance and contiguity, when they act on their own, produce many false psychological states because they are unreliable. Schmitt also suggests that since an account of justification will be given in terms of that which conduces to the truth of psychological states, if a mechanism tends to produce false states, the states produced by that mechanism will not be justified. Thus, the states produced by resemblance or contiguity alone are unjustified because resemblance and contiguity are unreliable (see ibid.).

Schmitt's reliability account, like Wolterstorff's proper-functioning account, emphasizes features that are less fundamental to Hume's epistemic naturalism than those emphasized by the determinacy account. We see this when we see that, to put it in a slogan, reliability depends on determinacy. More precisely, the determinacy account explains why resemblance and contiguity alone, or the psychological states they produce when they act on their own, are unreliable: resemblance and contiguity have the tendency to ascribe different and varying relations to objects from one occasion to the next precisely because they fail to make the mind feel determined to move. When only resemblance or contiguity is active, the mind might move to *o* when it encounters *i*. However, when the mind next encounters *i*, it will not feel determined to move to *o*, which means that it might very well move to no other idea at all, to some idea with which *i* is contiguous, to some idea to which *i* is related either as cause or as effect, or to some idea that *i* resembles. When the mind doesn't feel determined to move, the psychological states it produces will have the tendency to ascribe different and varying relations to objects from one occasion to the next. Since reliability depends on determinacy in this way, the reliability theory has not identified the foundation of Hume's epistemic naturalism.

Finally, let's consider the stability account. Here, I urge, along with Schmitt, that "we can do without the stability interpretation in one location extensively discussed by Loeb—the sixth paragraph of T 1.3.9" ("Loeb on Stability and Justification," 303). As I read Loeb, he reconstructs the argument of *Treatise* 1.3.9.6 as follows:

(1) Unsteadiness in belief is sufficient for instability in belief.

(2) If a psychological state is produced by a mechanism that tends to produce unsteady—and hence unstable—dispositions, then that psychological state is not a belief.

(3) If a psychological state is not justified, other things being equal, then it is produced by a mechanism that tends to produce unsteady—and hence unstable—dispositions.

Loeb prefers an interpretation of the stability theory according to which "[t]o say that . . . beliefs are *justified, other things being equal*, is to say that they are steady, in that they are infixed by the senses, memory, or repetition" (*Stability and Justification*, 88; my emphasis. Compare *Stability and Justification*, 91–98). There is also, according to Loeb, a second sense of justification: "[B]eliefs resulting from a psychological mechanism are *justified, all things considered*, if they tend to be steady in their influence given the actual degree to which the person who holds the belief is reflective" (ibid., 88; my emphasis). Loeb's reconstruction then concludes as follows:

(4) Therefore, if a psychological state is not justified, other things being equal, then it is not a belief.

(5) Therefore, if a psychological state is a belief, then it is justified, other things being equal.

While Loeb finds support for (1) elsewhere in the *Treatise*,[30] he finds support for (2) and (3) in *Treatise* 1.3.9.6. He says in defense of (2) that, according to Hume, "resemblance does not produce belief, [and] an explanation [of this fact] stresses the unsteady character of dispositions arising from this relation" (*Stability and Justification*, 73). Support for (3), which encapsulates the stability account, comes from Hume's claim that "there is 'little reason' (T 109) to feign objects based on [resemblance] and that we form a 'general rule' (T 110) against doing so" (ibid.). Moreover, the conclusion—in (4) and (5)—serves to explain "the intimate connection between claims about belief and claims about justification. . . . The explanation is that to establish that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are beliefs, and hence stable in the sense that they are steady or infixed, is sufficient to establish that they are justified, other things being equal" (ibid., 73–74).

This goes too far, however, for Hume suggests that there are cases in which we are not justified in holding certain beliefs, not even in a weaker or other-things-being-equal sense. The case of credulous beliefs is such a case. Note first that credulity can generate beliefs: Hume says that credulity involves "a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported, even concerning apparitions, enchantments, and prodigies, however contrary to daily experience and observation" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113). But we are simply not justified, Hume suggests, in holding credulous beliefs. He says that we are being "so rash" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113) when we form credulous beliefs and that credulity is a "weakness of human nature" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 112), "a too easy faith in the testimony of others" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 112), and "is generally much over-rated, and commands our assent beyond what experience will justify" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113). All this suggests that we are not justified in holding credulous beliefs, and so the stability theory goes too far when it says that our holding a belief is sufficient for our being justified in doing so.

What leads the stability theory into this difficulty is premise (2) above, according to which a psychological state is not a belief if it is produced by a mechanism that tends to produce unsteady—and hence unstable—dispositions. The case of credulous beliefs counts against this premise (in addition to counting against the stability theory's conclusion, in (4) and (5)). Credulity tends to produce unsteady and unstable dispositions, and so the psychological states produced by credulity are produced by a mechanism that tends to produce such dispositions. Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous paragraph, credulity can produce psychological states that count as beliefs. The stability theory falters on the case of credulous beliefs.

But then how does the determinacy theorist account for the fact that while credulity *can* produce beliefs, resemblance and contiguity, when they act on their own, *cannot*? First, Hume suggests that psychological states produced by resemblance or contiguity alone cannot count as beliefs because such states are "founded on so little reason." To say that such states are founded on *so little reason* is to say that there is "no manner of necessity" for the mind to produce them—it is to say, in other words, that those states are founded on *no reason at all*. When resemblance and contiguity operate on their own, Hume suggests, we "*feign* another object" upon the appearance of an impression, and "*arbitrarily*, and of our *mere good-will and pleasure*" give that object a particular relation to the impression (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109; my emphases). "[N]or is there *any* reason," he says,

> why, upon the return of the same impression, we shou'd be determin'd to place the same object in the same relation to it. There is *no* manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous objects; and if it feigns such, there is as little [that is, *no*] necessity for it always to confine itself to the same, without any difference or variation. (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109; my emphases)

Psychological states that are founded on so little reason—that is to say, on no reason at all—are such that there is no manner of necessity for the mind to produce them. In these cases, the mind moves from an impression to an idea, if it does so at all, with a force that is too weak to communicate enough of the impression's vivacity to the idea to make it the case that the idea counts as a belief. For Hume, then, a psychological state cannot count as a belief if the mind produces it even when there is no manner of necessity for it to do so. Since there is no manner of necessity for the mind to produce the psychological states for which nothing but resemblance or contiguity is responsible, neither of these relations can produce beliefs when it operates on its own.

Second, how can the determinacy account accommodate the fact that credulity can produce beliefs? How, more generally, can it account for the existence of *beliefs* that we are *not* justified in holding? Credulity can produce psychological states that count as beliefs because it is not the case that there is no manner of necessity—there is in fact *some* manner of necessity—for the mind to produce those states. For Hume, the ideas (words) of others are connected to certain matters of fact in that they are typically both images and effects of those matters of fact. When the mind succumbs to credulity, however, it is influenced by ideas that are not causally related to the matters of fact with which they are connected; in such cases, the mind's assent proceeds only from resemblance. Still, the inferences responsible for credulous beliefs, which are a species of what I will call testimonial inferences, have "the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from effects to

causes" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113): each kind of inference is rooted in experience.[31] Given this genetic similarity, along with experience's influence and authority (see, for example, T 1.3.6.2, 11.4; SBN 87, 125), it is natural to think that the epistemic punch of a testimonial inference will be similar to that of a cause-and-effect inference. It is natural to think, that is, that when the mind produces a psychological state through a testimonial inference, there is at least some manner of necessity for it to do so. On the determinacy account, this means that when the mind produces psychological states through testimonial inferences, which include inferences made under the influence of credulity, it experiences a feeling of determination that is similar to the one that indicates the operations of cause and effect. All this suggests that credulity can produce psychological states that count as beliefs because, just as with cause-and-effect inferences, there is at least some manner of necessity for the mind to produce psychological states when it makes inferences under credulity's influence.

Nevertheless, we are not justified in holding credulous beliefs. Even though there are cases in which there is *some* manner of necessity for the mind to produce credulous beliefs, this manner of necessity is *not* the one required for justification. Justification requires the mind to feel determined to move *by a relation that feels unchangeable*, that is, by the cause-and-effect relation. In credulous believing, however, the mind does not feel determined to move by cause and effect. In such cases, as we have seen, there is no causal relation between the ideas that influence the mind and the facts with which those ideas are connected; there is only a "resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113). But resemblance does not feel unchangeable, not even when it is involved in a movement of the mind that mimics cause and effect. It follows on the determinacy account that we are not justified in holding credulous beliefs: the mind does not feel determined to produce such beliefs by a relation that feels unchangeable.

We have now see that the determinacy account can explain why resemblance and contiguity cannot produce beliefs on their own, and that it can accommodate the existence of beliefs we are not justified in holding. This, along with the problems we have noted for the stability theory, suggests that we can do without that theory in *Treatise* 1.3.9.6, a paragraph that stability theorists take to be important, if not necessary, for establishing their view. Thus, we need not see stability as that in virtue of which, for Hume, we are justified in holding certain beliefs. Indeed, as we have now seen, neither stability, reliability, nor proper functioning is at the heart of Hume's epistemic naturalism.

3. Justified: Constant but Infrequent Conjunction, Contrariety, and Analogy

The determinacy account of justification can be tested by seeing how it holds up in later sections of *Treatise* 1.3. To see whether it handles cases of justified

believing, I begin with *Treatise* 1.3.12, *Of the probability of causes*. In that section, Hume distinguishes two species of probability: while proofs are based on the *frequent* and *constant* conjunction of objects (see *Stability and Justification*, 45–46), probabilities are based either on constant but not so frequent conjunctions or on "a *contrariety* in our experience and observation" (T 1.3.12.3; SBN 131), that is, on frequent but not so constant conjunctions. There are judgments based on each of these two kinds of conjunction that we are justified in making. We can explain why this is so in terms of the determinacy account.

Consider first our reasoning on the basis of constant but infrequent conjunctions of objects. Hume claims that we can be justified in believing even when we do so on the basis of the most infrequent of conjunctions of objects, those consisting of only one case in which those objects are conjoined in experience. In such a case, how is the mind to feel determined to form a judgment? Hume says that reasoning from a single observation can acquire sufficient force from "having form'd another observation concerning the connexion of causes and effects," namely, "What we have found once to follow from any object, we conclude will for ever follow from it" (T 1.3.12.3; SBN 131). Sometimes, this maxim works in conjunction with a single observation in allowing us to make a judgment about what will "follow from [the] object" (T 1.3.12.3; SBN 131). But not just *any* observation can work in this way with the maxim: Hume says that the observation must be "duly prepar'd and examin'd" (T 1.3.12.3; SBN 131) and that the observation will be fit to work with the maxim only "after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances" (T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104). Given that we put it together with an observation that meets these criteria, the maxim "bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be apply'd" (T 1.3.8.14; SBN 105) and "gives new force to [the mind's] reasoning from that [single] observation" (T 1.3.12.3; SBN 131). The suggestion here is that this new force is sufficient to make the mind feel determined by cause and effect to move from one object to another. In this way, the determinacy account explains how we can be justified in making judgments based on constant but infrequent conjunctions of objects.[32]

Next, consider that species of probability that is based on contrariety. Hume says that "when in considering past experiments we find them of a contrary nature, [the habit or determination to transfer the past to the future], tho' full and perfect in itself, presents us with no steady object, but offers us a number of disagreeing images in a certain order and proportion" (T 1.3.12.10; SBN 134). But "[m]any of these [disagreeing] images are suppos'd to concur, and a superior number to concur on one side. These agreeing images unite together, and render the idea more strong and lively, not only than a mere fiction of the imagination, but also than any idea, which is supported by a lesser number of experiments" (T 1.3.12.11; SBN 135). "This operation of the mind," Hume says, is exactly like the one involved in "the probability of chance" (T 1.3.12.11; SBN 135), which Hume discusses in *Treatise*

1.3.11. In fact, he says that "every thing that has been said on the one subject is applicable to both" (T 1.3.12.11; SBN 135). When we take Hume seriously here, we see that we should account for justification in cases of belief based on contrariety in just the way we account for it in cases of belief based on chance.

In cases involving contrariety or the probability of chance, we first get a judgment, according to which an observed object will have a particular effect. In the case of the die that Hume considers in *Treatise* 1.3.11, "[t]he imagination passes from the cause, *viz*. the throwing of the dye, to the effect, *viz*. the turning up one of the six sides; and feels a kind of impossibility both of stopping short in the way, and of forming any other idea" (T 1.3.11.12; SBN 129). Here, the mind feels determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable. The "full and perfect" habit that is responsible for this initial judgment is then "broke into pieces, and diffuses itself over all those images, of which each partakes an equal share of that force and vivacity, that is deriv'd from the impulse" (T 1.3.12.10; SBN 134). When some of these images agree, however, "they must concur in their influence on the mind, and must unite upon one image or idea . . . all those divided impulses, that were dispers'd over the several" agreeing images (T 1.3.11.13; SBN 129). These "re-unite[d]" agreeing images "must . . . become stronger and more forcible by the union" (T 1.3.11.13; SBN 130). In Hume's die example, the original impulse divides into six equal parts, four of which reunite as representatives of one figure and two of which reunite as representatives of another. Given this, the impulse toward the figure which marks four of the die's six sides is stronger than the impulse toward the figure which marks only two of its sides. Although "the inferior [impulse] destroys the superior, as far as its strength goes" (T 1.3.11.13; SBN 130), the stronger impulse wins out over the weaker one. Moreover, even though the superior impulse in this case is weaker than the one that operates when, for example, each of the die's six sides is inscribed with the same figure (see T 1.3.12.19; SBN 138), it is still true that the mind feels pushed forward by the stronger impulse, an impulse that originated in a cause, namely, the impression of "the throwing of the dye." That the mind feels this way is clear from the fact that it generates a belief (see T 1.3.11.9; SBN 127), albeit one that is not as vivacious as those produced by stronger impulses (see T 1.3.12.11–12; SBN 134–35). The mind also feels a kind of impossibility of preferring the figure inscribed on two of the die's sides over the figure inscribed on four sides. Here again, even though this feeling is weaker than the one we experience in other cases (when, for example, each of the die's six sides is inscribed with the same figure), Hume says that we "must conclude the one figure to be more probable than the other, and give the preference to that which is inscrib'd on the greatest number of sides" (T 1.3.11.9; SBN 127). The mind feels constrained by the stronger impulse, which originated in a cause, to prefer the figure inscribed on four sides. This preference is justified: it is grounded in the mind's feeling determined to move by cause and effect, a relation that feels unchangeable.

Finally, there is a third species of probability, that "arising from analogy" (T 1.3.12.25; SBN 142). Hume says that "in the probability deriv'd from analogy, 'tis the resemblance only, which is affected" (T 1.3.12.25; SBN 142). Hume's idea is that analogies can be forceful enough to "be the foundation of probability" (T 1.3.12.25; SBN 142), so long as there is a sufficiently strong resemblance between a present object, *q*, and one of two objects, *i* and *o*, which have been constantly conjoined in all past experience. When the resemblance is sufficiently strong between *q* and, say, *i*, the mind will feel determined by cause and effect to move from *q* to *r*, where *r* is the idea to which *q* is related as *i* is related to *o*. That is, the relation of cause and effect will make the mind feel determined in the analogous case, which involves *q* and *r*, to conclude that a particular effect is likely to occur, where this effect corresponds to the effect in the original experiment involving *i* and *o*, and where the strength of the likelihood is proportional to the strength of the resemblance between *q* and *i*. This, according to the determinacy account, is why we are justified in holding certain beliefs in cases of analogy.

4. Not Justified: Education, Poetical Enthusiasms, and Unphilosophical Probabilities

This section examines some cases from *Treatise* 1.3.9 and later in which, according to Hume, we are not epistemically justified. We will first consider some cases in which we are not justified in holding certain beliefs because something other than cause and effect influences the mind's movements in its production of those beliefs. In some of these cases, including those in which the mind is influenced by a second kind of custom, which is at work in what Hume calls education, the mind's movements are influenced by something that is similar to cause and effect in certain epistemically significant respects.

Hume says that "the effects of other kinds of custom" (T 1.3.9.16; SBN 115) arise when "a mere idea alone . . . frequently make[s] its appearance in the mind" (T 1.3.9.16; SBN 116). We see this sort of custom at work in education, which is not "recogniz'd by philosophers" because it "is an artificial and not a natural cause" (T 1.3.9.19; SBN 117). Education is an artificial cause because educators can be solely and completely responsible for it, in that they can make it so that *any* idea frequently appears in the minds of their pupils. To put this another way, education is an artificial cause because nothing independent of the will of educators need be responsible for an idea's frequently appearing.[33] Given this, the possibility exists that we come to see education as the arbitrary enterprise that it is: as reflection can reveal, the mind does not feel determined by cause and effect to move from the impression of an educator's words to the idea with which those words are connected. This accounts for the negative epistemic appraisal of beliefs produced by education, an appraisal that applies even though "this habit not only approaches

in its influence, but even on many occasions prevails over that which arises from the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects" (T 1.3.9.17; SBN 116).

But there is a worry in the case of education: given that it does not employ the cause and effect relation, how can education produce *beliefs*? To see how, we should take note of the fact that, for Hume, there is some manner of necessity for the mind to produce psychological states for which custom in general is responsible, not just those produced by custom in the guise of the cause-and-effect relation; "belief," Hume says, "is an act of the mind arising from custom" (T 1.3.9.13; SBN 114). He says, too, that the sort of custom at work in education is "built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects" (T 1.3.9.19; SBN 117). Thus, cases involving education, like those involving credulity, are cases in which the mind's movements are influenced by custom, whose influence is in general epistemically noteworthy in that it is strong enough to make the mind feel determined to move to ideas and to produce beliefs. Still, it is only when custom operates in the guise of cause and effect that we are justified in holding those beliefs; only in these cases does the mind feel determined *by a relation that feels unchangeable*.

Next, consider a case in which the mind's movements are influenced neither by cause and effect nor by custom in general. This is a challenging but instructive case in which an idea's vivacity is derived from poetry or a "poetical enthusiasm," or more generally from "a vigorous and strong imagination" (T 1.3.10.8; SBN 123) or "the present temper and disposition of the person" (T 1.3.10.10; SBN 630). Ideas enlivened in these ways seem to cause trouble for the determinacy account—these ideas seem to count as beliefs, but surely there is no manner of necessity for the mind to produce them.

These examples can be dismissed, however, because it is Hume's considered opinion that we do not hold *beliefs* in these cases.[34] He says that "whatever emotion the poetical enthusiasm may give to the spirits, 'tis still the mere phantom of belief or perswasion" (T 1.3.10.10; SBN 630).[35] Yet he also says that ideas enlivened by a poetical enthusiasm have a vivacity that "is in many cases greater than that which arises from custom and experience" (T 1.3.10.8; SBN 123). Why does Hume say that ideas enlivened by a poetical enthusiasm fail to count as beliefs? His answer is that there are differences among ideas "which cannot properly be comprehended" under the terms force and vivacity. "Had I said," he continues, "that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different *feeling*, I shou'd have been nearer the truth" (T Appendix 22; SBN 636). This bears on the discussion in *Treatise* 1.3.10.10 where he says that "the *feelings* of the passions are very different when excited by poetical fictions, from what they are when they arise from belief and reality," and that this "difference in the passions is a clear proof of a like difference in those ideas, from which the passions are deriv'd" (SBN 631). Hume means to suggest that there is a difference in feeling between "poetical

fictions," on the one hand, and "belief and reality," on the other. For Hume, then, poetical fictions are not beliefs, and a difference in feeling serves to distinguish such fictions from beliefs. Since such ideas fail to amount to beliefs, these cases do not count against the determinacy account's claim that a state counts as a belief only if there is some manner of necessity for the mind to produce it. Indeed, that claim is useful in explaining why poetical fictions do not count as beliefs: there is no manner of necessity for the mind to produce poetical fictions, since neither "a customary conjunction with a present impression" (T 1.3.10.10; SBN 631) nor custom in general is responsible for such fictions. Because poetical fictions fail to count as beliefs, the cases Hume presents in *Treatise* 1.3.10 do not tell against the determinacy account.

There are other cases, including those that involve "the universal carelessness and stupidity of men with regard to a future state" (T 1.3.9.13; SBN 113), in which we are not justified in believing because we simply fail to have the relevant beliefs. Hume says that even for those who "have taken care by repeated meditation to imprint in their minds the arguments for a future state" (T 1.3.9.14; SBN 114), such a state's "want of resemblance to the present life" is so profound that, with few exceptions, it entirely destroys belief (T 1.3.9.13; SBN 114). In most cases, then, we simply have no belief at all—and hence no justified belief—concerning a future state. Hume also says that "there are scarce any, who believe the immortality of the soul with a true and establish'd judgment; such as is deriv'd from the testimony of travellers and historians" (T 1.3.9.14; SBN 114–15). This leaves open the possibility that some of those who *do* hold beliefs about a future state can be justified in doing so, just as some of those who hold beliefs about spatially distant states, e.g., Rome, can be justified in doing so (see T 1.3.9.4; SBN 108). In such a case, the believer's mind feels determined by cause and effect to move from certain impressions—such as those received from "conversation and books" of appropriate kinds (T 1.3.9.4; SBN 108)—to an idea of a future state.

The cases Hume considers in *Treatise* 1.3.13, where he discusses unphilosophical probabilities, are cases in which cause and effect has *some* influence on the mind in its production of certain psychological states but in which a lack of resemblance or a lack of contiguity keeps cause and effect from making the mind feel determined to produce those states.

In the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, where cause and effect once made the mind feel determined to move, a lack of contiguity, by diminishing the force with which the mind moves, has now made it so that the mind no longer feels determined to move. The first kind of unphilosophical probability involves "a diminution of [an] impression" (T 1.3.13.1; SBN 143) as the temporal distance increases between it and the matter of fact that caused it. The second kind involves a weakening of "the custom and transition" (T 1.3.13.2; SBN 144) from a particular experiment, *e*, to an analogous case, *c*, as we move farther away in time

from the original experiment. In each case, a lack of contiguity is responsible for the relevant weakening. We can see what the determinacy account has to say about these cases by considering what goes on in those involving the first kind of unphilosophical probability. Suppose that at a particular time, we encounter *i* and that the mind, in producing a belief that concerns *o*, feels determined by cause and effect to move from *i* to *o*. As time puts us at a distance from the matter of fact that caused *i*, *i*'s vivacity decreases, which means that there is a decrease in the force with which *i* pushes the mind toward *o*. At some time *t*, then, when we are far enough away in time from the matter of fact that caused *i*, *i*'s vivacity will no longer be able to push the mind in such a way as to make it feel determined to move to *o*. In these cases, as well as in those concerning the second kind of unphilosophical probability, cause and effect has *some* influence on the mind in its production of a psychological state, but a lack of contiguity keeps it from making the mind feel determined to produce that state. In particular, a sufficient lack of contiguity keeps the mind, at *t* and at times later than *t*, from feeling determined by cause and effect to move from *i* to *o* or, with respect to the second kind, from *e* to *c*. According to the determinacy account, we are not justified in assenting to *o* or in assenting to *c* when we do so at or later than *t*.

The third kind of unphilosophical probability involves a belief concerning *o*, where that belief is weak because it was produced by an inference from *i* that was "carry'd thro' a long chain of connected arguments" (T 1.3.13.3; SBN 144), where this chain is "compos'd of parts [that are] different from each other" (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146). A lack of contiguity is once again responsible for this weakness: *o*, which is situated at one end of the chain of arguments, is not particularly close to *i*, which is situated at the other end. Suppose in the first place that, in producing a belief concerning *o*, the mind moves from *i* to *o* by an immediate inference. Suppose too that the mind feels determined by cause and effect to move in that way. Yet, as intermediate arguments that are "different from each other" are added to the inference from *i* to *o*, the conviction with which we receive *o* becomes weaker, and this is true no matter how "infallible the connexion of each link may be esteem'd" (T 1.3.13.3; SBN 144). Hume suggests that when a chain of connected arguments is composed of parts that are different from each other, no argument in the chain can transfer to one idea all of another idea's vivacity; in these cases, some vivacity is lost in every inferential movement of the mind. When the interposition of different arguments puts a sufficient distance between *i* and *o*, the mind will no longer feel determined to move from *i* to *o*, and we will not be justified in assenting to *o*.

Yet there are cases, among which is the case of "historical evidence" (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146), that involve long chains of arguments, such as "the long chain of causes and effects, which connect any past event with any volume of history" (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146), and in which we hold beliefs that deserve *positive* epistemic appraisals. These are cases, Hume says, in which the intermediate arguments "are all of

the same kind" (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146) and in which those arguments (or most of them, at least) are "perfectly resembling" (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146). In such cases, "the mind runs easily along [these intermediate arguments], jumps from one part to another with facility, and forms but a confus'd and general notion of each link" (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146). The length of the chain does not, in these cases, keep the mind from feeling determined to move by cause and effect: Hume says that the chain's length "has as little effect in diminishing the original vivacity, as a much shorter wou'd have, if compos'd of parts, which were different from each other, and of which each requir'd a distinct consideration" (T 1.3.13.6; SBN 146). Thus, the determinacy account can also explain why, in these exceptional cases, our beliefs deserve positive epistemic appraisals.

Finally, the "*fourth* unphilosophical species of probability" involves a belief concerning *o*, where that belief is unjustified because it was "deriv'd from *general rules*, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call prejudice" (T 1.3.13.7; SBN 146). Rashly formed general rules represent a connection between an effect and the *superfluous* circumstances of its cause rather than a connection between an effect and the *essential* circumstances of its cause. Superfluous circumstances are in fact circumstances of the cause, but they need not have been; they are not "requisite to the production of the effect" (T 1.3.13.9; SBN 148). Still, Hume maintains that "when these superfluous circumstances are numerous, and remarkable, and frequently conjoin'd with the essential, they have such an influence on the imagination, that even in the absence of the latter they carry us on to the conception of the usual effect, and give to that conception a force and vivacity, which makes it superior to the mere fictions of the fancy" (T 1.3.13.9; SBN 148). When rashly formed general rules operate, "custom takes the start, and gives a biass to the imagination" (T 1.3.13.9; SBN 148). This suggests that the psychological states that are produced in accordance with rashly formed general rules count as beliefs, which means that there is some manner of necessity for the mind to produce them.

Nevertheless, we are not justified in holding these beliefs, as we can see through "a reflection on the nature of those circumstances" that led to them (T 1.3.13.9; SBN 148). Reflection can reveal that those circumstances are superfluous and that there is only a small overall resemblance between those superfluous circumstances and the "complication of circumstances" which customarily precedes the effect (T 1.3.13.9; SBN 148). This lack of resemblance lets reflection know that what influences our minds in these cases is not the relation of cause and effect. Thus, through reflection, we can see that we are not justified in holding beliefs produced in accordance with rashly formed general rules. We can make use of this information in trying to rid ourselves of the propensities to form prejudicial beliefs and, in general, in trying to keep ourselves from forming beliefs on the basis of rashly formed general rules. Reflection can therefore help us in at least two ways: it can

show us that we are not justified in holding certain beliefs, and it can help us to rid ourselves of propensities to believe unjustifiedly.

We can also rashly apply legitimately formed general rules, as does the man "hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron" (T 1.3.13.10; SBN 148). This man "cannot forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho' he knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling, by his experience of the solidity of the iron, which supports him; and tho' the ideas of fall and descent, and harm and death, be deriv'd solely from custom and experience" (T 1.3.13.10; SBN 148). Here, the man's mind moves from impressions generated by his survey of "the precipice below him" to "the ideas of fall and descent, and harm and death." Nevertheless, he is not justified in believing that he will fall. Although the impressions that led him to believe that he will fall—namely, those that are revealed by his survey of "the precipice below him"—are generally impressions of essential circumstances of the cause, they are, in this case, rendered superfluous by "the solidity of the iron, which supports him." These superfluous circumstances do not bear a sufficient resemblance to those that are customarily conjoined with the idea of falling; in particular, in this case there is a causally relevant dissimilarity, namely, "the solidity of the iron, which supports [the man]" (T 1.3.13.10; SBN 148). This lack of resemblance shows that the man's mind does not feel determined by cause and effect to move from his impressions to the idea that he will fall. Like the man in the iron cage, then, we are not justified in holding beliefs produced by the rash application of legitimately formed general rules.

Concluding Remarks

The determinacy account explains why we are justified in holding certain beliefs and why we are not justified in holding others. On the determinacy account, justification is a matter of the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable, that is, by the cause and effect relation. Although we haven't applied the determinacy account to every passage and example in the *Treatise* where Hume's epistemic naturalism appears, I am confident that it gives us the resources to account for those passages and examples. The examples and passages that we *have* considered provide a strong and stable foundation for the determinacy account. They suggest that the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable justifies us in holding certain beliefs and that it does so because it indicates to us that we are being led to those beliefs by cause and effect. This feeling is the non-normative basis of the distinction between cases in which we believe justifiedly and cases in which we do not. Moreover, the determinacy account helps us understand how feeling plays a fundamental role in Hume's epistemology and in his theory of epistemic justification, and it helps us see how his epistemic naturalism contributes significantly to his turn from intellect to feeling.

NOTES

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1 Cf. Louis E. Loeb, *Stability and Justification in Hume's* Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 21.

2 I discuss several accounts of Hume's epistemic naturalism in Section 2, including a proper-functioning account (see Nicholas Wolterstorff, *John Locke and the Ethics of Belief* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 166n6); a reliability account (see Frederick F. Schmitt, "Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's *Treatise*," *Hume Studies* 30 [2004]: 297–327, 305–06); and a stability account (see Loeb, *Stability and Justification in Hume's* Treatise). In addition to these, Norman Kemp Smith provides an irresistibility account; see Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines* (Houndmills Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 388. Others who see Hume as holding that we are sometimes naturalistically justified in holding certain beliefs include the following: Tom L. Beauchamp and Thomas A. Mappes, "Is Hume Really a Sceptic about Induction?" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (1975): 119–29; Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg, *Hume and the Problem of Causation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Janet Broughton, "Hume's Skepticism about Causal Inferences," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 64 (1983): 3–18; Robert J. Fogelin, *Hume's Skepticism in the* Treatise of Human Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); and Barbara Winters, "Hume on Reason," *Hume Studies* 5 (1979): 20–35.

3 Other accounts, including Kemp Smith's irresistibility account, can be seen as attempts to characterize Hume's epistemic naturalism in terms of feeling. As I suggest below, however, Kemp Smith's account is flawed in ways my account isn't. (For an excellent critical discussion of the irresistibility account, see Loeb, *Stability and Justification*, 20–25.) Also, when Loeb proposes his stability account, he claims that terms like 'steady' and 'stable' sometimes refer "to the way th[e] property [of being steady, for example] feels when manifested in consciousness" (*Stability and Justification*, 71). Yet feeling is by no means an essential element of Loeb's account. His account characterizes Hume's epistemic naturalism in terms of the tendency of a source of beliefs to produce beliefs that possess the property of being steady or stable (see Section 2), a tendency that we can characterize without ever mentioning feeling.

4 Annette C. Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's* Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 20.

5 See, for example, Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments*, 2: "The turn itself occurs at T. [1.4.7.9; SBN] 269 when Hume joins the diners and backgammon players." See, too, Don Garrett, "Don Garrett: The Interview," by Rico Vitz, *Florida Student Philosophy Blog*, 26 March 2007, http://unfspb.wordpress.com/2007/03/26/don-garrett-the-interview/: "it is only at the end of Book I that [Hume] brings his own reflective epistemic sensibility fully to bear on the epistemic normative question of what to believe in the light of all this accumulated testimony. While he there reports experiencing extreme skepticism, he doesn't endorse it. On the contrary, he concludes that 'where reason is lively, and mixes with some propensity, it ought to be assented to'."

References to the *Treatise* are to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), hereafter cited as "T" followed by book, part, section, and paragraph numbers; and to *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), hereafter cited as "SBN" followed by page number.

6 See, for example, Loeb, *Stability and Justification*, 21.

7 It is a matter of some controversy whether Hume is in fact an epistemic naturalist and whether he has anything like epistemic justification in mind when he says of certain inferences that they are *just*. The work I do here presupposes that Hume is an epistemic naturalist. I do not make this supposition casually: I lean on the work of others who have ably and, to my mind, convincingly defended the claim that Hume is an epistemic naturalist. For example, Loeb (*Stability and Justification*, 43–47) draws our attention to several places in the *Treatise* where Hume's use of 'just' and its cognates can be read as having epistemic normative import. Moreover, Loeb persuasively argues that this sort of reading makes better sense of those passages than a reading on which Hume is not concerned with epistemic normativity.

8 The grammar of *Treatise* 1.3.9.3 (SBN 108) reveals that there are two feelings here for Hume. The relevant passage is this, with my emphases added: "and as [the mind] feels [a] *that* 'tis in a manner necessarily determin'd to view these particular ideas, and [b] *that* the custom or relation, by which it is determin'd, admits not of the least change, it forms them into a new system." There are two noun clauses here, so that we get a structure of this sort: 'the mind feels *this* and *that*.' There is the feeling that the mind is, in a manner, necessarily determined, as well as the feeling that the relation by which it is determined is unchangeable.

9 Don Garrett, "Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project," *Philosophical Studies* 132 (2007): 1–16, 9.

10 There are two things to note here about the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable. First, it is an impression of reflection. To borrow the words of Barry Stroud: this is an impression "that arises only from the repeated occurrence of certain kinds of ideas in the mind, and therefore it must be classified as an impression of reflection" (*Hume* [London: Routledge, 1977], 81). The second thing to note is that the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable is the impression from which the idea of necessary connection is derived. Hume says that "after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects,

the mind is *determin'd* by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or *determination*, which affords me the idea of necessity" (T 1.3.14.1; SBN 156).

11 Given that talk of justification might strike some as anachronistic or as unsuitable in some other way, we could characterize Hume's epistemic naturalism in terms of epistemic praiseworthiness, for example, rather than in terms of justification.

12 Compare a passage from *Treatise* 1.3.11.11 : "We have already observ'd, that the mind is determin'd by custom to pass from any cause to its effect, and that upon the appearance of the one, 'tis almost impossible for it not to form an idea of the other" (SBN 128).

13 Hume uses similar language later when, in considering the die that is the focus of his discussion of chance, he says that "[w]hen [the mind] considers the dye as no longer supported by the box, it can not without violence regard it as suspended in the air; but naturally places it on the table, and views it as turning up one of its sides" (T 1.3.11.11; SBN 128).

14 This "kind of impossibility" is not a species of impossibility. In saying that the mind feels a kind of impossibility of moving from *i* to something other than *o*, Hume is pointing out how extraordinarily difficult it would be for the mind to move in that way, a difficulty so great that it can feel like an impossibility.

15 This seems evident from the things Hume recommends in *Treatise* 1.3.9.12–13, namely, that we "regulate ourselves" by experience and that we let experience guide us "in our judgments concerning [the testimony of men]" (SBN 113). He also draws our attention to the fact that we sometimes violate certain norms of belief formation: "we are so rash in drawing our inferences from" testimony (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113); men exhibit a "carelessness and stupidity . . . with regard to a future state, where they show as obstinate an incredulity, as they do a blind credulity on other occasions" (T 1.3.9.13; SBN 113); "the bulk of mankind" is negligent "concerning their approaching condition" (T 1.3.9.13; SBN 113). Moreover, there are, of course, the rules Hume enumerates in *Treatise* 1.3.15, *Rules by which to judge of causes and effects*, which are meant to guide us as we form beliefs about causes and effects.

16 Peter Loptson ("Comments on Black," *Conference Papers*, 36th International Hume Society Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2–6 August 2009 [Halifax, N.S.: The Printer, 2009)]: 138–42) suggests that I see "*feeling determined to move* etc. as involving *reflection*" (141). Yet while I do think that reflection can help us to see whether we feel determined by cause and effect to hold a particular belief, I do not mean to suggest that reflection is involved in the feeling itself. Granted, there are cases for Hume in which "reflection and *general rules*" cause "the idea to feel very different from the external establish'd perswasions founded on memory and custom" (T 1.3.10.11; SBN 631–32), but even here reflection is neither a component of nor involved in the feeling itself.

17 It seems that two sorts of case are possible here, one in which reflection reveals that the mind does not feel determined at all to move as it does and another in which reflection reveals that the mind feels determined but by something other than cause and effect. Reflection's work seems fairly straightforward in the first sort of case, where it must show simply that a certain feeling is absent. The second sort of case seems less straightforward. For one thing, it gives rise to the question whether Hume believes that

we can confuse a feeling of being determined by cause and effect with a feeling of being determined by something other than cause and effect. While I find nothing in the *Treatise* that provides a direct answer to this question, a positive answer is suggested by Hume's claim that we can mistake one perception for another (see T 1.2.5.19, 1.4.2.32, 1.4.2.35; SBN 60, 202, 204). Furthermore, Hume suggests that we use reflection, albeit sometimes unsuccessfully, to correct such mistakes (see T 1.4.6.6; SBN 254), and this lends support to the claim that, for Hume, reflection can reveal whether our minds feel determined by cause and effect to move as they do.

18 See Michael Williams, "The Unity of Hume's Philosophical Project," *Hume Studies* 30 (2004): 265–96. See especially 276.

19 In *The Sceptical Realism of David Hume* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), John P. Wright suggests that, for Hume, truth is "a correspondence between the connection of our ideas and the real natures of things" (24) and, as such, "truth, for Hume, lie[s] outside of man" (26). In "The Concept of Truth in Hume's *Treatise*" (*Southern Journal of Philosophy* 19 [1981]: 217–28), Lilly-Marlene Russow puts it like this: "if we wish to decide whether a given judgment is true . . . we must . . . find a means of venturing beyond our ideas and impressions to come into direct contact with real relations and existence distinct from those ideas" (222).

20 I should perhaps say this instead: Hume is willing to call our impressions—*or what is presented or represented in our impressions*—realities.

21 Here again, I should perhaps say that nothing stands in the way of his saying that reality is *at least one* of our epistemic goals. Another plausible candidate, besides reality, is truth, that is, a notion of truth distinct from the one suggested at *Treatise* 1.3.5.2. Such a notion of truth might have to do with the features and properties, both relational and otherwise, of the elements of the two systems of reality. Some commentators suggest that such a notion can, in fact, be found in the *Treatise*: Kemp Smith (*The Philosophy of David Hume*, 385) says that "Hume's ultimate criterion of truth is conformity with the *realities* of [the] two systems [of *Treatise* 1.3.9.3]." In *Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), Rachel Cohon says, "Presumably [for Hume] we discover truth by comparing items in the mind with our *perceptions* of real matters of fact—with other items in the mind" (70). Russow finds this notion of truth in *Treatise* 2.3.10.2 (SBN 448) and in *Treatise* 3.1.1.9 (SBN 458), saying that "the relations and existence referred to in the definitions of truth are to be understood as remaining within the scope of our perceptions—the vulgar attitude" ("The Concept of Truth in Hume's *Treatise*," 222). If there is a notion of truth in the *Treatise* that has to do with the features and properties of the elements of the two systems of reality, then Hume might very well see this kind of truth as an epistemic goal.

22 The passages I quote in support of this claim—from *Treatise* 1.3.9.3–4 (SBN 108) and *Treatise* 1.3.7.7 (SBN 629)—as well as some other passages (for example, T 1.3.9.6; SBN 109 and T 1.3.10.6; SBN 122) "reveal," according to Saul Traiger, "that Hume sometimes uses the word 'fiction' or 'fictitious' for the mere offspring of the imagination. However," Traiger continues, "they by no means establish that this is the only or dominant use of the term in the *Treatise*" ("Impressions, Ideas, and Fictions," *Hume Studies* 13 [1987]: 381–99. See especially 384). Traiger argues that fictions cannot *always* be treated as the mere offspring of the imagination; "[a]ll fictions share the feature of being ideas which are applied to something from which they cannot be derived. The unifying feature is

not the feature shared by fictions of poetry and novels" ("Impressions, Ideas, and Fictions," 397). Traiger, in "Experience and Testimony in Hume's Philosophy" (*Episteme* 7 [2010]: 42–57) now distinguishes at least two kinds of fiction in Hume: complex ideas that are "*mere* fictions of the imagination" (52) and processes of the imagination that give rise to ideas like that of continued existence (see 52–53). Jonathan Cottrell argues that Hume calls acts of the imagination "'fictions"' when they are actions of fashioning and that Hume calls ideas "'fictions"' when they are the products of such actions (see his "Fictions of Bodies' Existence in Hume's *Treatise*," presented at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Diego, April 21, 2011). In spite of all this, it is undeniable that Hume sometimes contrasts fictions with reality. And the fact that he does this can help us see how he understands the notion of reality (as it appears in *Treatise* 1.3.9.3, for example).

23 Experience has the authority to justify because, through it, a cause "traces the way to our thought, and in a manner forces us to survey such certain objects, in such certain relations" (T 1.3.11.4; SBN 125). Experience, when it speaks with this kind of authority and in the voice of the cause and effect relation, is what Kemp Smith calls experience *in the normative sense*; see Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, 382–83, 387, 388, 460–61. Baier (*A Progress of Sentiments*, 54–77) hints at the sort of account sketched by Kemp Smith.

24 Contrast this with an example from *Treatise* 1.3.4.2, where Hume says that our belief "that Cæsar was kill'd in the senate-house on the *ides* of *March*" is founded on "certain characters or letters present either to our memory or senses" (SBN 83). On G. E. M. Anscombe's interpretation ("Hume and Julius Caesar," *Analysis* 34 [1973]: 1–7), Hume maintains that we are justified in holding this belief, and he "seeks the justification of [this] historical belief in belief about a chain of historical record which traces, by inference from effect to cause, back to the event which the belief is about" (Saul Traiger, "Humean Testimony," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 74 [1993]: 135–149, 138). "Anscombe's Wittgensteinian point," Traiger says, "is that the belief about the historical record depends on the belief about the event which it is supposed to support. The belief that Caesar was killed on the Ides of March is more secure than any beliefs about chains of testimony to support it" ("Humean Testimony," 138). I agree with Traiger, however, that "Hume's purpose in section 4 is to show that causal reasoning . . . always involves impressions of sense or memory, never simply ideas alone. His example is the historical belief about Caesar. Appearances to the contrary, this has nothing directly to do with the epistemic warrant of such beliefs" ("Humean Testimony," 139; compare Donald W. Livingston, "Anscombe, Hume and Julius Caesar," *Analysis* 35 [1974]: 13–19, especially 14–15).

Still, we are inclined to say—and I think Hume would be inclined to say, too—that we are justified in believing that Caesar was killed on the ides of March. How, then, are we to account for this, given our rejection of Anscombe's interpretation? On the determinacy account, we are justified in believing that Caesar was killed on the ides of March because the mind feels determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable and not, as Anscombe thinks, on the basis of a belief about a chain of historical record. The details will look something like this, I suspect, although the task of working these out must await another occasion: there is in this case "the unanimous testimony of historians, who agree to assign this precise time and place to that event" (T 1.3.4.2; SBN 83); experience and observation tell us that effects like this one—that is, widespread

agreement among reputable testifiers—are generally connected to particular causes, namely, those events reported by the testifiers; given this, experience and observation establish and support a movement of the mind from impressions of certain effects (e.g., impressions of "certain characters or letters") to ideas of certain causes (e.g., ideas of the causes referred to by the characters or letters) that feels determined by a relation that feels unchangeable.

25 These three accounts compete with the determinacy account. There are other accounts of Hume's epistemic naturalism that are compatible with the determinacy account and that might even be equivalent to it, at least over a certain range of cases. One of these is the account suggested by Garrett in his *Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), which involves what he calls the Title Principle: "Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us" (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). Although it would take some work to show this, it might well be that where reasoning about causes and effects is concerned, "reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity" just in case the mind feels determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable. In addition, Rico Vitz suggests a kind of virtue epistemological account ("Doxastic Virtues in Hume's Epistemology," *Hume Studies* 35 [2009]: 211–30). According to Vitz, Hume subscribes to the *Virtuous Belief Principle*, which sets out necessary and sufficient conditions for a person's believing that *p* virtuously ("Doxastic Virtues in Hume's Epistemology," 223–24). Again, it might well be that where reasoning concerning causes and effects is concerned, a person believes that *p* virtuously just in case she assents to an idea on the basis of her mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable.

26 Wolterstorff, *John Locke and the Ethics of Belief*, 166n6. See also Sean Greenberg, "'Naturalism' and 'Skepticism' in Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*," *Philosophy Compass* 3 (2008): 721–33, especially 728–29.

27 See Schmitt, "Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's *Treatise*," 305.

28 Loeb, *Stability and Justification*, 32. Elsewhere, Loeb claims that for Hume, we justifiedly believe when and only when our beliefs are produced by mechanisms that have a "tendency to infix ideas, to produce steady beliefs" ("Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument about Induction," *Synthese* 152 [2006]: 321–38, 334). Compare Louis E. Loeb, "Stability and Justification in Hume's *Treatise*, Another Look—A Response to Erin Kelly, Frederick Schmitt, and Michael Williams," *Hume Studies* 30 (2004): 339–404.

29 For a thorough, persuasive case against the view that Hume was a proper functionalist, see Kevin Meeker, "Was Hume a Proper Functionalist?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 72 (2006): 120–136.

30 See *Stability and Justification*, 73, for example, where Loeb refers to what he calls Hume's extensive discussion of the steadiness of belief in *Treatise* 1.3.5–10.

31 This is true despite the differences between testimonial inferences and cause-and-effect inferences. There are at least two differences. First, testimonial inferences are rooted in "our *experience* of the governing principles of human nature" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113), but cause-and-effect inferences are rooted in our experience of constant conjunctions. Second, Hume says that in testimonial inferences the effect points out its

cause "directly, and is to be consider'd as an image as well as an effect" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113). In cause-and-effect inferences, however, "effects only point out their causes in an oblique manner" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113.), which means, perhaps, that in such inferences the effect might bear no resemblance at all to its cause.

32 Objecting to the irresistibility account, Loeb says that the "higher-order belief [that like objects placed in like circumstances produce like effects], itself the result of conditioning, serves to buttress belief based on a single instance. It would be surprising were beliefs produced in this "*oblique* and *artificial* manner" (T 104, Hume's emphasis) to share the irresistibility of beliefs that are directly reinforced by custom" (*Stability and Justification*, 23). One might object in a similar fashion to the determinacy account. Yet in the cases we are considering here, the custom that drives the relevant inference is produced, albeit obliquely, by "many millions" of experiments (T 1.3.8.14; SBN 105). Given this, it rather seems that we should not be surprised in the slightest to find that the mind feels determined in these cases to move as it does.

33 See D. G. C. McNabb, *David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951), 96.

34 According to Loeb, it is Hume's view that in the cases he considers in *Treatise* 1.3.10, we hold pseudobeliefs, which "are unsteady dispositions that produce many of the verbal and nonverbal behaviors and internal episodes . . . that manifest genuine dispositional belief" (*Stability and Justification*, 114). Cf. *Stability and Justification*, 70.

35 Compare the following passages: The "poetical system of things" is "believ'd neither by [poets] nor readers" (T 1.3.10.6; SBN 121); the "personages and incidents" of comic poets are "known to be fictitious, and the pure offspring of the fancy" (T 1.3.10.6; SBN 122); "the fables of tragic poets" demonstrate "that the imagination can be satisfy'd without any absolute belief or assurance" (T 1.3.10.7; SBN 122); and ideas enlivened by poetry "can never amount to a perfect assurance" (T 1.3.10.7; SBN 122).