

Emily Kelahan

Naturalness and Artificiality in Humean Virtue Theory

Hume Studies vol. 44, no. 2(2018), pp. 249-76.

Hume Studies
Volume 44, Number 2, 2018, pp. 249–273

Erratum [11.23.21]: The "works cited" section was inadvertently omitted from the print version of Hume Studies 44.2. It has been added to the online version.

Naturalness and Artificiality in Humean Virtue Theory

EMILY KELAHAN

Abstract: In this paper I explore a parallel between Hume's virtue ethics and his virtue epistemology. Hume makes a categorical distinction between natural and artificial moral traits. Though it is less conspicuous, I argue that he draws a similar distinction between natural and artificial intellectual traits. In both the moral and the intellectual case, I argue that artificial traits are vulnerable to vice in a way that natural traits are not. Examination of this parallel opens the possibility of understanding Hume as a comprehensive virtue theorist while also raising questions about the distinction between moral and intellectual virtue in Hume's philosophy.

Hume has long been considered a virtue theorist as concerns ethics. There is now growing consensus that he is also a virtue epistemologist, as well as an emerging exploration of his virtue aesthetics.[1] However, few, if any, scholars have examined the viability of a *comprehensive virtue theoretic interpretation of Hume*.[2] In fact, Hume is often offered up as a foil to Aristotle in that he apparently rejects many of the tenets of Aristotle's considerably more integrated virtue theory.[3] However, the rise of virtue theoretic interpretations of Hume's epistemology and aesthetics give us cause to explore the relationships between Hume's accounts of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic virtue with renewed interest. To that end, this paper aims to examine a common element between Hume's accounts of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic

Emily Kelahan is Associate Professor, Illinois Wesleyan University, P.O. Box 2900, Bloomington, IL 61701.
Email: ekelahan@iwu.edu

virtue: a categorical distinction between natural and artificial character traits. My focus will be on the parallel between moral and intellectual traits.

This paper is largely exploratory, but I do advance and defend some claims. The first is perhaps obvious: just as Hume advances a distinction between natural and artificial moral traits, he advances a roughly parallel distinction between natural and artificial ways of forming beliefs, which ultimately relate to intellectual character. Secondly, examining this parallel reveals something hitherto unrecognized about the relationship between artificiality and vice. I argue that in both the moral and the intellectual case, artificial traits are susceptible to vice in a way that natural traits are not, due to their more complicated relation to the motives. Section 1 sets up the first component of the parallel, moral traits and their relation to naturalness and artificiality. Section 2 sets up the second component of the parallel, intellectual traits and their relation to naturalness and artificiality. As the claims I advance depend upon understanding Hume as a virtue theorist, both section 1 and section 2 devote some time to reviewing established interpretations of Hume as a virtue ethicist and epistemologist, respectively. The argument for parallel treatment of moral and intellectual traits and their relation to naturalness and artificiality is constructed across both sections. Additionally, I offer some contributions to our understanding of both Hume as a virtue ethicist and Hume as a virtue epistemologist. Concerning the latter, I argue that exploring this parallel provides us with good reason to conceive of Hume's mitigated skepticism as a kind of golden mean, which bolsters the case for adopting a virtue theoretic interpretation of Hume's epistemology.[4] Concerning the former, I offer some reflections on the status of the monkish virtues, arguing that in some cases they may be genuine virtues and that this is compatible with Hume's moral theory. Section 3 concludes the paper with suggestions for future avenues of exploration of Hume as a comprehensive virtue theorist.

1. The Distinction between Natural and Artificial Moral Traits

Let's begin with some preliminaries. First, I take for granted that Hume is a virtue ethicist and assume that doing so is uncontroversial.[5] Secondly, I am persuaded by established scholarship that while there are important differences between the *Treatise* and the second *Enquiry*, the changes to the latter work essentially augment the former and do not involve substantial revision of the views expressed in the *Treatise*.[6] This argument is important for my aims, as Hume's discussion of natural and artificial virtue drops out of the second *Enquiry* entirely. If scholars like Jacqueline Taylor are correct, we need not take this absence as a rejection of Hume's previous analysis. Finally, in exegizing Hume's moral philosophy, I try to remain mostly neutral on such issues as the extent to which Hume's moral theory is normative, the nature of the general point of view, the role of reason,

moral-realism and anti-realism, and many other important issues. The aim of this paper is not to debate the finer points of Hume's moral philosophy, but rather to draw broad connections across Hume's thought. My main concern is not whether Hume accurately describes our moral and epistemic practices, nor whether he develops a moral or epistemic framework capable of distinguishing between good and bad, justified and unjustified. These are obviously important questions, but I keep them at a distance in the interest of finding a new vantage point from which we might revisit them.

1.1. Hume's Moral Theory

Roughly speaking, for Hume, a virtue (or vice) is a quality of mind, or trait, that arouses the passions of an ideal observer (feelings of approbation or disapprobation) and garners the approval (or disapproval) of the moral sense. Contra Aristotle, virtues are fundamentally passionate:

> The most probable hypothesis, which has been advanced to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the origin of moral rights and obligations, is, that from a primary constitution of nature, certain characters and passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner excite a pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness. (T 2.1.7.5; SBN 296)[7]

One of the most pressing challenges for a sentiments-based account like Hume's is the partiality of the sentiments compared to the impartiality of moral judgment. We have stronger *feelings* toward the kindness paid to us by a friend, but our moral *judgment* of a friend's kindness does not rank higher than our moral judgment of the kindness paid by one stranger to another.[8] In the *Treatise,* Hume explains the "correction" of these sentimental inequalities using the notion of the "steady and general point of view" (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581–82). First, we survey the character of the agent about whom we are forming a judgment from the perspective of her "narrow circle" (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602–603) and sympathize with them. Secondly, we regulate sympathy by relying on general rules that allow us to understand the general effects of character traits. From that perspective, we correct our biases and generate calm passions that allow us to appreciate virtuous traits in distant people and facilitate impartial moral evaluation. In the second *Enquiry,* Hume expands the "narrow circle" of the agent evaluated to, essentially, humankind, with obvious practical impediments to how widely one can socialize one's sentiments.[9] This element of

Hume's account of moral judgment is important to the parallel I wish to draw. As we will review in greater detail in section 2, belief-formation and our evaluation of it is also explained in terms of the influence of general rules.

Of course, it is not just the outward expression of virtue that matters in moral evaluation, for an agent could certainly appear virtuous while actually being vicious, or be virtuous and lack the opportunity to translate her virtue into action (for example, "virtue in rags" T 3.3.1.19–21; SBN 584–85). Thus, virtue depends upon the motives:

> 'Tis evident that, when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive that produced them. (T 3.2.1.2; SBN 477)

In fact, our moral judgements are not judgements of actions at all, but rather judgements of the motives behind the actions. As above, this element of Hume's account of moral judgment is also important to the parallel I wish to draw. Section 2 will explore the relationship between motives and intellectual virtue.

1.2. Natural and Artificial Moral Traits

One of the most confounding elements of Hume's account of moral virtue is his distinction between natural and artificial virtue. What exactly is this distinction meant to capture? Hume uses the term "natural" frequently and to mean different things. After posing the question, "concerning this pain or pleasure, that distinguishes moral good and evil, *From what principles is it deriv'd, and whence does it arise in the human mind?*" (T 3.1.2.6; SBN 473), Hume ponders where to look, "in *nature,* or . . . in some other origin?" (T 3.1.2.7; SBN 473–74). He then observes that it is beneficial to clarify what is meant by "nature," as there is no term "more ambiguous and equivocal" (T 3.1.2.7; SBN 473–74). In the next few paragraphs, he distinguishes three senses of "natural": 1) natural as opposed to supernatural ("oppos'd to miracles"), 2) natural as opposed to "rare or unusual," and 3) natural as opposed to "artifice." It is the third sense in which "it may be disputed, whether the notions of virtue be natural or not" (T 3.1.2.9; SBN 474–75).

It is not obvious what philosophical work the distinction between natural and artificial is doing in the *Treatise*. Hume observes that he cannot say whether virtue is natural or artificial, as this question is better answered when considering

particular virtues and vices. However, in the meantime, he notes, "from these definitions of *natural* and *unnatural*, that nothing can be more unphilosophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natural, and vice with what is unnatural" (T 3.1.2.10; SBN 475). He goes on to explain that virtue and vice are both natural as opposed to supernatural, that all virtue is unnatural in the sense of being rare, and that both virtue and vice can be artificial or natural. Furthermore, *all* actions are to some degree artificial, as they "are perform'd with a certain design and intention" (T 3.1.2.10; SBN 475). Hume must have an idea about work that might be done with this distinction, but it is *not*, he tells us, to "mark the boundaries of vice and virtue" (T 3.1.2.10; SBN 475). Those boundaries are marked by an answer to the question, "*Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness?*" (T 3.1.2.11; SBN 475–76).

What of the artificial side of the distinction? To begin, artificial traits depend "on the artifice and contrivance of men" (T 3.3.1.1; SBN 574), but I will argue, the dependence relation is not the same across types of artificial traits. An agent has reason to adhere to rules of justice, promise-keeping, and truth-telling only if she thinks others will do so as well. The artificial virtues of justice, fidelity, and honesty are virtues in one agent only in a community of other agents with the same traits. Such traits, Hume explains, arise through convention. Consider what he writes about justice in the second *Enquiry:*

> if by convention be meant a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility; it must be owned, that, in this sense, justice arises from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is, indeed, evident) that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows, that every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the consequences of each act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as his self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very different from those, which are agreeable to the strict rules of right and justice. (EPM App. 3.7; SBN 306)

He further illustrates the conventional nature of the virtue of justice with his famous rowboat example:

> Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest, without any promise or contract; thus gold and silver are

> made the measures of exchange: Thus speech and words and language are fixed by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part; but what loses all advantage, if only one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct. (EPM App. 3.8; SBN 306–307)

Not only does this example amplify the way in which the artificial virtues of justice, fidelity, and honesty exist only in a social community in which enough members gain mutual advantage by adhering to general moral rules, and disappear where that advantage is not to be had, it highlights the connection between conventions related to artificial virtue and motives. The motives behind just behavior *deeply depend* on convention and agreement. I emphasize the *degree* to which the motives lauded in cases of artificial virtue depend on convention and general rules because almost all virtues, including natural virtues, rely on at least the convention of language.

Conventions present opportunities to complicate both motives and our judgments of them. The deeper the dependence on convention, the more complicated the relation to the motives can be. I argue that one role the distinction between natural and artificial virtue could be playing for Hume in the case of moral traits is in displaying and explaining the ways in which motives can be complicated by artifice and contrivance. If beliefs and ways of forming beliefs can be motivated, and it seems obvious that they can be, then a parallel can be drawn between Hume's virtue ethics and virtue epistemology using this distinction.

1.3 The "Monkish Virtues"

The natural virtues include, "Meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity" (T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578–79), and people who possess them are motivated independently of whatever artifices and contrivances might be in place (for example, the good Samaritan breaking convention and acting on natural sympathy). The artificial virtues include justice, fidelity to promises, honesty and, *possibly*, the "Monkish virtues" ("Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude" (EPM 9.3; SBN 270)). These virtues depend for their motives on institutions, conventions, and "general rules." The "monkish *virtues*," I contend, are particularly vivid examples of how complex conventions complicate motives and generate conditions in which we tend to make judgments of *vice*. The way I have just described the monkish virtues hints at the lively debate about their status. Are monkish virtues genuine virtues?[10] Are they vices? Does their moral valence depend on context and motives? I will defend the third option, but first let us consider the landscape.

Why might one doubt that the monkish virtues are virtues? For one thing, Hume clearly disdains them. Across his works, "monkish" is one of his stock insults for historians and writers with whom he disagrees. Secondly, in presenting the monkish virtues in his *Natural History of Religion,* he presents them as motivated by superstition and the desire to appease a temperamental deity.[11] Nowhere does he mention feelings of approbation in an ideal observer or approval by the moral sense. When he contrasts the Spartan hero Brasidas with Robert Bellarmine, a paragon of monkish virtue, in section 10 it seems obvious that he finds Bellarmine's allowing himself to be consumed by vermin absurd.[12] However, if Hume is simply describing our practices of moral praise and blame, it is inaccurate to treat the monkish virtues as in all cases phony. Additionally, if Hume's giving an account of what is and is not virtuous, it's far from obvious that he has the resources to discount them.

Rachel Cohon suggests the artificial virtues are "traits we need for successful *im*personal cooperation," whereas natural virtues are "more refined and completed forms of those natural human sentiments" most commonly displayed in personal contexts.[13] I find her analysis helpful for understanding some artificial virtues in some contexts, but I do not think it quite covers all the ground on this issue. The text supplies three criteria for artificial virtue. First, is the approbation-eliciting trait natural or does it depend significantly "on the artifice and contrivance of men" (T 3.3.1.1; SBN 574)? Secondly, is the motive dependent upon a community of agents possessing the same trait? Finally, does approval of the trait depend on some convention?[14] Celibacy, mortification, and the like do not depend for their motives on a sufficient number of members of an agent's community possessing the same traits. There is no obvious mutual advantage in several men developing the trait of celibacy, at least not such that if all but one man decided to give up their vows that one man would have no motive. Thus, the second criterion is not satisfied by the monkish virtues, but what of the other two? The monkish virtues satisfy the first criterion, as when they are approved of, the motive that is the true object of the approbation is not natural, but depends on human artifice and contrivance. The monkish virtues, at least some of them, satisfy the third criterion, as approval of them certainly depends on convention. Fasting, wearing hair shirts, practicing abstinence, and many other practices that enable judgments of piety and humility are, in fact, quintessentially conventional.

Regarding the first criterion, one might object that no one really approves of the motives behind the monkish virtues. It might be true that *Hume* does not feel feelings of approbation at someone taking vows of poverty or celibacy, nor perhaps does anyone in his narrow circle, but it would be quite a leap to conclude that *no* person or group experiences genuine feelings of approbation for the motive to take vows of poverty or celibacy. Related to this case, Rosalind Hursthouse argues that the Humean virtue ethicist must give up any way of distinguishing the "truly"

useful and agreeable traits from those that people mistakenly believe are useful and agreeable. Usefulness and agreeableness are cashed out in terms of feelings of approbation and the approval of the moral sense from the general point of view. Hursthouse helps us imagine an agent or social group—and though she does not, we could expand this to include the wider network used to generate standards of moral evaluation in the second *Enquiry*—that, without being fooled or mistaken, finds celibacy useful and agreeable.[15]

Sometimes Hume is very clear that he believes the monkish virtues are actually vices, and yet, if Hursthouse is correct, the framework he advances for explaining moral judgment may not give him the resources he needs to treat the monkish virtues as faux virtues.[16] But Hume need not find anything objectionable about a trait like celibacy sometimes counting as a virtue from the steady and general point of view. The monkish "virtues" are better understood as *traits* whose moral valence is highly contextual. Celibacy may be a virtue in some cases and a vice in others. This does not lead Hume into moral anti-realism, as there is a naturalistic standard of moral judgment that applies to each context. More often than not, the monkish virtues will be judged to be vices, but this is because the relationship between conventions and motives is so complex in the case of the monkish traits that there are more places where things can go wrong. As we will see in section 2, in the intellectual case, similar conditions lead to vices like super-skepticism and motivated irrationality.

1.4 Artificial Moral Traits and Motives

There is good reason to believe that *all* judgments of virtue and vice are contextual, and that Hume can be committed to such a position. Artificial traits, because of their more complicated relation to the motives and the greater complexity of the contexts in which they are displayed, possess a distinctive vulnerability. One might wonder, as Marcia Baron has, whether *any* artificial virtue is a genuine virtue.[17] For example, the contexts in which agents are judged to be just are more complex that the contexts in which agents are judged to be beneficent, and this creates some space for us to doubt the agent's motives. When the good Samaritan sees to the welfare of the beaten traveler, there is no thought of group allegiance or what is in it for him, but when an agent acts justly (or when we judge an agent to have acted justly), she (and we) almost always has to consider what reason she has to participate in the conventions of justice. We are immediately moved by the Samaritan, but we might find the just agent a bit too procedural and bureaucratic to count as virtuous. In a way, what I am arguing is that Hume, much to his sentimentalist chagrin, suffers from a classic problem of virtue theory, the problem of one (or two, or three, and so on) motives too many.

The case is roughly the same for more obvious contexts in which agents are judged to be vicious. Consider Hume's sensible knave.[18] The opportunity to game the system and gain a personal advantage complicates the knave's bad motives in a way that, to stick with the Samaritan example, the motives of the priest and the Levite who pass the beaten traveler before the Samaritan's arrival are not. A priest or Levite making his way on a notoriously dangerous road might simply be too focused on his own safety to thoughtfully consider the beaten man. There are not a host of motivational-conventional opportunities for elaborately vicious behavior as there are in the case of a con-artist. We will see this echoed in the intellectual case. Hume is surprisingly sympathetic to natural belief in polytheistic gods, but disdains convoluted doctrinal beliefs. In the first case, the motives are clear and unimpeachable. In the second, the motives are more complex and more suspect. Connecting the monkish virtues and artificial traits more broadly, it is not that they are vicious by their nature, but rather that the complexity of the motivational-conventional contexts in which they arise create more opportunity for vice. In the right context, humility might well be a virtue from the steady and general point of view, it just has more opportunity to become vicious than, say, generosity.

Looking at the complicated dynamics of motives and obligations in personal contexts, Erin Frykholm argues that Hume is a moral particularist, one "who holds that there are no general moral principles and that right action is determined only with reference to context and on a case-by-case basis."[19] According to Frykholm, sometimes acting justly toward one's children is acting virtuously, but sometimes it is not, and the virtuous agent knows whether justice is required in a given situation (2186). I would add to this that the virtuous agent knows whether justice is required in part because she knows her motives. I would also add that this particularist reading of Hume can be applied to the intellectual traits. For example, as we will consider in the following section, we can easily imagine contexts in which strong skepticism is intellectually virtuous and contexts in which it is not.

2. The Distinction between Natural and Artificial Intellectual Traits

The distinction between natural and artificial traits is considerably clearer in Hume's moral philosophy than in his epistemology. In the previous section, I explored what Hume might be trying to capture with the distinction and argued that artificial traits are distinctively vulnerable to vice due to the complexity of the motivational-conventional contexts in which they arise. I examined the so-called monkish "virtues" as an example of this. I argued that while they can be genuinely virtuous, more often they are vicious because of the aforementioned motivational complications. I concluded by observing that Frykholm's particularist interpretation of Hume's virtue ethics is a helpful lens for understanding this phenomenon.

Now we must turn our attention to Hume's virtue epistemology, which, I will argue, also makes use of the natural/artificial distinction and is also particularist.

2.1 A Brief Review of Humean Virtue Epistemology

Virtue epistemology is a broad collection of views, most of them highly self-reflective about epistemology, its history, and the shape its future ought to take.[20] Obviously Hume did not reflect explicitly on the nature of epistemological problems, certainly not the Gettier problem or the problems discussed by feminist epistemologists, and so it is anachronistic to expect a self-aware, detailed virtue epistemology from him. However, Hume arguably uses intellectual character traits to explain normative epistemic notions and a variety of doxastic attitudes, which satisfies the minimum criteria for having a virtue epistemology. Karl Schafer advances a compelling case for interpreting Hume as a virtue epistemologist in his fascinating paper, "Curious Virtues in Hume's Epistemology," and I will rely heavily on his account, which takes as its starting point Hume's Title Principle:

> Nay if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate on us. (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270)

Schafer argues that the Title Principle is a normative epistemic principle that sorts types of reasoning into "good" and "bad" piles on the basis of their approval by the moral sense. He proposes that Hume countenances certain "epistemic virtues" and that "the distinction between "good" and "bad" forms of reasoning is just a particular instance of the general moral distinction between virtuous and vicious character traits."[21] Schafer argues that the Title Principle gives us a standard below which a reasoner can fall:

> For while [the Title Principle's] recommendations do depend upon one's passionate makeup, it is perfectly possible to reason in a manner that doesn't conform to them. After all, as the example of Hume's own reasoning in 1.4.1 makes clear, it is easy to be prompted by one's curiosity to reason in ways that will frustrate this very passion. Thus, although these recommendations are to some degree relativized to the reasoner's passionate make-up, the Title Principle nonetheless articulates a genuine standard for reasoning that the reasoner can fail to meet. (14)

If you agree with Schafer, then it appears that Hume has a bona fide normative principle to undergird a robust, even if nascent, virtue epistemology capable of explaining our judgments of belief-formation and that allows for enforcing a distinction between justified and other types of belief.

Just as in the case of moral virtue and vice, the passions do important explanatory work in accounting for intellectual virtue and vice. Focusing on what Hume might mean by "propensity" and "inclination" in the Title Principle, Schafer links them to the *intellectual* passions of curiosity and ambition (11). He argues that Hume is recommending that we engage in reasoning just in case this reasoning satisfies our intellectual curiosity and the curiosity of those in our epistemic community, which affords us a definition of Humean intellectual virtue:

> An intellectual trait is an epistemic virtue just in case it receives the approval of the "moral sense" (on the "general survey" and from the general and steady point of view") because it tends to satisfy the curiosity and ambition of the believer and those in his epistemic community under normal conditions. (15)[22]

One difference between the moral and the intellectual case is the extent to which satisfying only oneself is virtuous. Sometimes one cannot earn the moral approbation of her circle (for example, virtue in rags), but we would not find someone virtuous from the general point of view who never elicited approving passions from others in contexts where it is possible to do so. However, intellectual traits, at least on the face of it, could be virtuous on a desert island. In fact, one might be even more intellectually curious and ambitious in such a circumstance.

2.2 Natural and Artificial Intellectual Traits

Hume does not discuss natural and artificial intellectual traits as such. However, if intellectual traits are durable qualities of the mind concerning how one forms beliefs that garner approbation or disapprobation on the general survey and from the general point of view, it becomes clear that Hume does countenance natural and artificial belief-forming processes, which can be understood as virtuous or vicious depending on the circumstances. Hume has much to say about "natural" connections and associations in our thought. In T 1.1.4, *Of the connexion or association of ideas*, Hume discusses the way "one idea *naturally* introduces another" (emphasis added). Throughout his discussions of causal reasoning (T 1.3.6), personal identity (T 1.4.6), the persistence of objects (T 1.4.2), and the influence of custom, Hume notes the way ideas "naturally convey" other ideas. "Naturally" formed beliefs seem to boil down to *unreflective, unschooled* beliefs, or beliefs developed through basic conditioning. Hume discusses natural ways of forming beliefs under a va-

riety of descriptions, but most frequently as "vulgar." Vulgar beliefs are largely unadulterated by artifice and contrivance. This does not make their possessors intellectually virtuous, but it tends to make their motives to believe less complicated and therefore less susceptible to vice than beliefs developed through artifice and contrivance. We hold a person with unreflective beliefs in higher esteem than a charlatan or sophist, but that is far from an endorsement by the passions. There is arguably no motive to speak of in such cases, and so nothing we might judge to be vicious. These belief-forming processes are pre-character, if you will, meaning that they are almost instinctive and do not significantly engage motives beyond those needed for basic survival, for instance, fear.

However, vulgar beliefs once "methodized and corrected" are "philosophical" beliefs (EHU 12.25; SBN 162), and philosophical beliefs *are* the product of virtuous traits, so the natural beliefs of the vulgar are importantly related to intellectual virtue, though not themselves virtuous. Before moving on to discuss artificial belief-formation, let us note one difference from the moral case. Hume thinks it is very difficult for an agent to change her *moral* character:

> [M]any of those qualities, which all moralists . . . comprehend under the title of moral virtues, are equally involuntary and necessary, with the qualities of the judgment and imagination. Of this nature are constancy, fortitude, magnanimity; and, in short, all the qualities which form the great man. I might say the same, in some degree, of the others; it being almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article, or cure itself of a passionate or splenetic temper, when they are natural to it. (T 3.3.4.3; SBN 608)

This passage suggests that Hume believes that natural virtues and abilities are something you possess either naturally or never.[23] In contrast, he seems to believe that epistemic agents are *constantly* changing their intellectual character. "The vulgar" form beliefs naturally and unreflectively, but *we all* form beliefs this way on a daily basis. As Hume frequently observes, we are all "return'd back to the situation of the vulgar" (T 1.4.3.9; SBN 222–23). Few agents, if any, reach a state of intellectual character such that they no longer engage in vulgar belief-formation.

Turning our attention to the artificial side of the distinction, Hume rarely refers to belief-formation as "artificial." He does so explicitly only once: "Nay, we find in some cases, that the reflection produces the belief without the custom; or, more properly speaking, that the reflection produces the custom in an *oblique* and *artificial* manner" (T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104–105). However, he discusses the effects of "general rules" on belief-formation extensively. Recall that contrivance and artifice resulting in general rules is the hallmark of artificial *moral* virtue and vice. With a little extrapolation, we can conceive of artificial belief-formation as

formation that is guided by general rules. Deborah Boyle's work on the intellectual virtue of wisdom is particularly illuminating here. She clearly explains how Hume distinguishes, to the extent that he can, between natural (vulgar) belief-forming processes and belief-forming processes that involve some artifice, though she does not deploy the concepts of naturalness and artificiality in her analysis.[24]

To begin, the three main species of artificial belief-forming processes are distinguished by differences in the influence of general rules:

> Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, though the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the *first influence* of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most established principles of reasonings, which is the cause of our rejecting it. This is a *second influence* of general rules, and implies the condemnation of the former. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to *the disposition and character* of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second. Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature, and again saved by a new direction of the very same principle. The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet it is only by following them that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities. (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 149–50, emphasis added)

The first influence of general rules moves an agent from the position of the vulgar to "false philosophy," for example, believing correlation is causation (T 1.3.14.27; SBN 168) or in the doctrine of double existence (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 214–16). The second influence of the general rules moves the agent from "false philosophy" to "true philosophy," or "the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected" (EHU 12.25; SBN 162). Hume is quite clear that which influence of the rules ultimately prevails in the development of an agent's beliefs *is a matter of character.*

As Boyle notes, becoming virtuous is a *process* that results in the wise *person* ultimately returning to her vulgar beliefs with a new understanding. Hume describes the process as follows:

> In considering this subject, we may observe a gradation of three opinions that rise above each other, according as the persons who form them acquire new degrees of reason and knowledge. These opinions are that of the vulgar, that of a false philosophy, and the of the true; where we shall find upon enquiry, that the true philosophy approaches nearer to the sentiments of the vulgar than to those of a mistaken knowledge. (T 1.4.3.9; SBN 222–23)

Now, an agent can take this too far. There are potentially infinitely many influences of the general rules. A deeply skeptical person may apply the rules multiple times just to make sure she is reasoning well, losing sight of the fact that slipping into this endless questioning is actually a way of reasoning poorly. As Boyle puts it, "What started as an apparently reasonable check on one's reasoning abilities ends with skepticism" (173).

Since we are trying to see Hume through a virtue-theoretical lens, think of the second influence of the general rules as Hume's version of Aristotle's golden mean. Though there are four rows in the taxonomizing table below, remember, vulgar belief forming processes don't skew the mathematical analogy because they arguably don't depend on traits that can be evaluated in terms of virtue and vice.[25]

Vulgar (pre-character)	natural, unreflective (for example, ducking when a frisbee is hurtling toward your head)
First influence of the general rules (vicious)	characterized by some unjustified inferences (for example, believing, "That frisbee has causal powers.")
Second influence of the general rules (virtuous)	characterized by a correction of unjustified inferences of the first influence of the general rules (for example, recognizing that the belief that the frisbee has causal powers is false but useful and ducking as it hurtles toward your head)
Third influence—∞ (vicious)	characterized by skepticism to the point of abandoning common sense (for example, thinking, "I cannot know that the frisbee hurtling toward my head will cause pain" [failure to duck])

The table above delineates four broad intellectual character *states*. We might call them "traits," but, as noted above, intellectual traits in contrast to moral traits are only semi-durable at best, and "states" seems to better capture their ephemerality at this point in our discussion. Even the most careful thinkers lapse into states of vulgarity.

What I am calling "Hume's golden mean" here has to be struck by the intellectually virtuous *person*, and one might well be wondering, what is the intellectual virtue here? Again, it is not the beliefs themselves we evaluate as virtuous or vi-

cious, but something about the traits and processes that produce them. So, what are those traits? Boyle suggests wisdom. Schafer suggests curiosity and ambition. I agree that at least these traits are intellectual virtues.[26] Let us connect them to Hume's golden mean. Hume says, "A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence" (EHU 10.4; SBN 110). This activity of proportioning exemplifies both wisdom and curiosity. The curious agent seeks evidence, but not to the point of paralysis or frustration. The wise agent weighs it carefully, but not too carefully. An agent gets to be curious and wise, that is, intellectually virtuous, by disciplining herself to stay in an epistemic state characterized by the second-influence of the rules as much as possible and appropriate. The result of this disciplining is that an agent can graduate, if you will, from occupying a state some of the time to displaying a semi-durable intellectual trait.

As in the case of moral traits, it can be difficult to judge whether particular instances of intellectual traits are virtuous or vicious, as much depends on the circumstances. Just as Hume can be reasonably interpreted as a moral particularist who acknowledges that a trait can be virtuous in one context but not in another, he can also be reasonably interpreted as maintaining the same view as concerns epistemology. In fact, this view fits very nicely with an overall virtue theoretic interpretation of Hume's epistemology. Epistemology is social. Of course, one can reap the benefits of good epistemic character as a castaway on a desert island in a way that one cannot reap the benefits of being a just person, but one often has a socially determined role to play in disciplining her thought. In a room full of Pollyannas with a weighty decision on their hands, it might be laudable for one to be a skeptic and apply the general rules many times in order to counteract their bias.[27]

Let us not lose sight of the distinction we are trying to understand, that between natural and artificial belief forming processes and, relatedly, natural and artificial intellectual virtue. Beyond this, we are trying to understand what parallels, if any, might be drawn between this distinction as concerns moral traits and this distinction as concerns intellectual traits. All influences of the general rules result in beliefs that are comparatively artificial. Vulgar beliefs are quintessentially natural. In the moral case, naturalness and artificiality do not mark the boundaries of virtue and vice. A trait can depend on artifice and contrivance and be virtuous *or* vicious, but I argued that artificial traits possess a distinctive vulnerability to vice because of the complexity of the motivational-conventional contexts in which they arise. Is the same true in the intellectual case? With some caveats, it is.

The intellectual case is quite messy in comparison to the moral case for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that we are *constantly engaging in belief-formation*. We expect consistency in moral situations, but we can hardly expect consistency in epistemic situations, as every moment of human existence is an epistemic situation. We can more easily track patterns of behavior when making moral judgments because moral circumstances don't arise every waking moment

of every day. To say that someone is benevolent is to say that her behavior indicates a benevolent motive in the appropriate circumstances. To say that someone is wise is to say that she proportions her belief to the evidence in the appropriate circumstances. In the first case, those circumstances come around occasionally. In the second case, those circumstances are ubiquitous. We admire those who manage to keep themselves in a state of subjecting their beliefs to the second influence of the general rules when *we,* ideal observers, have occasion to reflect on how beliefs are formed, but if there is a tight comparison to the moral case, a judgment of the agent as wise should take into account all occasions in which proportioning belief to the evidence would be a good thing, and, again, this is practically all of the time.

Recall the criteria for the artificiality of traits from the moral case: the trait depends "on the artifice and contrivance of men" (T 3.3.1.1; SBN 574), the motive depends upon a community of agents possessing the same trait, and approval of the trait depends on some convention. Now consider the intellectual virtues we have been discussing, wisdom and curiosity. Both seem to satisfy the first criterion. As Boyle describes, becoming wise is a process that depends on learning to apply the rules. The rules, of course, depend on artifice and contrivance. Curiosity involves taking an inquiry to just the right point, not asking too few questions and not asking too many, and this requires unnatural discipline. Furthermore, this discipline often depends on a social community. The incurious are boring to their communities and ideal observers, while those who are too curious become annoying, and it is social pressure that helps shapes the trait of curiosity. Unlike the case of artificial moral virtues like justice, artificial intellectual virtues, at least the two we are considering, do not absolutely depend on others in one's community possessing the same trait, but it helps. It is difficult to nurture wisdom and curiosity in a community that does not share and value these traits, but one can be wise and curious on a desert island. Finally, wisdom and curiosity do seem to depend on conventions for approbation. Conventions are manifestations of culture, and the extent to which wisdom and curiosity are lauded certainly depends on culture. For instance, one might worry that the culture of the United States is increasingly one of anti-intellectualism, and in such environments wisdom and curiosity are not likely to be admired and so are less likely to be developed.

2.3 Artificial Intellectual Traits and Motives

One of the main claims of section 1 was that artificial moral traits are susceptible to vice in a way that natural traits are not, because of their complicated relation to the motives. There are naturally vicious moral traits, of course, but there is something distinctive about the way artificial traits are vulnerable to vice. Now we must ask if the same is true of intellectual traits. Again, are artificial intellectual traits distinctively vulnerable to vice because of the complexity of the motivational-

conventional contexts in which they arise? I have argued that an important difference between the moral and intellectual case is that natural beliefs are the product of processes and traits that are *almost* unevaluable for virtue or vice. I say "almost" because I am committed to the view that there is no analog to natural *vice* in the intellectual case, but find the text unclear on natural intellectual *virtue*. As I will show below, there is textual evidence that Hume does not blame the vulgar for many of their false beliefs. It is less clear whether he thinks we do, or ought to, praise them for their true beliefs. Reliabilist virtue epistemologists would consider some of the abilities of the vulgar to be virtues, for example, having well-functioning faculties of sense. However, as noted above, Hume is a *nascent* virtue epistemologist. He obviously did not have a considered view on virtue reliabilism versus virtue responsibilism, so we must sift through the text in order to establish whether he leans closer to one camp than the other.

One of Hume's most illuminating works on intellectual traits is his *Natural History of Religion*. Sections 1–5 are devoted to a discussion of the origin of religious belief in early humans from Hume's, in many ways problematic, perspective. He maintains that the predominant belief system was polytheistic and, importantly, reactive. That is, it was not the product of reasoning or argument, but rather an emotional, almost instinctive response to ignorance of causes and "a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind" (NHR 2.4). Hume is sympathetic to the tendency to develop belief in anthropomorphic gods related to other objects from the sensory world, as he sees this as a *natural* extrapolation from experience:

> And thus, however strong men's propensity to believe invisible, intelligent power in nature, their propensity is equally strong to rest their attention on sensible, visible objects; and in order to reconcile these opposite inclinations, they are lead to unite the invisible power with some visible object. (NHR 5.2)

> And as an invisible spiritual intelligence is an object too refined for vulgar apprehension, men naturally affix it to some sensible representation; such as either the more conspicuous parts of nature, or the statues, images, and pictures, which a more refined age forms of its divinities. (NHR 5.9)

Hume never expresses disapprobation or finds these imagined agents guilty of intellectual vice for believing in polytheism. He questions the *content* of their beliefs, but never their *motives* for believing. What they believe is completely understandable given their epistemic situation. Their motives are primitive. To Hume, they are driven only by the desire to remove their discomfort and anxiety and they lack the opportunity to develop more complex motivation.[28]

Let us return briefly to the question of whether Hume thinks we do, or ought to, praise natural intellectual traits. For instance, is it proper to feel pride at your toddler's ability to complete a task that requires good hand-eye coordination? With toddlers, we do not blame them when they form false beliefs or fail at perceptual tasks. We do praise them when they form true beliefs and succeed at such tasks, but is our praise a case of genuine approbation from the general point of view, or is it largely feigned and primarily intended to reinforce accidentally good cognitive habits? Hume's view on natural intellectual virtue requires a more in-depth study than we can manage here, but I would like to note that, at the very least, the text does not obviously preclude the kind of more-virtue-responsibilist-than-virtue-reliabilist interpretation of Hume I lean toward here. Whether Hume thinks natural intellectual traits can be virtues is an interesting and open question.

With that, let us return to artificial intellectual traits. Our question is, are artificial intellectual traits distinctively vulnerable to vice because of the complexity of the motivational-conventional contexts in which they arise? If I am correct that Hume finds natural intellectual traits largely immune to disapprobation, then that would leave *only* artificial intellectual traits vulnerable to strong judgments of vice.[29] As in the moral case, it *is* the complexity of the motivational-conventional contexts in which they arise that causes this vulnerability. Again, think of Hume as having a golden mean. One finds oneself in a possession of intellectual vice when one fails to move beyond the first influence of the general rules or when one undergoes too many influences of the general rules. The vice of lack, if you will, is dogmatism. An agent questions and investigates up to a point, but then accepts a belief that ought to be questioned further. This might be attributed to laziness, another intellectual vice, but often it's attributable to motivated irrationality, which brings us back to the central claim of the previous section. Artificial traits are susceptible to vice because of their complicated relation to the motives. Peter Kail argues that the main point of Hume's *Natural History of Religion* is to show that belief in invisible, intelligent power is a case of motivated irrationality.[30] I do not agree that all such belief is attributable to motivated irrationality, but it does seem clear that one can remain stuck at the first influence of the general rules because of a fear of how further examination will destabilize their beliefs, values, and relationships. Consider again the monkish virtues. We discussed them in the context of moral virtue, but the monkish virtues are interesting in that they are so deeply tied to intellectual traits. It is not just that the monkishly "virtuous" often *do* the wrong thing for the wrong reasons, they also *think* the wrong thing for the wrong reasons. They are not motivated by a love of truth, as the intellectually virtuous agent Schafer describes is, but rather by fear and, in the worst cases, a lust for power and control.[31]

The artificial traits associated with being under too much influence of the general rules are also related to the motives. The super-skeptic is another type of

vicious intellectual agent. She might be motivated by a number of things, but one we can easily imagine is a kind of intellectual cowardice, a fear of being wrong. The virtuous agent takes calculated risks in forming her beliefs. The super-skeptic would rather believe nothing than believe something that might be false. One complication is the social nature of the epistemic enterprise. As we noted above, it might serve the agent and her community well if she plays the part of the skeptic in certain contexts, but absent these conditions, being too skeptical can be a form of intellectual cowardice related to fearful or inappropriately prideful motives.

3. Consequences and Questions

We have examined one commonality between Hume's virtue ethics and his virtue epistemology: a categorical distinction between natural and artificial character traits. Though there are some important differences, I have argued that in both cases, artificial traits possess a distinctive vulnerability to vice due to the complexity of the motivational-conventional contexts in which they arise. Though helpful for developing an understanding of Hume as a comprehensive virtue theorist, this analysis raises as many questions as it answers. For example, how does Hume conceive of the distinction between types of virtue? Is it a deep and important distinction to him, or is it mostly superficial? Secondly, is Hume's view compatible with some version of the unity of the virtues thesis, or does this remain an important difference between the Humean and Aristotelian models?

There is an intuitive distinction between the moral and intellectual virtues that some argue it is important to preserve.[32] Why might they think this? For one thing, there are agents who are intellectually virtuous but morally vicious (for example, a great chess player who is extremely selfish) and morally virtuous but intellectually vicious (for example, someone who is kind but extremely gullible). Secondly, the intellectual virtues themselves can actually be directed toward immoral ends (for instance, using one's creativity to devise new torture techniques). Thirdly, it might be the case that the very same trait that wins the approval of the moral sense via the satisfaction of curiosity also earns the disapproval of the moral sense via the dissatisfaction of some other passion. Honesty is a candidate for this kind of problem. We could easily imagine an agent sharing information in a blunt and honest manner such that she vastly improves her own and others' ability to reason about a particular matter, but also hurts someone's feelings. Was honesty a virtue in this case? Intellectually, yes, but morally, no? Finally, one might think, as Julia Driver does, that the general rules in ethics and the general rules in epistemology are different beasts.[33] One set is social, the other is not. Moral virtues must satisfy the community. Intellectual virtues can satisfy the agent alone. There is no reason to be just on a desert island, but there is reason to follow the rules by which

to judge of cause and effect. Of course, one might think, as Karl Schafer does, they are quite similar, if not different applications of the same thing.

Part of this inspiration for this paper is the prospect of an interpretation of Hume as an integrated, comprehensive virtue theorist. In addition to an analogous distinction between natural and artificial moral and intellectual traits, I also suggested that Frykholm's particularist interpretation of Hume's virtue ethics could be applied to his virtue epistemology. How do these observations bear on the question above? The analogy between natural and artificial moral and intellectual traits suggests a thinner boundary between moral and intellectual virtues than one might have supposed. Particularism affords us an answer to the tough questions posed by the person who wants to defend a more robust boundary between moral and intellectual traits. Consider the case above about honesty. Was honesty a virtue? The particularist answer is that it depends on the details of the case. A virtuous agent is one who knows which traits to prioritize in what circumstances in relation to her roles and relationships. To the contention that moral and intellectual traits and rules are simply different beasts, one social and one less so, I reply that the difference between the moral and the intellectual rules is one of degree. True, a castaway has no reason to be just and does have reason to weigh evidence with care, but in ordinary circumstances, reasoning well is a social endeavor. One can correct one's judgments in light of the rules by which to judge of cause and effect by oneself, but the results will be limited compared to what one can achieve as part of a social group. Following the intellectual rules is not social to the same degree as following the moral rules (moral rules are necessarily social), but, again, it is a difference of degrees.

This brings us to the second and final question, could Hume accept some version of the unity of the virtues thesis? Sarah Wright makes a compelling case that Humean moral and intellectual virtues are interrelated and interdependent in her work on testimony. In the context of evaluating the reliability of a testifier, she observes that it is hard to imagine knowing that someone is just without also knowing that she is honest.[34] Some virtues seem to stand and fall together for Hume, suggesting at least a local version of the unity of virtues thesis. Susan Wolf begins her "Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues" with the observation that, *prima facie,* the unity of the virtues thesis is a somewhat shocking thing to believe. No one has *all* the virtues. However, she goes on to argue persuasively that this thesis isn't as implausible as it initially appears. She advances a simple, two-premise argument:

> Premise one states that *each virtue essentially involves knowledge*, in particular knowledge of what's important. Premise two states that *knowledge is essentially unified*. That is, the perfect and complete knowledge of the importance of one item requires knowledge of the importance of everything

> else against which it may in principle have to be balanced. The conclusion that follows is that virtue is unified, in the sense that the perfect and complete possession of one virtue requires at least the knowledge that is needed for possession of every other.[35]

A softened version of what Wolf says in her second premise about how knowledge of the importance of one item requires knowledge of the things against which that item must be balanced might be compatible Hume's virtue ethics and epistemology. To be virtuous, one must reason well and have knowledge not just of what is useful and agreeable, but of what is more useful and agreeable in a situation where choices must be made. Secondly, it fits well with Hume's particularism, if you are persuaded by that interpretation, as knowledge of what is important includes knowledge of one's roles and relationships, both moral and intellectual, and how those shift from context to context. More work remains to be done, not least of which where aesthetic traits fit, but in Hume we might find an alternative to the Aristotelian framework that is equally comprehensive.

NOTES

I am deeply grateful to two anonymous referees at *Hume Studies* for their extensive and very helpful comments, both sets of which inspired me to restructure this paper in significant ways.

1 The virtue epistemology interpretation of Hume has its roots in Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments*, and Owen, *Hume's Reason*, and has received much more explicit attention in Schafer, "Curious Virtues in Hume's Epistemology"; Qu, "Hume's Practically Epistemic Conclusions?" and "Prescription, Description, and Hume's Experimental Method"; Vitz, "Contagion, Community, and Virtue in Hume's Epistemology" and "Doxastic Virtues in Hume's Epistemology"; Boyle, "The Ways of the Wise: Hume's Rules of Causal Reasoning"; McCormick, "Why Should We Be Wise?"; Hickerson, "What the Wise Ought Believe: A Voluntarist Interpretation of Hume's General Rules"; and Wright, "Hume on Testimony: A Virtue-Theoretic Defense" to name a few. Baceski, "Hume on Art Critics, Wise Men, and the Virtues of Taste" advances a virtue theoretic interpretation of Hume's aesthetics.

2 Of course, Annette Baier and scholars who have contributed to the interpretive path she charted take Hume's epistemology to be deeply informed by his ethics, and any comprehensive virtue theory interpretation of Hume is certainly informed by this tradition. Rico Vitz is also an exception.

3 For example, the unity of the virtues, an account of *phronesis,* and a grounding in *eudaimonia*.

4 Hsueh Qu's illuminating papers, "Hume's Practically Epistemic Conclusions?" and "Prescription, Description, and Hume's Experimental Method," were indispensable in convincing me that this is a useful way of thinking about Hume's mitigated skepticism.

5 This interpretative tradition has a rich history including, Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments;* Swanton, *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* and *The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche;* Cohon, "Hume's Artificial and Natural Virtues"; and Frykholm, "A Humean Particularist Virtue Ethic."

6 See Taylor, "Hume on the Standard of Virtue" and *Reflecting Subjects.*

7 All references to Hume's works except his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* and *Essays, Moral, Literary, and Political* are taken from the Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature* is abbreviated as "T," cited by the Book, part, section, and paragraph numbers, and followed by a corresponding reference to *A Treatise of Human Nature,* edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch, abbreviated "SBN" and followed by page number. The *Enquiries* are abbreviated as "EHU" and "EPM," cited by section and paragraph numbers, and followed by a corresponding reference to *Enquiries Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,* edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch, abbreviated "SBN" and followed by page number. The *Appendix* to the second Enquiry is abbreviated as "App." The *Natural History of Religion* is abbreviated as "NHR" and cited by section and paragraph numbers.

8 As Hume observes: "A statesman or patriot, who serves our own country, in our own time, has always a more passionate regard paid to him, than one whose beneficial influence operated on distant ages or remote nations; where the good, resulting from his generous humanity, being less connected with us, seems more obscure, and affects us with a less lively sympathy. We may own the merit to be equally great, though our sentiments are not raised to an equal height, in both cases" (EPM 5.41; SBN 227–28).

9 Careful consideration of the problems associated with Hume's account of the general point of view and determining "appropriate circumstances" (for example, how we manage to judge the character of agents distant from us in time, whether our judgments should be shaped so significantly by the judged agent's circle, and so on) is beyond the scope of this paper, but there is an impressive amount of thoughtful literature on these issues. See Abramson, "Correcting Our Sentiments about Hume's Moral Point of View" and "Sympathy and the Project of Hume's Second Enquiry"; Brown, "From Spectator to Agent: Hume's Theory of Obligation" and "Hume on Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy"; Cohon, "The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics"; Korsgaard, "The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics"; Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal-And Shouldn't Be"; and Smith, Adam, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.*

10 It is also an interesting question whether *any* artificial virtue is a genuine virtue. See, for instance, Baron, "Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of His Artificial Virtues."

11 "Where the deity is represented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief, though altogether just, is apt, when joined with superstitious terrors, to sink the human mind into the lowest submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable to him" (NHR 10.2).

12 "BRASIDAS seized a mouse, and being bit by it, let it go. There is nothing so contemptible, said he, but what may be safe, if it has but courage to defend itself. BELLARMINE patiently and humbly allowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey upon him. We shall have heaven, said he, to reward us for our sufferings: But these poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of the present life. Such difference is there between the maxims of a GREEK hero and a CATHOLIC saint" (NHR 10.6).

13 See Cohon, "Hume's Natural and Artificial Virtues," 259.

14 In delineating these three criteria, I am closely following the way they are presented in the excellent work of Jane McIntyre, Elizabeth Radcliffe, and Lauren Kopajtic on strength of mind. See McIntyre, "Strength of Mind: Prospects and Problems for a Humean Account"; Radcliffe, "Strength of Mind and the Calm and Violent Passions"; and Kopajtic, "Cultivating Strength of Mind: Government of the Passions and Artificial Virtue."

15 Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics and Human Nature," 76.

16 See Lottenbach, "Monkish Virtues, Artificial Lives: On Hume's Genealogy of Morals" for a different perspective. Lottenbach argues that the distinction between the monkish virtues and the other artificial virtues is part of Hume's descriptive moral psychology and that Hume uses it to partition off what he considers true virtue in order to give a genealogy of it. He does not, according to Lottenbach, give, or intend to give, an argument against the monkish virtues.

17 To gain a better understanding of the complicated relationship between the motives and artificial virtue, I relied on the following works: Baron, "Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues"; Garrett, "The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared"; and Gauthier, "Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave."

18 "Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible concessions, we must acknowledge, that there is not, in any instance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his integrity. And though it is allowed, that, without a regard to property, no society could subsist; yet, according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule; but is liable to many exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions." (EPM 9.22; SBN 282–83)

19 Frykholm, "A Humean Particularist Virtue Ethic," 2171.

20 There is no doubt that contemporary virtue epistemology has had a great influence on this burgeoning interpretive tradition in Hume studies. One can hardly write a paper on virtue epistemology in Hume without acknowledging the work of at least Sosa, Zagzebski, and Goldman. Of particular help in illuminating this nascent view in Hume are Sosa, "For the Love of Truth?"; Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge,* and Goldman, Liaisons. I also found Battaly, "Virtue Epistemology," and Baehr, "Four Varieties of Character—Based

Virtue Epistemology," helpful for understanding the broader landscape of contemporary virtue epistemology.

21 Schafer, "Curious Virtues in Hume's Epistemology," 7. Schafer's account builds on the work of Michael Ridge, but Ridge argues that Hume's Title Principle is a *practical* principle while Schafer argues that this reading does not quite capture the spirit of Hume's movement beyond his skeptical crisis at the close of Book 1.

22 This is not a matter than can be fully explored here, but it is worth mentioning that the passionate base for Hume's virtue epistemology articulated by Schafer is just a start. In looking at works besides the *Treatise,* especially Hume's works on religion, it appears that Hume acknowledges many other intellectual passions and virtues besides curiosity and ambition. Furthermore, we would benefit from clarifying what a passion is and what a virtue is in the intellectual case. Schafer describes curiosity as a passion that is satisfied in the face of intellectual virtue, but it is also a quintessential intellectual virtue. One might wonder how the thing that is doing the satisfying, curiosity, can be the same thing that is satisfied.

23 See Abramson, "What's so 'Natural' about Hume's Natural Virtues?" for a helpful analysis of this passage.

24 See Boyle, "The Ways of the Wise: Hume's Rules of Causal Reasoning."

25 In placing the vulgar in a pre-character, pre-virtue category, I am staking out territory for Hume in the broader virtue epistemology debate. Reliabilist virtue epistemologists would likely consider some of the abilities of the vulgar to be virtues, for example, having well-functioning faculties of sense. Without the time to argue for it adequately, I am placing Hume closer to the responsibilists' camp. I find him to be more concerned with the character traits that lead to being a virtuous epistemic agent than with what sources of knowledge are reliable. Of course, some will argue that these two things are connected, but it is not obvious to me that being a virtuous intellectual agent, for Hume, is always a matter of having traits that reliably track truth. This issue is a bit messier in the aesthetic case. In *Of the Standard of Taste,* Hume gives more attention to basic perceptual faculties. Where exactly Hume fits, if anywhere, in the reliabilist/responsibilist landscape is the subject of another paper.

26 There are surely more intellectual virtues than these.

27 Here I disagree slightly with Boyle. There are circumstances in which super-skepticism is a virtue.

28 One might rightly question the simplicity of Hume's description of these early humans. There is little doubt that his accounts of societies that pre-date his own are irresponsible by contemporary standards.

29 I say "strong" judgments of vice because we do judge some natural habits of mind to be *better* than others, but, again, we rarely blame others for their natural beliefs to such an extent that our blame might qualify as a judgment of vice.

30 See Kail, "Understanding Hume's Natural History of Religion."

31 See Hume's discussion of "priestcraft" in Part 1 of his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.*

32 See, for example, Driver, "The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue." Driver makes a compelling case against accounts of virtue, like Hume's, that, by her estimation, do not respect the difference between intellectual and moral virtues and draws the distinction in terms of the types of goods produced—epistemic virtues produce goods for the agent while moral virtues produce goods for others. This avenue is not open to Hume.

33 Though Driver discusses ends, not rules.

34 See Wright, "Hume on Testimony: A Virtue-Theoretic Defense," 260.

35 Wolf, "Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues," 150.

WORKS CITED

Abramson, Kate. "What's so 'Natural' about Hume's Natural Virtues?" In *The Cambridge Companion to Hume's* Treatise, edited by Donald C. Ainslie and Annemarie Butler, 333–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Abramson, Kate. "Sympathy and the Project of Hume's Second Enquiry," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 83 (2001): 45–80.

Abramson, Kate. "Correcting Our Sentiments about Hume's Moral Point of View," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 37 (1999): 333–61.

Aristotle. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Baceski, Tina. "Hume on Art Critics, Wise Men, and the Virtues of Taste," *Hume Studies* 39.2 (2013): 233–56.

Baehr, Jason. "Four Varieties of Character-Based Virtue Epistemology," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2008): 469–502.

Baier, Annette. *A Progress of Sentiments*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Baron, Marcia. "Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12.3 (1982): 539–55.

Battaly, Heather. "Virtue Epistemology," *Philosophy Compass* 3/4 (2008): 639–63.

Boyle, Deborah. "The Ways of the Wise: Hume's Rules of Causal Reasoning," *Hume Studies* 38.2 (2012): 157–82.

Brown, Charlotte. "Hume on Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy." In *A Companion to Hume*, edited by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, 219–39. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Brown, Charlotte. ""From Spectator to Agent: Hume's Theory of Obligation," *Hume Studies* 20 (1994): 19–35.

Cohen, Alix. "The Notion of Moral Progress in Hume's Philosophy: Does Hume Have a Theory of Moral Progress?" *Hume Studies* 26.1 (2000): 109–27.

Cohon, Rachel. "Hume's Natural and Artificial Virtues." In *The Blackwell Guide to Hume's* Treatise, edited by Saul Traiger, 256–75. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006.

Cohon, Rachel. "The Common Point of View in Hume's Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57.4 (1997): 827–50.

Driver, Julia. "The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue," *Metaphilosophy* 34.3 (2003): 367–83.

Frykholm, Erin. "A Humean Particularist Virtue Ethic," *Philosophical Studies* 172 (2015): 2171–91.

Garrett, Don. "The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared," *Hume Studies* 33.2 (November 2007): 257–88.

Gauthier, David. "Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave," *Hume Studies* 18.2 (1992): 401–27.

Goldman, Alvin. *Liaisons*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.

Hickerson, Ryan. (2013). "What the Wise Ought to Believe: A Voluntarist Interpretation of Hume's General Rules," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21.6 (2013): 1133–53.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Hume, David. A Dissertation on the Passions: *The Natural History of Religion*. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Hume, David. *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. Edited by Dorothy Coleman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Hume, David. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Hume, David. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Hume, David. "Of the Standard of Taste." In *Essays, Moral, Political, Literary*, revised edition. Edited by Eugene F. Miller, 226–49. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Virtue Ethics and Human Nature," *Hume Studies* 25.1–2 (1999): 67–82.

Kail, P.J.E. "Understanding Hume's Natural History of Religion," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 57.227 (2007): 190–211.

Kopajtic, Lauren. "Cultivating Strength of Mind: Hume on the Government of the Passions and Artificial Virtue," *Hume Studies* 41.2 (2015): 201–29.

Korsgaard, Christine. "The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics," *Hume Studies* 25.1–2 (1999): 3–42.

Lattenbach, Hans. "Monkish Virtues, Artificial Lives: On Hume's Genealogy of Morals," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26.3 (1996): 367–88.

McCormick, Miriam. "Why Should We Be Wise?" *Hume Studies* 31.1 (2005): 3–19.

McIntyre, Jane. "Strength of Mind: Prospects and Problems for a Humean Account," *Synthese* 152 (2006): 393–401.

Owen, David. *Hume's Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Qu, Hsueh. "Prescription, Description, and Hume's Experimental Method," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 24.2 (2016): 279–301.

Qu, Hsueh. "Hume's Practically Epistemic Conclusions?" *Philosophical Studies* 170 (2014): 501–24.

Radcliffe, Elizabeth S. "Strength of Mind and the Calm and Violent Passions," *Res Philosophica* 92.3 (2015): 547–67.

Ridge, Michael. "Epistemology Moralized: David Hume's Practical Epistemology" *Hume Studies* 29.2 (2003): 165–204.

Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal-And Shouldn't Be," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 11.1 (1994): 202–28.

Schafer, Karl. "Curious Virtues in Hume's Epistemology," *Philosophers' Imprint* 14.1 (2014): 1–20.

Sosa, Ernest. "For the Love of Truth?" In *Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility*, edited by Linda Zagzebski and Abrol Fairweather, 49–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Smith, Adam. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Swanton, Christine. *The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015.

Swanton, Christine. *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Taylor, Jacqueline A. *Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume's Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Taylor, Jacqueline. "Hume on the Standard of Virtue," *Journal of Ethics* 6.1 (2002): 43–62.

Vitz, Rico. "Contagion, Community, and Virtue in Hume's Epistemology." In *The Ethics of Belief*, edited by Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz, 198–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Vitz, Rico. "Doxastic Virtues in Hume's Epistemology," *Hume Studies* 35.1–2 (2009): 211–29.

Wolf, Susan. "Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues," *Ratio* 20.2 (2007): 145–67.

Wright, Sarah. "Hume on Testimony: A Virtue-Theoretic Defense," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 28.3 (2011): 247–65.

Zagzebski, Linda. *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.