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Hume’s Appendix Problem and Associative Connections in the *Treatise* and *Enquiry*

DANIEL R. SIAKEL

Abstract: Given the difficulty of characterizing the quandary introduced in Hume’s Appendix to the *Treatise*, coupled with the alleged “underdetermination” of the text, it is striking how few commentators have considered whether Hume addresses and/or redresses the problem after 1740—in the first *Enquiry*, for example. This is not only unfortunate, but ironic; for, in the Appendix, Hume mentions that more mature reasonings may reconcile whatever contradiction(s) he has in mind. I argue that Hume’s 1746 letter to Lord Kames foreshadows a subtle, but significant, shift in Hume’s reasonings regarding the relevance of “real connexions”; that the *Enquiry* of 1748 provides evidence for this shift; and that this shift obviates Hume’s second thoughts by reconciling the contradiction that he had in mind. In short, Hume’s letter to Kames and *Enquiry* supply the retrodictive keys to a systematically satisfactory account.

1. Unrenounceable Principles

At the end of 1740, David Hume published Book 3 of the *Treatise* with an infamous Appendix to Books 1 and 2, the meaning of which has vexed scholars as much as the problem that Hume “explains,” but woefully underdescribes, vexed Hume.¹

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Virtually every interpreter agrees that the two principles which Hume claims he can neither “render consistent” nor “renounce,” call them Hume’s *unrenounceable principles*,² are not inconsistent.³ Hume’s first unrenounceable principle is the *distinct-existence principle*: “that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences” (T App 21; SBN 636). Conjoined with Hume’s other philosophical principles,⁴ the distinct-existence principle entails that every perception is “self-sufficient” or capable of independent existence. Perceptions’ metaphysical independence is compatible with their *contingent* dependence, however; Hume takes his experiments to prove that perceptions are (as a matter of fact) brain-dependent.⁵

Hume’s second unrenounceable principle is the *non-perception principle*: “that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (T App 21; SBN 636). In the *Treatise* and Appendix—though not in the *Enquiry*, for reasons explained below—the phrase “real connexion” functions as a technical term meaning metaphysically necessary and inseparable. Hume’s hopelessness, therefore, somehow involves the unrenounceable principle that perceptions are distinct existences, hence metaphysically independent, and the similarly unrenounceable principle that the mind never perceives any metaphysically necessary, inseparable connection among distinct existences, meaning connections “beyond” or “stronger than” merely associative relations between perceptions.

Hume’s opacity about how these principles relate to his quandary has generated over thirty incompatible interpretations of what has come to be known as Hume’s *Appendix problem*. We can parse these interpretations into four general (albeit internally heterogeneous) groups.⁶ Group 1 interpretations take Hume’s problem to concern the metaphysics of the mind, and more specifically, bundling: how distinct perceptions are actually connected such that there can be a mind *qua* system of successive perceptions.⁷ Group 2 and 3 interpretations, in contrast, take Hume’s problem to concern the psychology of the mind, and more specifically, ascription: how the mind’s operations account for erroneous ascriptions of identity and simplicity to it.⁸ Group 4 interpretations locate Hume’s problem in neither the metaphysics of bundling nor the psychology of ascription.⁹

Widespread disagreement has led many commentators to maintain that Hume’s second thoughts remain underdetermined by the “‘interpretive openness’ of Hume’s actual text,”¹⁰ meaning the *Treatise* and Appendix. Indeed, some commentators have concluded that “the question [regarding the malady Hume expresses so poorly but feels so strongly] cannot really be settled on the basis of *any* texts.”¹¹ Given the alleged underdetermination of Hume’s second thoughts and the difficulty of characterizing the inconsistency, however, it is striking how few commentators have considered whether Hume addresses and/or redresses the Appendix problem after 1740—in the first *Enquiry*, for example. This is not only unfortunate, but ironic; for, in the Appendix, Hume mentions that more mature reasonings may reconcile whatever contradiction(s) he has in mind.¹²

I will argue that Hume's 1746 letter to Lord Kames foreshadows a subtle, but significant, shift in Hume's reasoning regarding the relevance of "real connexions"; that the *Enquiry* of 1748 provides evidence for this shift; and that this shift obviates Hume's second thoughts by reconciling the contradiction that he had in mind. In short, Hume's letter to Kames and *Enquiry* supply the retrodictive keys to a systematically satisfactory account.

Interpreters of the Appendix problem often describe criteria that any plausible interpretation should satisfy.¹³ In that spirit, I propose two new criteria motivated by the aspiration to appreciate the development of Hume's thought across his corpus. The first is the *Kames Criterion*: any interpretation should explain why Hume judges Lord Kames's method of analyzing personal identity to be "more satisfactory than any thing that had ever occur'd to [him]" six years after the publication of the Appendix and two years prior to the publication of the *Enquiry*.¹⁴ This criterion is crucial because Kames contends, explicitly against Hume and implicitly against the non-perception principle, that he can *directly perceive* "the only connecting principle, that binds together, all the various thoughts and actions of my life."¹⁵ The second is the *Enquiry Criterion*: any interpretation should explain whether Hume addresses the Appendix problem in the *Enquiry*; and, if so, how Hume putatively redresses it; or, if not, why Hume would forgo addressing a problem that caused all his hopes to vanish and continued to vex him until at least 1746.¹⁶

The Appendix problem, as I interpret it, concerns Hume's expressions of and reasonings regarding the non-perception principle. More specifically, it concerns the *Treatise's* assumption that associative connections between distinct perceptions are not sufficiently strong, or not enough, to justify the "true idea" of the mind asserted and analogized throughout the section concerning personal identity: "a system of different perceptions or existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). The problematic assumption is that "something more" than associative connections—specifically, *real* connections—are needed to justify the true idea of the mind asserted throughout Book 1 and, indeed, Hume's corpus. The *Enquiry*, I will argue, jettisons this assumption and its correlative technical term "real connexion," thereby obviating Hume's Appendix problem while preserving his skeptical critique of unjustifiable belief in the false idea of personal identity.

2. "Of Personal Identity"

The *Treatise* section, "Of personal identity," aims to refute the idea that so-called "personal identity" involves the strict identity or simplicity of a substance. The section begins by arguing that there is no idea of a perfectly identical and simple self, despite feelings to the contrary. The section's principal aims, correlatively, are

skeptical: it seeks to explain why people, and philosophers in particular, unjustifiably believe in the strict identity and simplicity of mind; and it emphasizes that all nice and subtle questions concerning personal identity are merely grammatical, rather than philosophical.

In the course of developing this skeptical critique, however, Hume asserts several propositions about the mind's nature: persons are "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252). The section reiterates these assertions via metaphors: the mind is a kind of theater lacking strict identity or simplicity; a chain of causally related and/or resembling perceptions; a system of different perceptions; similar to a republic or commonwealth; and so on. The section's skeptical arguments therefore assume, both that there is a true idea of the mind, and that that idea is distinct from the false idea of personal identity.

With this metaphysical assumption in the background, the section foregrounds questions regarding the psychology of ascription: What gives us so great a natural propension to ascribe strict identity and simplicity to some "thing" that in fact lacks those qualities, that does not exist in the manner so believed? Hume's answers refer to the relations of resemblance and causation in concert with the faculty of memory. The maximal resemblance of minimally different objects, he contends, causes the mind to substitute the inaccurate notion of identity for the accurate notion of diversity. Memories, moreover, acquaint an observer with the continuance, extent, and causal relatedness of the succession of perceptions that *are* that observer; "observer" refers to nothing over and above a succession of perceptions—the true idea of the mind. Consequently, memory also facilitates a smooth transition from the idea of diversity, which accurately characterizes the succession, to the idea of perfect identity, which inaccurately characterizes the succession. The feeling of, or belief in, strict identity inaccurately represents what presents itself empirically.

The section goes on to claim that all nice and subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided and present merely grammatical difficulties, and that all disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal. Hume implicitly holds that disputes about strict identity and simplicity are not merely verbal, however. They are philosophical; thus, Hume's skeptical arguments target philosophers such as Descartes. The section's arguments rely essentially on Hume's non-perception principle: the mind never perceives a real principle of union between perceptions, but only such a connection would *justify* belief in a strictly identical, simple self. Therefore, belief in such a self is unjustified, however strongly one might feel otherwise; and the idea of personal identity, correlatively, is false. Relations of resemblance and causation between perceptions are not real, but merely associative, principles of the mind. Yet, it is

precisely those relations which facilitate a smooth transition to, and strong belief in, the false idea of personal identity.

Having delivered this skeptical critique, the section reasserts what it assumes to be the accurate, true idea of the mind: "As to *causation*; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). The section not only refutes what it takes to be a false idea of personal identity (in the section's critical moments), but also asserts and analogizes what it takes to be the true idea (in the section's constructive moments). The final section of Book 1 reiterates this assertion: "[the] succession of perceptions . . . constitutes our self or person" (T 1.4.7.3; SBN 265).

The crucial point *vis-à-vis* the Appendix is that, in the section concerning personal identity, Hume conceives of a real principle of union as being germane only to whether personal identity involves strict identity and simplicity, given unjustified belief in that idea. He does not consider whether a real principle of union is required to justify belief in the true idea of the mind that he asserts, analogizes, and assumes throughout Book 1. The problem that Hume recognizes in the Appendix, then, is that the section concerning personal identity presupposes a conception of mind that the non-perception principle seems to rule out.

The Appendix expresses Hume's recognition that Book 1's section on personal identity fails to establish the conception ("true idea") of mind that it asserts and analogizes; it assumes an unproven point. More specifically, Hume recognizes that the section refutes only one kind of real principle of union, the first kind mentioned in the Appendix's potential solutions: the existence of a strictly identical, simple substance that would really (and not merely associatively) connect distinct perceptions. *A fortiori*, the section tacitly refutes another kind of real principle of union, the second kind mentioned in the Appendix's potential solutions—even though Hume's assertions and analogies seem to presuppose it: the existence of relations that would really (and not merely associatively) connect perceptions. The Appendix, in other words, reasserts Book 1's skeptical critique of substance-based accounts of personal identity; and, in addition, it expresses skepticism as to whether Hume's alternative—the "true idea" of the mind—has been justified.

Hume's second thoughts lead him to plead the privilege of a skeptic because the true idea of the mind appears to contradict the unrenounceable non-perception principle. In the absence of some real principle of union, Hume—so he believes, for a time—cannot help himself to the true idea of mind asserted and analogized in Book 1. The reason is that associative relations of causation and resemblance are not *real* in the technical sense, hence are not sufficient to explain the connectedness of mind that Hume's experiments make evident. The Appendix takes the *Treatise* section on personal identity to offer only a successful critique of

unwarranted belief in personal identity *qua* strict identity and simplicity. The Appendix does not take the section to establish the alternative idea asserted and analogized therein, however strongly Hume might feel that his alternative is the “true idea.” This quandary—an apparent contradiction between the unrenounceable non-perception principle and what Hume believes to be the true idea of the mind—causes Hume’s hopes to vanish.

By the *Enquiry*, Hume allows that the feeling of connectedness produced in the mind of an observer provides that observer with justified grounds for the true idea of the mind, with the caveat that that idea does not involve strict identity or simplicity. Hume’s revised reasoning allows for both association-generating relations and associative connections—including (mere) *feelings* of connections between perceptions—to sufficiently connect and unify their relata, thereby justifying the “true idea” of the mind assumed throughout Hume’s corpus. At the same time, Hume’s revision preserves the *Treatise’s* arguments against the absurd (because empirically false) claims that ideas are entirely loose and unconnected, and that relations between perceptions are metaphysically necessary or inseparable. The *Enquiry* allows that connections between perceptions are both *causally* necessary or psychologically inseparable and perceivable or discoverable as such. Therewith, the Appendix problem dissolves.

The shift from the Appendix, as I will now attempt to show, is that Hume has revised his reasonings concerning the non-perception principle: justified belief in the unity of mind *qua* connected succession does not require real, but only associative, connections.

3. Associative Connections and Real Connections

Hume takes his experiments to prove that the same type of simple ideas (or resembling tokens thereof) regularly fall into complex ones. Correlatively, Hume takes it to be inconceivable, hence impossible, for all perceptions to be joined merely by chance alone (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10). By “chance,” Hume means “nothing *real* in itself . . . [but] merely the negation of a cause” (T 1.3.11.4; SBN 125), or, as expressed in the *Enquiry*, “not any *real* power, which has, any where a being in nature” (EHU 8.25; SBN 95).

Appropriately, the question as to how distinct perceptions constitute one mind arises immediately after the *Treatise’s* claim that it is impossible for perceptions of all types (not just simple ideas)¹⁷ to be entirely loose and unconnected: “This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider’d as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination” (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10). On the one hand, Hume takes his experiments to prove that there are *associative* connections between perceptions, which are established by the imagination’s associative principles.¹⁸ On the other hand, Hume takes his analyses to have

excluded necessary, inseparable connections from the mind, and more precisely, *metaphysically* or *demonstratively* necessary connections grounded in relations of ideas (about mathematical objects, for example). This suggests that, insofar as necessity is germane to perceptions being connected, only *causally* or *psychologically* necessary connections are pertinent. The important implication, then, seems to be that, were a succession of perceptions connected via causal-psychological necessity and perceivable or discoverable as such, that would justify the true idea of the mind. But how do causally necessary connections differ from associative connections that lack necessity?

Associative connections that lack necessity are relatively weak. The imagination is constrained, neither by temporal ordering (as is memory), nor by the content of previous impressions; the imagination can produce the complex idea of a gold mountain or even the simple idea of an unexperienced shade of blue. Consequently, Hume regards the uniting principle among ideas merely “as a gentle force, which commonly prevails” (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10). Causally necessary connections, in contrast, involve it being (psychologically) impossible, even with voluntary effort, to conceive of constantly conjoined pairs of perceptions as not standing in the relation of cause-and-effect. Another way to put this is that causally necessary connections are associative connections with greater “force”: causally necessary connections are (psychologically) inseparable because of habits of the mind that are established and maintained by constant conjunctions of similar types of perceptions.¹⁹ As Garrett puts it, “if there is enough constant conjunction to determine the mind to association and inference, then there is causal necessity *simpliciter*; if not, there is mere chance and so no kind of necessity at all.”²⁰ Causally necessary connections differ markedly from demonstratively necessary connections, in this respect, though both are based on the mind’s inability to conceive otherwise. Demonstratively necessary connections such as those treated in mathematics are absolute; there is nothing “stronger” than a demonstratively inseparable relation.²¹ Listed in order of strength, therefore, the *Treatise* officially recognizes at least three kinds of connection: associative connections that lack necessity, causally necessary connections, and demonstratively necessary connections.

The metaphysical question that arises *vis-à-vis* (false) belief in personal identity, given Hume’s conclusion that it is impossible for a mind’s perceptions to be entirely loose and unconnected, is: What kind of connection metaphysically explains the fact that some perceptions naturally introduce others? The epistemological question is: Are these connections epistemically accessible to the mind itself?

The Appendix problem concerns the mind’s inability to perceive *real* connections between distinct existences. Throughout the *Treatise*, “real” functions as a technical term to mean something more than, or over and above, the associative connections established by the mind. In the section titled “Of the idea of neces-

sary connexion,” for example, Hume contends that, “If we really have no idea of a power of efficacy in any object, or of any real connexion between causes and effects, ’twill be to little purpose to prove, that an efficacy is necessary in all operations” (T 1.3.14.27; SBN 168). Hume advances this claim in the context of criticizing projections of determinations of the mind, namely, causal inferences based on constant conjunctions, onto “real connections” between putative causes and effects of external objects. The problem is that such projections unjustifiably presume that there is “any real intelligible connexion”—a connection that is both stronger than associative connections and perceivable or discoverable as such—between external objects. The projected connections, which, by implication, are unreal, “can only belong to the mind that considers [external objects]” (T 1.3.14.27; SBN 168). “Real connexion” thus means something more than merely associative connections, yet something less than demonstratively necessary connections. This does not entail, however, that real connections are tantamount to causally necessary connections. Indeed, substituting “causally necessary connection” for “real connexion” would contradict the empiricist principles that Hume defends.

We find further evidence of this distinction in Hume’s discussion of the sense-based reason of animals. There, Hume contrasts (putative) connections between external objects, which he refers to as “real connexion[s],” with constantly conjoined objects of perception—the basis of causally necessary connections.²² Hume’s aim, once again, is to criticize projections of determinations of the mind, and more specifically, causal inferences based on constant conjunctions, onto external objects. Thus, “real connexion” designates something more than merely associative, mind-determined, or customary connections, but neither demonstratively nor causally necessary connections. The implication is that real connections are *sui generis* in relation to associative, causally necessary, and demonstratively necessary connections.

Hume’s analysis of the idea of time also contrasts the associative succession of perceptions with a real succession of objects. Fittingly, the example that Hume introduces to explain this contrast, a man in sound sleep, recurs in the section concerning personal identity. Sound sleep entails there being no succession of perceptions, and therefore no idea of time or oneself, “even tho’ there be a real succession in the objects” (T 1.2.3.7; SBN 35). Once again, Hume employs the word “real” to distinguish mind-dependent and mind-independent connections.

This interpretation of “real connexion” accords with commentators such as Cottrell, Garrett, and Strawson:

By “real connexion” used as a technical term, Hume means (at least) a connection between two objects that is more than simply an associative relation in the imagination. The relation between a perception and a mental substance in which it is necessarily to inhere, and the relation

of necessary connection understood as a relation between the cause and effect themselves, would both constitute “real” connections, in this sense. . . . He implies, in fact, that in a “real connexion,” the existence of one object in some way entails or is impossible without the existence of the other.²³

Hume's principal example of a “real connexion” is a causal necessity realistically and naively figured as something that exists entirely independently of any construction of the Imagination. . . . In the *Enquiries* Hume drops the term “real connexion” and simply uses “connexion.”²⁴

In the *Treatise* section concerning personal identity, moreover, Hume contrasts real connections with associative connections and asks “whether [the relation of identity is] something that *really* binds our several perceptions together, or *only associates* their ideas in the imagination” (T 1.4.6.16; SBN 259; emphases mine). Identity is a philosophical and the most universal relation, “being common to every being, whose existence has any duration” (T 1.1.5.4; SBN 14). Hume's subsequent claim epistemically qualifies his metaphysical distinction between real and associative connections—a qualification that resurfaces when Hume describes what would solve the Appendix problem: “That is, in other words, whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some *real* bond among his perceptions, or *only feel* one among the ideas we form of them?” (T 1.1.5.4; SBN 14). These questions are easily decidable, Hume contends, because he takes himself already to have “prov'd at large,” in the technical sense of proof that we will examine momentarily, “that the understanding never observes any real connexion among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examin'd, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas” (T 1.4.6.16; SBN 260). The question that is not easily decidable, however, is whether a customary association of ideas is sufficiently strong, despite being unreal, to constitute the succession of perceptions represented by the “true idea” of the mind.

As early as T 1.1.4.1, then, Hume foreshadows the Appendix problem by maintaining that associative connections between distinct perceptions are not tantamount to the real connections that the author of the Appendix believes he needs.²⁵ The upshot is that, while there must be some connecting principle(s) that unites distinct perceptions, the relevant connections cannot be perceived or discovered because they are real, meaning that they transcend the mind and its epistemic capacities. When memory acquaints us with the causal relations that unite distinct perceptions into one interconnected chain of succession, and thereby enables us to “*discover* personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions,” the relevant connections are not real, but merely associative (T 1.4.6.19–20; SBN 261–62). Shortly after publish-

ing Book 1, Hume believes that he needs some stronger principle(s) of connection that is perceivable or discoverable as such. Otherwise, the true idea of the mind appears to be unjustifiable; but Hume's corpus, and the *Treatise* skeptical critique of personal identity in particular, require this idea.

This brings us back to the Appendix. Hume's reasonings regarding, and expressions of, the non-perception principle employ "real" in his technical sense: "*the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences*" (T App 21; SBN 636). This sense of "real" also motivates Hume's reasoning regarding how perceptions are connected: "If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only *feel* a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another" (T App 20; SBN 635). The distinction between associative and real connections enters, not only into Hume's formulations of the problem, but also into its potential solutions: "Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case" (T App 21; SBN 636). In the first case, perceptions would constitute an interconnected whole by inhering in one and the same substance that would serve as their uniting principle. Hume rejects this position in the section concerning personal identity, the anonymously published Abstract of March 1740 (which predates the Appendix by eight months),²⁶ and the Appendix itself (T App 14–15; SBN 634). The real contender, therefore, is the second solution. In that case, perceptions *qua* distinct existences would belong to one interconnected system in virtue of connections that *really* (and not just associatively) unite them; and the relevant connections would be perceivable or discoverable as such. The second solution, in short, would justify the critical *and* constructive aims of the *Treatise* section on personal identity.

If there are no such connections, however, then it is not clear how there can be a mind at all. More specifically, it is not clear that the "true idea" of the mind described in the section concerning personal identity and reasserted in the Abstract and Appendix is true.²⁷ If neither resemblance nor (especially) causation can generate sufficiently "strong" connections between distinct perceptions, despite the imaginary "links" or "natural connections" that those relations generate, then how can Hume legitimately maintain that the mind is a system of perceptions, a claim that Hume needs to avoid the absurd alternative that perceptions are entirely loose and unconnected? (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). This is the kind of contradiction—an apparent inconsistency between the non-perception principle and the true idea of the mind—of sufficient magnitude to cause Hume's hopes to vanish and lead him to plead the privilege of a skeptic.

The account adumbrated above becomes more appealing when we consider writings produced after the Appendix, especially Hume's letter to Lord Kames and

the *Enquiry*. Before we examine those texts, a brief foray into Hume's epistemology will help clarify what it would mean to either perceive or discover a real connection; what constitutes a proof, in Hume's technical sense; and what makes the "true idea" of the mind true. These epistemological considerations will illuminate Hume's praise of Kames and the *Enquiry's* subsequent claims about being able to perceive and discover (indeed, prove) that associative connections unify distinct perceptions.

4. Perception, Discovery, Proof, and Truth

Rather than abandon the unrenounceable non-perception principle, Hume revised his reasonings regarding and expressions of it.²⁸ In all relevant texts, Hume distinguishes between his philosophical principles *per se*, his reasonings regarding those principles, and his expressions of those principles and reasonings.²⁹

All forms of *reasoning* consist in comparing and discovering the constant or inconstant relations that two or more objects (of perceptions) bear to each other (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73). When any number of objects is present to the senses without a relation between them, the mind can reason by making a comparison and thereby discover the relation(s) that those objects bear. *Discovery* is thus a diachronic epistemic process involving: first, the presentation of two or more objects without an immediately evident relation; and second, a comparison that reveals some relation(s) holding between those objects. *Perception*, in contrast, involves the related objects being present to the senses along with the relation itself. Discovery and perception, therefore, differ: only discovery counts as a form of reasoning, in the strict sense; and only perception involves experiencing the relation(s) between two or more objects in addition to the relation's *relata*. Discovery and perception are complementary, however: one can discover and thus foster stronger belief in what one previously perceived.

The highest degree of confidence obtainable via probable reasoning is *proof*, which Garrett perspicuously parses as "a high level of psychological certainty resulting from the experience of completely uniform and pervasive constant conjunction."³⁰ A probable or sensible proof is non-demonstrative reasoning concerning matters of fact, where a high level of certainty results from uniform and commonly experienced constant conjunctions.³¹ Denial of a probable proof's conclusion is empirically contradictory or absurd. It would be absurd, for example, to claim that perceptions are entirely loose and unconnected; Hume takes his experiments to prove otherwise, even if it remains metaphysically possible for every perception to be distinguishable and separately existent *vis-à-vis* others.

When the author of the Appendix describes his second thoughts, they concern the mind never being able to either "discover" any connection among distinct existences or "perceive" real connections among distinct existences. Real connections,

therefore, are neither discoverable nor perceivable. Yet, the author of the Appendix reasserts the “true idea” of the mind, despite loosening all particular perceptions and having to explain the principle(s) of unity in virtue of which perceptions are unified. The non-perception principle, however, precludes Hume from explaining what justifies the true idea of the mind—so the author of the Appendix reasons.

What makes the “true idea” of the mind true?³² Hume notes that this conclusion derives from causal reasoning (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). Belief in the true idea of the mind is not grounded by perception (in the epistemic sense) because the connection between successive perceptions, according to the author of the *Treatise* and Appendix, is not immediately perceivable.³³ It takes time, hence a form of reasoning, to discover that there are connections among the perceptions that constitute the mind. By referring to this discovery as a “true idea,” Hume means that the reality of the idea’s object, meaning its referent, has effectively been proven to exist. This, in turn, entails that strong belief in the represented reality is epistemically justified, and that to believe otherwise is absurd.

On the one hand, then, Hume takes his science of human nature to discover and prove true the idea that the mind is a succession of perceptions, parts of which resemble and causally influence others. On the other hand, Hume’s reasonings regarding the non-perception principle seem to preclude him from proving that idea: Hume can neither discover nor perceive any real connection that would justify the belief that he asserts and analogizes throughout the section on personal identity. This dilemma is Hume’s Appendix problem.

Curiously, in texts written after the Appendix, Hume no longer employs the term “real” in the technical sense of the *Treatise*, Abstract, and Appendix. The reason, I will now argue, is that Hume realized that associative connections, together with the association-generating relations from which they derive, are sufficiently “strong” to justify the true idea of the mind without those relations having to be real.

5. Hume’s Letter to Lord Kames

Henry Home, more commonly known as Lord Kames, was a friend to whom Hume sent drafts of everything that he intended to publish.³⁴ Kames also sent drafts to Hume. Six years after the publication of the Appendix, Hume reviewed a manuscript copy of Kames’s *Essays*, the first edition of which Kames published in 1751. The letter that Hume penned to Kames in May or June of 1746 includes a striking, oft-overlooked compliment:

I like exceedingly your Method of explaining personal Identity as more satisfactory than any thing that had ever occur’d to me. As to the Idea of Substance, I must own, that as it has no Access to the Mind by any of

our Sense or Feelings, it has always appeared to me to be nothing but an imaginary Center of Union amongst the different and variable Qualities that are to be found in every Piece of Matter. But I shall keep myself in suspense till I hear your Opinion.³⁵

Although we do not have access to the manuscript that prompted Hume's compliment, the first edition of Kames's *Essays* illustrates what Hume found to be so satisfying about Kames's "Method." This, in turn, demystifies Hume's second thoughts and foreshadows the *Enquiry's* response to the Appendix problem.

In the first edition's short essay, "Of the Idea of Self and of Personal Identity," Kames invokes the *Treatise* to differentiate his account from Hume's:

Had we no impressions but those of the external senses, according to the author of the treatise of human nature, we never could have any consciousness of *self*; because such consciousness cannot arise from any external sense. Mankind [*sic*] would be in a perpetual reverie; ideas would be constantly floating in the mind; and no man be able to connect his ideas with *himself*. Neither could there be any idea of *personal identity*. For a man, cannot consider himself to be the same person, in different circumstances, when he has no idea or consciousness of *himself* at all.³⁶

Kames then implicitly uses Hume's conception of internal impressions against him: "Beings there may be, who are thus constituted; but man is none of these beings. It is an undoubted truth, that he has an original feeling, or consciousness of himself, and of his existence; which, for the most part, accompanies every one of his impressions and ideas, and every action of his mind and body."³⁷ *Contra* Hume, Kames contends that nearly every moment of experience includes awareness, not only of what I am feeling, thinking, or doing, but also that *I* am feeling, thinking, or doing.³⁸ Correlatively, Kames criticizes the conclusion that Hume draws from the example of sound sleep, namely, that whenever Hume's perceptions are removed, he is insensible of time and himself, and may be truly said not to exist (T 1.4.6.3; SBN 252). Kames's criticism employs reasoning similar to that which Reid levels against Locke:³⁹ to constitute personal identity, consciousness need not actually, but only possibly, extend to a previous thought or action. The feeling or consciousness of one's self and existence, Kames maintains, need not accompany every perception to justify belief in a continuous, identical self. In most circumstances, the impression of self is "of the liveliest kind"; and Kames takes this liveliness to corroborate the "undoubted" truth that an impression of oneself accompanies most perceptions.

Kames also holds that most perceptions involve self-preservation, hence that perception *per se* is self-preserving: "the vivacity of this perception [of oneself] is

necessary to make us attentive to our own interest, and particularly, to shun every appearance of danger.”⁴⁰ Kames allows that reveries or circumstances in which the mind “forget[s] itself” are possible, such as falling asleep to the sound of rain, or becoming engrossed in reading. Such exceptions prove the general empirical rule that perception of oneself rarely, for good (self-preserving) reasons, vanishes. Thus, whereas Hume partially grounds his account of perception, association, and the mind in a quasi-neurological theory about bodily organs and animal spirits, Kames partially grounds his account in a proto-evolutionary theory about self-preservation. This move is doubly subversive: Hume’s *Treatise* rejects the notion that there are internal impressions of agency or powers that aim at self-preservation (T 1.3.14.10, 1.3.14.12; SBN 160, 161).

The internal impression of oneself that Kames believes to be necessary to explain our instinct for self-preservation also explains personal identity: “It is this perception, or consciousness of self, carried through all the different stages of life, and all the variety of action, which is the foundation of *personal identity*. It is, by means of this perception, that I consider myself to be the same person, in all varieties of fortune, and every change of circumstance.”⁴¹ Here Kames means “perception,” not only in a metaphysical sense (*qua* impression that represents the self), but also in an epistemic sense that accords with Hume’s distinction between discovery and perception. Strictly speaking, however, Kames takes present consciousness of oneself to explain only why synchronic feelings, thoughts, and actions are experienced as belonging to or being owned by a self, meaning some self or other.⁴² What explains diachronic “ownership” and personal identity is something more: not merely present awareness of oneself, but also the lively “feeling of identity” that accompanies most experiences. Note how closely Kames’s diction resembles Hume’s:

The main purpose of this short essay, is to introduce an observation, that it is not by any argument or reasoning, I conclude myself to be the same person, I was ten years ago. This conclusion rests entirely upon the feeling of identity, which accompanies me through all my changes, and *which is the only connecting principle, that binds together, all the various thoughts and actions of my life.*⁴³

The feeling itself purports to prove precisely what Hume thought that he could not: the discovery or perception of the connecting principle(s) that unifies particular perceptions. The lively perception of self-identity through time and change, Kames contends, is that connecting principle. Consequently, Kames takes himself to have identified a pervasive, immediate perception of relation that contravenes Hume’s method—a perception that, *a fortiori*, Kames claims to be the only connecting principle that unifies particular perceptions.⁴⁴

The third edition of Kames's *Essays*, published three years after Hume's death, accentuates the importance of there being directly perceivable connections between perceptions. The sense of self and one's existence that accompanies most experiences qualifies, not only every present thought and action, but also "must qualify every idea of memory; because that faculty recalls to the mind things as they happened: *I was present at the King's coronation; and, at a greater distance of time, I saw the first stone laid at the Ratcliff library at Oxford.*"⁴⁵ The sense of self that accompanies most perceptions, especially present impressions and memories, directly acquaints the self with personal identity.⁴⁶ As in the first edition, Kames underscores the connections made possible by the impression of self-identity that attends present perceptions and memories: "I am assured of my own identity by connecting every thing I thought and did with myself."⁴⁷ Kames goes on to claim that the same process that acquaints the self with personal identity also acquaints it with the mind-independent identity of plants and animals, where again, the issue concerns connections between the mind's perceptions: "Were I kept ignorant of my personal identity, it would not be in my power to connect any of my past actions with myself: I could not think myself accountable for them, more than if done by another person."⁴⁸ Such connections are epistemically accessible in only one way: "inward sense of consciousness of fact."⁴⁹

What Hume finds to be "more satisfactory" about Kames's account of personal identity pertains, not to its content *per se*, for Hume continues to criticize the unjustifiable, false belief in personal identity. Rather, what attracts Hume—reading his letter to the letter—is the form or "Method" that Kames employs.

Unlike the author of the Appendix, Kames allows for the possibility of directly perceiving the principle that unifies distinct perceptions, *without that principle having to be real*. In addition, Kames rejects the relevance of discovering such a principle via probable reasoning.⁵⁰ Kames instead highlights a perception that provides immediate evidence of "the only" connecting principle which unites particular perceptions. The fact that Hume judges Kames's method to be "more satisfactory than any thing that had ever occur'd to [him]" does not involve Hume coming to believe in an impression of a diachronically identical, simple self. His praise pertains to Kames allowing there to be some perception that affords direct acquaintance with the principle that explains why the mind is not entirely loose and unconnected. The method that Hume finds so satisfactory, moreover, accords with the two general requirements prescribed in the Appendix: it features both a metaphysical and epistemological component, the latter of which justifies strong belief in the former. Hume's appreciation of Kames's method, therefore, foreshadows the *Enquiry's* revised reasonings regarding, and expressions of, the non-perception principle.

6. Evident Principles in Hume's Enquiry

The Appendix problem concerns whether the true idea of the mind is warranted, given Hume's (passing) belief that the non-perception principle precludes him from explaining how distinct perceptions are connected. The author of the *Enquiry*, in contrast, reasons that there are principles which justify the true idea of the mind, and that they are "evident," "observable," and "discoverable"—*provably* so. The *Enquiry's* revised reasonings are epistemically inspired by Kames's method: Hume allows that the connecting principles which bind together all various thoughts and actions of one life are perceivable as such. In effect, Hume recognizes that associative connections and association-generating relations unify distinct perceptions in a way that justifies belief in the true idea of the mind, regardless of whether such connections count as real. Hume's considered view, accordingly, is that association-generating relations and the associative connections caused by them jointly constitute the succession of perceptions that is the mind. This revision preserves the *Treatise's* skeptical critique of personal identity while advancing Hume's constructive aim of explaining the true idea of the mind, which his philosophy requires, without relying on unjustified assertions and analogies.

The *Enquiry* begins with Hume noting that there are truths and falsehoods about the mind which fall within the compass of human understanding (EHU 1.14–15; SBN 14–15). As in the *Treatise*, Hume holds that we may prove certain beliefs, for example, that it is neither by chance alone, nor by demonstratively necessary connections, that an observer's perceptions are united. But Hume also subtly widens the scope of the kinds of truths and falsehoods that we may know about the mind, including the range of phenomena that we can discover and perceive regarding the mind's unity. In particular, he claims that we can "observe" and "examine carefully the principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other [in the mind]" (EHU 3.3; SBN 23). The *Enquiry* still distinguishes associative connections from "the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations" (EHU 1.15; SBN 14). As in the *Treatise*, Hume pretends not to explain the origin of primary impressions of sensation, but only other perceptual subtypes, especially ideas, since determining the origin of specific ideas may enable us to discover something probable about the mind's secret springs and principles.⁵¹

Hume concedes that we cannot reflect on the operations and principles of the mind without their seeming to be obscure. Yet, he also allows that we may apprehend those operations and principles in an instant via a form of "superior penetration" that derives from nature and improves with habit and reflection. He describes such insight as follows: "This task of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind,

in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it" (EHU 1.13; SBN 13). Whereas the mind's secret springs and principles are not directly perceivable via superior penetration, associative connections are.⁵² So far, this is consistent with the *Treatise*. The twist is that the *Enquiry* allows associative connections to be that perceivable and discoverable principle of connection which unifies particular perceptions into "one" (diverse) succession. This metaphysical-epistemological claim—precisely the kind of claim that the author of the Appendix thought would solve his difficulty—justifies strong belief in the true idea of the human mind.

A key passage occurs at the outset of section 3, "Of the association of ideas":

It is evident, that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and [it is evident] that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. (EHU 3.1; SBN 23, emphases mine)

Compare these claims with the Appendix: "But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only *feel* a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another" (T App 20; SBN 635). The author of the *Enquiry* does not contend that we feel an unreal, and therefore insufficient, connection between perceptions. The fact that the principle of connection among ideas is merely associative, moreover, no longer entails that Hume (by his own lights) cannot explain the principle of connection that unites successive perceptions. Hume now maintains that "it is evident" and "observable" that such associative connections are the principle of connection between different ideas of the mind. He allows, in other words, that one can *perceive* the principles of connection that unify one's distinct perceptions. The metaphor of a chain is apt; it expresses the general empirical maxim that each idea *qua* part of the mind is necessarily—in the causal sense—connected with its immediate predecessor and successor, whether they are impressions (apropos of the copy principle) or ideas (apropos of the associative principles of the imagination and/or memory). Like links in a chain, such connections constitute a system that maintains itself even as its number of parts increases. The term "connexion," in this context, refers to an association; and the *Treatise* also sometimes employs the term "connexion" in this way. The difference is that, in the *Enquiry*, such connections justify the true idea of the mind; real connections are no longer relevant.⁵³

The passage from section 3 is one of many keys, not an Archimedean point or Achilles' heel.⁵⁴ Throughout the *Enquiry*, Hume maintains that the mind's

principles of connection are epistemically accessible through both perception and discovery. Even when the mind does not immediately perceive the principle of connection in a succession, it is discoverable upon reflection:

We shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connection upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something, which connected it in all its transitions. (EHU 3.1; SBN 23)

Hume foreshadows this claim in the Abstract, after lauding the author of the *Treatise* as an inventor for the use he makes of the principles of the association: “Hence arises what we call the *apropos* of discourse; hence the connexion of writing; and hence that thread, or chain of thought, which a man naturally supports even in the loosest *reverie*” (Abs 35; SBN 662).⁵⁵ Hume takes the fact that different languages are capable of expressing the same ideas, moreover, to provide “certain proof” of universal principles of connection that hold for all human beings, which makes it “too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together” (EHU 3.2, 3.1; SBN 24, 23). All three epistemic modes that we examined (perception, discovery, and proof), therefore, support the *Enquiry’s* claims about there being principles of connection that unify distinct perceptions.⁵⁶

These epistemic modes also justify strong belief in the true idea of the mind defended in the *Treatise* and presupposed throughout Hume’s corpus, including the *Dialogues*, in which all participants seem to agree about the mind’s general nature.⁵⁷

But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, *arrange themselves* so as to form the plan of a watch or house. *Experience, therefore, proves that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter.* [Philo] (DNR 2.14; SBN 146)

What is the soul of man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; *united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each other.* When it reasons, the ideas which are the parts of its discourse *arrange themselves* in a certain form or order, which is not preserved entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. . . . [Demea] (DNR 4.2; SBN 159)

A mind whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive, one that is wholly simple and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a

word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation.
[Cleanthes] (DNR 4.2; SBN 159)

Furthermore, the *Enquiry's* epistemic justifications recur in multiple sections: "We have already observed, that nature has established connexions among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement" (EHU 5.14; SBN 50). As in section 3, the mind's evident principles of connection not only bind and unite perceptions, but also "beget that regular train of reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among all mankind" (EHU 5.14; SBN 50). When describing a prisoner being conducted to the scaffold, Hume writes: "His mind runs along a certain train of ideas. . . . Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, in passing from one link to another" (EHU 8.19; SBN 90–91). The upshot is that, although the prisoner does not perceive the principles connecting his rapidly succeeding perceptions, most of which are vivacious and hence not "perfect ideas," reflection would enable him to discover those connections if only he had time.

Personal biographies also presuppose uniting principles that connect the events of a person's life "by showing their mutual dependence and relation" (EHU 3.10). As with the connections between narrative and historical events, the mutual dependence and relations between distinct events of a person's history presuppose resemblance, contiguity, and/or causal connections—that is, a "certain required unity"—between the ideas that represent those events.

The associative connections that the *Treatise* describes as principles of merely imaginary, unreal union are refashioned in the *Enquiry* as perceivable, discoverable, and provable connecting principles: "That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted" (EHU 3.2–3.3; SBN 24). The analyses conducted in the *Treatise*, motivated as they are by Hume's reasonings regarding the non-perception principle, fail to recognize that the existence of associative connections justify the true idea of the mind even if they do not count as real. Associative connections are precisely the epistemically-justified (because perceivable and discoverable), system-maintaining (because unifying) principles that Hume's philosophy requires. After all, Hume takes matters of fact, including perceptions, to be "real existences"; and he holds that principles pertinent to perception can be proven to be "real" or "have reality" in a way that does not entail their representing mind-independent realities about external objects or secret springs and principles (EHU 5.16; 5.8; SBN 52, 46). Hume, thanks in part to Kames, comes to recognize that associative connections "have reality" in this revised sense, and provably so.

Fittingly, the *Enquiry's* analogical reasoning regarding narrative, historical, and biographical productions alludes (intentionally or not) to the *Treatise* claim

that “[t]he mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. . . . The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind” (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 253). The connections characteristic of productions and biographies are directly relevant to questions concerning so-called personal identity. The mind, too, is a production that unfolds over time; and “a certain unity is requisite in all productions,” just as a certain unity is requisite in all minds (EHU 3.14). When an epic poem’s miraculous events resemble each other and are temporally contiguous, there is “sufficient unity to make them be comprehended in one fable or narration” (EHU 3.17). By analogy, when the object of a perception stands in a relation of resemblance or causation *vis-à-vis* the object of a preceding perception, there is sufficient unity to make those perceptions be comprehended in one mind or person. Hume’s revised reasonings, therefore, are directly relevant to the *Treatise* section concerning personal identity and the Appendix even though the phrase “personal identity” does not occur in the *Enquiry*. Hume’s revised reasonings, moreover, preserve his skeptical critique of personal identity while justifying the true idea of the mind employed in that critique.

Other issues pertinent to personal identity occur throughout the *Enquiry*. In section 8, for example, Hume inquires:

Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims, which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual, have a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons, and our observation of their conduct, could never teach us their dispositions, or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them. (EHU 8.11; SBN 86)

Hume speaks freely of persons remaining the same despite the diversity of sentiments, inclinations, characters, conduct, and perceptions that constitute them. This is consistent with section 3’s reasoning regarding the evident principles of connection between perceptions: “Not only in any limited portion of life, a man’s actions have a dependence on each other, but also during the whole period of his duration, from the cradle to the grave; nor is it possible to strike off one link, however minute, in this regular chain, without affecting the whole series of events, which follow” (EHU 3.10).⁵⁸ The perceivable, discoverable unity among distinct perceptions effectively redresses Hume’s second thoughts, as I have interpreted them: thoughts concerning what connects distinct perceptions in a way that justifies the

true idea of the mind without contradicting the non-perception principle. That said, the *Enquiry* preserves the *Treatise* claim that “this uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has already been excluded from the imagination” (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10). Far from undermining Hume's skeptical critique of personal identity, betraying his empiricism, or rejecting any of his philosophical principles, Hume's revised reasonings regarding, and expressions of, the non-perception principle enable him to embrace the epistemically qualified, metaphysical conclusions of his experiments.

One benefit of the interpretation proffered here is that it is consistent with Hume's claims in the Advertisement and subsequent writings that the *Treatise* and *Enquiry* present the same philosophical principles. Renouncing the non-perception principle would undermine the epistemological foundation of the critical and constructive aims of Hume's analyses of causation and the mind. Furthermore, Hume's revised reasoning, as interpreted here, constitutes a direct response to the loosening entailed by the separability and conceivability principles, which is precisely what causes Hume's hopes to vanish. The magnitude of Hume's problem may temporarily have caused all of his hopes to vanish, but the evidence does not suggest that it motivated him to reject a provably true idea or renounce an unrenounceable principle.⁵⁹ The *Enquiry* thus delivers on the Appendix's promissory note that, while the difficulty initially presents itself as being too difficult for Hume's understanding, more mature reflections may enable him to discover a hypothesis that reconciles the apparent inconsistency of the non-perception principle and true idea of the mind.

We can paraphrase Hume's revision succinctly:

The mind never perceives or discovers real connections between distinct existences, including perceptions. [*Treatise*, Abstract, Appendix]

The mind never perceives or discovers mind-independent connections between distinct existences, including perceptions. The mind can perceive and discover associative connections between distinct perceptions; and these, taken together with the association-generating relations on which they depend, justify the true idea of the human mind *qua* succession of perceptions. [EHU]

In effect, Hume's revised reasonings enable him to assert the Appendix's (second) proposed solution, while preserving an unrenounceable principle and justifying the true idea of the mind. As Hume's letter to Kames and the *Enquiry* help show, Hume does not continue to reason that only a strictly identical substance or an epistemically-accessible real connection would justify the true idea of the mind. Perceivable and discoverable associative connections, taken together with the

association-generating relations that they presuppose, metaphysically and epistemically ground the true idea of the mind. *Pace* Inukai, we need not look as far ahead as James to find an empiricist solution to Hume's Appendix problem.⁶⁰ The *Enquiry* is far enough, and the *Dialogues* lend support—thanks, in part, to Kames.

NOTES

1 When citing the *Treatise of Human Nature* (hereafter cited as *Treatise* or “T”), I first indicate the Book, part, section, and paragraph number, followed by the page number of Nidditch's revision of Selby-Bigge's edition (“SBN”). When citing from the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (hereafter cited as EHU), I first indicate the section and paragraph number, followed by the page number of Nidditch's revision of Selby-Bigge's edition (“SBN”). Passages occurring between EHU 3.3 and 4.1 did not appear in the 1777 edition, hence lack Selby-Bigge-Nidditch designations. References to subsets of the *Treatise* and EHU, for example, the “Appendix,” employ the same conventions.

2 This terminology derives from Garrett, “Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts,” 22.

3 Kemp Smith, *Philosophy of David Hume*; cf. Fogelin, “Hume's Worries.”

4 These include the copy, separability, converse separability, and conceivability principles.

5 Thanks to Karl Schafer for helping clarify this point.

6 Following Ellis, “Contents of Hume's Appendix.” Cf. Garrett, “Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts”; Stroud, *Hume*, 135.

7 Group 1 interpretations include Basson, *David Hume*; Cottrell, “Minds”; Garrett, “Hume's Self-Doubts,” *Cognition and Commitment*, and “Rethinking Hume's Second Thoughts”; Inukai, “Hume's Labyrinth”; Kail, *Projection and Realism*; Pears, “Hume's Account”; G. Strawson, “All My Hopes Vanish,” *Evident Connexion*, “Hume on Himself,” and “Humeanism”; and Stroud, *Hume*.

8 Group 2 interpretations differ from Group 3 interpretations, in that the former take Hume's problem to concern principles other than resemblance and causation. These include Fogelin, “Hume's Worries”; Lalor, “Antilogistic Puzzle”; Mascarenhas, “Hume's Recantation”; McIntyre, “Is Hume's Self Consistent?”; Nathanson, “Hume's Second Thoughts”; Robison, “Hume on Personal Identity”; and Waxman, “Hume's Quandary.” Group 3 interpretations take Hume's problem to concern something about the scope or operation of resemblance and causation. These include Ainslie, “Hume's Reflections”; Baier, *Death and Character*; Baxter, “Hume's Labyrinth”; Patten, “Hume's Bundles”; Haugeland, “Hume on Personal Identity”; Roth, “What Was Hume's Problem?”; and Winkler, “All is Revolution.”

9 Group 4 interpretations include Beauchamp, “Self Inconsistency?”; Kemp Smith, *Philosophy of David Hume*; Penelhum, “Hume on Personal Identity”; and Swain, “Personal Identity.”

10 Garrett, "Once More," 78; cf. Inukai, "Hume's Labyrinth," 258.

11 Stroud, *Hume*, 134 (emphasis mine).

12 "This difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions" (T App 21; SBN 636).

13 The widely accepted criteria that I have in mind derive from Ainslie, "Hume's Reflections." Cf. Garrett, "Once More," 78.

14 Quoted in Tsugawa, "Hume and Kames," 398.

15 Kames, *Essays* (1st ed.), 233–234.

16 In light of Moore, "Hume and Hutcheson," it is unfortunate that I will not be able to engage with Hutcheson's account and Moore's reconstruction. Cf. Thiel, *Early Modern Subject*, 411.

17 The passions, too, are connected and mutually dependent; and such connections are "found by experience" (Hume, T 1.4.2.20; SBN 195). Passions *qua* impressions are often *associatively* connected. Thus, while Hume sometimes writes as if associative connections hold only between ideas, he also allows, and in the *Enquiry* explicitly contends, that associative connections can hold between perceptions of all kinds, including lively non-representational perceptions. Here I agree with Cottrell, "Minds," 548n36.

18 The phrase "associative connection" is not Hume's, yet perspicuously expresses his considered view. Commentators employ the formulation "association-generating relations" to refer to relations that cause perceptions to be associated. Associated ideas, like associated perceptions more generally, establish and maintain *associative connections* between token perceptions, many of which exemplify general types. Any associative connection between perceptions presupposes the prior presence of some relation: an association-generating relation.

19 Thanks to an anonymous referee for motivating this clarification.

20 Garrett, *Hume*, 194.

21 Cf. Cottrell, "Minds," 543.

22 "Beasts certainly never perceive any real connexion among objects. 'Tis therefore by experience they infer one from another" (T 1.3.16.8; SBN 178).

23 Garrett, *Cognition and Commitment*, 181, 181n7.

24 Strawson, *Evident Connexion*, 103n3. Cottrell rightly points out "that a real connection would involve 'absolute' inseparability" ("Minds," 543).

25 We should not be misled by Hume's claim that "The very nature and essence of relation [*qua* complex idea] is to connect our ideas with each other, and upon the appearance of the one, to facilitate the transition to its correlative" (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 204). What Hume refers to as "natural connections" are associative connections generated by the imagination in response to complex perceptions involving natural relations of resemblance, contiguity, or causation. The *Treatise* does not countenance these as being real connections.

26 “The soul, as far as we can conceive it, is nothing but a system or train of different perceptions, those of heat and cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations; all united together, but without any perfect simplicity or identity. . . . Every thing, that exists, is particular: And therefore it must be our several particular perceptions, that compose the mind. I say, *compose* the mind, not *belong* to it. The mind is not a substance, in which the perceptions inhere. . . . So our idea of any mind is only that of particular perceptions, without the notion of any thing we call substance, either simple or compound” (Abs 28; SBN 657–658).

27 The author of the Appendix maintains that the self or mind is a composition of perceptions and that we have no idea of the self as something simple and individual (T App 11, 15; SBN 633, 634). Furthermore, Hume takes these reasonings to entail “*that we have no notion of [the mind], distinct from the particular perceptions,*” a principle that seems “to be attended with sufficient evidence” (T App 19–20; SBN 635). The true idea of the mind that represents it as an interconnected system of perceptions, therefore, is still in play.

28 Hume employs the technical term “reasoning” in both the Appendix to the *Treatise* (App 20; SBN 35) and Advertisement for EHU (xlii).

29 By “principle,” Hume sometimes means a theoretical item and other times a real item that a theoretical principle aims to characterize as accurately as possible. See Strawson, *Evident Connexion*, 113.

30 Garrett, *Hume*, 95.

31 “[T]would perhaps be more convenient, in order at once to preserve the common signification of words, and mark the several degrees of evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. *that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities*. By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, which are deriv’d from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty” (T 1.3.11.2; SBN 124; see EHU 6.1; SBN 56n10).

32 The phrase “true idea” occurs only twice in the *Treatise*; once with regard to extension (T 1.2.5.15; SBN 59) and once with regard to the mind (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261).

33 This may seem to conflict with the *Treatise*’s earlier claim that “we may observe, that what we call a *mind*, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 207). The observation, however, is “observable” only because a discovery has taken place. Once a relation-type is discovered to be constantly conjoined with multiple tokens of an object-of-perception-type, one can perceive (or observe) various objects represented by that abstract idea.

34 Tsugawa notes that “it was on Kames’s recommendation that [Hume] left out the essay ‘On Miracles’ from the *Treatise*” (“Hume and Kames,” 398n4).

35 Quoted in Tsugawa, “Hume and Kames,” 398.

36 Kames, *Essays* (1st ed.), 231.

37 *Ibid.*, 232–233. “Our internal impressions are our passions, emotions, desires and aversions” (Hume, T 1.2.3.3; SBN 33).

38 Cf. Tsugawa, "Hume and Kames," 399.

39 In the third edition of his *Essays*, Kames criticizes Locke who "inadvertently jumbles together the identity that is nature's work with our knowledge of it" (204). Kames then speaks favorably of Reid and quotes him at length, citing his contention that "All men agree, that personality is indivisible: a part of a person is an absurdity" (204–205). In effect, Kames invokes Reid to counter Hume's rejection of the simplicity of self, since he has already taken himself to have countered Hume's rejection of the identity of self. Kames also invokes Reid to underscore their common opinion that while memory (along with a present impression of self) serves to *acquaint* one with one's personal identity, it does not thereby constitute personal identity, *pace* Locke.

40 Kames, *Essays* (1st ed.), 232.

41 *Ibid.*, 233.

42 Cf. Tsugawa, "Hume and Kames," 399.

43 Kames, *Essays* (1st ed.), 233–234 (emphasis mine).

44 Kames also has Descartes in mind (234).

45 Kames, *Essays* (3rd ed.), 201.

46 "It is thus that I am made acquainted with my personal identity; that is, with being the person who saw the things mentioned above, and every other things recorded in my memory as said, done, or suffered by *me*; the same *person*, without regard to what changes my body may have undergone" (Kames, *Essays* [3rd ed.], 201).

47 Kames, *Essays* (3rd ed.), 201.

48 *Ibid.*, 202.

49 "Not the greatest skeptic ever doubted of his own personal identity, continued through the successive periods of life; of his being the same man this year as he was the last: which, however, is a discovery made by no reasoning; resting wholly upon an inward sense and consciousness of fact" (Kames, *Essays* [3rd ed.], 373).

50 The third edition reiterates that the sense of self, and thus the evidence for personal identity, derives from experience "without reasoning," and not via logical demonstration *à la* Descartes or causal reasoning *à la* Hume (Kames, *Essays* [3rd ed.], 198–199).

51 Cf. Hume's Abs 35; SBN 661–62, where the word "secret" refers to the principles of the association of ideas.

52 Regarding the relation between associative connections and secret principles, Hume writes: "It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal" (EHU 1.15; SBN 15).

53 Thanks to an anonymous referee for motivating this clarification.

54 As Pitson and others have recognized, the dialectical context of section 3 and related sections (excluding section 9) concerns only associative connections: "In fact, it is clear from the context of Hume's remark that his 'principle of connexion' is an allusion to the association of ideas of which we are aware by reflection and not a reference to some 'real' underlying connection unavailable to experience. There is no evidence

here of Hume renouncing the view of the relation between the mind and its ideas to which he commits himself in [1.4.6]" ("Skeptical Realism," 53–54).

55 Hume focuses on the principles of idea-idea connections because the imagination is the principle source of all our errors. His claims about the mind's principles of unity, however, also apply to impression-idea (à la the copy principle), idea-impression (à la the ideas giving rise to impressions of reflection), and impression-impression (à la the passions) connections. All such connections are discoverable upon reflection, even if not immediately perceived. See Hume, T 1.1.2.1, 1.3.8.7, 2.2.3.6 (SBN 7, 101, 350). Hume continues to hold this view in EHU, according to which passions *qua* impressions, like all perceptions, have origins and are connected to other perceptions (EHU 3.12; 9.1; SBN 104).

56 As in the *Treatise*, proofs are "such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition" (EHU 6.1; SBN 56n10).

57 Cf. Cottrell, "Minds," 565.

58 This qualifies Hume's separability and converse separability principles.

59 On this point, I agree with Garrett that it is in complete accordance with Hume's empiricism for the mind to be able to perceive and discover systematizing connections that are not real, in the technical sense (*Cognition and Commitment*).

60 Inukai, "Hume's Labyrinth," 271.

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