Hume Studies
Volume 40, Number 1, 2014, pp. 3–28

Personal Identity, Passions, and "The True Idea of the Human Mind"

LILLI ALANEN

Abstract: This paper explores some strands of the new science of man proposed in Hume's *Treatise*, focusing on the role given to the passions in Hume's account of personal identity. How is the view of the self with regard to the passions examined in Book 2 supposed to complement, as Hume suggests, that with regard to thought and imagination discussed in Book 1 (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261)? How should the nature and object of the account there proposed be understood? While it is clear that Hume rejects a metaphysical thesis of the mind as a unitary, simple thinking substance, it is less clear whether he also gives an alternative metaphysical theory of the mind as consisting in a mere succession of discrete impressions and ideas or more modestly offers a description of what we actually observe when inspecting our idea of self. I favor the latter view and argue that Hume's best and most interesting characterization of the mind is the political analogy of the self as a republic or commonwealth that Hume calls a "true idea of the human mind." The mind in this metaphor is compared to a dynamic political system of changing members driven by common or shared goals and interacting in determinate ways regulated by its constitution. This system of interconnected ideas already comes with all the elements that a broader, embodied and social self presupposes. It is thus because the idea of mind or self as sketched in the Section "Of Personal Identity" in Book 1 is grounded in the passions that the examination of their nature and mechanisms in Book 2 can be seen by Hume as actually "corroborating" it.

Lilli Alanen, Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala, Sweden.
E-mail: Lilli.Alanen@filosofi.uu.se.

Hume is famous for his criticism of substantial minds, free will, and self-consciousness—central elements in traditional philosophical accounts of persons. His empiricism dissolves self-inspecting minds into heaps of distinct perceptions and turns cognitive faculties into successions of causally related, discrete impressions and ideas. Whatever regularities the complex ideas and their bundles or heaps display are explained by laws of association of ideas, which are supposed to play the same role in the mental world as Newton's laws of gravitation play in physical nature.

This paper explores some strands of the new science of man proposed in Hume's *Treatise*, in particular his account of personal identity or the self and of the passions to the extent they figure in this account.[1] It owes its inspiration mainly to Annette Baier's *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's "Treatise"* and its holistic reading, where Hume's treatment of many of the controversial issues in Book 1—like that of the self or persons—is seen as a preparation for a more constructive moral psychology in Book 2 and the secularist ethics defended in Book 3.[2] The line of reading to be developed here goes beyond Baier and attempts to clarify some issues her discussions raise. In particular, the question that I will try to answer is how and in what sense the view of the self with regard to the passions examined in Book 2 is supposed to complement, as Hume suggests, that with regard to thought and imagination explored in the Book 1 account of personal identity.

Hume despairs of his account of personal identity in a famous passage in the appendix to the *Treatise* that has been the focus of intense discussions, and different proposals as to what the real problem is and how to get Hume out of the labyrinth in which he finds himself entrapped abound (T App., 10–18).[3] Baier too touches on the question but leaves it unsettled. The main difficulty as she sees it, given that the appendix was written later than the second book of the *Treatise*, is to reconcile the assurance with which he grants a notion of the self in Book 2 with the skepticism of Book 1, including the fact that no trace of the worries expressed in the Appendix appears anywhere in his subsequent writings (Baier, *Progress of Sentiments*, 137–43). In her brief discussion, Baier seems to concede that Hume's Book 1 treatment of personal identity was flawed because limited to a solipsistic and intellectualist perspective, but she argues that the problem vanishes once a broader view—one including the body, other persons, and the passions relating us to them—is taken into account from Book 2 on (*Progress of Sentiments*, 138–45). While Baier's point about the wider perspective of Book 2 is important, I do not think her reading does full justice to Hume's Book 1 account or the Appendix worry. That problem deserves a separate treatment and cannot be directly addressed here, though the reading I defend may suggest a way of getting around it.[4]

I shall focus on examining what the idea or fiction of the self outlined in "On Personal Identity" is and the precise sense in which Hume's later account of the passions can be seen as contributing to or "corroborating" his treatment of the self in Book 1 (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). I argue that we should take seriously the political analogy of the self and a republic or commonwealth—what Hume describes as a "true idea of the human mind." Seeing the relations between its idea-members as relations of power gives the passions an important role already in the Book 1 account and explains why their detailed analyses in Books 2 and 3 support and strengthen the analysis of self in Book 1—its dynamic and changing nature as well as whatever continuity and imperfect unity it can have.

I begin by discussing Hume's problem with the self in Book 1 of the *Treatise* (T 1.4.6) and the principles at play in his analysis of it (that is, the principles of association and the role of memory), reflecting also on the status of the idea or fiction of the self that he there defends and the ways the later account of the passions could be seen as confirming it (section 1). Section 2 looks at the Book 2 account of passions, and section 3 at the indirect passions and their role in the constitution of personal identity. In the last section, Hume's true idea of the human mind is considered in light of the foregoing reading of his theory of passions. I argue that this idea of the mind represents a dynamic system of perceptions conditioned by and expressing the changing states of a social and passionate animal concerned as much with its bodily as with its moral wellbeing. The metaphor of the republic, I claim, already comes with all the elements that a broader, embodied and social self presupposes. It is thus because the idea of the mind sketched at the end of Book 1 is, as it were, grounded in the passions that the examination of their nature and mechanisms in Book 2 can be seen by Hume as actually "corroborating" it. If this is right, causal connections between perceptions are not the only principles at play in Hume's account of personal identity.

1. Hume's Controversial Concepts of the Self and the Role of the Passions

The view that Hume directly targets in *Treatise* 1.4.6 is some version of the Cartesian idea of a simple, immaterial soul-substance—perhaps a Lockean interpretation of the Cartesian soul.[5] Hume rejects it on the ground that it fails to stand up to the empiricist tools of analysis he brings to bear on the experience that its defenders appeal to (T 1.4.6.2–3; SBN 251–52). All he can find is "a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252). The mind is compared to "a kind of theatre" where perceptions "pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations," appearing and disappearing without

any simplicity at one time or identity over time (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 253).[6] Before giving his account of why we nevertheless tend to ascribe identity to these perceptions, or "suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence," Hume makes a point of separating two questions, that of personal identity (1) "as it regards our thought or imagination" and (2) "as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (T 1.4.6.5; SBN 253). Leaving consideration of the latter for later, he notes that the present discussion concerns the first. I shall be concerned mainly with the second question (2) and how Hume's treatment of it relates to and possibly complements the first.[7]

This first question, in Hume's discussion of it, is not, as it appears, about real identity, but imagined, felt, or fictitious identity (T 1.4.6.15–16; SBN 259). The question Hume sets out to answer is what makes us *ascribe* identity to the human mind, given that his earlier analysis has revealed that there can be no "real bond" or connection tying the passing perceptions together.[8] There is controversy among commentators on what the question and the answer really is about—metaphysical selves or fictional ones.[9] Hume's answer to the metaphysical question—as I understand it—is negative: there is no substantial self over and above our perceptions, which do not yield any pure, unitary, thinking thing or substance (T 1.4.5.5–6; SBN 234.). But it has also been argued that Hume, having rejected the metaphysical thesis about the nature of the mind ascribed to "some philosophers," advances another positive metaphysical thesis, claiming that the nature of the mind is a bundle or mass of causally related distinct perceptions.[10] It is, it would seem, the only answer that a strict application of the understanding and imagination according to his rules can yield (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 207). However, offering a new metaphysical thesis about the nature of the mind would seem to be at odds with Hume's methodology and professed skepticism concerning rational theology and psychology, which do not lend support to any metaphysical theses about such abstruse matters. Yet at the end of the section "Of Personal Identity," he does outline, with the help of another analogy, what he calls the true idea of the human mind, to show how the different and distinct perceptions are linked together by cause and effect (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261).

To get clear about Hume's own view one would need to settle on what the notion of mind or self that he works with—the one he rejects as well as the one he retains—is. It is plausible to take the target of Hume's negative thesis to be a mind or self in the narrow sense of a unitary entity given to or discoverable through rational intuition or mental introspection. I will call this mind in a narrow sense the "inner self" (perhaps an empiricist version of the Cartesian mind). This is the self that, supposedly, has perfect identity and simplicity (T 1.4.6.1, 1.4.2.39; SBN 251, 206–207). But Hume also seems to use 'mind' or 'self' in a broader sense, where it is seen as complex and changing, reflecting or expressing the body and its changing states and qualities.[11] Hume has already dispensed with the thesis

about the immateriality of the soul that is discussed and ridiculed in the previous section (T 1.4.5). I argue that what he calls the "true idea of the human mind" is the idea of a mind in a larger sense, one that is or includes a living body—a mind-body that, although it is neither perfectly simple nor has any strict unchanging identity, is still a whole structured enough to ground the belief in a continuous self (T 1.4.6.21; SBN 262).

Hume explains that this belief is the product of the mind's operation according to two principles of association of ideas, those of resemblance and causation, giving priority to the latter. Thus "the true idea of the human mind" is the idea of "a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). The most proper comparison he can come up with here is the famous "republic or commonwealth" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). Hume also suggests in this connection—presumably referring to the two questions distinguished before—that "our identity with regard to the passions" serves to support that with regard to the imagination, formed by causal association of ideas. He writes, "Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T 1.4.5.19; SBN 261).

This second complementary aspect or point of view is taken up in Book 2, but before considering just how it completes or supports the first (our identity with regard to thought or imagination), I want to draw attention to some remarks Hume makes about memory here. The principles of association at work in his account of both aspects of identity are causation and resemblance, which presuppose that past perceptions are retained in memory: "For what is the memory," Hume asks, "but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions?" (T 1.4.6.18; SBN 260). Images resembling their object, the "placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought" must, Hume speculates, "convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem as the continuance of one object. In this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions" (T 1.4.6.18; SBN 260–61). This, he adds, is the case whether we consider "ourselves or others" (T 1.4.6.18; SBN 261). The role that Hume here in passing assigns to memory is remarkable and although often noted, seldom discussed. Causation is said to complement memory, which, upon reflection, "does not so much *produce* as *discover* personal identity, by showing us the relation between cause and effect among our different perceptions" (T 1.4.6.20; SBN 262). Memory, however, is also at work in forming ideas of causal relations.[12]

Whether memory here is understood as something like a storage place for the ideas and impressions that get associated or a power to revive past impressions and their interrelations, it seems to be presupposed by Hume as a condition for the laws of association to do their work, both for discerning causes and effects and for picking out resemblances to be associated. At the same time, while recognizing the important role of memory, Hume seems to dissociate himself from the view of those who, like Locke and Collins, ground self-identity in consciousness and memory, where the mere continuity of the stream of consciousness warrants the continuity of the self and personhood.[13] Memory, for Hume, is not constitutive of but contributes to the discovery of the causal relations constituting the self, which go beyond memory. Yet memory, as a power of reviving past impressions with their causal idea-associates and their particular order of appearance, is what preserves structure in the heap or bundle of ideas that constitutes the self when considered as an object of thought or imagination. It is, I argue, crucial also for the second aspect of identity, that with regard to the passions and the concern we take in our past and future pains and pleasures.

Hume distinguishes ideas of memory from those of imagination on account of their greater force and liveliness.[14] Moreover, as long as it is fresh and lively, memory preserves the original order and form in which its objects were presented: "The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position" (T 1.1.3.3; SBN 9). If we depart from that order, it is due to some defect of this faculty or its exercise. Imagination is at liberty to transpose and change its order of ideas (T 1.1.3.2; SBN 9). We are not at liberty to change our memories, which can haunt us also when we would rather forget. If imagination can easily separate one impression from another and treat them as distinct or recombine them (T 1.1.3.4; SBN 9), memory, as long as it works, cannot. I remember the insult I received, my anger, and regretfully, my overreacting to it, with the ensuing break-up of a long friendship. Since the liveliest of all our impressions are those of our passions, of pain and pleasure, sorrow and joy, they keep reappearing or being repeated (in their original order and positions) by memory, continuing to affect us or our present train of thoughts, giving our idea of who we are its structure and history, feeding into, or as the case may be, distracting us from our ongoing "concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T 1.4.5.19; SBN 241).

How then, turning to the second question (2), does our identity with regard to the passions give support to that formed by the imagination? Passions do not only feed our self-concern, they direct our actions and regulate our relationships to others and through them our self-regard. The first passion to be examined in Book 2 is pride, which has the self as an object and, moreover, is a socially conditioned passion (T 2.1.2–3; 2.1.11.4; 2.2.2.15; SBN 278; 317; 339). For, as Hume shows with many examples, how we come to view our self in feeling pride or humility depends on how we appear to others and take other persons to view us. These two passions,

along with love and hate, belong to what Hume calls indirect passions, which have persons—ourselves or others—as their objects, and in this sense persons and passions go together.[15]

The role of passions, in my view, cannot be stressed enough, for they are in fact at play already in the Book 1 account of personal identity, although not yet analyzed. As impressions of reflection, direct or indirect, they are listed there right from the start with other sensations among the perceptions succeeding and entering into associations with one another.[16] The passions are not discussed in Book 1, which is focused on "the principles and operation of our reasoning faculty and the nature of ideas" (T Abs. 3; SBN 646). Their anatomy, nature, causes, and effects are not examined until Book 2, starting with an account of the indirect self-directed passions of pride and humility. In this sense then, both Baier and Penelhum, to whom Baier refers, seem right that the Book 2 analysis of passions completes the Book 1 account of self-identity.[17]

However, both also seem to agree the Book 1 account shows that the idea of a unitary self is a fiction.[18] Is it, then, their view that the Book 2 account strengthens or completes the fiction? There seem to be at least two ways in which it could do so. It could strengthen the thesis that no unitary, simple self is given to introspection, giving indirect support to the thesis that the idea of the self is but a fiction.[19] This would be a negative result—a part of Hume's criticism of rationalist metaphysics. Alternatively, taking the idea of a unitary self as a product of the natural laws of association's combining successive resembling ideas into the fiction of a continuous mind or person where no ground for discerning its perfect identity or simplicity can be found, the Book 2 account of the passions as reflective impressions could be seen as providing additional glue for holding the successive ideas together, strengthening the fiction (or the feeling on which the fiction is supposed to rest).

The second alternative gets support from the fact that it would treat the fiction of a unitary self as analogous to other fictions mentioned in this connection (for example, plants and animals). Baier's discussion, without clearly separating them, moves between these two alternatives. But what should we make of the idea that the passions "corroborate" the fictional identity bestowed by understanding and imagination? Are we supposed to think that the passions increase or support the delusion of a unitary and simple self that the operations of understanding and imagination, together perhaps with what Baier calls our "mental inertia" (*Progress of Sentiments*, 124), have created? There are at least two problems with this reading: first, the Book 2 account does not give any additional explanation of an inner, continuous, and simple unitary self. Far from contributing glue to the construction of a fiction of such a self, neither the perfectly simple, unitary self nor its fiction or idea is further discussed. Yet a notion of self or person does figure at the very center of Hume's moral psychology and is clearly presupposed

by his account of the passions. The second worry is that Hume's idea of the self or personal identity in terms of a bundle or theatre seems, in fact, to have even less unity than the fictions of plants and animals to which the Book 1 compares it, so it could hardly play the role that the Book 2 account assigns the idea of self.[20]

This gets us back to the question of what the fiction that would be strengthened by taking passions into account is supposed to be a fiction of. That of a unitary, simple, incorporeal inner self or mind? or that of an enduring, embodied person, an identity, in the latter case, that presupposes the (fiction of a) continuing identity of the complex and changing human body, whose parts, like those of other animals are related to each other and some common end (T 1.4.6.11–12; SBN 257)? If one were to opt for the first, one might think that this fiction produced by the understanding and imagination cannot, as such, be corroborated by the passions, which are impressions of reflection. Passions originate from feeling and the senses, not thinking alone. They are the actual reactive (reflective) impressions of a sentient, desiring being, arising from impressions of sensation like pain and pleasure, which depend on the constitution of the body and the action of external objects on its organs (T 2 1.1.1–2; SBN 275–76).

Hume's third way of characterizing the human mind as a republic offers, as argued in section 5, a more promising metaphor than a heap, bundle or mental theatre for whatever unity and identity a person can have. It allows for another way of seeing how the Book 2 account of passions completes the Book 1 account of self-identity, which is the one I favor. What it completes, I suggest, is not a fiction of a perfectly unitary and simple self but what Hume, at the end of the discussion of personal identity, calls the "true idea of the self." This idea, in so far as it is called true, is not an improved version of a fictitious inner self given to mental introspection. There is no perfect simplicity or unproblematic unity—real or feigned—in Hume's "true idea" of self as a republic or commonwealth, yet the republic still clearly has *more* of unity and continuity than a heap, bundle, or theatre of passing ideas and impressions. It makes more sense for other reasons, too, to think of "our identity with regard to the passions" as corroborating or supporting whatever imperfect unity or identity the imagination supplies with the help of memory and association by cause and effect—imagining a republic persisting through time, for instance.[21] For our identity with regard to the passions is anchored in this present concern we have for our past or future pains or pleasures, concern which itself is a (possibly reflected) form of desire, one of the direct passions in Hume's account, and as much subject to variation as are the changing conditions of the body causing any other passions. Although Hume, beyond this passage where he refers to our *concern* for pain and pleasure, does not mention desire, it is, I argue, essential, for if we were not desire-driven, pleasure-seeking, and pain-avoiding animals, we would hardly have any present concern for our past or future pleasures and pains either. This self-concern seems to be, in addition to memory, another fact about

our nature as complex, passionate, and reflective animals that Hume simply takes for granted without argument. I will discuss the passions first, and get back to the republic later, in section 5.

2. The Passions

That Hume here, as so often elsewhere, leans on facts of nature or original endowments tends to be neglected in discussions of his account of passions, partly because so much—in my view unnecessary—weight is given to his claim that passions are "original existents," bearing no relations to anything else. In this often quoted passage, one that Baier brushes off as a "silly" pronouncement made in passing and expressing Hume's youthful zeal to oppose the rationalists (*Progress of Sentiments*, 163), Hume claims:

> A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. (T 2.3.3.5; SBN 415)

This taken together with another passage where Hume characterizes passions—for example, love and hate—as "simple impressions" which cannot be defined but are clearly known "from our common feeling or experience" (T 2.2.1.1; SBN 329) have been taken to show that passions for Hume are non-intentional, purely conative states.[22] Although the impressions of reflection that constitute the passions may in themselves, qua impressions, be "existents" or "modifications of existence," that is, existential facts as opposed to representational ideas, they are neither simple nor unrelated brute atomic facts but are complex phenomena depending on specific bodily-cum-psychological causes, for example, on instincts connecting impressions and ideas with which they are interrelated in various, systematic ways as their natural causes and objects.[23] As modifications of existence, there is an existent that they modify. What would that existent be, if not the desire or appetite moving a living being or animal in its pursuit of survival and wellbeing?

Consider Hume's account of perceptions that he divides into two main kinds, impressions and ideas, the latter being copies of the former. The impressions are subdivided into original and secondary; the former are also called impressions of sensation and the latter, impressions of reflection. The former, the original ones, are called original because they have no mental antecedents; however, they have causes, for, Hume explains—as a good Cartesian—they "arise in the soul, from

the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs" (T 2.1.1.1; SBN 275).[24] They are original in the sense that our explanation of them stops here—we know they have bodily conditions, but to explain just how they arise is the business not of moral philosophers but of anatomists and natural philosophers. Hume for his part, confines his analysis (an anatomy of the passions qua states of mind) to secondary, or what he also calls reflective, impressions and ideas, which have original impressions or other ideas as their causes and objects. So it is not that bodies are absent from Hume's account of the passions, which are impressions reflecting how our body fares or is affected. Passions are, for Hume as for Descartes and Spinoza, irreducibly psycho-physical phenomena.[25] Hume writes, "Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever way you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception" (T 2.1.1.2; SBN 276).[26] It does not matter, Hume thinks, whether we call it (the mind) "soul" or "body," for all we know, they could be the same thing. He continues with this example: "A fit of gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not deriv'd immediately from any affection or idea" (T 2.1.1.2; SBN 276).[27]

Bodily affections are among the causes of the passions, but passions also and importantly have objects.[28] In his general survey of passions, Hume divides them into *direct* and *indirect*. The former are "such as arise immediately from good and evil, from pain and pleasure," the latter "such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities" (T 2.1.2.4; SBN 278). He says he cannot "justify or explain" this division any farther. The direct passions, which as we saw arise from original impressions or their ideas, comprise *desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security*.[29] The indirect passions include *pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, pity, malice, generosity*, "with their dependents." Hume starts his account with the latter, which are the only ones I will consider here.[30] But to review, all passions arise—directly or indirectly—from "good and evil, from pain and pleasure," presupposing a living, striving being, endowed with organs for navigating its environment, for reacting to and pursuing what is good or pleases it and for avoiding what is bad or harmful, endowed, in addition, with a concern for and ability to keep track of her reactions to these proper to persons.[31]

3. Indirect Passions and Their Objects

Pride and humility for Hume have the same object, and this object, he writes, "is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness."[32] Later on, having spent the first 8 sections of Book 2 on pride and humility and their causes, Hume turns to other indirect passions, that is, love and hate, noting that they, too, have objects: "As the immedi-

ate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the *object* of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are not conscious" (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329). Clearly, the reading often encountered of Hume's passions as non-intentional raw feels is in need of revision. But what should we say about the objects of indirect passions, of the idea of the self as a succession of related impressions, with its corollary that the idea of a unitary self is a fiction? If the idea of a simple, substantial, immaterial self is a fiction, does it then follow that there is no enduring, howsoever changing, self whose identity persists over time? In the first passage cited above, from T 2.1.2.2 (SBN 277), Hume claims that the object of our "intimate memory or consciousness of self" is "a succession of related ideas and impressions." In so far as there is some "self" that intimate consciousness or memory reveals, it is a system of related ideas and impressions—not a fiction of a simple, unchanging entity, so not a fictitious self—and not an idea of an inner, unitary phenomenal self. However, if Hume does not give us much of an account of the self over and above the associative connection of ideas, he certainly presupposes its existence and uses the term "self" interchangeably with "person" to refer to the self as well as to other persons, humans or animals, whose thoughts and memories we have no direct access to but whose character and actions we can observe as they observe ours.

I will not dwell on the various problems posed by Hume's deflation of a substantial, unitary self in Book 1 but note that he takes self-awareness as a fact and so presupposes some notion of self, which he describes indifferently in terms of a succession of impressions or as a person.[33] Hume's selves or persons, as they appear in the rest of the *Treatise*, are "embodied selves." The self that Hume presupposes is neither an underlying metaphysical entity nor a fictive logical construction out of distinct sensations, but this particular sentient and thinking person of flesh and bones, appearing and evolving in space and time, and thriving only in a certain kind of natural and social environment. Baier emphasizes the last aspect, commenting on the passage quoted above from T 2.2.1.2 (SBN 329): "it does take 'us' to make it possible for me to have any sustained pleasure or pain to be conscious of" (*Progress of Sentiments*, 130), and she goes on, quoting another of Hume's claims: "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing" (T 2. 2. 2.17; SBN 340; quoted in *Progress of Sentiments*, 130).[34]

To see why this is a point worth making, we must dwell a bit on Hume's basic empiricist tools of analysis, whose ultimate objects, as we saw, are these two kinds of "perceptions," impressions and ideas, the latter being described as fainter copies of the former. I understand this distinction as follows: impressions are made, or impinge, on the mind. Impressions (of external or internal objects) always come in bundles, as complex impressions: it is only by analysis and experiment that they are isolated into single impressions, as, for instance, my perception of a street in

Paris I recently walked. I perceived it through countless more and less lively impressions, with a lot of details caught on the spot, most of which have faded away but enough are retained to leave me a (complex) idea of that particular street. The idea is a "copy" taken by the imagination of sense impressions stored in memory, which may be retained or re-evoked in connection with other thoughts later on. This typically happens by causal association: its force and liveliness then will depend on the force of the ideas triggering it and concomitant, current or freshly remembered (resembling or opposed) impressions with the past associations they evoke. Hume stresses that there is nothing in the idea which was not formerly in the impression "and that they differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul." He writes,

> It has been remark'd in the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are borrow'd from impressions, and that these two kinds of perception differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars, that distinguish them. (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 318)

Note, again, that the "soul"—something on which perceptions strike—is presupposed here, and that whatever content or object an idea has must be present in the impression.

Passions are "impressions of reflection" caused by, and reacting to, other impressions and ideas, and I will get back to these shortly. But what has been said so far should give pause to those who think that impressions for Hume do not represent or have cognitive contents.[35] For Hume there is nothing beyond impressions or appearances, that is, things as we perceive them or as they appear to us. There is nothing beyond them that we could reach without other perceptions, that is, impressions or ideas copying them, and the former come with or involve whatever objects the latter—that is, the ideas—have. Taking it this way, there is nothing odd in the fact that Hume—who does not dwell on metaphysical issues, having put them behind him with the critical work of the first Book—should switch carelessly from talk about successive impressions to talk about persons or bodies in the second. The self-identity of the mind may be impossible to establish with the tools Hume avails himself of in Book 1, without other means than ideas or thoughts inspecting themselves, something he seems to acknowledge in the famous appendix passage. But once the role of the passions with their natural and social contexts is taken into full account, the very problem of personal identity, based on nothing but the idea of an inner, unitary self, forged by understanding and imagination, seems to vanish. In Book 2, Hume

has switched from metaphysics and logic to a natural and social space, and he sticks with the perspective of a common world in his subsequent discussions of passions and morality.[36]

Consider again the passage cited by Baier: "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing" (T 2. 2. 2.17; SBN 341). I would add to this, as a parenthesis: singular impressions are really nothing. They are nothing without some context or other in which they occur, and they exist, qua singular and separable, only as the result of empiricist analysis. Hume himself, in his metaphor of the theatre, notes of the perceptions appearing there that they "pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252). Not only do perceptions mingle, they come in different postures and situations, which are retained and repeated by memory. Among the perceptions gliding by and mingling with each other in the bundle are perceptions of extended things, including complex ones, such as embodied human persons. It is by attending to the latter, their reactions to us or our behavior and our own passions reacting to theirs, that our sense of self develops and acquires some stability.[37]

Thus, to have a notion of ourselves we must, as Hume writes, neglecting here his own Book 1 method of inspecting only perceptions, "turn our view to external objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us" (T 2.2.2.17; SBN 340–41). The mechanisms of passions, on Hume's account, are such that once the self is in view, as an object of pride or humility, "'tis not natural to quit the consideration of it, till the passion be exhausted," that is, until the relations of ideas causing and sustaining them (Hume's famous "double relation of impressions and ideas") cease to operate (T 2.2.2.17; SBN 341). "The passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself, of whom we are at every moment conscious. But when the affections are once directed to ourself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person, how closely so ever connected with us" (T 2.2.2.16; SBN 340). In Hume's account, once the passion has turned my thoughts to myself, they tend to rest there. Pleasure-seeking beings as we are, this tendency is stronger in the case of pleasant pride than painful humility. But there is this peculiar asymmetry in the transition of ideas when caused by these passions, which turn one's thoughts to our own person or self where they tend to rest, whereas the passions of love or hate are fixed on the person loved or hated. Hume provides a series of thought experiments to illustrate this interaction between thoughts and passions (T 2.2.2; SBN 332–47).[38] That it is seen as a matter of mainly causal interactions between impressions and ideas should not obscure the fact that the items related include impressions and ideas of my body as well as (impressions and ideas) of other persons and spatially located things, and it is *these* relations that provide a more stable basis for identity. The role of nature—or

instinct—should also be recognized here, for instinct is what determines the objects and effects of the different passions.[39]

Let us finally take a closer look at Hume's true idea of the human mind and the principles and suppositions at work in it.

4. The True Idea of Mind

Towards the end of his treatment of personal identity in Book 1, Hume comes up with the idea of a republic or commonwealth as the most proper comparison with the soul or the human mind, "the true idea" of which "is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linke'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other" (T 1.4.6.18; SBN 261). There is a lot to comment on in this passage, and it is worth reading carefully. First, we are now talking of the true idea of the self, not just any fiction. Second, what was earlier described as a mere mass (T 1.4.2.40; SBN 207) or bundle is now pictured as a structured, dynamic *system* of interrelated powers, where stronger and more lively perceptions chase out or destroy weaker ones, at least those weaker ones which do not support or subject themselves to the authority of the stronger ones or do not contribute as they should to preserving the system as a whole.

Here, as later, Hume refers carelessly to "the human mind," "the soul," and "person." Why would he choose a political analogy to illustrate this entity or its idea? To introduce a modern, more democratic or republican version, perhaps, of Plato's *Republic*, where individual idea-members and their mutual power relations replace those of the three fixed, hierarchically ordered parts of the Platonic soul? One way to understand why Hume would call it a true idea, rather than a fiction, would be by noting that it introduces the idea of stable, repeated patterns of relations and interaction between its changing individual members, relations based on "reciprocal ties of government and subordination" that Hume himself may have thought of as reducible to a form of causation but which clearly involve considerations going beyond any simple model of efficient causation. Hume writes,

> As to causation; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chaces another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than to a republic or commonwealth, *in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and*

> *subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts*. (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261; emphases added)

Note not only that its members are *united* by ties of government and subordination but, moreover, that their union is said to give rise to other persons *propagating* (that is, continuing or upholding) *the same republic* in the incessant changes of its part. There is some ordered, politically structured, so accepted or mutually recognized union of its members—the system of impressions and ideas—such that although the individual perceptions forming the union are ever changing, their interrelations are stable enough to produce new perceptions that contribute to its preservation and continuity as this same person or entity. Hume continues:

> And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, *without losing his identity*. *Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures.* (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261; emphases added)

The republic referred to as a point of comparison conserves its identity while its members are replaced, and its laws and constitution may change. Hume singles out the relation of causation as that which in the end holds its parts together.[40] How does causation work here? It can hardly be a matter of reducing causality to a mere brute succession of perceptions. Presumably, the causal history is a history of political institutions and events, too, so a political history—a history, which to be told, requires experience of government, bonds, covenants, transactions, and their regulations.[41] Analogously, the story of the succession of ideas making up an individual human mind or person must be a moral story, but to add up to a moral story, more than mere resemblance and brute succession of the items connected must be at play. Just as his impressions and ideas can vary, the same person, Hume writes, "may vary his character and disposition" "without losing his identity" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). Character and dispositions may be more stable than passing ideas, as the constitution and laws of a republic are, but the latter allow of variation too, so something else must account for its enduring (however imperfect) identity. It is here, at this point in the text, where Hume mentions the second aspect again: "our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261).

There is a wide variety of readings of how this is supposed to happen; I will end by sketching another attempt to make sense of this. The relation of causation traces a history between causally connected passing sets of ideas, which include among their objects one's present and past actions, emotional reactions, and interrelations with other person, forming threads or patterns in the web constituting (the idea of) a person's identity, a web that the dynamics of passions, which are modifications or determinate expressions of her desire, strengthen and corroborate. The passions work through their greater vivacity as reflective impressions and through the greater force with which remembered past or anticipated future pleasures or pains happen to affect and enliven the present ideas and impressions with which they are associated by resemblance and memory. A present impression of sadness or pain evokes and connects with similar past experiences, bringing related past saddening ideas or beliefs to the mind. The vivacity of reflective impressions and their ideas is transferred through resemblance from one set of perceptions to another, forming more or less stable patterns of interrelated emotional reactions, beliefs, and images of actions that we can remember and recognize as our own. These patterns feature the history of those more or less stable "prevailing" passions and motives, including moral sentiments that it matters to us to keep track of and propagate, as the system of perceptions or republic we are. For, again, brute causation or succession cannot account for a recognizable, recurring pattern that would be of any special concern to us. The direction of the concern for self that guides the selection of ideas or sets of ideas to be retained in the causal subsystems or networks is set by nature. (It is original or innate in Hume's sense of these terms). So is the concern we show, as social and moral animals, for others, for their past and future pains or pleasures. The dispositions and present perceptions of the sentient and thinking person, with her ideas of good and evil, her dominant passions, memories, anticipations—hopes and fears—all contribute to determine what causal and associative links will be included in her sense of self or personhood.[42] Her place and the space she occupies in the socio-political hierarchy are equally important, just as the identity and stability of the republic as a political community whose members expel and replace one another depends not only on their mutual relations of interdependence—subordination and dominion—but also on the territory claimed by it as its own and the recognition by other communities of its territorial boundaries and possessions. For, as we saw, its laws and constitution may change while the same republic endures, just as, in addition to the changing perceptions passing through her mind, the character and dispositions of a person may also change—at least to a point—without her turning into another person. Is it, then, its dependence on a recognizable territory that explains why Hume, in the end, would prefer the republic or commonwealth as the true idea of the human mind—better perhaps than a bundle or heap, neither of which has any determinate spatial location?[43]

While the fact that the self requires a recognized spatial and physical location is undeniably important, it cannot, on the line of reading here suggested, be the sole or main reason why this analogy is used to illustrate the "true idea of the human mind." Comparing the mind to a political system comes with a reference to the Platonic view of the soul, with its hierarchically ordered classes of governors, helpers, and slaves. Hume questions the idea of a pre-determined hierarchy of faculties and famously rejects the rationalist idea of an autonomous, independent reason or intellect with natural authority and power to govern lower unruly parts. He reverses the order and casts reason in the role of slaves. His view may, in the end, be closer to that of Spinoza and more in tune with the early modern view of nature as a dynamic plenum of forces, where the human mind too is seen as a collection of conflicting forces, or ideas asserting themselves with varying degrees of vivacity and causal power. Yet it retains the idea of a regulated whole of interrelated parts, with repeatable reciprocal ties of dominion and subordination between its various individual idea-members, struggling to maintain themselves and the stability of the community they belong to. Those who fail to collaborate or who oppose its ends are expelled, while those who manage to stay in power can do so only to the extent that they get some recognition and support from subordinate members or from the coalitions they have entered into.

None of this, however, is to say that the republic grounds a better fiction of a simple unitary thing; it is a true idea precisely because it is neither simple nor strictly unitary but, rather, a complex metaphor picturing a complex, messy, physical and moral, socio-political (and forensic), constantly changing but still enduring entity, more true to the reality of the phenomenon. As such, the republic or person cannot be constituted by mere causal connections between distinct, unrelated, inner parts or elements. The latter must already be related to each other in some determinate ways within the limits set by their embodied, social, and political natures—facts that Hume's empiricist moral science observes and takes into account but does not explain.

NOTES

1 This paper develops material from a talk, "Persons and Passions in Baier's Reading of Hume," delivered at the Annette Baier Memorial Session at the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division meeting in Baltimore, December 27, 2013, a version of which was given at the Department of Philosophy, La Sapienza-Università di Roma on May 8, 2014. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the 41st International Hume Conference, Portland, July 2014, and to the Philosophy Department of the Åbo Academy University in Finland, January 2015. I have benefited from questions and discussions at all of these occasions. I am grateful in particular for the comments of John Carriero and Peter Myrdal on a written draft as well as from the criticisms and

very helpful suggestions from the editors of the *Hume Studies*, Corliss Swain and Saul Traiger, and two of its anonymous referees.

References to the *Treatise* are to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Norton and Norton, hereafter cited in the text as "T" followed by Book, part, section and paragraph numbers, and to A *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. by Nidditch, hereafter cited as "SBN" followed by page numbers. References to its appendix are indicated as "T App." followed by the paragraph number and SBN followed by page number.

2 See Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments*. Among the number of questionable theses Hume is often saddled with in ethics and moral psychology, the most infamous are the so-called Hume's law or Hume's guillotine ("there is no valid inference from facts to values"), the "inertness of reason," and "emotivism." The passions, in the latter, are reduced to emotional reactions consisting in lively brute pleasurable or painful impressions, comparable to shivering or heat-flushes, and moral judgments to (non-cognitive) expressions of subjective passions. They all hang together, and how one reads them affects what one makes of Hume's view of persons and moral agency. Baier's reading questions whether Hume held any of these views. What human reason and rationality is, and how it depends on sentiment, passion, and community, are themselves problems that Baier's line of interpretation opens up for a new kind of probing, inviting us to answer them not by introspecting our individual minds or mining the philosophical tradition but by looking, as Hume himself recommends in his introduction to the *Treatise*, at our actions, practices, and patterns of interaction in a shared natural and social world. For a helpful refutation of a "standard" view of Hume's arguments concerning the role of reason or reason's "inertness," see Sayre-McCord, "Hume on Practical Morality."

3 The challenge is considerable, for the difficulty, due to Hume's unclear formulation of it, is as much about what exactly the problem Hume saw with it as it is to determine whether and how it could be solved. For influential discussions, see Penelhum, "Hume on Personal Identity"; Pears, "Hume's Account of Personal Identity" and "Hume's Recantation"; Stroud, *Hume*, 118–40; Garrett, "Hume's Self-Doubts"; and Baxter, "Hume's Labyrinth. See also the literature referred to below, notes 10–11.

4 Baier herself returns to the problem in "Life and Mortality" and "Hume's Labyrinth." Hume clearly does have reasons to worry, puzzling as it is, about the principles he explicitly refers to in his Book 1 account (whether or not one could agree on what the problem he sees when writing the Appendix really is; see note 3 above). But when considering those he takes for granted but does not explain, the view of self that is sketched in Book 1, supported by the view of self with regard to the passions, may well be good enough for his purposes, that is, for his account of moral agency and whatever progress in the development of character his naturalist ethics allows for. What is puzzling for me is that the despair he expresses when reviewing his account of personal identity seems to be over his inability to explain a strict simplicity and unity of a self or mind that his moral psychology does not require. I hope to discuss this in a sequel to this paper.

5 See Ainslie, "Hume's Reflections" and "Hume's Anti-Cogito." Hume attributes the view he opposes "to some philosophers," also referred to as "some metaphysicians of this kind," that is, those who believe in some "simple and continued" something that they call "himself" (T 1.4.6.3–4; SBN 252).

6 See note 18 below.

7 As suggested by Baier (*Progess of Sentiments*) and Penelhum ("Self-Identity and Self-Regard"), whose readings are the starting point of my discussion. See also McIntyre, "Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity." For interesting discussions along different lines, see Ainslie "Skepticism about Persons," "Sympathy and Unity," and "Hume on Personal Identity" as well as Lecaldano, "The Passions, Character, and Self."

8 Understanding, as Hume has shown, "never observes any real connexion among objects," and "even the union of cause and effects, when strictly examin'd, resolves itself into customary association of ideas. For from thence it evidently follows, that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas, when we reflect upon them. And the only qualities which can give ideas an union in the imagination, are these three relations above-mention'd" (T 1.4.6.16, SBN 260).

9 For a recent overview and discussion see Garrett, "Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts." I am grateful to the author for having made a manuscript of this paper available to me.

10 For example, by Pears, "Hume's Account of Personal Identity"; Stroud, *Hume*; and Garrett, "Hume's Self-doubts" and "Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts." Ken Winkler, in "All is Revolution," argues that Hume (in T 1.4.6; SBN 251–63), unlike Locke, "offers a metaphysics to the reader and makes no excuse for it," and that "the basic unit of his metaphysics of the person is not the substance but the *perception*" (16). While I agree with Winkler both that Hume rejects any notion of substance and that he is telling us what the self is, in as far as we can conceive it, I would be hesitant to see this as a metaphysics of the self or the person. See Swain, "Personal Identity," but see also Tony Pitson, "Skeptical Realism."

11 Don Garrett, in "Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts," notes that it is an open question whether Hume is using self also in a broader sense and what exactly it includes" (3n2). Winkler thinks that the body is absent from the Book 1 discussion of self but gives "evidence of the body's restoration in Book Two" ("All is Revolution," 36n32 and references there given). See also Baier, who writes that "[a] person's body, and his fellow persons and mirror images, were all left, along with his passions and self-concern, for Book Two" (*Progress of Sentiments*, 137).

12 See Traiger, "Hume on Memory," 69–70 and the literature there referred to.

13 See the comment on T 1.4.7.20 by Norton and Norton in their edition of the *Treatise* (487). Hume was aware of the criticism of that view by Butler, in his "Of Personal Identity." For discussion, see Wiggins, "Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness."

14 He writes, "We find, by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when, in its new appearance, it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the *memory*, and the other the

imagination. 'Tis evident, at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours than any which are employ'd by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas, in the imagination, the perception is faint and languid, and cannot, without difficulty, be preserved by the mind steady and uniform for any considerable time. Here, then, is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another" (T 1.1.3.1; SBN 9).

15 See Baier, *Progress of Sentiments*, 52 and 129–30; see also McIntyre, "Personal Identity and the Passions," which is quoted by Baier (307n2).

16 "Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time" (T 1.4.6.2; SBN 252). In the very first paragraph, Hume writes, in reporting the view he criticizes, "The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on *self* either by their pain or pleasure" (T 1.4.6.1; SBN 251). This is speculative, but I think Ainslie is right, in "Hume's Anti-Cogito," that the view Hume criticizes here is that of a phenomenologically unitary and simple self—an inner self as I take it—to which we would have direct and unproblematic access. What Hume objects to, as I understand it, is not that passions influence the self by their pain or pleasure—on the contrary, he takes that claim on board—but that we could perceive a continuous self *apart* from the passions keeping it within our view.

17 Baier sees no contradiction but rather "supplementation and completion" between the negative results of the Book 1 account of self and what Book 2 says. She writes, "Hume never retracts his Book One denial of a 'simple' persisting self, the sort of thing of which we might have a simple impression. The self is complex, changing, dependent on others for its coming to be, for its emotional life, for its self-consciousness, for its self-evaluations" (*Progress of Sentiments*, 130).

18 Penelhum reads Hume's section "Of personal identity" as providing a psychological answer to the question of "the belief in the unity of a person" (see T 1.4.6.5; SBN 253). The question is posed just after Hume has dismissed the view of "some metaphysicians" and advances that each of us—"the rest of mankind"—"are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perception. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other sense and faculties contribute to this change, nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment." Introducing the analogy of a theater, Hume stresses, "There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252–53). According to Penelhum, the life-history of a person (or mind) in Hume's account is merely a sequence of "different perceptions," to which identity is ascribed by the "thought or imagination" because of various connections and relationships between its successive members" ("Self-Identity and Self-Regard," 254). Thought or imagination makes us "feel" a connection and identity where there is none, just as the transitions of thoughts are supposed to make us feel a necessary causal connection where no such connection

is perceived. Baier, on this point, appears to agree with Penelhum, but they seem to differ on how the relation between the two accounts (Book 1 and Book 2) should be understood.

19 Here fiction would be pejorative, as opposed to a true idea, and this is the sense in which Penelhum uses it. But fiction, as John Carriero reminds me in conversation, is not pejorative for Hume, nor is a fictitious identity, of the kind we ascribe to external things, necessarily false. More should be said here about Hume's different uses of "fiction," sometimes referring to voluntarily made up ideas, at others to involuntary or "natural ones," which presumably is the sense of fiction in the context of personal identity. A fiction, on Baier's reading of Hume, is not false but rather unverifiable, yet fictions have an important role as indispensable, pragmatic postulates. See her discussion in *Progress of Sentiments*, 102. See also Baxter's discussion in "Hume's Critique of Pure Substance" and the comments by Traiger, who suggests that the psychological mechanism at work in forming fictions is actually more important in Hume's discussion than the idea-product, and hence that fictions are not, properly speaking, false for Hume.

20 Could this be one of the grounds for despair expressed in the Appendix? See the discussion of Penelhum, "Self-Identity and Self-Regard." In his metaphor of the theatre, Hume explicitly excludes from consideration any spatial location for the succession of perceptions (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 253). Garrett suggests that Hume came to realize that his account of the self requires the location his principles could not provide ("Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts," section 3).

21 Imperfect identity would be problematic identity—identity that must be asserted or re-negotiated at all times. There is, Hume writes, "no just standard, by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time, when [the related ideas] acquire or lose a title to the name of identity" (T 1.4.6.21; SBN 262). Hume speaks of attributions of "identity in an improper sense, to variable and interrupted objects" and argues they always come with a fiction, or at least a propensity to form a fiction, of "either something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable" (T 1.6.4.7; SBN 255). Here the fiction is not of identity, which is not in itself a fiction for Hume, but of something unchanging or something "we know not what." See Traiger's "Comments on Baxter."

22 I discuss this in "Reflection and Ideas."

23 See, for example, T 2.3.9.2–8 (SBN 438–39), and note 29 below.

24 Hume relies on speculations about animal spirits elsewhere (T 1.2.5.20; SBN 60–61), albeit reluctantly. In anatomizing our causal reasoning in T 1.3.5.2, he is more careful and professes agnosticism with respect to the causes of impressions arising from the senses. As a phenomenologist he should be agnostic. Thus, in T 1.1.2.1, where he distinguishes impressions and ideas, he says of the former, "The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral, and therefore shall not at present be enter'd upon." See also T 1.2.5.26 (SBN 64), where he makes a similar disclaimer and commits himself not to trespass experience.

25 That is, they cannot not be reduced to either purely psychological or purely physical processes but are, instead, complex phenomena involving physical processes as well as psychological acts and behavioral reactions.

26 Although Hume, for reasons of methodology, does not get into physiology, and although he does not, as I read him, take a stand on metaphysical issues, it is important to emphasize that passions are causally connected to states of the body and depend, qua impressions, "upon natural and physical causes" (T 2.1.1.2; SBN 275).

27 Hume uses the term "affection" for an impression—presumably a mental state. Spinoza uses "affection" for bodily as well as mental affects. Hume does not care to emphasize any radical distinction between mind and body, other than causal, and the fact that they are causally related poses no problem for his view of causation. A fit of gout cannot be derived from ideas but is an affection of the body that causes pain and other ideas in its train.

28 Hume's naturalism does not exclude, as contemporary "hard" naturalism (physicalism) would, intentionality, nor is there anything mystical about this, so assigning objects to passions does not violate Hume's naturalism. See below section 3; see also next note.

29 Consider Hume's remark against Locke's use of the word "idea" in commenting on the fact that no ideas are innate: they are copies of impressions (so would fall in the category Descartes calls "adventitious"). Hume thinks Locke made a mistake, though, in not observing the distinction Hume finds between impressions and ideas. No ideas are innate, because they are copies of impressions, but it does not follow that we have no innate perceptions: there are impressions that are innate—namely, the passions. Hume writes, "For it is evident our strongest perceptions are innate, and that natural affection, love of virtue, resentment, and all the other passions, arise immediately from our nature," adding that "all our passions are a kind of natural instinct, derived from nothing but the original constitution of the human mind" (T Abs .6; SBN 648).

30 For details see my "Powers and Mechanisms." The system of a double association of ideas and impressions is retained in the shorter *Dissertation on the Passions* (1757), which, however, treats of the direct passions first.

31 If pleasure, as I read Hume, presupposes desire, it is to be noted that not all desires are interested or self-directed for Hume. Particular passions, including, but not restricted to, self-love, seem to require some "original propensity of some kind, . . . by giving a relish to the objects of its pursuit" and, Hume adds, "none [are] more fit for this purpose than benevolence or humanity" (EPM 9.20; SBN 281).

32 He continues: "Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions. According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are elated by pride, or dejected with humility. Whatever other object may be comprehended by the mind, they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou'd never be able to excite these passions, or produce the smallest increase or diminution of them. When self enters not the picture, there is no room either for pride or humility" (T 2.1.2.2; SBN 277).

33 Garrett uses his reading of Hume's account of abstract ideas to propose that the self of the passions should be seen as one particular set of successive ideas that, through abstraction, gets to represent all the others in the succession ("Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts," 17n12–13). For criticism of this line, see Ainslie, "Unity of Self." However, Garrett also argues that for Hume any idea or perception would be of one's self, although none of them represent a unitary, simple self. So Hume can claim

without contradiction that we always have some perception (idea or impression) of self. Since no ideas occur singly, any idea here, I take it, would be any complex of ideas and impressions, which would include some awareness of one's embodied sentient and thinking self.

34 The rest of the quotation should really be given too: "For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us" (T 2. 2. 2.17; SBN 340).

35 Only ideas that copy impressions, according to an influential reading, represent: they represent the impressions they copy. Baier, in my view rightly, opposes this reading ("Response to My Critics," 213–14).

36 Hume himself refers to the vague but common conception we all—as ordinary persons—have of our self (T 1.4.2.6; SBN 189–90), and would this not be a fact for an empiricist observer of human nature to take seriously?

37 Baier writes that the reflections of impressions are important "both for displaying the causal influence of past members and the influence of anticipation of future members, and for displaying my dependence on my fellow persons for a steady idea of myself" (*Progress of Sentiments*, 130). There would, indeed, be no self to think of independently of the perception of other objects, specifically, other persons.

38 "This easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions, and facilitates or retards their transition; which is a clear proof, that the two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections" (T 2.2.2.15; SBN 340).

39 The *Dissertation on the Passions*, in its opening section, distinguishes two kinds of good and evil: good and evil which consist in agreeable or painful sensations produced by objects stimulating our organs because of the way they are structured; and objects which are called good and evil because "*naturally* conformable or contrary to passions." Thus, "[t]he punishment of an adversary, by gratifying revenge, is good; the sickness of a companion, by affecting friendship, is evil" (121–22; emphasis added).

40 In answer to a question raised by Wade Robinson, I take the causal relation here to be a natural relation—not a philosophical one. The former are the result of the natural operation of the three associative principles. See T 1.3.6.16 and T 1.1.5.2 (SBN 94 and 14).

41 "Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government. Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks of men" (T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402).

42 By dominant or prevailing passions I mean those that either because of natural disposition, or for other reasons, such as education and habit, come out of the ongoing conflicts of contrary passions as the stronger ones. (See, for example, T 1.3.10. 4, 2.3.4.2–5, and 2.3.9.12–13; SBN 119, 419–21, and 440–41). Passions can be anything between calm and violent, and much of the moral psychology of Book 2 is an analysis of their dynamics and transitions of force or power, their influence on the will, our actions, and moral judgments (T 2.3.4.1; SBN 418–19). For the importance of the interplay between emotional reactions—even such as are so customary that they go unnoticed—and ideas or beliefs, see, for example, T 2.2.8.4–6; SBN 373–74, and for the constant

unions in the actions of the mind and between motives, tempers, circumstances, and actions, see T 2.3.1 (SBN 398–407).

43 See Baier, *Progress of Sentiments*, 131, 142. The lack of a spatial location of the bundle is a reason for Hume to worry about his account in the Appendix, according to Don Garrett, who suggests, as a way out of the labyrinth, that the brain (!) be included in the causal story ("Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts").

WORKS CITED

Ainslie, Don. "Hume on Personal Identity." In *A Companion to Hume*, edited by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, 140–56. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2011.

Ainslie, Don. "Hume's Anti-cogito." In *Hume Readings*, edited by Lorenzo Greco and Alessio Vaccari, 91–120. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2013.

Ainslie, Don. "Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001): 557–78.

Ainslie, Don. "Skepticism about Persons in Book 2 of Hume's *Treatise*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 37 (1999): 469–92.

Ainslie, Don. "Sympathy and the Unity of Hume's Idea of Self." In *Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier*, edited by Joyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting and Christopher Williams, 143–73. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.

Alanen, Lilli. "The Powers and Mechanisms of the Passions." In *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise*, edited by Saul Traiger, 179–98. Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Alanen, Lilli. "Reflection and Ideas in Hume's Account of the Passions." In *Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier*, edited by Joyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting, and Christopher Williams, 117–42. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.

Baier, Annette. *Death and Character: Further Reflections on Hume*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Baier, Annette. *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's "Treatise*." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Baier, Annette. "Response to My Critics." *Hume Studies* 20 (1994): 213–14.

Baxter, Don. "Hume's Critique of Pure Substance." Paper presented at the 41st International Hume Society Conference, Portland State and UCSB, July 22–26th, 2014.

Baxter, Don. "Hume's Labyrinth concerning the Idea of Personal Identity." *Hume Studies* 24 (1998): 203–33.

Garrett, Don. "Hume's Self-doubts about Personal Identity." *The Philosophical Review* 90 (1981): 337–58.

Garrett, Don. "Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts about Personal Identity." In *The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud*, edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Hume, David, *A Dissertation on the Passions*. Facsimile of the 1957 edition reprinted in David Hume, *Four Dissertations and Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul*, with introductions by John Immerwahr and John Valdimir Price, 119–82. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2000.

Hume, David. *Enquiries Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Hume, David. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.

Hume, David. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Lecaldano, Eugenio. "The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume." *Hume Studies* 28 (2002): 175–94.

McIntyre, Jane. "Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity." In *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, edited by David Fate Norton and Jaqueline Taylor, 177–208. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

McIntyre, Jane. "Personal Identity and the Passions." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27 (1989): 545–57.

Pears, David. "Hume's Account of Personal Identity." In *Questions in the Philosophy of Mind*, 15-26. London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd, 1975.

Pears, David F. "Hume's Recantation of His Theory of Personal Identity." *Hume Studies* 30 (2004): 256–64.

Penelhum, Terence. "Hume on Personal Identity." *The Philosophical Review* 64 (1951): 571–89.

Penelhum, Terence. "Self-identity and Self-regard." In *The Identities of Persons*, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 253–80. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Pitson, Tony. "Skeptical Realism and Hume on the Self." *Hume Studies* 39 (2013): 37–59.

Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. "Hume on Practical Morality and Inert Reason." In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 299–320. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Stroud, Barry. *Hume*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.

Swain, Corliss. "Personal Identity and the Skeptical System of Philosophy." In *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's "Treatise,"* edited by Saul Traiger, 133–50. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Traiger, Saul. "Comments on Don Baxter's 'Hume's Critique of Pure Substance,'" presented at the 41st International Hume Society Conference, Portland State and UCSB, July 22–26th, 2014.

Traiger, Saul. "Hume on Memory and Imagination." In *A Companion to Hume*, edited by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, 58-71. Malden, MA, Wiley Blackwell, 2011.

Wiggins, David. "Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: and Men as a Natural Kind." In *The Identities of Persons*, edited by A. Oksenberg Rorty, 139–73. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Winkler, Kenneth P. "All is Revolution in Us: Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and Hume." *Hume Studies* 26 (2000): 3–40.