

Alison McIntyre

Fruitless Remorses: Hume's Critique of the Penitential Project of *The Whole Duty of Man*

Hume Studies vol. 40, no. 2 (2014), pp. 143–167.

Hume Studies
Volume 40, Number 2, 2014, pp. 143–167

Fruitless Remorses: Hume's Critique of the Penitential Project of *The Whole Duty of Man*

ALISON MCINTYRE

Abstract: Familiarity with the doctrines presented in Richard Allestree's devotional work *The Whole Duty of Man* (1658), which Hume reported having read as a boy, can illuminate the strategy of argument Hume employs in *Treatise* 2.1.6–2.1.8 to undermine views he attributes to "the vulgar systems of ethicks." Hume's explicit critique of the view that pride is a sin and humility a virtue in *Treatise* 2.1.7 relies on assumptions that are already present in Allestree's account of pride and humility and are described using similar language. Sections 6–8 of *Treatise* 2.1 also provide an implicit critique of Allestree's attempts to induce a general stance of humility based on mortifying considerations about human nature and to inspire episodes of penitential humility for the sins of the day. I argue that the "limitations to this account" gathered together in 2.1.6 are placed there to set up this critique. Together, the limitations imply that defects in our personal character are sufficiently close to us, peculiar to us, discernible to others, of appropriate duration, and supported by general rules to generate the passion of humility when we reflect on them, while reflection on human nature in general and particular episodes of sin are not.

First published in 1658, *The Practice of Christian Graces. Or The Whole Duty of Man Laid Down in a Plaine and Familiar Way for the Use of All, but especially the*

Alison McIntyre, Virginia Onderdonk '29 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Wellesley College, 106 Central Street, Wellesley MA 02481. Email: amcintyre@wellesley.edu.

Meanest Reader[1] became the most popular devotional work in Restoration England (Sommerville, *Popular Religion*, 38).[2] It contains 17 sermons designed to be read in sequence, one each Sunday, in order to guide the penitent in reflecting on the week's sins. Samuel Johnson's mother made him read it on Sunday afternoons during his youth (Stranks, *Anglican Devotion*, 125–26). Hume also read it as a boy. James Boswell reports that during his deathbed interview with Hume,

> I asked him if he was not religious when he was young. He said he was, and he used to read the *Whole Duty of Man*; that he made an abstract from the Catalogue of vices at the end of it, and examined himself by this, leaving out Murder and Theft and such vices as he had no chance of committing, having no inclination to commit them. This, he said, was strange Work; for instance, to try if, notwithstanding his excelling his schoolfellows, he had no pride or vanity. He smiled in ridicule of this as absurd and contrary to fixed principles and necessary consequences. (Boswell, "Last Interview," 227–28)

The Whole Duty of Man treats pride as the master sin and so as the underlying cause of violations of our duties. Particular sins are taken up according to the traditional tripartite division of duties: duties to God, duties to self, and duties to others.

Hume recalled his youthful reflections about the psychological inevitability and rather benign character of taking pride in one's accomplishments in his conversation with Boswell, echoing the explicit challenge to this traditional religious understanding of pride as a sin and humility as a virtue that can be found in *A Treatise of Human Nature*:

> There may, perhaps, be some, who being accustom'd to the style of the schools and pulpit, and having never consider'd human nature in any other light, than that in which they place it, may here be surpriz'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice; and of vice as producing humility, which they have been taught to consider as a virtue. But not to dispute about words, I observe, that by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy'd with ourselves: and that by humility I mean the opposite impression. 'Tis evident the former impression is not always vicious, nor the latter virtuous. The most rigid morality allows us to receive a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action; and 'tis by none esteem'd a virtue to feel any fruitless remorses upon the thoughts of past villainy and baseness. (T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297–98)[3]

Familiarity with the doctrines of *The Whole Duty of Man* can illuminate the strategy of argument Hume employs leading up to this explicit critique of the *Whole Duty*'s psychology. In section 1, I review features of the *Whole Duty*'s account of penitential humility that would have been familiar to Hume and his audience. In section 2, I argue that Hume's initial account of pride and humility (provided in *Treatise* 2.1.2–2.1.5) contests the traditional association of pride with vanity, "the desire of reputation" (T 2.2.1.9; SBN 331–32), by emphasizing respects in which basic forms of pride are grounded in private reflective evaluation. Allestree and Hume each have their own reasons to insist that humility is not necessarily tied to concerns about our reputation with others. Hume's critique of *The Whole Duty*'s view that pride is a sin and humility a central virtue will rest on this shared tenet combined with Hume's reasonable assumption that pride and humility are correlative and should be given strictly parallel accounts.

A close acquaintance with *The Whole Duty of Man* also makes it possible to identify Hume's implicit critique of the psychological assumptions underlying that work's attempts to induce humility in *Treatise* 2.1.7–2.1.8. This in turn can lead to the solution of an interpretive puzzle that concerns the role of the section immediately preceding the critique: "Limitations of this system" (T 2.1.6; SBN 290–94). The puzzle will be explained in section 3. It concerns the fact that the constraints laid out in the "Limitations" are routinely violated by Hume when he provides examples of pride in sections that follow (T 2.1.9–10; SBN 303–16). In section 4, I argue that the limitations are gathered together in *Treatise* 2.1.6 because they imply that *The Whole Duty*'s attempt to induce both a general stance of humility, by introducing mortifying considerations about human nature, and specific episodes of humility in the course of repentance for the sins of the day is bound to be inefficacious. Together, the limitations imply that shortcomings *in personal character* will be sufficiently close to us, peculiar to us, discernible to others, of appropriate duration, and suitably related to general rules to generate the passion of humility. In contrast, general considerations about human nature and regrets concerning particular instances of sin will not be efficacious in generating the passion of humility.

1. *The Whole Duty of Man* on Sin and Penitential Humility

The full title of *The Whole Duty of Man* is *The Practice of Christian Graces. Or The Whole Duty of Man Laid Down in a Plaine and Familiar Way for the Use of All, but especially the Meanest Reader, Divided into XVII Chapters, one whereof being read every Lords Day the Whole may be read over Thrice in the Year.* Philosophers had, until quite recently, accepted Norman Kemp Smith's verdict that *The Whole Duty of Man* is a Calvinist work and that in rejecting its doctrines Hume was rejecting a form of Scottish Presbyterianism that was familiar from his youth.[4] In *Reason, Grace, and*

Sentiment, published in 2000, Isabel Rivers pointed out that *The Whole Duty of Man* was not only not a Calvinist work, it was an anti-Puritan and anti-Calvinist work written in the 1650s by an Anglican clergyman (1: 19–21). David F. Norton identifies *The Whole Duty of Man* as an Anglican, anti-Calvinist work ("Historical Account," 433n2, 485n126). M. A. Stewart remarks, "Who in a Calvinist culture would have openly recommended a work of seventeenth-century Anglican piety to Hume is unclear," and he speculates that "Hume's copy was probably handed down from an older generation: his maternal grandfather, Sir David Falconer, had held high judicial office under the episcopalian administration" ("Hume's Intellectual Development," 19).

The author was not identified in his lifetime but is now presumed to be Richard Allestree.[5] A royalist, Allestree served in a scholar's regiment in the English civil wars, became an Anglican clergyman during the Interregnum, was driven out of Christ Church, Oxford, after refusing to submit to the authority of the Parliamentary forces in 1647, and was proscribed from preaching in July 1648.[6] Allestree travelled frequently to the continent as a courier for Charles II, the king in exile, and was arrested just before the Restoration because of intelligence provided by a spy. John Fell reports: "After several difficult journies successfully perform'd, in the Winter before his Majesties happy restauration he was sent over into Flanders, from whence returning with letters, he upon his landing at Dover, was seiz'd by a part of Soldiers, who waited for him" (*Life of Allestree*, Leaf c). Allestree had the presence of mind to secure his letters by shifting them into "a faithful hand" who took care of them; he was imprisoned at Lambeth House for six or eight weeks and released: "some of the Leaders of the Party, seeing things move towards his Majestie's restoration, were willing by kindnesse to recommend themselves in case of a revolution; among who was the late Earl of Shaftesbury, who was us'd to value himself, that Mr. Allestree owed his preservation to him" (*Life of Allestree*, Leaf c). Allestree was rewarded at the Restoration with a canon's position at Christ Church, Oxford and appointment as one of Charles II's chaplains (Lehmberg, *Cathedrals Under Siege*, 115). In Scotland, the Revolution of 1689 placed control of the Church of Scotland in the hands of the Presbyterians, and *The Whole Duty of Man* was associated with episcopal forms of church government. John Cockburn, in his account of the General Assembly in Edinburgh held in 1690, complained that Episcopal ministers were libeled by the Presbyterians and deprived of their parishes by the zealots in this assembly; he reports that "[t]he minister of Abbots-Hall was accused for neglecting the Catechism of the *Westminster Divines*, and using that which was first set forth by the Synod of Edinburgh, and afterwards enlarged by the Reverend and pious Bishop *Scowgal*: The Catechism (I must tell you) is as well as *The Whole Duty of Man* much spoken against, and severely condemn'd as erroneous" (*Historical Relation*, 12).

Clearly, then, it is wrong to suppose that *The Whole Duty of Man* would have been viewed by Hume as an exemplar of Calvinist doctrine, entirely continuous with the religious environment that prevailed in Scotland in his youth. To Hume, *The Whole Duty of Man* must have instead represented generic Christian morality organized in terms of divine commands, divine rewards and punishments, and private examination and repentance for sins. Yet even though the religious menu presented to the youthful Hume offered a choice between the orthodox Calvinism of Scotland's Presbyterians and the Anglicanism of *The Whole Duty of Man*, it is clear that he eventually turned away from both. Compared to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, the Arminian claim that salvation is open to all who address themselves to repentance and improvement, and not merely to the elect, sounds encouraging enough.[7] But great scrupulousness in detecting sin and great diligence and self-command in repenting of it are required for success in the penitential project that *The Whole Duty of Man* recommends.

The *Whole Duty of Man* begins with a call to penitence that is designed to be shocking and terrifying: "Therefore if ever you mean to *obey* intirely (as you must if ever you mean to be *saved*) get your hearts possest with the *sense* of that great unspeakable *distance* that is between *God* and you. Consider him as he is a *God* of *infinite Majesty*, and *glory*, and we poor *worms* of the earth (*Whole Duty*, 2.3, 35).[8] The first few sermons argue that salvation depends on not allowing a single sin to pass unrepented (*Whole Duty*, 6.21, 154). And repentance involves not only recognizing our sins but also feeling humbled by each one of them:

> [W]e must be heartily sorry for the sins we confess, and from our Souls acknowledge our own great unworthiness, in having committed them, for our confession is not intended to instruct God, who knows our sins much better then our selves do, but it is to humble our selves, and therefore we must not think we have confest aright, till that be done. (*Whole Duty*, 5.2, 110)

The chief obstacle to salvation is pride, understood as both a general stance of self-conceit and as a background desire for approval and the acclaim of others. Both attitudes obstruct the development of the forms of humility that will lead to obedience to God's commands. The subduing of pride is to be accomplished by considering the ways in which humans are inferior not only to God but also to other creatures and by opposing to each prideful thought mortifying considerations about one's follies or sins, "and so make this very motion of pride an occasion of humility" (*Whole Duty*, 6.12, 144). It is a folly to be proud of such goods of nature as beauty, strength, or wit, because even "if they were as excellent as we fancy them, yet they are not at all durable, they are impaired and lost by sundry

means; a phrensy will destroy the rarest wit, a sickness decay the freshest beauty, the greatest strength, or however old age will be sure to do all. And therefore to be proud of them is again a folly in this respect" (*Whole Duty* 6.9.142). As we will see, Hume will argue that pride and humility must be grounded in *durable* properties at T 2.1.6.7 (SBN 292–314).

Sins of pride are the first seven of the items in the "Brief Heads of Self-Examination" that concern duties owed to oneself (*Whole Duty*, 601). This is the list that Hume recalled and from which he prepared his own abstract:

> Being pufft up with high conceits of our selves:
>
> In respect of natural parts as beauty, wit, &c
>
> Of worldly riches, and honours.
>
> Of Grace.
>
> Greedily seeking the praise of men.
>
> Directing Christian Actions, as prayer, almes, &c. to that end.
>
> Committing sins, to avoid reproach from wicked men.

The other virtues listed among the duties to self include Meekness (that is, Anger-prevention), Consideration (i.e., examination of conscience and repentance of sins), Contentedness, Diligence, Chastity, and Temperance. Vices that oppose our Duties to Others include Injury, Scoffing, Murder, Adultery, Malice, Covetousness, Oppression, Theft, Deceit, Falsewitness, Lying, Ingratitude, and Irreverent Behavior to Parents (e.g., "Condemning their Counsels, Murmuring at their Government") ("Brief Heads," 601–608).

Allestree distinguishes between two forms of sinful pride. There is pride as a form of self-esteem not necessarily responsive to the present or future attitudes of others and pride as vainglory, a concern about gaining the admiration or approval of others. There are two corresponding forms of humility: "the first is the having a mean and low opinion of our selves, the second is the being content that others should have so of us. The first of these is contrary to pride, the other to vain glory" (*Whole Duty*, 6. 2, 136). Pride is an obstacle to salvation because our duties of obedience and repentance will frustrate our desire to think well of ourselves. Furthermore, a proud person refuses to respond to criticism or reproach by grasping the grounds for humility that such criticism indicates (*Whole Duty*, 6.14, 146–47).

Each "Partition," or sermon, of *The Whole Duty of Man* focuses on a particular sin or group of sins and begins by citing Biblical passages concerning the sin. In each sermon, Allestree includes a section demonstrating the "folly" of the sin in question by showing its incompatibility with self-interest or with our worldly

desire to be on a good footing with others. Allestree points out that Vainglory, a form of pride that consists in "a great thirst after the praise of men" (*Whole Duty*, 6.13.145), leads us to go against our own reason and conscience in ordinary life, leading to folly and, more to the point, public embarrassment, which will endanger our reputation and self-esteem. For example, Allestree observes, in being proud of the goods of nature, "beauty, strength, wit and the like,"

> we are very apt to mistake, and think our selves handsome or witty, when we are not, and then there cannot be a more ridiculous folly, than to be proud of what we have not, and such every one esteems it in another man, though he never supposes it his own case, and so never discerns it in himself. And therefore there is nothing more despiseable amongst all men, then a proud fool, yet no man that entertains high opinions of his own wit, but is in danger to be thus deceived, a mans own judgment of himself being of all others the least to be trusted. (*Whole Duty*, 6.9, 141)

Allestree develops in vivid language this ironic theme that pride, when detected, alienates one's audience and diminishes one's standing with others, thereby undercutting its own aims:

> [E]ven for the present it is observable, that of all other sins, [pride] stands the most in its own light, hinders it self of that very thing it pursues. For there are very few that thus hunt after praise, but they are discerned to do so, and that is sure to eclipse whatever praise worthy thing they do, and brings scorn upon them in stead of reputation. And then certainly we may justly condemn this sin of folly, which is so ill a manager even of its own designs. (*Whole Duty*, 6.14, 148)

Throughout the *Whole Duty of Man*, the motives underlying sinful behavior are redirected by arguments that show that these motives are best satisfied in the long term by rejecting such behavior. (See, for example, the discussion of charity (*Whole Duty*, 17.7, 364).

Allestree is attentive throughout the *Whole Duty of Man* to the tensions generated by casting repentance as both a simple reflective duty occasioned by God's commandments and also as the only prudent course for a person hoping for salvation. The appeal to self-interest expressed in the call to penitence in front of a divine audience threatens to undermine the sincerity and authenticity of the repentance itself. The sermons address four tensions that arise from the fact that repentance must be imagined to be both sincere and carried out with an eye to its effect on its audience.

First Tension: We can't be sorry only because we are like to smart

Allestree warns that if we engage in repentance with the sole object of doing what we can to obtain divine approval in order to secure salvation, then our attitude will be too self-interested to have the desired effect. He writes,

> Endeavour therefore to bring your selves to this melting temper, to this deep unfeigned sorrow, and that not only for the danger you have brought upon your self; for though that be a consideration which may and ought to work sadness in us, yet where that alone is the motive of our sorrow, it is not that sorrow which will avail us for pardon; and the reason of it is clear, for that sorrow proceeds only from the love of our selves, we are sorry because we are like to smart. (*Whole Duty*, 3.8, 76)

The remedy: the sorrow of a true penitent must be joined with the love of God, and "that will make us grieve for having offended him, though there were no punishment to fall upon our selves" (*Whole Duty*, 3.8, 76).

The humility owed to God is a form of deference and placation, offered in hope of securing God's approval and forgiveness, and yet to be appropriately sincere, humility must involve a more private and reflective form of sorrow, one that gives rise to regret and amendment. Thus, one must focus on the grounds for humility and not on the audience for humility in order to have any hope of getting things right.

Second Tension: High conceits of our performances will blast the best of them

The *Whole Duty of Man* allows that "consideration" of our standing with God and of our actions is itself a virtue, and if our actions are good, "recalling them helpeth us to the comfort of a good conscience, and that comfort again encourageth us to go on in the like; and besides it stirrs us up to thankfulness to God, by whose grace alone we were enabled to do them" (*Whole Duty*, 6.24,146). However, if this comfort should grow into pride, then this will obliterate the merit of the actions of which one feels proud. Even if we are obedient, humility will still be needed "to keep us from any *high conceits* of our performances, which if we once entertain, it will *blast* the best of them, and make them utterly *unacceptable* to *God* (*Whole Duty*, 2.4, 36). Pride erases the merit of any good action while also constituting an obstacle to salvation: "For let a Man have done never so many good acts, yet if he be proud of them; that pride shall be charged on him to his destruction, but the good shall never be remembered to his reward" (*Whole Duty*, 6.11, 136).

To develop the right attitude, it is not enough to acknowledge the role of grace and to diminish any sense of personal accomplishment. Even if we were to succeed in viewing our moral successes as brought about only through grace, we will

not receive credit for these successes if we are proud of them: "the being proud of grace, is the sure way to lose it" (*Whole Duty*, 6.11, 135).[9]

Third Tension: Genuine repentance is fruitful in that it leads us to an amendment of our ways

Our repentance must be accompanied by clear signs that it is not perfunctory. After all, repentance cannot be so easy that in clearing our consciences each evening, we allow ourselves to form the expectation that tomorrow's sins will be adequately dealt with in tomorrow's repentance. What is required is proof of genuine, life-changing, hearty repentance that leads one to a new life, not mere regret. It must somehow carry within it a resolution or promise to desist from such sins in the future. Allestree views fasting and self-indignation as a mark of sincerity and sufficient self-command.[10] This is what explains Allestree's warning: "the oftener thou hast been pardoned, the less reason thou hast to expect it again" (*Whole Duty*, 3.33, 88).

Although penance does not make satisfaction for our sins—only the blood of Christ does that—"[y]et since that blood shall never be applyed to any but penitent sinners, we are as much concern'd to bring forth all the fruits of repentance, as if our hopes depended on them onely" (*Whole Duty*, 5.34, 135). Allestree explains that complaining or "murmuring" at our afflictions shows a failure of genuine humility and submission, since these afflictions are meant to encourage us to amend our lives. Genuine humility is "fruitful" in that it brings forth the amendments in our lives that affliction and repentance together should promote.

Fourth Tension: Even in our duty of humanity toward others we should be motivated solely by obedience to God's commands

One of the "helps" Allestree offers regarding the subduing of "VainGlory" is not to think about what will be praised by others: "in all matters of Religion, let the duty be thy motive; In all indifferent things of common life, let reason direct thee; and though thou mayest so far consider in those things the opinion of men, as to observe the rules of common decency, yet never think any praise, that come in to thee from any thing of that kind worth the contriving for" (*Whole Duty*, 6.15.149). If one sets up for oneself the aim of pleasing God, "then thou wilt not be at leisure to consider what praise it will bring thee from men. And surely he that weighs of how much more moment it is to please God, who is able eternally to reward us than men, whose applause can never do us any good, will surely think it reasonable, to make the former his onely care" (*Whole Duty*, 6.15, 149).

When pride is discussed as a violation of our duties to others, it is contrasted with humanity, not humility. Allestree describes the virtue of humanity as what prevents us from falling into the "the common guilt of all proud and haughty

persons, who are so busie in admiring themselves, that they over look all that is valuable in others, and so think they owe not so much as common civility to other men" (*Whole Duty*, 13.19, 265). Yet even here, the respect we owe others is not based on considerations of sociability or reciprocity:

> A second thing we owe to all is humanity and courtesie of behaviour, contrary to that sullen churlishness we find spoken of in Nabal, who was of such a temper, that a man could not speak to him. 1 Sam. 25. 17. There is sure so much of respect due to the very nature of mankind, that no accidental advantage of wealth or honour, which one man hath above another, can acquit him from that debt to it, even in the person of the meanest; and therefore that crabbed and harsh behaviour to any that bears but the form of a man, is an injustice to that nature he partakes of. (*Whole Duty*, 13.18, 265)

Similarly, "Scoffing" or scorning a man for "deformity and unhandsomeness" of body or "weakness or folly" of mind is contrary to a duty of justice that we bear to others. But it is a duty because it is commanded by God, not because it is a requirement of civility: to scorn a man is "in effect to reproach God" who did not give him excellencies of body and mind (*Whole Duty*, 13.7.257). Yet at the same time, Allestree's arguments about the folly of pride and the folly of other vices use for leverage precisely what is here being discounted: the depth of our concern to be respected by others and to avoid exposing ourselves to public humiliation.

In summary, true, sincere, and fruitful penitential humility is presented by *The Whole Duty of Man* as the product of a private review of one's own conduct and character, carried out in obedience to God's commands. Carrying out the project properly would involve pleasing a divine audience and perhaps a human one as well, but one cannot repent in the proper way if one does so while keeping an eye on one's audience. Being too self-conscious in repenting one's sins can ruin the entire performance. Being proud of grace can cause one to lose it. Seeking the approval of others is a dereliction of one's duty of obedience to God. Showing oneself worthy of God's pardon by inducing powerful feelings of humility is likely to be seen through as merely self-interested behavior calculated to please God: only the amendment of one's behavior in the conduct of life will show those performances to be genuine by demonstrating that they have been fruitful.

Many of the sins itemized in *The Whole Duty of Man* are hard to avoid, so it would be unreasonable for a penitent to hope for any decisive form of amendment regarding them. Included in the list are such things as Wandring thoughts in prayer, Uncontentedness in our estates, Envying the condition of other men, Being negligent in observing and resisting temptation, Being proud of apparel, Being too curious or costly in meats, Peevish conversation, Unthankfulness to those that

Admonish us, the Wife's striving for rule and dominion over the husband, Not loving and forgiving Enemies, and Murmuring at the Government of our Parents. ("Brief Heads," 600–609). A recommended form of prayer is inserted following the *Brief Heads* that includes this admission: "Nay, O Lord, even my repentances may be numbred amongst my greatest sins, they have sometimes been feigned and hypocritical, alwayes so slight and ineffectual, that they have brought forth no fruit in amendment of life" ("Brief Heads," 609).

2. Pleasures of Reflection and Fruitless Remorses in T 2.1.7

The Whole Duty of Man is viewed by Hume as an exemplar of popular or "vulgar" Christian morality. He mentions it by name in a letter to Hutcheson in 1739: "Upon the whole, I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from Cicero's Offices, not from the Whole Duty of Man" (*Letters* I.13.34).[11] The point is taken up in Hume's discussion of the tendency of virtues to produce pride and vices to produce humility:

> But pride and humility arise not from these qualities alone of the mind, which, according to the vulgar systems of ethicks, have been comprehended as parts of moral duty, but from any other that has a connexion with pleasure and uneasiness. Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature. (T 2.1.7.7; SBN 297)

Not only does Hume contest the list of virtues and vices to be found in *The Whole Duty of Man*, he also contests the view that pride is always a sinful response to a survey of oneself and humility is always a virtuous one. Hume observes, "[t]here may perhaps, be some, who being accustom'd to the style of the schools and the pulpit," will be surprised "to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice; and of vice as producing humility, which they have been taught to consider a virtue" (T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297). Hume seems to realize that he can cite the authority of *The Whole Duty of Man* in reconciling this benign view of pride with Christian morality. Hume observes that "[t]he most rigid morality allows us to receive a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action" (T 2.1.7.8; SBN 298). As we have seen, *The Whole Duty of Man* allows that "Consideration" of our standing with God and of our actions is itself a virtue, and if our actions are good, "the recalling them helpeth us to the comfort of a good conscience, and that comfort again encourageth us to go on in the like" (*Whole Duty*, 6.21, 146). He can also rely on Allestree's arguments to support his claim that humility, understood as an attitude of displeasure adopted in light of some property of the self, is not in itself a virtue. Hume notes: "'tis by none esteem'd a virtue to feel any

fruitless remorses upon the thoughts of past villainy and baseness" (T 2.1.7.8; SBN 298). This view of fruitless remorses is, indeed, affirmed in *The Whole Duty of Man* (5.34, 135). Humility is an insufficient response to one's perceived sinfulness if not accompanied by resolution and amendment

Both Hume and Allestree treat pride and humility as correlatives and distinguish basic forms of pride and humility from the more self-conscious emotions of vanity and modesty, which involve some sensitivity to the attitudes of one's audience. Allestree's effort to distinguish sincere heartfelt repentance from an attempt to produce the right kind of result in the omniscient deity who constitutes the penitent's audience has an interesting parallel in Hume's concerted effort to distinguish a benign form of pride from vainglory. Allestree reminds penitents that since they have an omniscient audience for all of their thoughts, they will do better to attend to the good properties of their virtuous acts, the grounds for divine approval, than to anticipate divine approval with feelings of pride. Similarly, Hume will go on to argue in "Of the love of fame," the qualities that give rise to pride will be the same as those that give rise to approval from others, but in feeling pride in the face of praise, one's attention is directed, by the principles of sympathy and authority, to the grounds for the praise. On Hume's account, praise intensifies pride because it indicates grounds for pride, not because it constitutes grounds for pride in itself (T 2.1.11.9; SBN 316–24).[12]

3. The Limitations to this Account—An Interpretive Puzzle

In his initial account of pride and humility in *Treatise* 2.1.2–2.1.5, Hume had emphasized the variety of things that can cause pride. A person can be proud of "[e]very valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity," as well as physical traits and abilities: "beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture" (T 2.1.2.5; SBN 278–79). "[W]hatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us" can also cause pride: "[o]ur country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths" (T 2.1.2.5; SBN 278–79). The beauty of houses, equipage, and furniture are mentioned specifically (T 2.1.5.2; SBN 285). A person (presumably the host) can even be proud of a magnificent feast (T 2.1.5.1; SBN 285).

It comes as a surprise, then, when at *Treatise* 2.1.6, "Limitations of this System," Hume introduces some "limitations" to his initial account that would seem to disqualify many of these items from serving as causes of pride. Hume lists four limitations and one "enlargement" of the system. (1) In order to generate pride and not merely satisfaction, the relation of an agreeable object to us must be "endow'd with double force and energy." This is why it needs to be a close relation

between the agreeable object and the self "to produce a transition from one passion [namely, joy] to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity" (T 2.1.6.2; SBN 291). (2) The agreeable object must be "peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons" (T 2.1.6.4; SBN 291). Because we are apt to overlook what is good in things closely related to us, things must be exceptional and stand out by comparison to others in order to make them salient to us (T 2.1.6.4; SBN 291). Health is Hume's example of a familiar good that causes pleasure without generating pride: "We are rejoic'd for many goods, which, on account of their frequency, give us no pride. Health, when it returns after a long absence, affords us a very sensible satisfaction; but is seldom regarded as a subject of vanity, because 'tis shar'd with such vast numbers" (T 2.1.6.4; SBN 292). (3) The pleasant object must be very discernible and obvious to others (T 2.1.6.6; SBN 292). Hume writes, "We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others" and and then sets the issue aside, with a reference forward to the section "Of the love of fame" (T 2.1.11). (4) The properties must be "in some measure constant, and hold some proportion to the duration of ourself, which is its object" (T 2.1.8.8; SBN 302). This is presented not as a conceptual necessary condition of pride, but as a consideration that concerns the mechanism that generates pride: "What is casual and inconstant gives but little joy, and less pride. We are not much satisfy'd with the thing itself; and are still less apt to feel any new degrees of self-satisfaction upon its account (T 2.1.6.7; SBN 293).[13] (5) Hume adds "as a fifth limitation, or rather enlargement of this system, that general rules have a great influence upon pride and humility" (T 2.1.6.8; SBN 293). This relaxes a claim that Hume has emphasized throughout the discussion of pride: that the cause of pride must be something that actually generates a separate, independent impression of pleasure. It allows that it is enough if the cause of pride is something that is expected to produce pleasure through the effects of custom and general rules because it typically causes pleasure (T 2.1.6.8–9; SBN 294).

The limitations are ignored in the passages that concern the "foreign and extrinsic causes" of pride, which are taken up in *Treatise* 2.1.9 and 2.1.10. The external advantages and disadvantages that can cause pride are not limited to items that are closely related to the self and common with a few, while also being of long duration (T 2.1.9; SBN 303–309). Hume notes that people tend to be proud of their country, its climate, "the fertility of their native soil; of the goodness of the wines, fruits or victuals produc'd by it; of the softness or force of their language" (T 2.1.9.7; SBN 306). Having seen or lived in a foreign country (T 2.1.9.8; SBN 307) can generate pride, as can the wealth and antiquity of one's family (T 2.1.9.10–12; SBN 307–308). Property is described as the relation "which is esteem'd the closest, and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride" (T 2.1.10.1; SBN 309). However, items of property that cause pride need not be closely related to the self, of long duration, and common with only a few. Hume notes that a person

can be proud of "his houses, equipage, furniture, cloaths, horses, hounds," as well as such particular items as his wine, cookery, table, servants, local air, local soil, fruits grown on his property, antiques, artworks (T 2.1.10.2; SBN 310–11), money, and other financial instruments (T 2.1.10.3; SBN 311). The restrictions mentioned in the "Limitations" do not seem to be in force in *Treatise* 2.1.9 and 2.1.10, where the foreign and extrinsic causes of pride are discussed.

Some clues to Hume's intentions in introducing the limitations are supplied in the concluding paragraph of "Limitations of this System."

> I shall close this subject with a reflection deriv'd from these five limitations. This reflection is, that the persons, who are proudest, and who in the eye of the world have most reason for their pride, are not always the happiest; nor the most humble always the most miserable, as may at first sight be imagin'd from this system. An evil may be real, tho' its cause has no relation to us: It may be real, without being peculiar: It may be real, without shewing itself to others: It may be real, without being constant: And it may be real, without falling under the general rules. Such evils as these will not fail to render us miserable, tho' they have little tendency to diminish pride: And perhaps the most real and the most solid evils of life will be found of this nature. (T 2.1.6.10; SBN 294)

This brief argument suggests that Hume views the first four limitations as describing the conditions under which something that is eligible to cause pride or humility, an impression of pleasure or pain caused by something related to the self, will have sufficient force to be transmuted into the passion.[14] The fifth condition enlarges Hume's system by dispensing with the need for that triggering impression in the first place: custom, in the form of general rules, takes us from the eligible property to the passion without the intervening impression.

The limitations are not viewed by Hume as conceptual constraints on what kinds of properties are eligible to serve as grounds of pride, nor are they presented as necessary conditions of prideworthiness.[15] Lorraine Besser-Jones has argued that Hume takes peculiarity, the second limitation, to be a feature that enhances pride, but she argues that it is not a requirement for pride ("Hume on Pride-in-Virtue," 179). This would make sense of the fact that Hume describes pride as existing and then being *destroyed* by the process of comparison when the second limitation is not met: "Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguish'd; and upon comparing the object we possess, we discover still the same unlucky circumstance. By two comparisons so disadvantageous the passion must be entirely destroy'd" (T 2.1.6.5; SBN 292). And one could add that the third limitation, discernibility, relies on the seconding

of our attitudes by the attitudes of others, and this is also not taken by Hume to be a necessary condition of pride.

However, Hume does not present the features listed in the limitations merely as pride-intensifiers or humility intensifiers. Hume uses the limitations to point out a distinction between what I will call pride-eligible properties and humility-eligible properties, on the one hand, and pride-generating or humility-generating contexts or circumstances, on the other. The pride-eligible and humility-eligible properties are agreeable or disagreeable properties of the self or of subjects that are related to the self. They have been identified by analyzing the causes of particular episodes of pride and humility and by generalizing about the kinds of grounding features that have been found in every case. The limitations identify the circumstances in which such properties will be psychologically salient enough to generate the passions of pride or humility. This interpretive hypothesis fits nicely with Hume's way of contrasting the properties that have "real and intrinsic merit" (T 2.1.6.4; SBN 291) and "intrinsic worth and value" (T 2.1.8.8; SBN 302), the pride-eligible properties, with contexts that introduce extrinsic, relational considerations due to the operation of the psychological principles of comparison and sympathy and to the influence of past experience in the form of general rules.

Hume's conclusion that evils that make us miserable might nevertheless fail to diminish pride rests on the intermediate premise that humility-eligible properties might fail, because of their circumstances, to generate humility.[16] If an evil is real but is not caused by ourselves, is not peculiar to us, is not discernible to others, is not constant, and does not fall under the general rules (that is, is not a generally recognized ground of humility), then it will not induce humility and thereby diminish pride. The fifth limitation, or rather "enlargement," is meant to explain why it is that some pride-inducers are not experienced as pleasures by the proud person; instead they are viewed with sentiments of satisfaction or approval in light of general rules. Similarly, it explains why some humility-inducers are not so much experienced as pains by the humble person as viewed with dissatisfaction or regret in light of general rules. General rules operate when we "form a notion of different ranks of men, suitable to the power or riches they are possest of; and this notion we change not upon account of any peculiarities of the health or temper of the persons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their possessions. . . . Custom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings" (T 2.1.6.8; SBN 293).

There are other indications that the limitations are disregarded in the rest of the *Treatise*. The problematic claim that the limitations have been introduced to limit (namely, that any agreeable or disagreeable objects related to the self by a double relation of impressions and ideas will be *sufficient* to cause pride and humility) is repeated in later sections. For example, Hume writes, "*Concerning* all other bodily accomplishments we may observe in general that whatever in ourselves is either

useful, beautiful, or surprising, is an object of pride; and its contrary, of humility" (*T* 2.1.8.5; SBN 300–301)—and in the Fourth experiment of *Treatise* 2.2.2: "Having found, that neither an object without any relation of ideas or impressions, nor an object, that has only one relation, can ever cause pride or humility, love or hatred; reason alone may convince us, without any farther experiment, that whatever has a double relation must necessarily excite these passions" (T 2.2.2.9; SBN 336).

In presenting the second limitation—that the object be peculiar or common with a few—Hume explains that "every thing, which is often presented, and to which we have been long accustom'd, loses its value in our eyes, and is in a little time despis'd and neglected" (T 2.1.6.4; SBN 291). He promises that he will "endeavour to explain afterwards" this quality in human nature, which prevents health from generating pride. This seems to be a reference forward to the discussions explaining why health fails to generate pride and why sickness fails to generate humility (T 2.1.8.8; SBN 302–303). This line of reasoning conflicts with a theme that is prominent in Book 2: that familiarity gives rise to preference and partiality. In his discussion of love and hatred, Hume will argue that the bare familiarity of our property can give rise to partiality, and partiality to pride: "The mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects, to which it is accustom'd, and naturally prefers them to others, which, tho', perhaps, in themselves more valuable, are less known to it. By the same quality of the mind we are seduc'd into a good opinion of ourselves, and of all objects, that belong to us. They appear in a stronger light; are more agreeable; and consequently fitter subjects of pride and vanity, than any other" (T 2.2.4.8; SBN 355). Hume also remarks that familiarity can make us partial to a habitual acquaintance in a way that need not be based on merit: "When we have contracted a habitude and intimacy with any person; tho' in frequenting his company we have not been able to discover any very valuable quality, of which he is possess'd; yet we cannot forbear preferring him to strangers, of whose superior merit we are fully convinc'd. These two phaenomena of the effects of relation and acquaintance will give mutual light to each other, and may be both explain'd from the same principle" (T 2.2.4.3; SBN 352).

These observations support the hypothesis that the intended scope of the limitations concerns the role they play in the two sections that immediately follow. These sections contain the only direct references to the limitations. "Of vice and virtue" begins with "[t]aking these limitations along with us" (T 2.1.7.1; SBN 294), and the second and the fourth limitations are referred to explicitly in the discussion of sickness and health at T 2.1.8.8 (SBN 302).

Hume's handling of this material in the *Dissertation on the Passions* confirms this suggestion.[17] In the *Dissertation*, four of the five conditions appear near the very end of the discussion of pride and humility (DP 2.11). They now appear after rather than before the problematic sufficiency claim (DP 2.11) and after rather than before the examples that involve properties that are of brief duration: surprising

feats of vigour and activity are objects of vanity (DP 2.20); or are not common to only a few: men are vain of the beauty of "*their* country, or *their* county, or even of *their* parish" (DP 2.22). The first three conditions—objects that cause pride must be (1) not only obvious to others, but approved by others, (2) of constant duration, and (3) peculiar to us or common with only a few—are described as *circumstances* of consequence in generating pride or humility rather than as *limitations* to an account. These three conditions are immediately followed by a reworking of *Treatise* 2.1.8.8 (to be discussed in the next section), which explains why sickness and health do not give rise to humility or pride. This is followed by a discussion of general rules, a reworking of T 2.1.6.9, which ends section 2 of the *Dissertation.*

4. Hume's Implicit Critique of Attempts to Induce Humility in *The Whole Duty of Man*

Hume considers an "objection" to his system: "that tho' nothing be more agreeable than health, and more painful than sickness, yet commonly men are neither proud of the one, nor mortify'd with the other" (T 2.1.8.8; SBN 302). This is really Hume's own observation, and he treats it as an invitation to invoke the limitations and the associated distinction between properties related to the self that cause pleasure and pain and the context needed for these properties to generate pride or humility through the double relation of impressions and ideas. To explain why people are not proud of health, he appeals to the second and fourth limitations regarding peculiarity and duration: "Now as health and sickness vary incessantly to all men, and there is none, who is solely or certainly fix'd in either, these accidental blessings and calamities are in a manner separated from us, and are never consider'd as connected with our being and existence" (T 2.1.8.8; SBN 302). It follows that attempts, like those in *The Whole Duty of Man*, to induce a general stance of humility by pointing out our susceptibility to pain, sickness, and disease are based on faulty psychological assumptions that are at variance with those codified in the limitations.

In a corresponding passage in the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume makes the religious context for such remarks explicit:

> All men are equally liable to pain and disease and sickness; and may again recover health and ease. These circumstances, as they make no distinction between one man and another, are no source of pride or humility, regard or contempt. But comparing our own species to superior ones, it is a very mortifying consideration, that we should all be so liable to diseases and infirmities; and divines accordingly employ this topic, in order to depress self-conceit and vanity. They would have more success, if the common bent of our thoughts were not perpetually turned to compare

> ourselves with others. The infirmities of old age are mortifying; because a comparison with the young may take place. (EPM 6.26n31; SBN 245–46)

In applying the limitations, Hume sometimes presents himself as a head-scratching observer of the fact that properties that are genuinely *pride-eligible* do not in fact generate pride, and properties that are genuinely *humility-eligible* do not in fact generate humility. Does Hume think that we are mistaken in failing to respond with pride or humility to such properties? Hume might seem to hold this kind of position. After all, in introducing the second limitation, he declares: "We likewise judge of objects more from comparison than from their real and intrinsic merit" (T 2.1.6.4; SBN 291). But when he explains why episodes of pain and sickness, which he concedes to be "proper causes of humility," fail to generate humility, he makes it clear that he is vindicating our habits of judgment, not condemning them.

> This sufficiently proves that bodily pain and sickness are in themselves proper causes of humility; tho' the custom of estimating every thing by comparison more than by its intrinsic worth and value, makes us overlook these calamities, which we find to be incident to every one, and causes us to form an idea of our merit and character independent of them. (T 2.1.8.8; SBN 302–303)

The contexts for judgment encoded in the limitations are not a distraction from "real" value since they constitute central features of our evaluative tendencies and practices. Although Hume typically describes the operations of comparison as fleeting and unstable, the other elements mentioned in the limitations—the implicit reference to the attitudes of others in the discernibility condition and in the operation of general rules—invoke processes of evaluation that are more stable. Thus he writes,

> The passions are often vary'd by very inconsiderable principles; and these do not always play with a perfect regularity, especially on the first trial. But as custom and practice have brought to light all these principles, and have settled the just value of every thing; this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of general establish'd maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another." (T 2.1.6.9; SBN 294)

(Hume concludes section 2 of the *Dissertation* by repeating this paragraph.)

The conditions laid out in the limitations can be readily generalized to cover moral evaluation as well as the generation of pride and humility. It is crucial to Hume's account of moral evaluation that the circumstances that govern the

generation of pride and humility provide an acceptable basis for our assessments of the merit of ourselves and others. The psychological theory embodied by the limitations explains why it must be *character* and not particular, isolated incidents of moral accomplishment or moral fault that is the proper object of appraisal concerning personal merit. It is character that is (1) most closely related to the self. Although having a good or bad character is not (2) peculiar to ourselves or common with only few, our particular character and reputation is clearly peculiar to ourselves.[18] Furthermore, remarks about human susceptibility to pain and sickness that are meant to be mortifying apply equally to all of us. Character, as revealed in conversation and action is (3) discernible by others and (4) of long duration, in a way that sinful thoughts and impulses are not. And most importantly, even if our virtues do not actively and directly cause pleasure or pain in us, (5) our awareness, *through general rules*, that our kind of character is thought valuable may be sufficient to cause a sentiment of approval or satisfaction that can ground an impression of pride. Correlatively, our awareness that our kind of character is such as to be condemned by others may be sufficient to cause humility by generating apprehension, even if our character does not directly cause pain in us.[19]

Hume emphasizes the centrality of character in *Treatise* 2.1.7, "Of vice & virtue." Vice and virtue are described as "the most obvious causes" of pride and humility (T 2.1.7.2; SBN 295), and Hume specifies that "[t]he virtue or vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility" (T 2.1.7.4; SBN 296). Hume provides in *Treatise* 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 the arguments needed to substantiate his earlier claim that "the good and bad qualities of our actions and manners constitute virtue and vice, and determine our personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on these passions" (T 2.1.5.2; SBN 285).[20] These comments may sound like platitudes, but they contest the idea that it would be possible for someone to summon up feelings of humility simply by considering sobering and "mortifying" facts about human susceptibility to pain, disease, and death.

The limitations and the discussions of the effects of health and sickness on pride and humility also contest *The Whole Duty of Man*'s project of coaching the sinner to experience penitential humility concerning each and every episode of sin. The doctrines of *The Whole Duty of Man* contrive to make such inevitable shortcomings as wandering thoughts in prayer, peevish conversation, unthankfulness to those that admonish us, and even lust within marriage count as instances of sin.[21] Yet if such attitudes do not seem remarkable when we compare ourselves with others, are not discernible to others, are inconstant in nature, and are not supported by general rules, they will not induce humility, according to the psychological theory set forth in the limitations, even if they are classified as sins by the people concerned.

It might be objected that clerical denunciations of such attitudes would be enough to induce shame, and these experiences would provide the basis for later humility via the influence of general rules. However, shame induced only on Sundays but not felt the rest of the week would not be sufficient: "in order to establish a general rule, and extend it beyond its proper bounds, there is required a certain uniformity in our experience, and a great superiority of those instances, which are conformable to the rule, above the contrary" (T 2.2.5.13; SBN 362). There is an irony in this: the more thorough one's approach to identifying and repenting each of one's sins, Hume's account implies, the more likely one is to fail to induce genuine humility while reflecting on them.

Furthermore, Hume observes that when "a malady of any kind is so rooted in our constitution, that we no longer entertain any hopes of recovery, from that moment it becomes an object of humility" (T 2.1.8.8; SBN 302–303). This implies that a sinful disposition would qualify as the kind of thing that could generate humility only if one has given up all hope of amending it. These would be fruitless remorses indeed.

The undermining of the elements that make up the penitential project will continue in the discussion of love and hate that follows in part 2 of Book 2. Hume there insists on treating pride and humility, the passions that have self as their object, as the same in their grounds as love and hate. The grounds that others have for loving and approving of us will be exactly the properties that reliably generate the passion of pride in us. The grounds that give rise to humility will be limited to the kinds of considerations that give others grounds to hate us or view us with contempt. Self-love, traditionally taken to be the basis for pride, will turn out to be an incoherent notion because the passion of love will always have another person as its object. The attitude that *The Whole Duty of Man* recommends toward sin, hatred of the sin, will be shown to be psychologically implausible since hatred, as an indirect passion, necessarily has a person—rather than sin—as its object: "We may be mortified by our own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred except from the injuries of others" (T 2.2.1.2, SBN 329). Hume will classify "those penances, which men inflict on themselves for their past sins and failings" as falling in the category of "irregular appetites for evil" and will explain them as an attempt to reduce the uncomfortably stark psychological contrast between their present ease and the punishments they think they deserve (T 2.2.8.11; SBN 376–77). Challenging the psychological assumptions behind the penitential project is certainly not Hume's primary goal as he presents his account of the indirect passions in Book 2 of the *Treatise.* Nevertheless, he is alert to the ways in which his account provides reason to doubt the efficacy of the calls to repentance and mortifying reflections to be found in *The Whole Duty of Man* and other, similar works of traditional Christian piety.

NOTES

Versions of this paper were presented at the 2011 Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, D.C. and the conference of the Hume Society in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in 2013. I would like to thank the audiences as well as Åsa Carlson, my commentator in Brazil, for discussion of some of the themes in this paper. Two anonymous referees for *Hume Studies* and the editors of *Hume Studies* helped shape the final version. I gratefully acknowledge research support from the Virginia Onderdonk '29 Professorship at Wellesley College.

1 Allestree, *The Whole Duty of Man*, hereafter abbreviated *Whole Duty*. References are to the 1658 edition and will identify the sermon number, followed by section and page numbers.

2 Reporting on a study of forty-two popular religious books published between 1660 and 1711, Sommerville concludes that the *The Whole Duty of Man* "enjoyed the greatest number of editions between 1660 and 1711, perhaps forty-five in all, again probably enough copies (135,000) for every tenth family" (29).

3 References to the *Treatise* are to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Norton and Norton, hereafter cited in the text as "T" followed by Book, part, section, and paragraph number, and to *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. by Nidditch, cited in the text as "SBN" followed by the page number.

4 Norman Kemp Smith wrote in 1947 that *The Whole Duty of Man* "gives a somewhat tame version of Calvinist teaching, almost entirely omitting its sublimer features, and toning down the more difficult doctrines, yet without departing from them" ("Introduction to Hume's Dialogues," 5). Fred Wilson viewed it as a representative of the views of the Church of Scotland "Stoicism," 67n18. Annette Baier identified it as a "Calvinist tract" in 1991 (*Progress of Sentiments*, 314n12). Jerome Schneewind thought it was Calvinist, though he observed that "[u]nlike the sermons to which Hume listened when he was a boy, The Whole Duty is not explicit about the doctrines of election, prevenient grace, and predestination" (*Invention of Autonomy*, 355). T. L. Beauchamp identifies it as Calvinist in the "Annotations" to the 1998 Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the second Enquiry (248), but as Anglican in the 2006 critical edition, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (184). Alasdair MacIntyre described it more accurately as "at once a typical and a popular work of Protestant piety" ("Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought,'" 464). See also MacIntyre, *Short History*, in which the author, Allestree, is identified as "a royalist divine" (171).

5 The identification was made by Elman, "Richard Allestree," 19–27. It was conjectured in 1864 by Barham in "Discovery," 433–35. See also Purcell, "'Useful Weapons," 130.

6 Without identifying him as the author of *The Whole Duty of Man*, an account of Allestree's life is given by John Fell, "Life of Allestree." John Fell was the son of Samuel Fell, dean of Christ Church, who was closely involved in the anonymous publication of Allestree's works. The organization of *The Whole Duty of Man* followed another Anglican and anti-Calvinist work, Henry Hammond's *Practical Catechisme*, which had been published anonymously in 1644 (Sommerville, *Popular Religion*, 38–39, 95).

7 See Kraal, "Irreligious Aim" for a discussion of the Arminian dimensions of Anglican theology in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

8 Peter Kail cites these preliminary passages in the call to penitence and observes that "[b]oth Malebranche and *The Whole Duty of Man* recommend a view of oneself as almost entirely undesirable, corrupted by one's bodily, animal nature, when compared with infinite perfection" ("Ethical Conclusion,"131, 135).

9 For Allestree, this was an anti-Calvinist theme: "This it much concerns us to consider and examine, and that not by those easie rules men are apt to frame to themselves, as whether they believe that Christ died for their sins; that they are of the number of the elect; and shall certainly be saved, if these and the like were all that were required to put us into Gods favour, none but some very melancholly person could ever be out of it, for we are apt enough generally to believe comfortably of our selves. But the rules God hath given us in his word, are those by which we must be tryed at the last day, and therefore are certainly the only safe ones, by which to trie our selves now" (*Whole Duty*, 6.21, 153–54).

10 Practices like fasting can serve as proof of earnestness in these occasions of humiliation, according to Allestree, for "fasting carries in it somewhat of revenge, which is reckoned as a special part of repentance" and "a proper effect of that indignation which every sinner ought to have against himself" (*Whole Duty*, 5.34, 133). See *Treatise* 2.2.8.11 for Hume's account of the psychology of penance and the "irregular appetites" of self-malice and self-indignation that are involved.

11 Hume is here responding to Hutcheson's objection that he wrongly includes traits like wit and cleanliness among the virtues. Hume's account of how the virtues are determined is fully explained in Book 3 of the *Treatise*. *The Whole Duty of Man* is again mentioned in this regard in the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, App. 4n72 (SBN 106–107). References to the second *Enquiry* are to Hume, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. Beauchamp, hereafter cited in the text as "EPM" followed by section and paragraph number, and to Hume, *Enquiries*, ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. by Nidditch, hereafter cited in the text as "SBN" followed by page numbers.

12 Hume denies that the approval of others would, on its own, constitute grounds for self-approval even when the mechanism of sympathy is supposed to be in operation. When one is praised, "if a person consider'd himself in the same light, in which he appears to his admirer, he wou'd first receive a separate pleasure, and afterwards a pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above-explain'd" (T 2.1.11.9; SBN 320).

13 The phrase "self-satisfaction" appears here for the first time in the *Treatise*. It appears again in *Treatise* 2.1.11.9 and 3.3.2.10. This is another detail that links this section to *Treatise* 2.1.11.

14 Hume emphasizes the generality of these considerations—that they apply to all passions (joy is mentioned specifically)—and not just to pride and humility.

15 Páll Árdal thinks that the limitations concern the *justification* of pride and that Hume "is making a perfectly valid point, but expressing it misleadingly because of his predisposition to state a logical point in causal terms" (*Passion and Value*, 29).

16 In making revisions to this passage for the *Dissertation on the Passions*, Hume made this inference explicit. The passage was changed so that "becomes an object of humility" in T 2.1.8.8 (SBN 302) was replaced with "damps our self-conceit" in DP 2.44.

17 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for *Hume Studies* who pointed out to me the placement of the conditions described in the limitations at the conclusion of section 2 of the *Dissertation.*

18 Perhaps this is sufficient to allay Annette Baier's concern in *Progress of Sentiments* that Hume seems to have waived the second limitation in order to allow for pride in one's own good character in Book III (207).

19 See Taylor, "Evaluation of Character," 283, for a full discussion of how these claims about the causes of pride in relatively durable traits of character will ground Hume's account of moral judgment. Our sympathy with the indirect passions of others is what gives rise to the moral sentiments.

20 Although Hume acknowledges later that property and signs of social status might be the most common causes of pride (T 2.1.10.1; SBN 309–10), his considered view is that qualities of mind and body are the natural, immediate, and primary causes of pride and humility. See also T 2.1.9.1–2 (SBN 303–304).

21 *The Whole Duty of Man* argues that marriage has two ends—begetting children and avoiding fornication—and that it is contrary to the second end "to make marriage an occasion of heightening and enflaming lust" (*Whole Duty*, 7.18, 160).

WORKS CITED

Allestree, Richard. *The Practice of Christian Graces, Or, The Whole Duty of Man: Laid Down in a Plain and Familiar Way for the Use of All, but Espcially the Meanest Reader: Divided Into XVII Chapters, One Whereof Being Read Every Lords Day, the Whole May Be Read Over Thrice in the Year: With Private Devotions for Several Occasions*. London: Printed for T. Garthwait, 1658. Accessed on Early English Books Online.

Árdal, Páll. *Passion and Value in Hume's* Treatise. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966.

Baier, Annette. *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's* Treatise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Barham, F. "Discovery of the Authorship of *The Whole Duty of Man*." *The Journal of Sacred Literature and Biblical Record* 10 (1864): 433–35.

Beauchamp, Thomas L. "Annotations." In David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: A Critical Edition*. Edited by Thomas L. Beauchamp, 124–95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Besser-Jones, Lorraine. "Hume on Pride-in-Virtue: A Reliable Motive?" *Hume Studies* 36 (2010): 171–92.

Boswell, James. "The Account of His last Interview with David Hume, 7 July 1776." In *The Private Papers of James Boswell from Malahide castle; in the Collection of Lt.-Colonel Ralph Heyward Isham; Prepared for the Press by Geoffrey Scott*, 227–32. Mount Vernon: W.E. Rudge, 1931.

Cockburn, John. *An Historical Relation of the Late General Assembly Held at Edinburgh from Octob. 16, to Nov. 13 in the Year 1690 in a Letter from a Person in Edinburgh to his Friend in London*. London: J. Hindmarsh, 1691. Accessed on Early English Books Online.

Elman, Paul. "Richard Allestree and *The Whole Duty of Man*." *The Library*, 5th Series 6 (1951): 19–27.

Fell, John. "Account of the Life of Richard Allestree." Preface to *Forty Sermons, Whereof Twenty are Now First Publish'd, the Greatest Part Preach'd before the King and on Solemn Occasions*, by Richard Allestree, Leaves a–e. Oxford: R. Scott, G. Wells, T. Sawbridge, R. Bentley, 1684. Accessed on Early English Books Online.

Hume, David. *A Dissertation on the Passions; the Natural History of Religion*. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

Hume, David. *Enquiries Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Hume, David. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Hume, David. Hume to Hutcheson, 17 September 1739. In *The Letters of David Hume*, vol. 1. Edited by J. Y. T. Greig, 32–34. (New York: Clarendon Press, 1932).

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Kail, Peter. "Hume's Ethical Conclusion." In *Impressions of Hume*, edited by M. Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail, 125–40. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.

Kraal, Anders. "Anglicanism, Scottish Presbyterianism, and the Irreligious Aim of Hume's *Treatise*." *Hume Studies* 39 (2013): 169–96.

Lehmberg, Stanford E. *Cathedrals Under Siege: Cathedrals in English Society, 1600–1700*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought.'" *The Philosophical Review* 68 (1959): 451–68.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. *A Short History of Ethics*. New York: MacMillan, 1966.

Norton, David F. "Historical Account of *A Treatise of Human Nature* From its Beginnings to the Time of Hume's Death." In David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 433–38. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

Purcell, M. "'Useful Weapons for the Defence of That Cause': Richard Allestree, John Fell and the Foundation of the Allestree Library." *The Library* 21 (1999): 124–47.

Rivers, Isabel. *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660–1780*, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991–2000.

Schneewind, Jerome. *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Smith, Norman Kemp. "Introduction." In David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. Edited by Norman Kemp Smith, 1–75. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947.

Sommerville, C. John. *Popular Religion in Restoration England*. Gainesville, FL: The University Presses of Florida, 1977.

Stewart, M. A. "Hume's Intellectual Development 1711–1752." In *Impressions of Hume*, edited by M. Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail, 11–58. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.

Stranks, C. J. *Anglican Devotion*. London: SCM Press, 1961.

Taylor, Jacqueline. "Virtue and the Evaluation of Character." In *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's "Treatise,"* edited by Saul Traiger, 276–95. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

Wilson, Fred. "Hume's Cognitive Stoicism." *Hume Studies* 10th Anniversary Issue (1984): 52–68.