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Hume Studies Volume 39, Number 1 (2013), 3-35.
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Hume Studies
Volume 39, Number 1, 2013, pp. 3–35

Hume on the Normativity of Practical Reasons

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Abstract: It is well known that Hume both denies that reason in the strict sense is practical and claims that no end an agent adopts is contrary to reason. Many conclude from this that Hume denies that there are action-guiding reasons and that a person can be blamed for failing to do what she acknowledges as means to her end or for remaining indifferent to the acknowledged means to her end. This paper argues against this reading by mining the texts for Hume's account of the relation between desiring an end and willing the means to that end. The first part of the paper argues that for Hume, willing an end and willing the acknowledged means to that end form a complex of passions of a sort, so that it is not within human nature to remain indifferent to the acknowledged means to an end. In this sense, willing a certain action is a necessary response to having an end in view and believing that that action will achieve it. In the second part, the paper argues that for Hume, when willing an action as a means to an end is defeated by a contrary desire, the agent is blameworthy for having acted contrary to reason in a sense to be defended. Calm passions, while often confused with reason, play some of the roles ascribed to reason. For example, an agent sets ends through calm passions, thereby imputing value to objects that would otherwise remain objects of mere desire. It is through calm passions that we endorse the objects of lower-level desires as constituting our happiness and good. These features of calm passions help to explain why in choosing to ϕ as a means of achieving a valued end, an agent acknowledges that ϕ-ing is valuable in relation to that end and that she ought to ϕ in the sense that she

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> has a defeasible reason to ϕ. The calm passions are thus sources of defeasible action-guiding reasons. Strength of mind is a case of managing, in the face of a competing passion, to do what one has reason to do. Its counterpart, weakness, is an example of culpably failing to do what one has reason to do. Here willing the means to a given end is motivationally weaker than a competing desire whose object is either not endorsed or negatively valued. The agent is blameworthy for failing to do what she ought, despite willing it.

In this paper, I argue that Hume accepts two claims. The first is that it is not possible for a human agent, having adopted an end, to remain committed to it, have it in view, and be indifferent to what he or she acknowledges as the proper means of realizing it, where indifference is the absence of a favoring attitude.[1] The second is that, other things being equal, an agent who fails through weak resolve to take the acknowledged means to an acknowledged end violates a norm of practical agency akin to Kant's hypothetical imperative understood as a command to take the means—that is, to do what has the prospect of realizing the ends one happens to have adopted.

I begin with the first claim because some interpreters of Hume in particular and critics of instrumentalist theories of practical reason in general take remaining indifferent to the means to one's acknowledged ends as a genuine phenomenon that a theory of practical reason must recognize as a central case of blameworthy irrationality. I argue that on Hume's view it is not possible to remain indifferent to the means to one's end by collecting reasons for ascribing to him a stronger claim, which I will put in terms that will strike many as inappropriately Kantian: while it is possible for a human being to will an end and not take the acknowledged means, it is not possible for a human being to will an end and not will what he or she acknowledges as means to that end.

I do not aim to justify the use of the phrase 'willing the end,' especially in its Kantian sense, in reading Hume.[2] I do, however, show that, and in what sense, Hume thinks that willing the acknowledged means to one's end is necessary, and I argue that he recognizes the distinction between merely desiring something and desiring it as an end, that is, adopting it as an end to be achieved through action. My Kantian framing of these questions is heuristic, and while I do not believe that it distorts what Hume says, the ultimate test will be whether this way of framing the question sheds light on Hume's views.

After arguing that Hume is committed to denying the possibility of remaining indifferent to the means to one's end, I defend the ascription of the normative claim to him. I argue that he aims to preserve the pre-theoretical judgment that reasons for action are normative and that he offers an account of the normative character of hypothetical imperatives construed as conditional statements of the form 'Given

that one of *S*'s ends is best realized by doing *A*, something *S* acknowledges, *S* has reason to do *A*.' There are certain points in my account that overlap with Kieran Setyia's account.[3] The main point of agreement is the claim that Hume is not a skeptic about practical reasoning and that he recognizes action-guiding norms. On Setiya's interpretation Hume also holds that the transition from a belief to a motivating passion is a practical inference, hence an activity of reasoning, even if Hume does not call it that.[4] I do not take up this question.

1. Remaining Indifferent to the Acknowledged Means to One's End

1.1

I begin with a brief discussion of an instrumentalist theory of practical reason that is often attributed to Hume. On this theory, an agent's ends and values are set by the agent's desires and not by a special organ of reason. The only reasons for action are instrumental. Thus, if an agent has reason to do something, for example, take regular exercise, it is only because there is something she desires as an end, for example, health, which is promoted by exercising. The ends an agent has cannot be criticized as contrary to reason because they are not determined by reason. However, on this theory, an agent is subject to the criticism of acting contrary to reason if she acts on desires due to false beliefs about what promotes her acknowledged ends, for example, if she reaches for a peach to eat in the false belief that it is sweet and juicy. This theory, while supposedly naturalistic in rejecting the idea that ends can be reasonable or unreasonable, supposes that talk of reasons and what ought to be done is still appropriate in assessing actions as long as the reasons are instrumental.

Hume himself treats cases of choosing insufficient means to one's ends more as failures of theoretical reason than as failures of practical reason. The reason one acts contrary to is the reason that forms factual beliefs. It is because of a false belief about what causes what that Hume, in his initial discussion, allows that actions can be contrary to reason. When it comes to more explicitly practical failures, such as failing to take acknowledged means to an end because of a contrary passion, Hume initially rejects the idea that such a failure is a failure of reason. He thus appears to reject the idea that such a failure constitutes the violation of a norm of practical agency.

Some commentators who argue that Hume's view excludes norms of practical reason focus on cases I have not yet mentioned, cases where the connection between desiring an end and desiring the means to that end putatively breaks down. Jean Hampton, for example, notes that Hume calls attention to the fact that there is nothing to criticize as irrational in an agent who is indifferent to the means to her end.[5] She supposes on her own, as well as on Hume's, behalf that it is certainly not a contradiction to be indifferent to the means to one's end, and she

uses this supposition not simply as an opening wedge to criticize Humean theories of practical reason but also as a preliminary premise in an argument aimed at revealing Hume himself to be more radical in his negative pronouncements about practical reason than the sponsors of Humean theories have thought. She orients her discussion by speaking on Hume's behalf: "So someone who fails to act so as to achieve his end, in a situation where he has no desire to perform the actions required to achieve those ends, does nothing wrong. He violates no rational standards of action" (Hampton, 68). Thus she portrays Hume as claiming that there are no grounds for faulting an agent who fails to desire the instrumentally valuable action, even though what the action is seen to promote is still acknowledged by the agent as her end.

According to Elijah Millgram, Hume also denies that there are grounds for faulting an agent who continues to desire the hitherto instrumentally valuable action when it has ceased to be of value because the end to which it is fitted has been abandoned.[6] Desiring an end causally sustains desiring what one believes is the means to that end. Ordinarily, once this causal support is withdrawn by abandoning the end, the desire for the means ceases. But it is not logically necessary that it do so. One may persist in desiring to eat that piece of fruit having been disabused of the false belief that it is of excellent relish, and doing so would not be contrary to reason. Therefore, just as it is possible, and not contrary to reason, to desire an end and be indifferent to the means, so, too, is it possible, and not contrary to reason, to continue to desire the means even when one has become indifferent to the end.

Hampton and Millgram both portray Hume as an eyes-open skeptic who even denies that these are cases of irrationality. On their readings, reason cannot be practical because there is no norm of rationality violated even in these cases. Those debating whether Hume rejects even a minimal instrumentalist theory of practical reason seem to agree that an agent can flout a hypothetical imperative by failing to will the means to her end, remaining indifferent to it. Christine Korsgaard, like Hampton, assumes that remaining indifferent to the means to one's end is an important case of true irrationality.[7] However, unlike Hampton, she supposes that Hume denies that this is possible. Thus, she faults Hume for not even countenancing a phenomenon that she describes as a type of true irrationality as well as for lacking the resources to criticize it.

In short, influential critics of Hume's and Humean theories of practical reason suppose that remaining indifferent to the means to one's acknowledged end is a central case of true irrationality. They assume that a theory of practical reason is acceptable only if it is one according to which an agent can remain indifferent to the acknowledged means to her end, and on occasions when she does, she is culpably irrational. They find that Humean theories, as they understand them, fail this test.[8] Hume's own theory also fails this test, according to these interpreters.

On Hampton's reading, Hume is a skeptic who aims to establish that there are no robust reasons for action. He flaunts the apparent irrationality of being indifferent to the acknowledged means to one's ends in order to deny that such indifference is not contrary to reason. Preferring the destruction of the world to the scratching of one's finger is also apparently contrary to reason, but Hume boldly denies that it is. On Korsgaard's reading, Hume does not even recognize this phenomenon of indifference to the acknowledged means to one's ends and is thus in no position to criticize it as contrary to reason.

This may not be the best way to raise the question of whether Hume tries to accommodate the normative character of reasons for action or, as a take-no-prisoners naturalist, he aims to debunk it. Nonetheless, the question in Hume—of the possibility remaining indifferent to means to one's end—is both worth pursuing in its own right and, as I will later show, for the light it sheds on how Hume distinguishes between mere desire and desiring something as an end, a distinction which is important for determining his position regarding the normative character of reasons for action. Accordingly, in the remainder of this section I argue that Hume's moral psychology leaves no room for the putative phenomenon of remaining indifferent to the acknowledged means to one's end. In part 2 I turn to the question of how Hume's theory aims to accommodate the blameworthiness of failing to take the acknowledged means to one's end, despite willing that end, and in what sense this is a case of failing to do what one has reason to do.

1.2

The following passages indicate that Hume recognizes, in some sense, a conceptual entanglement of passions regarding means and ends:

> [T]he means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable (T 3.3.1.9; SBN 577)[9]
>
> Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued (T 3.3.6.2; SBN 619)
>
> Whoever chuses the means chuses the end (T 3.2.7.4; SBN 536)
>
> [I]t is a contradiction in terms, that anything pleases as a means to an end, where the end itself no wise affects us (EPM 5.17; SBN 219).[10]

Thus, for Hume, it is a contradiction to suppose that *S* desires to take exercise for the sake of health, but *S* does not desire health as an end. Just how Hume distinguishes an object as an end from an object of mere desire is a question to which we will return. However, that he does seems clear. The distinction is an important one. In desiring an object as an end, one imputes value to the object as opposed to

simply desiring it. In saying this, I am drawing on Hume's words, "[m]eans to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued" (T 3.3.6.2; SBN 619).

Admittedly, there appears to be logical daylight between desiring *E* as an end and valuing it. The daylight I have in mind, however, is not the apparent gap between valuing something and adopting it as an action-guiding end but, rather, that between desiring *x* as an action-guiding end, construed as desiring *x* non-instrumentally, and imputing value to *x* as a source of reasons. In the course of my argument, I will provide support for the claim that Hume supposes that desiring something as an end imputes value to it beyond simply desiring it and, thereby, is a source of reasons. Since I am ascribing to Hume a view that implies that desires have complex intentional objects—for example, the object *to be healthy as a worthy goal*—I should also make explicit my commitment to the claim that, despite the common reading of the so-called representation argument at T 2.3.3.5 (SBN 415), Hume does subscribe to what Rachel Cohon dismisses as the cognitive inclusion thesis.[11] That is, I am supposing that, for Hume, passions have genuine intentional objects, and not in the attenuated sense that they are caused by beliefs or other perceptions with genuine intentional objects.[12] While it may appear that I am simply dogmatically asserting a heterodox claim about Hume, I discuss these matters at length elsewhere.[13] There I argue that all Hume needs from the representation argument to establish that there is no contrariety between reason and passion is the claim that a passion is not a doxastic attitude of affirming a proposition, not that it has no representational content.[14]

Hume accepts the obvious conceptual dependence of means on ends in one direction, namely, that the idea of means is an idea of means to an end. That a means is a means to an end is obviously necessary as a relation of ideas, but it may not be as obvious that desiring something as means is desiring it as means to an end. Still, Hume's view cannot be in doubt, since he affirms that "[w]hoever chuses the means chuses the end" (T 3.2.7.4; SB 536).

Does the dependence also run in the opposite direction? Does Hume also think it a contradiction in terms to choose an end and remain indifferent to what one recognizes as the means?[15] The answer is not obvious. I consider two views that would support an affirmative answer. The first is an extreme suggestion, one which I do not endorse, nor am I aware of anyone who does. I present it for the sake of clarity for the way it contrasts with the suggestion that I do endorse. In laying out this suggestion, I assume that choosing to ϕ as well as being motivated to ϕ is incompatible with remaining indifferent to ϕ-ing. The suggestion is that 'choosing an end' and 'choosing the means' are strictly correlative expressions on the model of 'cause' and 'effect' (T 1.3.3.8; SBN 82). On this interpretation, Hume would accept that it is a contradiction in terms to adopt something as an end and yet be indifferent to the prospect of doing anything about realizing it. However, while it is trivially true that necessarily every **effect** have a **cause**, it is not

necessary, as Hume is fond of pointing out, that every **event** have a cause. Similarly, on the current hypothesis, while it would not be necessary that an agent choose the means for any old object of her desire, it would be necessary that for each object she adopts as an end, she choose to do what she thinks would realize that end. As **event** is to **cause**, so **object of mere desire** is to **endorsed end**. As **effect** is to **cause**, so **choosing an action for the sake of ϕ** is to **endorsing ϕ as an end**. On this extreme suggestion, Hume thinks that it is true in the manner of relations of ideas that *S* desires something as an end only if *S* desires or wills to do what she believes will realize that end.

I defend a similar but less extreme view, modeled on Hume's account of pride and other indirect passions, according to which human beings are so constituted by nature that choosing an end is an element in a complex of causally related perceptions that includes choosing the means to that end. Thus, while the proposition that he who chooses the end chooses the means is not necessary as a relation of ideas, it is necessary in whatever way it is necessary that the impression of pride is caused by a perception of something as admirable and related to the self.[16] On this suggestion, desiring something as an end is partly constituted by desiring or willing to do what is believed to promote the realization of that end. The fact that an agent is unmoved to do anything she believes will promote the realization of some putative end would be a conclusive reason for believing that the putative end is not currently an acknowledged end for that agent. Here is a kind of essentialism that appears to blur the bright line drawn in the first *Enquiry* between relations of ideas and matters of fact or, in the terms of the *Treatise*, between knowledge and probability as they pertain to modality. For the necessity is neither logical nor causal.

1.3

Before I take up the direct defense of this less extreme, but still controversial, view, let me recall the evidence for the claim that Hume recognizes that some passions are bound together in complexes due to our very constitution. My thesis is that there is a class of claims that Hume endorses as necessary, but whose necessity is to be construed neither in terms of relations of ideas nor as causal matters of fact. The best way to express this modality is with a counterfactual of the form 'If it weren't a case of *G* it wouldn't be a case of *F*.' In his discussion of pride, Hume claims that from our very constitution, the feeling of pride is directed toward oneself (T 2.1.5.3, 2.2.2.7; SBN 286, 335). Perhaps it is possible for the feeling itself to occur in the absence of the idea of self. But that feeling would not be a case of human pride. An occurrence of a passion either not caused by the approval of something recognized as related to self or not having self as its object would not be an episode of pride, at least not in the case of a human being.

One might raise the following questions about passions in general. Does Hume regard the fact that impressions of reflection, or secondary impressions, are caused by antecedent perceptions as a merely contingent fact discovered by empirical observation, or does he suppose that the very idea of an episode of being angry at someone, for example, that is not caused by a prior perception, in particular, by the thought of that person, is a contradiction? If the latter, he would presumably regard such a contradiction as the artifact of a definition that emerges in the course of his theorizing rather than a relation of ideas drawn from the common stock of ideas. Even if it is not a contradiction by his lights—as the idea of an uncaused event is not a contradiction by his lights—Hume would be hard pressed to accept that a putative episode of being angry at *x* would be an episode of being angry at *x* if it were not a response to a prior perception.

Hume contrasts a fancied monster's indifference to another's suffering with the humanity of a human being to show that it is not in human nature, *ceteris paribus*, to be indifferent to what is useful or pernicious to another (EPM 6.1; 235; see also EPM 5.39–43 [SBN 225–30]). It is not clear whether the fancied monster is a sociopath or just a person stipulated to be indifferent to the pain and pleasure of others. What is clear, however, is that the fancied monster lacks the humanity requisite for being a subject of ordinary moral assessment. A member of the species of that sort would not be one of us. The contrapositive is that by nature, human beings feel sympathy for the perceived suffering and enjoyment of others.

Here is yet another case of a complex of passions suggestive of a quasi-conceptual connection. The central assumption in Hume's argument against the claim that moral distinctions are founded on reason, narrowly construed as understanding, is that moral judgments have a motivational aspect. Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions (T 3.1.1.6, T 3.1.1.10; SBN 457, 458). The motivational aspect of moral judgment is central in his introduction of the idea that moral judgments have to be understood in terms of moral sentiments. However, as Hume develops his account, he focuses not on practical deliberative contexts but on third-person assessments of character. Consequently, the motivational aspect drops out of view. He does, however, return to the motivational aspect of moral sentiments in defending the claim that the motive of a virtuous action must be distinct from the agent's sense of morality. At T 3.2.1.8, Hume presents the case of acting from a sense of duty or moral obligation when the motive that would render the action virtuous—for example, benevolence—is missing (SBN 479). Thus, in the absence of a virtuous motive, moral sentiment causes an action that is not virtuous but is in conformity with virtue. In the case of an artificial virtue where one presumes there is no natural motive, the virtuous motive is a moral sentiment. To have the virtue of justice, to do what is just because it is just, is to be moved to act by a moral sentiment.

This is the basis for Hume's arguing that a moral judgment is a sentiment of approval or disapproval. In this, Hume appears committed to the claim that the moral sentiment constituting the judgment that a contemplated course of action is vicious is a motive, however weak, to refrain from undertaking that action. Thus, a conclusive reason for thinking that there is not the least desire to refrain from a contemplated course of action is a conclusive reason for denying that the agent judges it to be vicious. It would not have been an occurrence of the moral sentiment of disapprobation toward a contemplated action unless the subject had been moved, however weakly, to refrain.

While these cases do not conclusively determine Hume's answer to the question of remaining indifferent to the recognized means to one's end, the last case is especially suggestive. For the fact that moral sentiment as the source of moral evaluation is tied to motivation, however secondary and ineffective, does certainly suggest that the motivational state of desiring something as an end may be similarly tied, in Hume's thinking, to willing an action as the acknowledged means to that acknowledged end.

1.4

Thus far I have presented Hume's account of a number of complex passions as a kind of inductive basis to support the claim that on his account, desiring an end is also complex in that, because of our constitution, it includes willing the acknowledged means to that end. I am now in position to address the main question directly, to see whether on Hume's account it is impossible to remain indifferent to the acknowledged means to one's acknowledged end, and if so, in what sense.

According to Hume, reason discovers causal relations but has no original motivational influence. Only passions have that (T 2.3.3.2–5, T 3.1.1.6; SBN 413–15, 457).[17] In his discussion of the relation between reason and action-originating desires at T 2.3.3.3–4, he characterizes action-originating passions as emotions, where one would expect him to speak of desires (SBN 414). In any case, the emotion or propensity toward an object for its prospective pleasure puts reason to work. Hume says, "'Tis . . . obvious that this emotion rests not here but, making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with the original one by the relation of cause and effect" (T 2.3.3.3; SBN 414).

If the emotion "comprehends" whatever objects are connected to the original one by the relation of cause and effect, then if *S* desires *y* as an end, and *S* believes that ϕ-ing will produce *y*, then *S* has a propensity to ϕ to bring about *y*. My question is whether such comprehension is a defining relation for desiring something as an end in general[18] or at least grounds the following deductive inference:

> *S* believes that action *A* is the proper means for bringing about *y*, but has no desire to undertake *A*.
>
> Therefore, *S* does not desire *y* as an end.

The fact that Hume speaks of the originating emotion as not resting and as comprehending the objects discovered to be causally connected to the object of the originating emotion suggests that without the desire for the means, the originating emotion is incomplete. Hume makes an explicit claim about completeness in his discussion of the relations between love and benevolence and between hatred and anger:

> The passions of love and hatred are always follow'd by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence and anger . . . . [L]ove and hatred are not compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery (T 2.2.6.3; SBN 367).

Hume argues that what best explains this phenomenon is not that love has an end, namely promoting the happiness of its object, for this would collapse love and benevolence into a single passion. The desire for the beloved's happiness would then constitute the very nature of love, and the passions would be not only inseparable, but the same. Instead, Hume argues that the two are distinct yet inseparable because of the original constitution of the mind. Human nature is such that "as we are possessed with love . . . the correspondent desire for the happiness of the person, who is the object of the passion . . . arises in the mind" (T 2.2.6.6; SBN 368). Hume maintains that the passions are still distinct on the ground that our nature could have been different:

> This order of things, consider'd abstractly, is not necessary. Love and hatred might have been unattended with any such desires, or their particular connection might have been entirely reversed. If nature had so pleased, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex'd to love and of happiness hatred" (T 2.2.6.6; SBN 368).

That is, he denies that loving *x* and desiring the happiness of *x*, considered in abstraction from human nature as it is, are necessarily connected. It is worth observing that this qualification does nothing to undercut the inference from '*x* loves *y*' to 'If *x* is human, then *x* desires the happiness of *y*.'

Similarly, I claim that, for Hume, the desire for an end comprehends the desire for the means to that end, thereby completing it. Indeed, one might suppose that *comprehending* the desire for the means on its face suggests something stronger than the *annexation* that characterizes the case of love and benevolence. So even if there is reason to believe that Hume regards desiring an end while remaining indifferent to the acknowledged proper means as logically possible, we have increasing reason to believe that on his view, it is not within human nature to desire an end and not desire or will to do what is acknowledged to be causally productive of that end, and more generally to desire *x* as an end and not desire or will to do what is believed will realize *x*.[19] For Hume this claim, however empirically based, functions, for the purpose of moral discourse, to ground the following as a deductive inference:

> *S* believes that action *A* is the proper means for achieving her end *E*, but has no desire to undertake *A*.
>
> Therefore, *S* does not desire *E* as an end, or *S* is not a human agent.

I have attributed to Hume the claim that it is not possible to fail to will what one acknowledges as the sole practicable means of realizing one's end. And I have glossed the modality of this claim and related claims with various forms: 'It wouldn't be *F* unless it were *G*,' 'It makes no sense to suppose that someone is *F* and not *G*,' and 'It's not within human nature to *F* and not *G*'. I have, however, refrained from characterizing the relation between desiring ends and desiring the proper means to those ends in terms of Hume's orthodox dichotomy of relations of ideas and matters of fact. The claims in question are clearly not relations of ideas construed in terms of Hume's typical conceivability test. Of course, if the dichotomy is between relations of ideas and everything else, then the claims in question belong with everything else. If causeless events can be conceived without contradiction, so can indifference to the means to one's end. Still, I am inclined to suppose that Hume is committed to treating the claims in question as a distinct subclass of the class of everything else. Whether the commitments I claim to have found in Hume trespass the rigid boundaries of the dichotomy between relations of ideas and matters of fact is a question that engages Hume's views on modality, a topic obviously too large to be pursued further here.

1.5

I have argued that, for Hume, willing an end and willing the acknowledged means to that end form a complex of passions of a sort, so that it is not within human nature to remain indifferent to the acknowledged means to an end. In this sense, willing a certain action is a necessary response to having an end in view and believing that that action will achieve it. To conclude this discussion and add support to this interpretation, I turn to a related case of responsiveness,

that is, Hume's discussion of a change of mind in willing an action once the agent comes to believe that she is mistaken and that the action will not achieve her end. Hume says that when I realize my mistake, the action must become indifferent to me (T 2.3.3.7; SBN 417). In this case, ceasing to will an action acknowledged as means to an end is a necessary response to the revised belief that the action will not achieve the end.

The fact that Hume puts forth as a general thesis the claim that a volitional passion abates when an agent realizes that her desire to achieve *E* by ϕ-ing is impossible is evidence that Hume is here relying on a distinction between objects of mere desire and objects of desire as action-guiding ends. Ignoring this distinction, Nathan Brett and Katherina Paxman argue that it is just a mistake for Hume to claim generally that passions yield to reason when the agent comes to believe that it is impossible to satisfy the passion.[20] It is quite true, as they point out, that my longing to see a friend does not dissipate when I suddenly learn that that she has been killed in an accident and that we sometimes want what we acknowledge to be impossible. But this is a reason to restrict the scope of Hume's claim to the narrow context in which it occurs. He is talking about passions threaded on means-end reasoning in the course of practical deliberation. When they consider an objection along the lines of the reading I am advancing, they concede that one cannot reasonably continue to desire to eat that peach as being of excellent relish once one no longer believes that it is of excellent relish (Brett and Paxman, 53). However, they insist that it is possible, nevertheless. But they do not argue that Hume thinks that it is.

My aim is to establish that on Hume's understanding of desire abatement in the face of change of belief, it is necessary, in the sense I have argued for, that an agent become indifferent to a course of action that she has chosen as a means to an end once she becomes convinced that it is not a means to that end. This is the flip side of the thesis that, on Hume's view, it is not possible for a human agent, having adopted an end, to remain committed to it, have it in view, and be indifferent to what he or she acknowledges as the proper means of realizing it.

In describing how an action-guiding desire is sensitive to new information, Hume identifies two kinds of error: we may "perceive the falshood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means" (T 2.3.3.7; SBN 416). When we discover either kind of mistake, Hume says, "our passions yield to our reason without any opposition" (T 2.3.3.7; SBN 416). Hume illustrates these two cases and our reaction to the discovery of a mistake as follows:

> I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases. I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desir'd good; but as my willing of these actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they

> are causes of the propos'd effect; as soon as I discover the falshood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me. (T 2.3.3.7; SBN 416–17)

Later at T 3.1.1.12 (SBN 460), using the same example of the fruit, he again identifies the two kinds of error in choosing. One is choosing to eat the fruit in the mistaken belief that it is productive of pleasure, and the other involves "choos[ing] certain means of reaching this fruit, which are not proper for the end," for example, believing, falsely, that the fruit can be got by merely reaching with an outstretched arm, or some such thing, and choosing to reach for the fruit with an outstretched arm. Even though in the later passage Hume characterizes the first type of error as a mistake about the influence of objects (namely, their producing pleasure or pain), he must still mean that the error is about what the object is, or what qualities it has, for example, whether it is a piece of fruit or is of excellent relish. Otherwise, the contrast Hume is drawing would be lost. For if the desire for a given piece of fruit were based on a miscalculation of how much pleasure eating it would produce, then choosing to eat that piece of fruit for that pleasure would be choosing means not proper for the end; and the first type of error would collapse into the second type.

It is worth considering why the longing ceases in the first type of case, in which the discovery of error leads to the passion's yielding to reason without opposition, as Hume claims it would, because it prepares the ground for the flip side of the thesis I am defending. That thesis, recall, is that on Hume's view, it is not possible for a human agent, having adopted an end, to remain committed to it, have it in view, and be indifferent to what he or she acknowledges as the proper means of realizing it. The flip side is that it is necessary that an agent become indifferent to a course of action that she has chosen as a means to an end once she becomes convinced that it is not a means to that end.

Millgram claims that the abatement of desire in the first type of case is causal and argues that Hume countenances the logical possibility that the desire to eat the piece of fruit persists even as the agent recognizes that he no longer has the end of eating that piece of fruit because he has come to believe that it is not a tasty piece of fruit. I believe this is mistaken and proceed to show why.

It is not clear what specification of the object Hume has in mind when he describes it as an object of the desire for "any fruit as of excellent relish" (T 2.3.3.7; SBN 416–17). This may be genuinely general, as would be the case if I wanted a tasty piece of fruit and did not really care what kind it was. Or the specification 'any fruit as of excellent relish' may be a general way of referring to something quite specific, namely, that tasty-looking peach over there. In either case, let us suppose that the agent comes to have a desire with respect to something in his perceptual environment as either a tasty piece of fruit or as a tasty peach.

Since we have already dismissed the suggestion that he desires it as a mere instrument of pleasure, it would appear that eating that piece of fruit is an end

in itself, at least in the thin sense of not being productive of something else. On the one hand, the determinate desire for that object might arise simply from seeing what appears to be a ripe peach of excellent relish unprompted by a prior determinable desire to eat a piece of fruit or anything at all. On the other hand, it might also arise from a perceptual belief identifying the object in accordance with a prior determinable desire to eat a tasty fruit of that sort, a tasty fruit of any sort, or just anything tasty. Obviously, the object of the determinate desire to eat that piece of fruit would provide a more determinate specification of the determinable desire. In either case, if the determinate desire on which the agent is about to act is the desire to eat that object qua tasty ripe peach or qua tasty piece of fruit, then it is difficult to see how that desire could persist if she revises her belief and no longer believes that there is a tasty ripe peach there or a tasty piece of fruit there. She might still desire to eat a tasty ripe peach or at least a tasty piece of fruit. But she cannot continue to desire eating that tasty ripe peach qua tasty ripe peach as an end if she no longer believes that there is a tasty ripe peach there, even though she could still desire to eat what is over there under a different description, for example "what would become a tasty ripe peach as soon as I touched it."

When Hume says that when you convince him of his mistake, his longing ceases and the former object of willing must become indifferent, he is claiming that it makes no sense to suppose that someone will continue to will an action as realizing a particular end once he believes that the prospective course of action will not realize that end. And this would be different both from the causal claim that Millgram ascribes to Hume—namely, that without the sustaining causal support of the initial belief, the longing typically ceases—and from the normative assessment that the agent no longer has reason to do what he was about to do. The fact that failure of desire abatement in these cases makes no sense is traceable to the incoherence of believing that what is over there is a tasty piece of fruit and that it is not a tasty piece of fruit. The incoherence of this belief is to be distinguished both from the impossibility of '*p* and not-*p*' and from the impossibility of occurrently believing *p* and not believing *p*.

Let us now turn to standard cases of desiring means to a given end and to the second type of error, mistaking the means to one's end. This will bring us closer to the target thesis that on Hume's view, it is impossible to remain indifferent to the acknowledged means to one's end. Hume says of these cases, "I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desir'd good; but as my willing of these actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the propos'd effect; as soon as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me" (T 2.3.3.7; SBN 417).

If what one wills in willing an action as a means of obtaining a desired good is ϕ-ing to obtain *E*, then, again, if an agent comes to believe that ϕ-ing is not the way to obtain *E*, then it becomes difficult to see how, in the light of the revised

belief, the agent could still will ϕ to obtain *E*. My forward momentum may continue to carry me to the refrigerator, even as I realize that the cheese is on the counter. My momentum is, in a sense, explained by my desire to go to the refrigerator, but what I am doing no longer counts as acting on the desire to go to the refrigerator to get the cheese. I can no longer have that volition if I occurrently believe that the cheese is not in the refrigerator because I see that it is on the counter. Going to the refrigerator to get the cheese must become indifferent to me on Hume's view because it does not make any more sense for me to go to the refrigerator to get the cheese I occurrently believe not to be in the refrigerator than for someone to continue to feel pride in owning a piece of property after she discovers that the she is not the owner. This is what I take Hume's point to be. The 'must' in "it must become indifferent to me" is neither causal nor normative.

It is not clear whether Hume considers this a strict logical impossibility or sees the failure of passion to yield to reason as a contradiction on the order of desiring *x* for the sake of *y* but not desiring *y* as an end. At the very least, continuing to desire *x* as a means to *y* while realizing that *x* is not a means to *y* is a failure of agency that does not make sense on Hume's understanding of human nature.[21] That is, here we have another case of what I earlier described as Hume's limited essentialism. It is not within human nature for an agent to continue to will an action as realizing an end when he no longer believes that the action will realize this end. Similarly, it is not within human nature to remain indifferent to the acknowledged means to one's end.

2. Does Hume Believe in Norms of Practical Reason?

2.1

I now turn to the question of whether Hume's theory recognizes norms of practical reason and, in particular, whether he recognizes the culpable irrationality of an agent's failing to do what she intends as promoting some end because of a contrary passion and not because of a competing end. This is a question about blameworthiness, whether Hume's theory recognizes that such an agent who fails to ϕ because of weakness acts contrary to a reason to ϕ. Our earlier question about Hume on the possibility of remaining indifferent to the means to one's end was, it turns out, a question about the conditions of agency in general and not about ordinary occasions of acting contrary to reason. On the view I ascribed to Hume, willing the acknowledged means to one's end is constitutive of human agency, even if being constitutive is not to be construed as logical necessity. I am now raising the question of whether there is a reading of Hume that makes room for the idea that what *S* correctly wills as a means to an end (instrumentally or constitutively) is what *S* has a defeasible reason to do and its corollary, that if *S* fails to perform

accordingly (because of a gust of passion, for example), *S* has acted contrary to reason in the sense that she failed to act as she ought.

Of course, on the restricted notion of reason in play in T 2.3.3, cases of weakness are not cases where the agent is acting contrary to reason, except insofar as the action is informed by a false belief (SBN 413–18).[22] But we can still ask whether Hume recognizes that such an agent has a reason to do what she failed to do and whether, in this sense, her failure to act on this reason is contrary to reason. Hume does not generally use the language of reasons in these contexts.[23] He does not speak of facts, such as the fact that a dentist is the one who drills and fills cavities, as reasons for agents whose end is to be relieved of a toothache to go to the dentist. He does, however, say the following in a passage from the last section of appendix 1 of the second *Enquiry* where the topic is the ultimate ends of human actions:

> Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling. If you ask, why he is anxious on that head, he will answer, because he desires to get money. If you demand Why? It is the instrument of pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason, why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection. (EPM App.1.19; SBN 293)

This passage is a *locus classicus* for the Humean idea that reason does not set ultimate ends and that all practical reasons are instrumental reasons.[24] The fact that the imagined interlocutor cannot properly exercise his calling unless he is healthy is a reason for him to desire and cultivate healthy habits. The fact that this calling is productive of wealth is a reason to take it up. The fact that wealth makes for a comfortable and pleasurable life is a reason to acquire it. But there it stops. There is no reason to pursue pleasure. It is not good for anything else. In this passage Hume displays a nested hierarchy of ends, health for the sake of employment, employment for the sake of wealth, wealth for the sake of pleasure, and pleasure for its own sake.[25] The agent pursues pleasure as desirable on its own account for no reason at all. It appears to confer reasonableness on the other members of the hierarchy without having any of its own to transmit.

Here is as good a place as any to remark briefly on Hume's hedonism. Let us suppose that Hume thinks that pleasure is the natural good. This raises a problem for my interpretation only if Hume is committed to more than extensional equivalence and thinks that the idea of the natural good is the same as the idea of pleasure. In that case, it would be hard to avoid the reductive implication that to think that something is good is to think no more than that it is pleasurable.

Such an implication would be out of keeping with Hume's unguarded reference to value with its ordinary normative force. Consider, for example, Hume's discussion of what we ought to take pride in, when he invokes custom and practice as settling the just value of everything (T 2.1.6.9; SBN 294, see also T 3.2.7.2 and T 3.2.7.8; SBN 534 and SBN 538). Moreover, if an end is a good realized in action and to desire something as good is just to desire it as pleasurable, then there is no distinction between merely desiring to do something as pleasurable and desiring it as an end. If Hume did hold this view, then those who claim that he has no account of instrumental reasons would be correct. For the mere fact that *S* desires *x* (as pleasurable) does not make the acknowledged fact that ϕ-ing will bring about *x* a reason for *S* to ϕ, unless one stipulates that normativity is implicated in simply desiring something or desiring it as pleasurable. That is why I have been gathering evidence to support the ascription to Hume of a distinction between merely desiring an object and desiring it as an end.

Returning to the dialectic in the quoted passage, the question is how an ultimate end that is not determined by reason can confer reasonableness on members of a hierarchy of means. Does Hume regard a reason derived from an end that itself has no rational credentials as a normative practical reason rather than simply something that reflects causal reasoning? The interlocutor is described as giving a chain of reasons that finally runs out. Then Hume steps in to comment that chains of reasons for desiring and, by implication, for acting must be anchored in objects desirable on their own account and because of their immediate agreement with human sentiment. Is Hume equating the desirability of an object with the psychological fact that it is simply the immediate object of desire? Or is the normative aspect of desirability left intact? One might be tempted to suppose that Hume is endorsing the view that (1) the imagined interlocutor's desire for pleasure is a non-evaluative desire involving no reflection or judgment, (2) the fact that it is desired on account of nothing else constitutes it an ultimate end, and (3) what is so desired is desirable on its own account, where desirability on its own account is simply a stipulated implication of being desired on account of nothing else. This is a conventional reading of Hume as holding a minimal instrumentalist version of practical reason.[26] People want what they want, and the fact that an action is instrumentally productive of it is a reason to perform that action.

But such a view, as I indicated above, is properly criticized for supposing that instrumental reasons for acting can be grounded in objects of non-evaluative desires. First, an object of desire can only be a source of reasons if either it is valuable or, at least, it is valued by the agent. Even on an internalist conception of reasons, what makes some fact a reason for *S* to ϕ depends on something's being of acknowledged non-derivative value to *S*, so the viability of Hume's view requires that *S*'s desiring something on account of nothing else impute non-derivative value to it. The fact that there is a reason for *S* to ϕ for the sake of *E* depends on ϕ-ing's being valuable

for realizing *E*, which in turn presupposes that *E* is valuable. One who desires, for example, to be of rid of a toothache and believes correctly that a dentist provides relief from toothaches has reason to go to a dentist, but only because of the value imputed to being rid of a toothache.

On a Kantian view, in willing a material end, an agent rationally endorses an object of desire as an end or constituent of happiness. The acknowledged end confers rationality on the means by transmitting its own defeasible rational authority. In commanding actions, hypothetical imperatives simply reflect the rational authority of one's practical reason in willing an end. The fact that ϕ-ing realizes what an agent, through practical reason, wills as an end explains why the agent has a reason to ϕ. For Hume, however, there is no faculty of reason to set ends or impute value. Nor do ordinary desires confer value or set ends as of non-derivative value. This, of course, is what leads many to conclude that either Hume is not serious about the normativity of instrumental "reasons" or that he is seriously mistaken in thinking that instrumental reasons can be spun out of ordinary desires. If, however, as I have been arguing, some calm passions are evaluative and can set ends, then here, too, the acknowledged fact that ϕ-ing realizes what an agent, through a calm passion, values as an end explains why the agent has reason to ϕ. And in that case, if an agent fails to do what he has reason to do, because he wills too weakly in the face of a competing desire, he would be blameworthy in the same way as he would be for violating a hypothetical imperative. This is precisely what Korsgaard and others reject as a reading of Hume, because they deny that Hume recognizes desires that are value-imputing and reason-constituting.

To reverse field, it is of course possible that Hume does not even recognize the distinction between ordinary desires and desires that are value-imputing and reason-constituting because he is confused about the locutions 'wanting *x* for its own sake' and 'wanting *x* as an ultimate end' and mistakenly thinks that each is interchangeable with 'wanting *x* for the sake of no other thing.' For, as I understand it, wanting *x* for its own sake and wanting *x* as an ultimate end imputes non-derivative value to *x*, whereas 'wanting *x* for the sake of no other thing' refers, somewhat misleadingly, to a simple non-evaluative desire for *x*.

The discussion in the appendix on self-love in the second *Enquiry* may clear this up. Here Hume appropriates Butler's arguments against the Hobbist thesis that there are no other-regarding passions, in particular no disinterested benevolence, and that every action is only the expression of self-love.[27]

> There are bodily wants and appetites, acknowledged by everyone, which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have drinking and eating for their end; and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure, which may be the object of another species of desire or

> inclination that is secondary and interested. . . . In all these cases [cases of hunger, thirst, vanity, ambition and anger] there is a passion, which points immediately to the object and constitutes it our good or happiness; as there are secondary passions, which afterwards arise, and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted such by our original affections. (EPM App. 2.12; SBN 301)

In this passage, Hume distinguishes first-level non-evaluative desires and second-level interested desires. The object of an agent's first-level desire typically constitutes her good or happiness, but retrospectively from her point of view. The object of such an original affection is not desired **as** good or happiness-constituting. That is the case Hume, following Butler, makes for non-interested benevolence.[28] Original affections do not confer value on their objects.[29] They point to an object immediately. The object is desired for nothing else, although not for its own sake either, insofar as that would imply valuation and would impute to it the status of ultimate end. It is only as an object of the secondary passion of self-love that something is desired under the aspect of being a good, a part of happiness, or, as I would claim, an ultimate end.

Hume complicates the picture by also referring to the object of the secondary interested passion as the pleasure consequent upon acting on the first level desire. But this is more for dialectical advantage. He wants to stress, as does Butler, that as an original affection, benevolence has only the good of the other as its object. The clearest way to do that is to claim that the pleasure that results from acting on benevolence becomes the object of a secondary passion.

Even if Hume's conception of happiness does not include the normative dimension of well-being, there is no reason to dismiss the evaluative dimension of the secondary interested passions that aim at one's good as good. This point is secured by Hume's remark about strength of mind in the second *Enquiry*:

> Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another: And these decisions though really the result of our calm passions and propensities (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure reason and reflection (EPM 6.15; SBN 239).

Only a calm passion can pronounce an object eligible. A violent first-level appetite cannot, presumably because it has no evaluative dimension and, therefore, is not directed at its object as something choice-worthy. Nor can understanding pronounce an object eligible because an attitude toward an object as eligible implies a sentiment of approval and a motivation toward that object, neither of which are

supplied by our intellectual faculties. In contrast, an object pronounced eligible by a calm passion is endorsed as an end, for example health. On a general prospect of health—that is, what it is, what promotes it, what ruins it as determined by the understanding—one forms certain policies or rules of conduct embodied in a calm passion in the form of a commitment, for example, to take daily exercise.

The idea of a passion pronouncing an object eligible is not a departure from the *Treatise*. It only sharpens the question Hume has left for others to figure out, namely, what constitutes an evaluative judgment? Obviously, reason alone cannot be the source of the judgment that something is worthy of choice (eligible). And a passion, even a calm one, is not a truth-targeting endorsement of a proposition. This is a topic unto itself. For the purpose of this essay, I am going to treat a moral sentiment and a desire for something as an end as calm passions functioning as quasi-evaluative judgments. After all, they are, Hume tells us, supposed to play the role that others have mistakenly ascribed to reason.[30]

We are now in a position to conclude that when Hume claims that a chain of reasons must be anchored to an ultimate end, that is, that something must be desirable on its own account and in immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection, the source of the valuation he has in mind is a calm passion of the sort that pronounces the object eligible in concert with the agent's intellectual assessment of the object's advantages and disadvantages, however fallible.

In the passage just quoted, just as in the passage from the *Treatise* where Hume first introduces the idea of calm passions (T 2.3.3.8; SBN 417), his concern is to explain away the appearance of reason's primary role in determining action. Calm passions, just because they are calm, can be confused with acts of the intellect, that is, reason. So far we have seen that a calm passion, rather than reason, plays the role of setting ends that provide an agent with practical reasons. My next task is to clarify the authority Hume attributes to the calm passions that determine an agent's acknowledged interests and ends and to show how the fact of this authority corroborates the claim that actions undertaken for the sake of ends so determined are guided by reasons.[31]

It is worth noting in passing, however, that the class of calm passions is not simply the class of evaluative passions replacing the class of practical judgments mistakenly thought to be the work of reason. The term 'calm' picks out passions by their lack of emotional intensity in contrast to violent passions.[32] Hume says that there are two sorts of calm passion: "either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such" (T 2.3.3.8; SBN 417). So while it would a mistake to suppose that every calm passion is the exercise of a faculty of quasi-practical judgments, there is, as we shall see, a class of calm passions that do function as practical judgments,

both moral and prudential. Páll Árdal[33] suggests that Hume's introduction of the term 'calm passion' is influenced by Francis Hutcheson who says in *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, "There is a distinction to be observed on this Subject, between 'the calm desire of Good and aversion to Evil, either selfish or publick, as they appear to our Reason or Reflection; and the particular Passions toward Objects immediately presented to some Sense.'"[34]

I would also reiterate the suggestion that Hume is influenced by Butler's idea of cool self-love and the principle of conscience.[35] Hume obviously does not adopt Butler's explicit three-tiered system of motivation: conscience, self-love, and propensions. The terms 'conscience' and 'self-love' do, however, occur in the *Treatise*.[36] It is clear that the exercise of conscience is constituted by moral sentiments, which are themselves calm passions, while self-love is the source of calm interested passions aimed at the agent's good as she conceives it in light of a sentiment of the same sort that determines her ultimate ends.

Before turning to the authority of calm passions, let me forestall a possible misunderstanding. On the interpretation I am proposing, hypothetical imperatives as reflecting defeasible prudential reasons for actions are restricted to ends determined by the agent's value-imputing calm passions. This thesis is perfectly compatible with the fact that there are actions that are caused by non-evaluative violent passions whose proximate object is determined by a kind of instrumental reasoning. Reason can be a slave both to calm and to non-evaluative passions. Not every case of weakness in which an agent acts on a non-evaluative desire contrary to her acknowledged good involves simply reaching for the bowl of salty snacks. Sometimes more scheming is involved. Of course, the more planning there is—for example, meeting friends for drinks later, despite having promised oneself to work on revising a paper—the more likely it is that the case is one of Socratic change of mind or of revising one's ends. Thus, one must take care not to confuse a "reasoned" action threaded on a non-evaluative desire with cases in which an agent is making up his mind between competing courses of action, each representable as the conclusion of a piece of reasoning. If upon deliberation one ranks the competing potential ends by endorsing one, eating a piece of cake, and then decides to go into the kitchen to get a piece of cake instead of fixing the fence, one has determined that there is reason to go to the kitchen. The object of the appetitive desire for the cake has been ratified, mistakenly or not, by the calm passion of self-love. Non-human animals may provide a clearer case of "reasoned" actions threaded on non-evaluative desires. Let us assume that on Hume's view, non-human animals lack higher order calm passions subject to correction by a distant view of their good. Hume, nonetheless, credits them with the exercise of causal inference in pursuing the objects of their passions (T 1.3.16; SBN 176–79). Such "reasoned" actions in the absence of a calm passion for the good as such would not be guided by reasons.

So far in discussing whether Hume accepts norms of practical reason, I have argued that Hume accepts the following claims: (a) objects of mere desire are distinguished from action-guiding ends by the fact that the latter are determined by calm passions, and (b) it is because an object is endorsed as an end by an agent through an interested calm passion that what the agent acknowledges as the proper means for realizing that end is what she has reason to do. In what follows, I show how Hume can explain the authority of calm passions. In particular, I argue that interested calm passions directed at the agent's own good have defeasible authority over any competing opportunistic desire whose object is not incorporated as an end, and this authority is reflected in the fact that the general prevalence of such passions over competing violent ones is a virtue, though this authority is limited, since a reason to ϕ as determined by self-love can be defeated by moral considerations, either because ϕ-ing will not bear the survey of unbiased moral sentiments, or because the end to which ϕ-ing is a means will not.

2.2

I now turn to the task of clarifying the authority that Hume attributes to the calm passions associated with the general appetite to the good considered as such in order to adduce more evidence of Hume's commitment to the idea that an agent's ends provide her with reasons for action. Suppose, then, that *S* fails to do what she acknowledges is the means to her end because her desire to do it is weaker than an impulsive desire to do something else. *S* acts knowingly against her acknowledged interest when, let us say, preferring an acknowledged lesser good (watching bad TV) to her greater (working on her income tax return), she watches bad TV.[37] Hume characterizes this as a case of a violent passion prevailing over a calm passion. This calm passion is a specific determination of the general appetite to good, and its being calm is independent of its motivational efficacy.[38] Were the agent possessed of strength of mind, the calm passion would have prevailed, and she would have done what we are provisionally supposing she had reason to do. Our question is whether Hume agrees that she failed to do what she had reason to do. The answer to this question, I believe, depends on whether the general appetite to good is a capacity for setting ends and is authoritative relative to lower level desires as I have been advocating. The fact that Hume treats strength of mind as a virtue certainly suggests that the calm passion for one's acknowledged good, *ceteris paribus*, ought to prevail over a competing appetite.

Let us suppose then, in accordance with evidence to date that Hume is committed to the form of words, 'In believing (correctly) that by doing *A*, *S* will achieve her end *E*, *S* has reason to do *A*, and in failing to do so because of an impulsive desire that is motivationally stronger than her desire to do *A*, she displays the vice of weakness of mind.' We still have work to do to establish more securely that Hume

is committed to the normativity of practical reasons. The further challenge is to show that Hume accepts that the volition to perform an action to achieve one's end is a calm passion that has authority over a competing desire for an acknowledged lesser good, not to mention a competing desire for something acknowledged to be of no value or of negative value. (For now I am ignoring the case where what the agent acknowledges as a lesser good is, in fact, a greater good, so that unbeknownst to the agent she has reason to act on the desire for the acknowledged lesser good.)

We need to show that, for Hume, the authority of a volition to do *A* for an acknowledged end *E* will further ground the language of having a reason to do *A*, at least in the sense of an internal reason. I will return to the question of normative practical reasons outside the ken or acknowledgment of the agent later. A point to be reiterated is that Hume seems to treat a specific calm passion for an acknowledged good that may or may not prevail over a conflicting violent passion as a function of what, with its attendant authority, Butler invariably calls self-love. Rather than rehearse the arguments I have advanced elsewhere to secure this point, it would be better to present the case for the authority of calm interested passions directly.[39] What we have to work with from the *Treatise* is the following: (1) Hume's well known official doctrine that moral distinctions are determinations of sentiment, not reason, and its corollary that value, moral or otherwise, is not discovered by intellect but imputed by sentiment (T 3.1.12–10; SBN 456–58); (2) the analogy between (a) moral sentiments as issuing from a general point of view that corrects for the partiality toward those close to us in relation, time, or space, and (b) interested passions issuing from a point of view that also corrects for bias toward proximity, that is, toward pleasures of the moment near at hand; in short, the analogy between the correction to which moral sentiments are subject and the correction to which interested preferences are subject; (3) the analogy between these corrected sentiments and perceptual and aesthetic judgments corrected for distortion due to distance and perspective (T 3.3.1.15, 3.3.3.2; SBN 603, 581–82); and (4) Hume's conflicted or tempered rehabilitation of the term 'reason' to apply to "[what] we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection" (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 583).

From (1) we know that *S*'s moral judgment that *x* is virtuous is an expression of her moral sentiment of approval of *x*. As an impression of reflection, the moral sentiment of approval is an attitude toward *x* in response to some feature *x* is represented to have. Furthermore, this moral sentiment of approval is a calm passion, which, being calm, is mistaken for a determination of our intellectual faculties. Thus, one might also suppose, especially in light of (2,) that *S*'s judging *E* to be of (non-derivative) value to her—that is, acknowledging *E* as one of her ends—expresses a determination of the general appetite to good, a calm determination of the

interested passions founded on some distant view or reflection. Passages in which Hume explains our preference for the contiguous over the remote corroborate the specific claim that the interested calm passion that prevails in a strong agent is founded on a reflective view of her ends that corrects for the merely apparent value of immediately available pleasures (T 3.2.7.1–5,8; SBN 534–36, 538). In particular, Hume claims, rather optimistically, that when we abstract from the circumstances and situation of objects, we always give the preference to what is preferable in itself in forming intentions to act in the future. He also adds, pessimistically, that when it is time to act, our resolutions are often overturned by a competing desire for a present good. It is certainly possible to read the overturning of a resolution by a competing desire for a present good as a change of mind and endorsement of the present apparent good as good rather than simply as a case of a competing non-evaluative desire being motivationally stronger than the resolution. For my present purposes it does not matter. What is important is that the resolution is a calm passion that is authoritative and ought to prevail over the competing desire because, by incorporating a wider view of the agent's good, it is likely a better guide to what is of value.

At the beginning of his discussion of how our acknowledged interest in and natural obligation to justice fail to operate because of competing desires for immediate goods, Hume speaks rather unguardedly of value and our judgments thereof:

> It has been observ'd, in treating of the passions, that men are mightily govern'd by the imagination, and proportion their affections more to the light, under which any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic value. What strikes upon them with a strong and lively idea commonly prevails above what lies in a more obscure light; and it must be a great superiority of value, that is able to compensate this advantage. Now as every thing, that is contiguous to us, either in space or time, strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional effect on the will and passions, and commonly operates with more force than any object, that lies in a more distant and obscure light. Tho' we may be fully convinc'd, that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment; but yield to the sollicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous. (T 3.2.7.2; SBN 534–35, cf. T 3.2.7.8; SBN 538)

What must be emphasized here is first, that our judgments of interest, in particular, that justice is in our interest, have authority over the pleadings of the passions in favor of the contiguous, and secondly, that this authority rests in part on the fact that these judgments are formed in a light that reveals real and intrinsic value in contrast with the merely apparent value of what is near. Again, a judgment of

interest as a belief expresses a calm passion's approval of an end in response to a distant and steady view. These judgments of individual agents, when pooled together, constitute a kind of collective wisdom expressed in general maxims capable of guiding passions.[40] Hume offers an early glimpse of this view in his discussion of pride:

> [T]he influence of general rules and maxims on the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the principles, which we shall explain in the progress of this treatise. For 'tis evident, that if a person full-grown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he wou'd be very much embarrass'd with every object, and wou'd not readily find what degree of love or hatred, pride or humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it. The passions are often vary'd by very inconsiderable principles; and these do not always play with a perfect regularity, especially on the first trial. But as custom and practice have brought to light all these principles, and have settled the just value of every thing; this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of general establish'd maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another (T 2.1.6.9; SBN 293–94) [41]

Thus far we have seen Hume fully committed to the idea that there are standards of value and a method for assessing value that together play a role in determining our interested passions, including choosing and preferring. The fact that a motivating passion results, or would result, from using a method of deliberation aimed at a correct determination of value is one reason for attributing to Hume the view that a calm interested passion both has authority over impulsive desires with which it competes and establishes ends that provide an agent with reasons for action. A calm interested passion incorporates a wider view of the agent's good that is generally bound to be a better guide than transient desires, even if many of the latter are ratified by the former. (For example, I may, prompted by nothing but thirst, get up to get a drink of water without giving it any thought. Even so, it accords with a settled policy of acting on such impulses as promoting my good, unless considerations to the contrary arise.) There are further indications of Hume's recognition of the authority of calm passions; Hume's tempered rehabilitation of the term 'reason' to refer to calm passions and the fact that such calm passions are what prevail in strength of mind, where 'mind' would otherwise imply reason or rational will. Further, the fact that Hume refers to the disposition to act on calm interested passions in the face of competing violent ones as the virtue of strength of mind also indicates that he recognizes their authority. It is a virtue to be strong-minded because, Hume observes, the strong-minded are

more likely to be successful in the pursuit of their ends, in contrast to those who weaken in the face of every temptation of the moment. This is one reason why those contemplating such a character from a steady and general point of view feel the sentiment of moral approbation.

But beyond approving the character simply for her utility to herself, we approve of such a character as someone who authorizes her actions as means to her ends. (I am assuming that Hume recognizes that both ends and means are subject to tests of acceptability. One who coolly prefers the injury of someone who could be easily spared on the spot to the least inconvenience to himself has unacceptable ends.) The point can be brought out in the case of weakness, the vice of being prone to giving in to a contrary impulse. Consider the agent reflecting on his yielding to the desire for a pleasure near at hand, contrary to his settled intention. He would regret yielding for the disutility of failing to achieve his end. He would, however, stand self-condemned for being defeated by a passion whose object he does not identify as his good. This weakness of mind is exhibited in the combat between calm passions and violent ones, where the losing calm passions are playing the role mistakenly thought to be played by reason. Presumably, an agent identifies with the losing calm passion, mistaking its urgings for the dictates of reason. That is why in reflecting on his situation, he feels defeated rather than simply disappointed at not achieving his end, unless it is a case where there is no regret because on further reflection acting on the contrary passion was the right thing to do. Similarly, an agent who reflects on her successful resistance to temptation would approve and feel pride as the author of her own actions.

So far I have been emphasizing the relation between the authority of calm interested passions and internal reasons, as it were. An agent whose end is to be healthier and who acknowledges exercise as an essential means to that end has reason to exercise. That she has reason to exercise is a reflection of the authority of the calm passion that, through reflection, determines her end of being healthier. But one supposes there are other essential means to this end, whether or not she acknowledges them, for example, a change in diet, and thus, that she has reason to change her diet. Similarly, Hume supposes that everyone has ends that are served by maintaining the institution of justice and property, and thereby society, and obedience to government. Our well-being and happiness depend on each. Hume claims that everyone has natural obligations of interest to justice and to civil obedience because they are indispensable means to our acknowledged ends.

> The interests are not more distinct in the one case than the other. A regard to property is not more necessary to natural society, than obedience is to civil society or government; nor is the former society more necessary to the being of mankind, than the latter to their well-being and happiness. In short, if the performance of promises be advantageous, so is obedience

> to government: If the former interest be general, so is the latter: If the one interest be obvious and avowed, so is the other. And as these two rules are founded on like obligations of interest, each of them must have a peculiar authority, independent of the other. (T 3.2.8.6; SBN 545)

An agent who is moved to refrain from injustice by a calm interested passion that results from considerations of the general advantages of the system of justice acts on the authority not only of her own "reason" but on the authority of a correctly "reasoned" passion. (This interested reason owing to the natural obligation to justice must be distinguished from the moral obligation to justice. (See T 3.2.2.23–25; SBN 498–500).) Some, however, may not acknowledge their interested obligation to justice. Their narrow selfishness may blind them to it, but according to Hume, they still have reason to comply with the rules of justice. Their general appetite to the good, however determinately specified, authorizes the necessary means to their ends. So here there is an external reason for action tied to the agent's acknowledged ends, external at least in the sense that the agent is not moved by this reason, however connected it might be with his avowed end of happiness as he conceives it.

Of course, in extreme cases, the agent's conception of her good may be so warped that complying with the rules of justice is not a means thereto. She may coolly prefer as her considered good keeping her finger scratch-free, even at the cost of the world itself, including herself and her finger.[42] Or consider a sociopath. In these cases there is no point in appealing to the agent's avowed end as providing a reason to maintain society through complying with the rules of justice. Let us assume that Hume would not regard such cases as beyond the pale and that he would acknowledge that these are agents subject to criticism, even though their preferences are not contrary to reason in his sense. That is, suppose he were to recognize them as having ends that provide them with reasons for action. These reasons would be defeated because the ends are perverted. Anyone surveying such characters from a steady and general point of view would condemn them for their ends, which custom and practice have shown to be without genuine value. There are, thus, moral reasons against doing what they intend to do to realize their ends, and these reasons outweigh their subjective reasons. They simply ought not to do what they have subjective reason to do.

Before concluding, let me recapitulate the main argument of this section. Some desires are interested calm passions and are specific determinations of the general appetite to good as such. Calm interested passions confer value on their objects as action-guiding ends. An action-guiding end authorizes actions acknowledged by the agent as means to that end. The fact that ϕ-ing is acknowledged by the agent as a means to an authorizing action-guiding end is a reason for ϕ-ing, however defeasible by other considerations. The authority of a calm interested passion

and its reason-conferring capacity are further reflected in the following. (1) The strength of mind exhibited by ϕ-ing as a means of realizing an end determined by a calm interested passion in the face of a competing non-evaluative desire is a virtue. The counterpart weakness and failure to ϕ is a vice. The praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of the corresponding virtue and vice respectively indicate that the agent did or failed to do what she had reason to do. (2) An interested calm passion is responsive to considerations that correct for biases and distortions that favor importunate desires of the moment. Accordingly, a calm interested passion has the potential for being a reliable guide to the agent's good and what she has reason to do to realize that good. In this sort of responsiveness, calm interested passions are comparable both to moral sentiments, which are calm passions sensitive to considerations that correct for partiality, and to perceptual judgments that correct for perspectival distortion.

To conclude, I have argued in part 1 that on Hume's account, it is constitutive of human agency that an agent forms intentions or volitions to do what she believes promotes the realization of her ends, and thus that in that sense it is not possible (even if conceivable) for an agent whom we recognize as a human agent to adopt and remain committed to an end while being indifferent to the means of realizing it. However, as I argue in part 2, failures that warrant run-of-the-mill charges of irrationality are cases where an agent fails to do what he or she has reason to do because contrary motivations that are not ratified on reflection are motivationally stronger than the authoritative calm interested passions that set our ends and provide us with prudential reasons to act. These internal prudential reasons may be overridden if they prescribe an action that is contrary to virtue or if the agent is mistaken in her conception of her end.

These commitments of Hume, to the extent that my argument is credible, are surely sufficient evidence that Hume is not the skeptic about practical reason that Hampton, Korsgaard, and Millgram portray him to be, irrespective of whether the theory I have attributed to him is an adequate account of practical reasons. My reading is vulnerable to the charge that I have drawn Hume too far from his presumed abstemious naturalism. Even so, I am confident that I have not pushed him far enough to spare him the wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the Kantians.

NOTES

I am deeply grateful to the editors for their generosity, patience, and helpful criticism.

1 Whether this is to be understood as an empirical claim of psychology or something stronger is a question I discuss below.

2 On Hume's official characterization, willing "is the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind" (T 2.3.1.2; SBN 399). It is possible to read the sentence less restrictively, that is, as only indicating sufficient conditions. Nonetheless, it is natural to read the sentence as limiting acts of will to impressions that proximately cause actions. However, if volitions are limited to desires that cause actions, then Hume faces a dilemma: he must either retract his claim that in one who lacks strength of mind, a calm passion is weaker than a competing violent passion or deny that calm passions that would otherwise produce actions are volitions. That is, it would follow on the strict reading that an intention to perform an action as the means to an end would not be a volition, if a competing desire prevented the intention from being realized. And yet, Hume speaks of willing an action that produces no action when, because of new information, the action becomes indifferent to the agent (T 2.3.3.7; SBN 417). At the very least, Hume recognizes that intentions and resolutions to perform actions, if not strictly speaking acts of will, are volitions understood as conative states that can be defeated by importunate desires for what is present at hand.

3 See Kieran Setyia, "Hume on Practical Reason," *Philosophical Perspectives* 18 (2004): 365–89. I have discussed some of these points at length in Cass Weller, "The Myth of Original Existence: The Content of Passions in Hume's *Treatise*," *Hume Studies* 28 (2002): 215–49.

4 This, he claims, is the point of the "representation" arguments at T 2.3.3.5 and 3.1.1.9 (SBN 415 and 458). The standards for evaluating these practical inferences, that is, the "inferred" motives, are the standards for attributing virtue. The reason is that Humean virtue is having a good motivational disposition, and a good Humean practical inference is the exercise of a good motivational disposition (Setyia, "Hume on Practical Reason," 382).

5 Jean Hampton, "Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?" *Hume Studies* 21(1995): 57–74.

6 Elijah Millgram, "Was Hume a Humean?" *Hume Studies* 21 (1995): 75–94.

7 Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986): 5–25.

8 Others understand "Humean theory" more narrowly as referring to a view about motives and have argued against attributing it to Hume. See, for example Mikael Karlsson, "Reason, Passion, and the Influencing Motives of the Will" in *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's* Treatise, ed. Saul Traiger (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 235–55. He criticizes as a "Humean" reading of Hume the idea that a motive to action *A* is the joint product of believing that *A* will bring about *E* and desiring *E*. He argues that on Hume's view, the motive to action *A* is caused by the desire to bring about *E*, which in turn derives from the belief that *E* is a source of pleasure and *A* is the means to *E*. See also Elizabeth Radcliffe, "The Humean Theory of Motivation and Its Critics," *A Companion to Hume*, ed. E. S. Radcliffe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 477–92. For somewhat different reasons, she also rejects the ascription to Hume of what she calls the Humean Theory of Motivation, that is, that motivation is the joint product of belief and desire. Some of their concerns intersect with mine, but it would not be dialectically profitable to pursue them here.

9 References to the *Treatise* are to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), hereafter cited in the text as "T" followed by Book, part, section, and paragraph numbers; and *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), hereafter cited in the text as "SBN" followed by page numbers.

10 References are to David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. Tom. L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), hereafter cited in the text as "EPM" followed by section and paragraph and to *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), hereafter cited in the text as "SBN" followed by page numbers.

11 Rachel Cohon, "An Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology," *Hume Studies* 20 (1994): 179–94.

12 The fact that episodes of calm passions are easily confused with products of our intellectual faculties supports the claim that calm passions, at any rate, have intentional content and suggests that the object of the moral sentiment of approval in perceptual contexts is properly represented as of the form "that person qua possessed of feature F."

13 Weller, "The Myth of Original Existence."

14 For more on this debate in addition to Cohon, "An Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology," see Páll Árdal, *Passion and Value in Hume's* Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966); Annette C. Baier, "Response to My Critics," *Hume Studies* 20 (1994): 195–210, and Annette C. Baier, *Progress of the Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's* Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); John Bricke, *Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 21–27; and Setyia, "Hume on Practical Reason."

15 Korsgaard thinks it obvious that he does and just as obvious that he is mistaken in so thinking ("Skepticism about Practical Reason," 12, 15).

16 In an unrelated context Elizabeth Radcliffe makes this sort of move. She appeals to Donald Davidson, "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1976): 744–57, in support of her claim that the causal ancestry of a moral judgment is essential to its identity as a moral judgment, arguing that it would not be a moral judgment if it were not caused by an appropriately related moral sentiment: "Moral beliefs (judgments) are essentially connected to moral sentiments in the same sense that the indirect passions are essentially connected to the complex of impressions and ideas that cause them" (Radcliffe, "Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics," *Synthese* 152 [2006]: 353–70, 365).

17 For further discussion of this point see Rachel Cohon, "A Very Brief Summary of *Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication*," *Hume Studies* 34 (2008): 253–56, and "Reply to Radcliffe and Garrett," *Hume Studies* 34 (2008): 277–88. Cohon challenges orthodoxy by arguing that if reason is properly understood to be a process of reasoning, then of course reason alone cannot motivate or prevent action, since the product of reasoning is a belief. But this leaves open the possibility that beliefs, whether non-inferentially produced perceptual judgments or conclusions of reasoning, can have original motivating

influence if they directly cause action-motivating passions. Cohon's view is not without its critics. See Don Garrett, "Rachel Cohon's *Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication*," *Hume Studies* 34 (2008): 257–66, and Elizabeth Radcliffe, "Reason, Morality, and Hume's 'Active Principles,'" *Hume Studies* 34 (2008): 267–76.

18 Hume speaks here of the object as something of a pleasurable prospect. Since this is a general account of reason's being put to the task of finding the means to an end, I am sidestepping the question of hedonism for now, whether Hume holds that the putatively evaluative idea of an end is reducible to the descriptive ideas of pleasure and desire.

19 Here, somewhat belatedly, I must hasten to acknowledge the likelihood of an agent having incompatible ends.

20 Nathan Brett and Katherina Paxman, "Reason in Hume's Passion," *Hume Studies* 34 (2008): 43–59.

21 I should add, however, that this putative phenomenon appears to strain credulity more than the target putative phenomenon, namely, remaining indifferent to what one acknowledges as the sole practicable means of realizing one's end. It is, no doubt, for this reason that Millgram seeks to press his advantage here in arguing that Hume is an even more radical skeptic about practical reason than Hampton and Korsgaard think he is.

22 I take preferring one's acknowledged lesser good to one's greater good to be a case of more strongly desiring to do what one acknowledges as worse, and not of desiring as better what one believes is worse. For a discussion of this and the other two outré preferences, see Cass Weller, "Scratched Fingers, Ruined Lives, and Lesser Acknowledged Goods," *Hume Studies* 30 (2004): 51–85.

23 In non-technical contexts he certainly uses such locutions as "reason to fear" (T 3.2.2.12; SBN 492), "reason to blame" (T 1.3.13.15; SBN 151), "reason for pride" (T 2.1.7.10; SBN 294), "reason to wish"(T 3.2.2.22; SBN 497), and "reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion" (T 2.2.3.9; SBN 351).

24 It is also where one finds the notorious image of the internal sentiment of taste staining and gilding natural objects with colors of its own, in contrast to motivationally inert reason which discovers objects as they really stand in nature. I take the doctrine here to be perfectly consistent with T 2.3.3 (SBN 413–18) and T.3.1.1–2 (SBN 455–76). In particular, I take the image of staining and gilding to be an elaboration of the comparison of vice and virtue to secondary qualities at T 3.1.1.26 (SBN 469). The fact that Hume now emphasizes taste as the source of moral sentiment does not change that. The main point of the passage is that virtue as an end in itself is not commended by reason. See Tito Magri, "Hume on the Direct Passions and Motivation," in *A Companion to Hume*, ed. E. S. Radcliffe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 185–200. He disagrees and claims that Hume introduces the doctrine of taste in recognition of the inadequacy of the theory of the calm passions in the *Treatise* to account for the role played by dethroned reason.

25 Compare this with Aristotle's regress argument in *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. I. Bywater, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), at 1.2 (1094a18–22). Aristotle takes this action-guiding final good or end, the object of rational desire, as a source of practical reasons. He, of

course, acknowledges (at *Ethica Nicomachea* 1.5 1095b14–22) that hedonists mistakenly identify this final good with a life of low pleasure, while still supposing that as the final good, on the their mistaken conception of it, a life of low pleasure functions normatively as the source of reasons for action.

26 It is this version of Hume that Hampton and Korsgaard criticize.

27 Joseph Butler, *Five Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel*, ed. Stephen L. Darwall (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 19, 47.

28 Butler, *Five Sermons*, 20, 47–52.

29 This point is somewhat complicated by Hume's discussion of our preference for the contiguous over the remote, insofar as preference implies valuation, and preference includes lower level desires (T 3.2.7.8; SBN 538). See Weller, "Scratched Fingers, Ruined Lives."

30 Radcliffe, "Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism," offers an account of moral judgments according to which the judgment of reason that *x* is virtuous is by definition causally tied to a moral sentiment of approval. However, her account does not say what the content of the evaluative idea of virtue ingredient in the belief is, for example, whether it is to be reductively spelled out in terms of the sentiment of approval.

31 Magri, "Hume on the Direct Passions and Motivation," also attributes to Hume a normative difference between calm interested passions and the violent ones with which they often conflict. The idea is to relocate the authority presumed to attach to reason in its presumed combat with passion. Magri bases his account on the fact that interested calm passions are influenced by a distant view of one's good that corrects for bias toward what is near at hand. I develop this idea in the next section.

32 This point is rightly emphasized by Páll Árdal, *Passion and Value in Hume's* Treatise, 99–100, in his criticism of Rachel Kydd, *Reason and Conduct in Hume's* Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).

33 Árdal, *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise*, 99.

34 Francis Hutcheson, "An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions" in *The British Moralists*, vol. 1, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford University Press, 1897), 399.

35 Butler, *Five Sermons*, 16–19, 45.

36 See T 2.1.10.1, 2.2.1.2, 2.2.5.9, 3.1.1.10, 3.2.1.10, 3.2.6.6, 3.2.8.5, 3.2.8.7, 3.2.9.3 (SBN 310, 329, 361, 458, 480, 529, 543, 545, 551).

37 In Weller, "Scratched Fingers, Ruined Lives," I argue that in preferring the lesser good, *x*, to the greater, *y*, the agent has a desire for *x* greater in strength than her desire for *y* but does not value *x* more highly than *y*.

38 John Locke speaks of the general appetite to good, but insofar as he thinks that every action is caused by a present uneasiness, he does not see specific determinations of the general appetite as different in kind from any bodily desire: "Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing: these may be observed in all

persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding." John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1.3.3, 67.

39 See Weller, "Scratched Fingers, Ruined Lives."

40 The idea of the judgments of individuals being pooled together comes from Annette C. Baier, *Progress of the Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's* Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

41 The passage continues: "This remark may, perhaps, serve to obviate difficulties, that may arise concerning some causes, which I shall hereafter ascribe to particular passions, and which may be esteem'd too refin'd to operate so universally and certainly, as they are found to do" (T 2.1.6.9; SBN 94). This picks up his earlier reference to what he will explain in the progress of the treatise. What Hume has in mind are the subsequent passages in which he will discuss, among other things, the reflection-sensitive calm passions of moral sentiment, on the one hand, and of desire for acknowledged ends, on the other, both of which can be guided by general maxims.

42 See Weller, "Scratched Fingers, Ruined Lives."