

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Abstract: The following text suggests interpreting Hume's theory of sympathy in Book 2 of the *Treatise of Human Nature* in a broader context of relations, feelings, and sentiments. It is this context which marks off different types of impressions and their different phenomenology, and offers rich insights into Hume's theory. As regards Hume's theory of sympathy, it can be analyzed for various cases of sympathy both in the context of the (1) *conception* involved in a given case of sympathy, and in the context of its (2) *doxastic* and (3) *affect-constituting* vivacity. The article first describes three kinds of associative relations (causal relations, relations of modes and substances, and projection of spatial contiguity) involved in the conception of passions in sympathy, and shows how these relations might help to differentiate impressions of our feelings from those of other people. Yet another distinction between impressions produced by sympathy is possible with respect to the context of belief or doxastic vivacity involved in the conception of the feelings of others. The text tries to illustrate this by showing how the neutralization of disbelief and relations of space and time differentiate impressions of sympathy with fictive heroes of tragic plays, from sympathy with real people in everyday life. Finally, the article discusses a broader context of the affect-constituting vivacity. Even though Hume's view of the origin of this vivacity remains unclear, it can be shown that the affect-constituting vivacity grounds our proper experience with others as *affective others*, and differentiates our conception of persons from our conception of inanimate objects. Moreover, different kinds of associative relations involved in the transfer of the affect-constituting liveliness differentiate felt emotions of people which are close to us from felt emotions of people related to us merely on account of our self-interest.[1]

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Hume arguably uses the word "sympathy" in different ways.[2] However, in Book 2 of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, the focal sense of "sympathy" points to the psychological mechanism by which we "enter deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them" (T 2.1.10.20; SBN 319).[3] We can find main descriptions of the mechanism in section 11, "Of the love of fame," of the second Book of Hume's *Treatise.* Additional remarks concerning sympathy are also scattered in sections 4 and 5 of the second part of Book 2. Hume also offers a short recapitulation of his account of this mechanism, in the first two sections of the third part of Book 3.

In Book 2, Hume describes the mechanism of sympathy in terms of a remarkable conversion of ideas into impressions.[4] Passions and sentiments of others appear, on account of a causal inference, "at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact" (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 319), only to be "presently converted into the very impressions they represent" (ibid.). Hume further states that "this conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself" (ibid.). Our consciousness gives us "a lively conception of our own person" (T 2.1.11.4; SBN 317), which is always "intimately present with us" (ibid.).

In the operations of sympathy, the idea of another person's passions and sentiments is always, in some measure, associated with this idea, or "rather impression," of the self, by relations of resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Due to this association, the liveliness of the self is transferred from the self to the associated idea of the passion. As a result, the mechanism of sympathy, when operating "in its full perfection," enlivens the idea of the passion in "such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection" (T 2.1.11.3; SBN 317). In other words, not only do we conceive what other people feel, we *feel* what other people feel. Throughout his *Treatise* Hume is, among other things, interested in showing how the impressions of passions and sentiments of other people shape our selves and affect our beliefs and emotions in everyday life.

In his discussion of the mechanism of sympathy in T 2.1.11, Hume puts considerable weight on the analogy between the mechanism of sympathy and the mechanism of the constitution of belief described in the first Book of the *Treatise*. In both cases, liveliness of a present impression is transferred to an associated idea. All the three natural relations of resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect are involved in the transfer—with cause and effect being the leading relation in the formation of belief, and resemblance in sympathy. Moreover, in the beginning of the *Treatise,* Hume tells us that "the lively idea of any object always approaches its impression" (T. 2.1.11.7; SBN 319) and that the difference between the two may be "in some measure" removed (ibid.).

According to Hume, we find this initial observation confirmed in the operations of sympathy, for here the difference is bridged, and the lively idea of a passion is not only enlivened but converted into an impression. In fact, such conversion takes place *mainly* and *principally* in sympathy. This turns sympathy into a "remarkable," "surprising and extraordinary" phenomenon (T 2.1.11.7–8; SBN 319–20). According to Hume, the operation of sympathy will help us to "understand how the relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen

and enliven an idea" in the operations of understanding (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 320). Despite this remarkableness of sympathy, Hume concludes his description by stating that "sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of understanding" (ibid.).

Hume points out the exact correspondence between the operations of understanding and of sympathy to gain additional confirmation of the all-important role played in his philosophical system by the *transfer* of liveliness. However, this transfer is always set in a broader background of Hume's system. Our impressions of other people are never considered and felt simply, but always in the context of our awareness concerning the sources of their force and within our awareness of numerous other associations. This sensitivity to a broader situation makes the double transfer of liveliness, as it usually occurs in sympathy, into a phenomenon of mind, which is, despite Hume's own words, very unlike anything we experience in the operations of understanding. There are however still deeper reasons to look for such broader context in Hume's theory of sympathy.

Concerning ideas and impressions, Hume holds that "the different degrees of their force and vivacity are . . . the only particulars, that distinguish them: And as this difference may be remov'd, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, 'tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means be so enliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion" (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 319). Although Hume claims that there is only one kind of such vivacity, he never claims that various types of our ideas and impressions are not phenomenologically, that is to our feeling, further distinguished by our awareness of the broader context of feelings and relations. Failure to keep this in mind leads to the kind of criticism of Hume, already initiated by Thomas Reid:

> Suppose, for instance, that I see the sun rising out of the sea: I remember to have seen him rise yesterday; I believe he will rise tomorrow near the same place; I can likewise imagine him rising in that place, without any belief at all. Now, according to this sceptical hypothesis [of Hume], this perception, this memory, this foreknowledge, this imagination, are all the same idea, diversified only by different degrees of vivacity.[5]

Reid notes that if this were true, then one and the same idea, by gradually losing its vivacity, would be first perceived, then remembered, then anticipated and finally merely imagined "so that the ideas, in the gradual declension of their vivacity, seem to imitate the inflection of the verbs in grammar. They begin with the present, and proceed in order to the preterite, the future, and the indefinite." (Reid, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind," 199). This is clearly absurd. To accept such theory "appears to require as much faith as that of St. Athanasius" (ibid.).

As Norman Kemp Smith pointed out, such criticism is provoked by Hume's unsatisfactory exposition of his teaching concerning force and vivacity of ideas in the *Treatise*.[6] At the same time, it exhibits Reid's "incapacity to have any proper appreciation of Hume's quality as an adversary" (Kemp Smith, 231). While Hume insists that the force and vivacity is the only differentiating mark of impressions and ideas, he (as Kemp Smith holds) is also pointing to a

broader context of relations and sentiments which, to our *feeling*, mark off one type of ideas, for example, ideas of memory, from another one, for example, ideas of imagination. For instance, *ideas* of memory are felt differently, because "in memory the order of the ideas, like the order of sense-impression, is determined for the mind and not by it," while in imagination an idea "not being tied down by any act of assent or belief, is at the free and full disposal of the imagination," and "the individual can hardly be free to exercise this liberty without being aware of it" (Kemp Smith, 234). Once we explore similar contextual differences in Hume's theory of sympathy, it reveals a surprising subtlety. This helps to address one of the bigger problems of Hume's theory, closely resembling the one ridiculed by Reid. If the force of an *isolated* perception were the *only* mark distinguishing my emotions from the felt emotions of others, and if in sympathy the idea of a passion "acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection" (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317), then there is apparently no way of distinguishing felt emotions of others from my own emotions. Hume's way of speaking sometimes lends itself to this interpretation. So, for example, Philip Mercer notes the following: "[Hume] nowhere suggests that our feelings are, as it were, 'not really our own.' On [SBN] p. 317 Hume explicitly says that our idea is converted into 'the very passion itself.' Hume seems unable to make the distinction between actually being, say, anxious, and sympathizing with someone who is anxious."[7]

And recently, Byoungjae Kim seems to have been working with the view attributed to Hume already by Reid:

> The fact that for Hume vivacity is the only scale to distinguish perceptions of myself from perceptions of others leads to a very interesting conclusion when it comes to the role of sympathy. As we have seen, causal inference generates the belief in other minds, and thus allows us to distinguish perceptions of myself from perceptions of others. But sympathy erases the distinction between my mind and other minds by converting the belief into an impression. He says that when an idea is converted into an impression by sympathy, the idea 'acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection' (T 2.1.11.3; SBN 317). That is, when the idea of another's passion is converted into the passion itself by sympathy, I do feel that the passion is mine, not others.' Therefore, we can conclude that sympathy does not have a role to play in generating the belief in other minds, and hence making a distinction between perceptions of myself and of others. Rather, it erases the distinction between them, which have been made by an act of causal inference, by converting the belief into an impression.[8]

I find it hard to accept such an interpretation. Hume clearly presupposes that in many cases we can sharply differentiate between our own passion and sympathizing with a passion of someone else. For example, he sees no substantial problem here, when he writes the following:

> Sympathy being nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression, 'tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures which *neither belong to ourselves*, nor at the present instant have any real existence. (T 2.2.9.13; SBN 385, italics mine)

We also need to add that Hume has a definite systematic reason for presupposing a clear distinction between two ways of feeling impressions of passions, that is, as our own and as someone else's. He famously introduces his theory of sympathy in the chapter "Of love of fame," to elucidate our *feeling* of other people's love and hate (taken in Hume's sense) toward *ourselves*. If the above-mentioned "Reidian" interpretations were true, then in sympathizing with someone's love or hate toward me, I would love or hate myself, or at least lose the distinction between my love toward myself and another person's love toward me. This is of course absurd and not even possible, as Hume, strictly speaking, *denies* that there is such an emotion as self-love and self-hate (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329).[9] Instead, Hume claims that in feeling someone's love toward me, I feel proud of the quality which caused the love (T 2.1.11.9; SBN 320). However, while the pride I feel is mine, the love I feel can never be mine and is clearly understood by me as someone else's. Since interpreters sometimes read Hume in the above mentioned Reidian way, some ambiguity of meaning must be suspected.

Even though Hume perhaps did not always clearly differentiate between different meanings of "my," it is clearly one thing to say that I have *my* feeling of someone's anger, and to say that I have my feeling of *my* anger. In the first, weaker case, my impression of someone's anger is mine in the very same sense that my previous idea of that very same anger was mine—it belongs to a complex idea or bundle of perceptions that constitute my own self. Such impression of someone's anger stands on a par with the perception of "heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure" (T 1.4.6.3, SBN 252) on which I stumble "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself" (ibid.). We might call this an impressional sense of "my."

In the second case, I attribute a feeling to myself, or to another person, in a personal sense, as a *property* of a person. People, Hume holds, tend to harmonize their personal feelings and sentiments just as strings on a musical instrument (T 3.3.1.7; SBN 576). Some of the emotions and sentiments are "contagious" (T 2.1.11.2; SBN 316). They tend to become mine in the personal sense—I *feel* someone's joy, that is: I already have the impression of joy in the impressional sense of "my joy," and I quickly start to *feel* the joy in the personal sense as well (T 2.1.11.2; SBN 317). However, as we have seen, this is hardly a universal consequence, since some important emotions, such as love or hate, can never become my own in the personal sense, if my self is their object.

The personal aspect of sympathy plays an important role in Hume's theory. If we are to explain its structure in more detail, its broader context of relations both on the level of initial conceptions and on the level of resulting impressions, as well as differences in the sources of sympathy's liveliness, must be brought under scrutiny. The following text attempts to outline main problem areas and offer some results of such an investigation.

Sympathy and Quality

I take it to be self-evident that in Hume's system of sympathy there is no perception of a feeling, treated as a cause or an effect, which is not simultaneously understood, or rather felt, as being a property of a person. After all, what we are dealing with here, according to Hume, are emotions *of* people as we perceive them in our everyday encounters, that is, as we meet them in the everyday world of common objects. Qualities of our mind and body are parts of ourselves (T 2.1.9.1; SBN 303), and emotions are qualities of the mind.

This means that in Hume's system, ideas and impressions of feelings of other people, besides belonging to a complex unity of my mind in the impressional sense, are also associated in a complex idea or perception of a person. So are the perceptions constituting basic, most rudimentary external signs of feelings of the person.[10] An example of the latter will perhaps make some interesting consequences of this aspect clearer.

When we perceive a smile as caused by another person's joy, being an *effect* is not the only determination of the smile of which we are aware. The difference between the smiling face and the head of the person, for example, is for Hume clearly a rational distinction. The smiling face is a part of a *quality*. It is a part of the complex perception of the head conceived as a part of that person. Such quality is closely *united* and integrated with other qualities to form our complex perception of that person (smiling John, smiling Mary, and so on). The *principle* of union forms here a "chief part of the complex idea" (T 1.1.6.2; SBN 16).[11] Hume did not discuss this union in detail. The least we can say here is that perceptions which we take to be qualities of everyday objects are "suppos'd to be closely and inseparably connected by the relations of *contiguity* and *causation*" (T 1.1.6.2; SBN 16, italics mine). The combination of contiguity and causation in integrating perceptions into complexes, which appear to us as everyday phenomenal objects endowed with sensory qualities, has an interesting influence on time relations holding among some of the united qualities, especially when one quality is a causal symptom of another.

Hume, as might be argued, holds not only that we believe that an apple is red *because* it is sweet, we also believe that it is red *and* sweet, since both qualities, of which one happens to be the cause of another, are also co-present in time and appear as contiguous in space in the volume of the apple.[12] That is why the redness shows the *current state* of the apple.

It is clear that a similar combination of causality and contiguity is valid for the most rudimentary, bodily based cases of sympathy as well, and that such combination affects our causally determined conception of feelings of other persons. After all, Hume himself talks of external *signs* of feelings, and even though an effect is a sign of a cause, it by itself need not give us a motive for believing in the present existence of the cause. But most of the rudimentary signs of emotions necessarily give us such belief. In fact, as Thomas Reid noted, in sympathy we are fully occupied with the present *existence* of the expressed emotion, and we *do not*, strictly speaking, observe its external signs. We simply "pass through" these signs to the emotions that interest us.[13] Hume did not produce such fine and subtle observations, but

for him too, I think, a smile signifies the existence of joy more like, for example, fever signifies illness rather than like thunder signifies lightning.

Hume's theory, as it seems to me, works along the following lines. I see, for example, that someone is crying, and that leads me to the belief that the crying is caused by a feeling of sadness, which the person experiences. The causal relation and the relations of contiguity in space and time integrate my impression of crying and my idea of sadness into my complex perception of the crying *and* the sad person. Therefore, I do not believe that the person *was* sad, because the person is crying, but rather I believe that the person *is* sad, because the person *is crying*. Despite the fact that cause always precedes its effect (T 1.3.2.7; SBN 76), the sadness and the crying are believed to be two co-present *qualities* in *one* subject. This is an essential part of our conception of feelings of other people that forms a background which, as I will claim, is preserved in the subsequent conversion of ideas into impressions. If Hume held that we infer joy from a smile in the same way in which we infer that one billiard ball must have been hit by another because we see it moving, he would be proposing a theory too absurd for many people to merit serious consideration. Clearly, co-presence in time mentioned by Hume with regard to qualities alongside causality (T 1.1.6.2; SBN 16) must play a part in our conceptions of the basic layer of feelings received through sympathy as well.

I have already claimed that this background is inherited by the impression resulting from sympathetic conversion. It seems obvious that, according to Hume, an idea of sweetness of an apple can be replaced by an impression of that quality when we taste it, and that an idea of a smile can be replaced by an impression of that quality when we see it. These impressions, if they confirm the previous ideas, inherit the associative relations of the replaced ideas. In a similar way, we can have the idea of an instance of sadness of a crying person and then feel this quality as a result of a conversion.[14] There is no reason to think that the associations standing in the background-awareness of our conception of feelings received through sympathy, somehow disappeared because the vivacity of the conception had been raised to a new level. The impression of sadness, for example, is *still* taken to be a *cause* of the person's gloomy face. It is still conceived as a feeling of an external object (we feel the person *there* feels sadness) and it is contiguous in time (and space, as we will argue) with the continuous existence of its external signs.

To sum up, sympathy, for Hume, transforms ideas of feelings understood not only as real causes and effects but also as real *properties of* others. That is especially obvious in those cases where sympathy is there to detect how permanent a mental *trait* of someone's character is. Is, for example, my feeling of someone's anger, exhibited by a tone of the person's voice, an exceptional property of that person, or is it something that characterizes that person as having a disposition for anger? My love or hate of the person may depend on it.[15]

Some interpreters, most notably Nelson Pike and Terence Penelhum,[16] found it hard to pinpoint the principle by which the Humean mind establishes the difference between the personal, bodily self and the self of other people. It has been argued that Hume presupposes the distinction without clear explanation. I tend to agree with this view. However, I think that once we realize that for Hume our conceptions and impressions of feelings of other people

are never experienced simply, but always in a broader awareness of further associations, his view of this difference becomes clearer.[17]

A very rudimentary self/other distinction is, as we have seen, already explained by Hume by means of the *causal association* of the conceived passions with *external* signs—primarily with the perception of bodies similar to mine, which exhibit external signs of psychological states similar to mine.

I *believe* in the existence of joy, when I see a smiling face of another person. This feeling turns into an impression when this behavior and the person is related to me by resemblance, contiguity, and (blood) relations of causality. The feeling still draws a part of its liveliness from the relation of cause and effect. I still believe that *the joy of another person, which I feel,* is the *cause* of the smiling face I see. Both sources of liveliness are clearly missing if the felt impression is mine in the personal sense. I do not have to believe *my* own passion really exists when I am feeling it, and my feeling need not draw a part of its liveliness from its previous lively conception. Neither do I have to see myself in a mirror or imagine my body to establish some ties of resemblance and contiguity with myself and have a subsequent impression of my own joy.[18] When conceived passions of other people turn into impressions, the peculiar double source of their liveliness (in causal inference and in their relation with our self), and further relations of causality and contiguity which integrate them with other ideas as qualities into a complex perception of an external object, clearly sets them apart from those impressions of passions, which are *ours* in the personal sense.

An attempt at providing a further, more comprehensive and systematic theory of the self-other differentiation in Hume's system would probably result in a Humesque theory, which is not developed by Hume, and would require a series of lengthy investigations. It is, however, possible to further discuss some parts of Hume's system in the light of the self/other distinction without attempting to construct a robust theory of personal individuation.

The broader context of sympathy, as we have just claimed, is co-determined not only by causal relations but by relations of spatial contiguity. What I would like to show in more detail is how we need to understand spatial contiguity of emotions, if Hume's theory is to address a serious critique of its description of how we experience other people.

Sympathy and Incorporation of Passions

Hume holds the view that passions and sentiments share the nature of most of our perceptions—they do not have spatial extension. According to Hume, the only perceptions with parts ordered in space are those of seeing and feeling (T 1.2.3.15; SBN 38). Passions thus cannot be proper parts of the order of perception which forms our idea of extension. They can be neither inside, nor outside of anything. If there was no other underlying mechanism of sympathy besides the causal inference, we would infer the existence of passions, which are in reality nowhere, from the existence of located spatial objects. Since these passions would retain their motivational force, the bodies of other people would resemble puppets or soulless bodies moved from a hidden, unextended source. In other words, the passions would not be

attributable to someone who is fully here or there, but to someone or something which is only partially present in the extended world. The same would be the case of the mind of the other: "the ghost" would be conceived as being neither in, nor outside "the machine." This clearly contradicts our most common everyday beliefs. This was, and still is, one of the main points of criticism directed by proponents of phenomenology at those theories of empathy which reduce our knowledge of other minds to the inference by resemblance. The classic place of this criticism is Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy.*[19] Even though Stein mainly targets John Stuart Mill's theory, Hume's theory, as its predecessor, is affected as well. And since this critique has been around for more than one hundred years, and proved to be quite influential in continental philosophy, it should be considered in the context of Hume scholarship as well.[20]

Even though Hume does not directly address the spatiality of passions, he discusses the spatiality of unextended sensations. The unextended sweetness of a fig, for example, is not attributable to the fig lying *there* on the table simply by inferring the sweetness from the ripe color of the fig. As such, the fig's sweetness does not have a place *in* the extended world. But Hume contends that causal inference is not the only mechanism at work when we infer the existence of unextended perceptions from extended signs (or vice versa).[21] And he provides an example to show us what he means.

> Thus supposing we consider a fig at one end of the table, and an olive at the other, 'tis evident, that in forming the complex ideas of these substances, one of the most obvious is that of their different relishes; and 'tis as evident, that we incorporate and conjoin these qualities with such as are colour'd and tangible. The bitter taste of the one, and sweet of the other are suppos'd to lie in the very visible body, and to be separated from each other by the whole length of the table. This is so notable and so natural an illusion, that it may be proper to consider the principles, from which it is deriv'd. (T 1.4.5.11; SBN 236–37)

Let us choose the fig. According to Hume, we believe 1) that the sweetness of the fig is *where* the fig is, 2) that it is a quality, a property of the fig on the table, and 3) that the sweetness "shows" itself on account of the color of the fig (Hume is not eating the fig, he is looking at it). This remarkable union is conditioned by relations of contiguity and causality (for example, whenever we taste the fig, which has such and such color, it tastes sweet—and the sweetness causes a certain color of the fig—the fig looks ripe). These relations lead our mind into incorporating the sweetness into the volume of the fig.

> These relations, then, of causation, and contiguity in the time of their appearance, betwixt the extended object and the quality, which exists without any particular place, must have such an effect on the mind, that upon the appearance of one it will immediately turn its thought to the conception of the other. Nor is this all. We not only turn our thought from one to the other upon account of their relation, but

> likewise endeavour to give them a new relation, viz. that of a conjunction in place, that we may render the transition more easy and natural. (T 1.4.5.12; SBN 237)

Since conjunction in place is co-existence in time, we now believe that the fig is sweet when it looks ripe. It does not become sweet only *after* we bite it.

Hume then explains that such conjunction has very little in common with conjunction in the ordinary sense. Sweetness has no extended parts, but it is incorporated into all the parts of the fig, despite the fact that it cannot "touch" anything. Such (believed) incorporation goes against everything our reflection on the nature of the perception of taste tells us. As usual, Hume assigns the incorporation to the tendency of the imagination.

> Here then we are influenc'd by two principles directly contrary to each other, viz. that inclination of our fancy by which we are determin'd to incorporate the taste with the extended object, and our reason, which shows us the impossibility of such an union. Being divided betwixt these opposite principles, we renounce neither one nor the other, but involve the subject in such confusion and obscurity, that we no longer perceive the opposition. We suppose that the taste exists within the circumference' of the body, but in such a manner, that it fills the whole without extension, and exists entire in every part without separation. In short, we use in our most familiar way of thinking, that scholastic principle, which, when crudely propos'd, appears so shocking, of *totum in toto and totum in qualibet parte*. (T 1.4.5.13; SBN 238)

According to Hume, we believe that the world around us is filled with colors, smells, and sounds, even though our philosophical reflections show us that the perceptions of these qualities do not have extension. If we can show that neither the senses, nor reason can account for our common belief in their location, then some tendency of the imagination must be responsible for this remarkable union. What about the passions?

If we look at the self-other distinction in the light of the incorporation of "unextended qualities," then it is clear 1) that Hume holds that all passions as perceptions are unextended, and 2) that he works with them as if they were incorporated as qualities into the bodies of other persons. One of the nicest examples is Hume's description of compassion.

> Suppose the ship to be driven so near me, that I can perceive distinctly the horror, painted on the countenance of the seamen and passengers, hear their lamentable cries, see the dearest friends give their last adieu, or embrace with a resolution to perish in each others arms: NO man has so' savage a heart as to reap any pleasure from such a spectacle, or withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy. (T 3.3.2.5; SBN 594)

It is hard to imagine that Hume would dispute our *belief* 1) that people *there* on the ship are in horror, while we are safe *here*.[22] Emotions are believed to be *where* the people that have them

are. Nor would he challenge our belief 2) that the horror is believed to be a quality, a property of the persons that feel it, and 3) that it shows itself *on account of* and *in* the countenance and movements of the people on the ship.

In sympathy we feel another's passions as if they were ours. However, in our underlying conception of someone else's passion, the causal inference, on which sympathy is grounded, is not working in isolation—just as the causal inference from the color of the fig to its sweetness is not an isolated principle in constituting our belief in the fig's sweetness. In Hume's system the impressions of passions are believed to be "incorporated" by contiguity into the bodily external signs, bodily countenance and behavior. The horror clearly does not have external parts. It cannot be spread over the bodies like butter on bread. Neither do we believe, in opposition to the sweetness of the fig, that an instance of fear fills all parts of the volume of the body (its lungs or brain, for example). Still, the person's face is somehow full of fear and the person has this fear as a quality (the person *is* scared). Even though Hume's mechanism of the incorporation of unextended perceptions with extended perceptions conceived as properties of objects is very rudimentary, it gives yet another hint of a process of individuation concerning the self-other distinction. We conceive emotions of others and believe them to be *there*, where others are (while we are *here*). When an emotion becomes our emotion, we feel it *here*, where we are (where our mind and body is) in the impressional sense,[23] but since the impression is a part of a complex perception of another person, we see it incorporated *there* as a quality in the complex perception of someone. It is not ours in the personal sense. Moreover, the *there* of the spatial conception and personal attribution of the passion seems to overshadow the *here* of our impressional awareness, since "in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves" (T 2.2.2.17; SBN 340). In the underlying conception of feelings received from sympathy, causality and spatiality complement each other. The subsequent conversion of ideas into impressions retains the causal and spatial bonds in which the ideas of the passions were originally produced and fixed.

However, in the *Treatise* the theory of the believed incorporation of unextended perceptions into spatially extended perceptions is hardly more than a crude idea. Hume seems to have introduced it without giving much thought to how exactly it fits in with the rest of his system.

Sympathy and the Doxastic Liveliness

So far, we have been concentrating on the broader context of associative relations which shape our *conception* of feelings of other people. Subsequently, this conception helps to differentiate two *types* of secondary impressions—those that belong to us and those that belong to others. But Hume's examples show that there are also interesting type-determining variations in our awareness concerning the *liveliness* of this conception.

As interpreters often point out, sympathy (in the common everyday face-to-face encounters with others) already starts with an enlivened idea, that is, with belief. We "feel the same emotion we believe the other to be experiencing."[24] Hume makes it repeatedly clear that we discover these ideas by causal inferences from external signs: "No passion of another discovers

itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy" (T 3.3.1.7; SBN 576). These inferences concerning the passions of other people—from seeing them in tears to believing that sadness is causing them to cry, from observing charitable action to belief in the motivating passion of benevolence—are just as stable and reliable as any inference concerning matters of fact (see, for example, T 2.3.1.17; SBN 406). We believe others feel joy when laughing, or fear when in serious danger, just as firmly as we believe that a billiard ball will move if struck by another. This dependency of the liveliness of the full impression of sympathy can be called the *doxastic* dependency of sympathy, and the liveliness drawn from it the *doxastic* liveliness. But however firmly we may believe in the reality of the conceived passion, the transfer of doxastic liveliness can never convert ideas of passions into impressions: "For *besides* the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc'd of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize; *besides* this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection" (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 320, italics mine). The relation of resemblance and contiguity needs to be there to allow for the transfer of liveliness coming from the self. This transfer of liveliness makes the conversion possible. We can call this liveliness the *affect-constituting* liveliness, and the dependency of the full impression of sympathy on the resemblance and contiguity with our self the *affective* dependency.

It is obvious that the total liveliness of the *impression of a passion* remains determined by the fixed order of sense impressions which form the external signs, and by the causal relations which we infer from these signs. Once we recognize that the signs of the felt passions are fake, or that we misread them, we immediately lose the impression of sympathy. In such cases the impression does not become less lively. The *whole impression* is lost, if the doxastic link is severed. In real life, we share and react to what we take to be signs of *real* emotions of others. A person faking tears does not really feel sadness. Our impression of that person's sadness was based on a misconception. Once we recognize such error, our belief is *contradicted*, the transfer of liveliness from our self loses its object, so to speak, and our sympathy ceases. In a similar fashion, we can also misconceive the resemblance relation which grounds the causal one. In a different culture, external signs need not always indicate the same passions which they indicate in ours.[25] Again, once we recognize this mistake, our sympathy with the misconceived passion is shaken or lost. For Hume, the doxastic transfer of liveliness is therefore a condition *sine qua non* of the sympathy in our everyday encounters with others. Since rudimentary sympathy in everyday encounters is based on belief, its impression must be continuously confirmed by impressions coming from the sensory perception of the external signs of passions. However, the dependency of the affect-constituting liveliness on the underlying conception is more complicated than this.

While Hume claims that there can be no sympathy without belief in real encounters with others, he accepts it in other contexts. This is possible because our awareness of the broader structure behind the conception of passions is here of a different, modified type. Such modified sympathy fulfills an important role in Hume's moral philosophy and aesthetics.[26] This is, for example, very clear in Hume's discussion of tragedy.

> A spectator of a tragedy passes thro' a long train of grief, terror, indignation, and other affections, which the poet represents in the persons he introduces. As many tragedies end happily, and no excellent one can be compos'd without some reverses of fortune, the spectator must sympathize with all these changes, and receive the fictitious joy as well as every other passion. (T 2.2.7.3; SBN 369)

We cannot enter here into a difficult discussion of Hume's explanation of the effect of tragedy. However, as Brian Kirby pointed out,[27] for Hume our suspension of belief in the reality of the events we see on stage is counterbalanced by the suspension of disbelief. Our awareness of this counter-suspension, so to speak, needs to be in place while we read the external signs, if sympathy is to operate in the realm of tragedy. Certainly, such sympathy without belief is not full-fledged. Hume makes this clear in his essay *Of Tragedy*: "It is certain, that, on the theater, the representation has almost the effect of reality; yet it has not altogether that effect. However we may be hurried away by the spectacle, whatever dominion the senses and imagination may usurp over reason, there still lurks at the bottom a certain idea of falsehood in the whole of what we see."[28]

I think that one of the main aspects of our broader awareness of such poetic liveliness is the following. According to Hume, our mind is *always* conscious of its real here-and-now (T 2.3.7.2; SBN 427–28). It is also aware of the relations of contiguity connecting its here-and-now to the things and events it perceives, or believes, to be *real* (ibid.). Regardless of how faithful the poetic imitation is, our mind is therefore always aware that the time and the place of the things and causal events on stage are not the time and the place of the displayed tragic events. We might not be able to differentiate the sword duel of Hamlet and Laertes on stage from a real one, but we know that the duel is not happening in Denmark many years ago as the actors want us to believe. Moreover, while Hamlet is a fictional story, tragedians, as Hume points out, often present stories loosely based on facts. In such cases, our belief in the reality of these facts helps us to suspend our disbelief. It makes the events on stage look more real. This makes our sympathy with the heroes of the tragedy easier by making "the idea of falsehood in the whole" more acceptable:

> [T]ragedians always borrow their fable, or at least the names of their principal actors, from some known passage in history; and that not in order to deceive the spectators; for they will frankly confess, that truth is not in any circumstance inviolably observ'd; but in order to procure a more easy reception into the imagination for those extraordinary events, which they represent. (T 1.3.10.6; SBN 121–22)

We cannot discuss this associative background of liveliness further. We considered it in order to highlight our mind's sensitivity to the wider background of the doxastic source of sympathy, and to point out that this background subsequently determines the *phenomenology* and the *type* of the impression received through sympathy. In the remaining sections of the text, we

will attempt to highlight some of the features of our mind's sensitivity to the broader type-determining context of the second, affect-constituting source of the liveliness of sympathy.

Sympathy and Affective Others

Before we start our discussion, we need to ask an interesting question. What kind of liveliness is Hume talking about when he mentions that the affect-constituting liveliness comes from "the impression" of our own self? And what kind of self is at work here? Does Hume mean the liveliness of the self "as it regards our thought or imagination" (T 1.4.6.5; SBN 253), or the liveliness of the self "as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves?" (ibid.). Is the impression of the self, which Hume mentions as essential for sympathy, somehow "charged" by the liveliness of our passions, and especially by indirect passions of pride which, according to some readers of Hume, "produces the idea of self"? Some interpreters seem to favor this view. After all, it seems that the self of Book 2 should be somehow involved in the mechanism of sympathy discussed on so many pages of the very same book. So, for example Nicolas Capaldi writes that

> Hume has already made clear in the discussion of the passions that there is a transfer of vivacity from the original exciting idea to the indirect passion which is an impression and thence to the self which in the case of pride and humility is the object of the passion. The transfer of vivacity allows the idea of the self to acquire the vivacity of an impression.[29]

And Annette Baier then views this emotionally charged self as charging the emotions of others in sympathy:

> Our idea of ourselves must have greater 'vivacity,' he [Hume] claims, than that of our idea of any other person, because of our constant consciousness of 'ourself.' This superior vivacity, invigorated by pride, overflows in sympathy to vivify our ideas of the feelings of others, indeed to raise them into impressions, into shared feelings.[30]

Jane McIntyre seems to hold a similar opinion:

> The resemblance between the other person and ourselves then lends force to that idea [of the passion of that person], by transferring to it some of the vivacity of our own passions. Further relations that hold between persons also contribute to sympathetic communication."[31]

These interpretations seem to imply that the affect-constituting liveliness of sympathy comes from the self insofar as it is a self of a passionate (or proud) and self-concerned person. However, other interpreters seem to read Hume as saying that the vivacity in question

comes from the vivid feeling of connection of all our perceptions. This in turn generates our (rationally ungrounded) belief in the identity of our mind in time. The self here is therefore the self of Book 1 of the *Treatise*. For example, Åsa Carlson writes that "The idea of self at work in sympathy is the ordinary man's vague idea of himself as his perceptions."[32] Byoungjae Kim holds that

> I have the feeling of self-identity when reflecting on the bundle of perceptions since the vivacity of those perceptions that I have been constantly bombarded with generates the strong feeling of connection. Hence, Hume says [in the passage concerning sympathy in Book 2] that it is with 'the vivacity of conception' that "we always form the idea of our own person." (T 2.1.11.5; [SBN 318])[33]

As is often the case, the question is hard to answer, and Hume's text might be ambiguous. The passage from Book 2 quoted by Kim seems to point to Book 1 (but Hume does not actually tell us what forms the vivacity of the self in that passage). In some other passages Hume seems to think that the self of our passions and our self-concern is involved in the transfer of liveliness. When we, for example, have the same propensity for the passion we observe in others, the propensity joins "force" with the resembling passion. The conception of the passion becomes material that takes "fire from the least spark" (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354). The resemblance seems to tie the liveliness of the passion to a quality of the "passionate" self in the sense of a trait or a tendency. Because we are quick to have lively impressions of certain passions, we generate stronger liveliness of the same passions when we conceive them in others. As we will also show below, Hume claims that our self-concern is able to circumvent the conditions of sympathy and transfer affect-constituting liveliness to the emotions of people to whom we are tied we are not tied by close resemblance and contiguity but by a common interest. The least we can say concerning the question we raised is that the self of our passions, its individual features, and particular situation influences the transfer of the affect-constituting liveliness and the conditions of this transfer.

Whatever the answer is concerning the origin of the liveliness of our self in sympathy, there is not much exaggeration in saying that its affect-constituting liveliness opens a whole new *dimension* of experience with others *as others*. Without the conversion we would simply *believe* that other people feel this or that without having any immediate impression of the passion. This, if a general condition, would not prevent our mind from registering and instrumentally evaluating passions and beliefs of other people. For example, we could still register that because someone shows that he or she likes us, the probability of getting something we want from that person is higher. This conception of being liked could thus produce our joy. In this sense, we certainly are affected by others. But according to Hume, in everyday encounters of others, it is the *felt* emotion, and *not only* its utility, which affects us and produces our own responsive passions and actions. The completely unsympathetic self would experience its actions and reactions towards people, along with their conceived emotions and attitudes, as actions and reactions toward merely *useful* or *adverse*, *pleasant* or *unpleasant* matters of

fact. In such a state, we could perhaps believe that someone helps us out of the kindness of her heart, and we could feel joy or love towards the person in question since the person acts in our favor. However, we would never feel her benevolence toward ourselves and we could not feel a morally induced love for that person, since moral approval presupposes pleasure received from sympathy with a character of a person which is "naturally fitted to be useful or pleasant to others, or to the person [herself]" (T 3.3.1.30; SBN 591). In short, such persons and their emotions would be *conceived* persons, but not *affective* persons in the stricter sense of those who affect us by our feelings of their emotions.

> *The sentiments of others can never affect us*, but by becoming, in some measure, our own; in which case they operate upon us, by opposing and encreasing our passions, in the very same manner, as if they had been originally deriv'd from our own temper and disposition . . . if they went no farther than the imagination, or conception; that faculty is so accustom'd to objects of every different kind, that a mere idea, tho' contrary to our sentiments and inclinations, wou'd never alone be able to affect us. (T 3.3.2.3; SBN 593, italics mine)

To claim that affective persons play a crucial role in Hume's system is not to claim much, since this only amounts to saying that sympathy itself has such a crucial role. Still, it is important to point this out, since according to Hume, in sympathy we never conceive and feel emotions *per se*, but only in a wider (and very complex) context in which we conceive and feel emotions as qualities embodied in others. In natural sympathy, it is always the person, and never his or her emotion as such, who is closely related to ourselves. Now, since affective liveliness elevates beliefs concerning passions into felt passions, it—in this wider context—raises persons conceived by analogy to ourselves to *felt* persons. As said, such persons affect us in ways which are, for Hume, crucial and otherwise inaccessible.

We can illustrate this by the following example. Hume, as is known, holds that "man is altogether insufficient to support himself" and if left alone "drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair" (T 2.2.4.4; SBN 352). He or she thus "seeks after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits" (T 2.2.4.4; SBN 353). And the liveliest of all objects is "a rational and thinking being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind . . . and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions, which are caus'd by any object" (ibid.) A conceived passion of another human being enlivened by sympathy thus "becomes a kind of passion, and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or conception" (ibid.). This allows Hume to show why family relations, acquaintance or resemblance of tempers are so important for human life: "sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits, since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to relation, acquaintance, and resemblance" (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354).[34] In short, we need to be affected by others to avoid depression. Contact with familiar people, relatives or with people who naturally think and

act like us gives us an easy way of reaching this goal of being affected by felt minds of others. Merely conceived minds cannot help us here.

However, one might justifiably claim that, pathological cases excluded, it is impossible for our mind to populate its world with merely conceived others, just as it is impossible, due to the partial and limited nature of our sympathy, to populate it only with affective others. Any interaction with another human being already adds some affect-constituting liveliness to our ideas of others. The causal inference transferring the doxastic liveliness from the impressions of external signs already presupposes some resemblance between us and the person with whom we sympathize. This resemblance also connects that person to our self and enlivens the idea of his or her feeling. The transfer of liveliness from our self might not be strong enough to initiate a conversion of an idea into an emotion, but it still has an important role to play. In Hume's system, we are aware that people are "facts" whose feelings *can* be felt, even though we might be too far or too tired to sympathize[35]—there is always some awareness of a closer relation of such objects to our self, and of a possibility of actual sympathy with them. This *conditional sympathy* already constitutes a fundamental difference between the phenomenology of conceived persons on the one side, and conceived senseless and inanimate things on the other.

The awareness of a broader context of relations accompanying the transfer of the affect-constituting liveliness brings one more aspect into Hume's phenomenology of emotions. In the *Treatise*, Hume rather surprisingly claims that conceived others can sometimes become affective persons without being related to us by any of those particular relations enumerated by Hume in the central passages dealing with sympathy. This certainly requires further explanation.

As is known, Hume holds that matters of facts can motivate our action only by producing pleasure or pain, or their lively idea, which calls forth a motivating passion on our side. Now actions of other people as matters of fact can produce just the same. Agents can be more or less relevant to our self-interest. Because of this, as Hume points out, the affect-constituting liveliness sometimes converts the conception of the feelings of these agents into impressions of these feelings, even without any close resemblance or contiguity. This is especially clear, "when our happiness or misery have any dependance on the happiness or misery of another person, without any farther relation" (T 2.2.9.6; SBN 382–83).[36] Hume mentions the following case: "Suppose again, that two merchants, tho' living in different parts of the world, shou'd enter into copartnership together, the advantage or loss of one becomes immediately the advantage or loss of his partner, and the same fortune necessarily attends both" (T 2.2.9.6; SBN 383).

As is evident, the affect-constituting liveliness here does not (primarily) come from the relation of resemblance and contiguity with the self, but from our self-interest: "Our concern for our own interest gives us a pleasure in the pleasure, and a pain in the pain of a partner, after the same manner as by sympathy we feel a sensation correspondent to those, which appear in any person, who is present with us" (T 2.2.9.9; SBN 384). Since our interest and love share "parallel direction of the affections" (ibid.), we feel benevolence toward our business partner: "On the other hand, the same concern for our interest makes us feel a pain in the pleasure, and a pleasure in the pain of a rival; and in short the same contrariety of sentiments

as arises from comparison and malice" (T 2.2.9.9; SBN 384). It is the relation of a means to an end, that is, to our happiness, which in this case, for Hume, grounds the transfer of the affect-constituting liveliness to the conceived pain or pleasure of the rival.

Since the impressions of others are never considered simply, but always occur in the context of our broader awareness of relations, the phenomenology of felt emotions when I, for example, sympathize with my friend differs in Hume's system from the phenomenology of emotions of an otherwise unrelated, but useful business partner. The affect-constituting liveliness can come from different sides, so to speak, and the transfer of the affect-constituting liveliness is clearly constrained by different sets of conditions. Sympathy, if we still want to call it that, with my *distant* partner—whom, as Hume points out, I might never meet in person—diminishes when he or she stops being useful. Conceived emotions of a friend, when we think of him or her, usually lose their affect-constituting liveliness when he or she has been *distant* for a longer time. As regards the broader context of affect-constituting liveliness, the received emotions are of a different subtype.

However, it seems that one type of the affect-constituting transfer of liveliness need not exclude the other. Emotions of others often gain their vivacity from both sources. We are often well acquainted with people on whose actions our happiness depends. Our business partners can become our friends. Actions of our close relatives often cause our happiness or unhappiness.

It would be interesting to follow the Humean phenomenology of emotions in those situations, in which we are aware of the conflict in the background of the affect-constituting vivacity—when, for example, our brother or sister becomes a close rival in business or love. Such case studies would further showcase the value of the broader associative context as regards the transfer of affect-constituting liveliness for the interpretation of Hume's psychology of emotions.

Conclusion

We have tried to show that a broader context of associative relations, feelings, and sentiments needs to be discussed, if we want to talk about different types of impressions of sympathy and their different phenomenology in Hume's work. This allows us to get a more nuanced view of Hume's theory. We have attempted to illustrate the usefulness of this interpretative principle on three basic levels—on the level of conception to outline a possibility of differentiating our emotions from emotions of other people, on the level of doxastic vivacity or belief to discern sympathy in everyday life from sympathy in art, and on the level of affect-constituting vivacity or impressions of passions to describe how we experience felt emotions of other people and how our relation to them influence the process of sympathy.

Our analysis of Hume's theory of sympathy in the *Treatise* is by no means exhaustive. We left out sympathy mediated by inanimate objects, sympathy with imagined emotions, the broader context of sympathy in Hume's moral philosophy, and much more. It should be clear, nevertheless, that once we pay attention to the broader context of associations and feelings,

we can describe how this context determines impressions of sympathy into different types and subtypes and their respective phenomenology.

NOTES

1 This article is a result of the grant project of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic 20-02972S "Virtues Old and New: Virtue Ethics in Hume and Mandeville" realized at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences.

2 See for example Vitz, Rico "The Nature and Functions of Sympathy in Hume's Philosophy," 314–15.

3 References to the *Treatise* are to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Norton and Norton, from now on cited in text as "T" followed by Book, part, section, and paragraph numbers; and to *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Selby-Bigge, from now on cited in text as "SBN" followed by page number.

4 Here I discuss the explicit theory of the mechanism of sympathy, especially in the form described in the section "Of the love of fame." I therefore leave aside the question whether Hume, in some places, hints at a different and perhaps more direct mechanism of sympathy, as Lorenzo Greco, for example, claims; see Greco, "The Force of Sympathy in the Ethics of David Hume." I nevertheless think that the conversion of ideas into impressions is essential for all of Hume's accounts of the mechanism—in sympathy, ideas always precede impressions. See for example T 2.2.4.6–7 (SBN 354), where Hume seems to introduce a more immediate way of sympathizing, but still defends the necessity of the conversion of ideas into impressions. I also leave aside the difficult question as to what exactly Hume means when he claims our inferences from behavior to passions of other people are based on an *analogy* with the relations holding between our own body and mind.

5 Thomas Reid, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind," 198, hereafter cited in text by page number.

6 Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, 233, hereafter cited in text by page number.

7 Philip Mercer, *Sympathy and Ethics,* 35.

8 Byoungjae Kim, "Hume on the Problem of Other Minds," 17.

9 There is therefore no "emotional contagion" in the personal sense to speak of—unless we want to say that in being loved we become infected with pride. Indirect passions thus present a more complex picture of Hume's theory than Hume's usual discussions of "contagious" sympathy with direct passions of, say, joy and sadness. Concerning Hume's denial of self-love, that might seem to be a surprising claim to make, since self-love is quite often understood as a motivating force behind our self-interest. A detailed analysis and clarification of Hume's denial of the existence of self-love in relation to his theory of self-interest has been given by Jennifer Welchmann, "Self-Love and Personal Identity."

10 By basic signs we mean signs of feelings as they appear in a human countenance and bodily behavior, including speech (. . . , tone of voice), gestures, posture, and so on. In the following discussion of sympathy, we will limit our analysis to such basic signs of feelings, leaving aside other,

more mediated cases of significations of feelings by inanimate objects as they appear, for instance, in landscapes (T 2.2.9.17; SBN 388), riches (T 2.2.5; SBN 357–65), ramparts (T 2.3.10.5; SBN 450), or surgical instruments (T 3.3.1.7; SBN 576). We will also limit ourselves to simple significations of feelings that we believe or feign to be presently existing, and leave aside contra-factual cases of sympathy in which the result of sympathy almost completely depends on a general rule or on its contrast with it (see T 2.2.9.13, 2.2.7.5–6; SBN 386, 371).

11 Interpreters such as Phillip Cummins wrote detailed articles on the ontological status of qualities (Phillip Cummins, "Hume on Qualities"). Much less has been written on Hume's view of the *synchronical* multiplicity of qualities belonging to everyday phenomenal objects. Such belief is clearly implied by Hume's famous discussion of our belief concerning the continuous existence of everyday material objects in "Of Scepticism with Regard to Our Senses" (T 1.4.2).

12 It need not interest us here that the integrated perceptions themselves are not really contiguous in space, since for Hume, sweetness has no extension. For further discussion of the appearance of contiguity in space in relation to unextended perceptions, see section "Sympathy and Incorporation of Passions" below.

13 "[W]e pay no attention to the sign but to the thing signified, as in a painting it is the passion we attend to, not the particular formation of the features. Every man can tell what is the passion by which a man is affected when he sees the countenance; but he cannot tell the particular formation of the features and countenance and the gesture for to express this passion. Nature has intended that we should proceed from the features to the passions, not from the passions to the features. It is only great painters that can arrive at this." Thomas Reid, "Lectures on the Fine Arts," 31.

14 Of course, in sympathy there is not an impression replacing and confirming an idea. Instead, an idea becomes an impression.

15 Since according to Hume, we love only those qualities in others of which we would be proud ourselves, the limitations of pride are also the limitations of love. The permanent nature of a mental quality we love thus directly follows from Hume's fourth limitation of a quality of which we are proud (see T 2.1.6.7; SBN 293).

16 For example, Nelson Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense" and Terence Penelhum, "The Self of Book 1 and the Selves of Book 2."

17 Attempts at establishing this distinction from within Hume's system sometimes concentrate on Hume's account of indirect passions (see for example Robert S. Henderson's, "David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions"). Hume is indeed proud of discovering a particular group of the specifically personal passions, which have either our self (in pride and humility), or the self of other people (in love and hate) for their object (T Abs 30; SBN 660). However, indirect passions come too late to establish the basic distinction between our self and others. Objects of pride and shame have to be obvious to others (T 2.1.6.6; SBN 292) and it is hard to be proud of something other people genuinely dislike (T 2.1.11.9; SBN 320–21). Even the impression of sympathy itself seems to presuppose a self/other distinction (see Penelhum, "The Self of Book 1 and the Selves of Book 2," 286). One might further argue that the interpreters who claim that according to Hume the indirect passions somehow produce, in the strict sense, our idea of the self (for example A. O. Rorty, "'Pride produces the idea of self': Hume on moral agency") are committed to accepting that they produce our idea of another person as well. That might be true only with respect to the concept of an "affective other" discussed below in the section "Sympathy and Affective Others" in this article, but it need not be true with respect to the conception of the self/other distinction as such.

18 This, of course, does not mean that the association of my feelings with my bodily behavior is not important for the conception of the difference between myself and others, or for the constitution of the general concept of person.

19 Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 26–27.

20 That does not mean that Hume scholars ignore the mind-body relation in Hume's work. Quite the contrary. For example, both Annette Baier and Annik Waldow argue from their respective positions for the importance of human body for Hume's conception of a person or a personal mind as a mind that conceives itself as one among many. According to Baier, "to become recognizable, persons must become incarnate and in Book Two they are treated as ordinary persons of flesh and blood" (Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments*, 130). According to Waldow (*David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds*, 132–43), we can have a general *idea* of the mind, only if we understand ourselves as having a mind similar to others. This presupposes association of the ideas of our mental states or episodes (feelings, emotions, passions, volitions, and so on) with the perceptions of our bodily behavior. This association allows for a projective association of mental states with observed bodily behavior of others. Bodily behavior thus informs our general concept of the mind. However, what I suggest here is a Humean analysis of how the unextended emotions and passions could be conceived to be *in* the extended body of other persons (how they can become "incarnate"), to avoid claiming that the observed bodies of others are conceived as "physical, soulless and lifeless bodies" (Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 26) or bodily causal indicators of unextended mental states. This analysis is missing in the texts of Humean scholarship with which I am familiar. I do not analyze a related question of how, according to Hume, our own mind could be conceived as being present in its spatial body, since this also involves an analysis of Hume's view of the *first person* experience of our own body. Such discussion goes beyond the possible scope of this article.

21 In Hume's famous example (T 1.4.2.20; SBN 196), we hear a postman opening a door located *behind* us. But according to Hume, sounds do not have any spatial extension. How is it possible for Hume to explain that we nevertheless believe they come from somewhere? Hume would certainly appeal to a certain tendency of the mind to unite sound with space on account of causal relations and contiguity, even though he never presented a theory of such unification of sounds with space.

22 Following Lucretius, Hume employs this spatial contrast to explain the pleasure we might reap from the consideration of people in danger. See Gerald Postema's discussion of the "serene satisfaction of the shipwreck spectator" in his excellent article "'Cemented with Diseased Qualities': Sympathy and Comparison in Hume's Moral Psychology," 252–54.

23 As Marina Frasca-Spada noted in "Some Features of Hume's Conception of Space," 407, the manner of appearance of objects in space is for Hume the arrangement of objects in relation to the body of the perceiving subject (see T 2.3.7.2, SBN 427–28). Thus, in the second Book of the *Treatise*, the term contiguity in space does not usually refer to bodily contact of one object with another, but to the nearness of an object to ourselves.

24 Annik Waldow, *David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds*, 79.

25 I would like to thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility to me.

26 The whole situation concerning the two sources of liveliness of the sympathetic impressions reaches a new level of complexity in Hume's moral philosophy. Its discussion would exceed the scope of this inquiry.

27 Brian Kirby, "Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater," 317, 321.

28 David Hume, "Of Tragedy," in Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, 31.

29 Nicolas Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, 140.

30 Annette Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments*, 143.

31 Jane McIntyre, "Personal Identity and the Passions," 555.

32 Åsa Carlson, "There Is Just One Idea of Self in Hume's *Treatise*," 177.

33 Byoungjae Kim, "Hume on the Problem of other Minds," 16.

34 It is interesting to note that in T 2.2.4, Hume clearly treats emotions of others felt in sympathy as enlivened conceptions, while he, as far as I know, never talks about our own passions in this way (and for a good reason—see section "Sympathy and Quality" of this article).

35 A very nice example of such conditional sympathy with others, although with a different underlying mechanism of sympathy, is given by Adam Smith in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 1.1.3.4.

36 As we have said, the following arguments count in favor of viewing the affect-constituting liveliness as coming from the self "as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves."

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